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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION
R epresen tative democracy has been c a lle d  a "ch ild  o f  
peace • • • th a t  cannot l iv e  a p a rt from i t s  M other." I t  
would be more c o r r e c t  to say th a t  re p re se n ta tiv e  in s t i tu t io n s  
tend  to be bred in  tyranny, bom  in  rev o lu tio n , grow to  adol­
escence under o lig a rc h ic a l  c ircum stances, and mature in  peace. 
However, w hatever i s  the ca se , re p re se n ta tiv e  democracy must 
le a rn  to l iv e  a p a r t from peace, fo r  optimum working co n d itio n s 
a re  no longer in  s ig h t .  The ravages o f  econosiic in f la t io n ,  
d e f la t io n , and d is lo c a tio n ; the d is to r t io n s  o f  tw en tie th  cen­
tu ry  hyper-nationa lism ; the s ta rk  r e a l i t i e s  o f war o r  the 
th r e a t  o f  war and the  demands o f su rv iv a l th e re  e n ta i le d  have 
profoundly a f fe c te d  the evo lu tion  and development o f  p o l i t i c a l  
in s t i tu t io n s  in  the Western w orld . The r e s u l t  too o f te n  has 
been the c re a tio n  o f  a "perpe tual emergency" in  which s ig n i­
f ic a n t  aspects o f  the  business o f  government must be c a r r ie d  
on by ex trao rd in a ry  procedures. Consequently, a s u b s ta n tia l  
p o rtio n  o f the answer given by any n a tio n  to  the questions 
p resen ted  by the s ta rk  r e a l i t i e s  o f  ou r tiam s w i l l  be phrased
W illia m  E . Rappard, The C r is is  o f  Democracy (Chicago: 
U n iv ersity  o f  Chicago P re ss , 1938), p . 265.
2o f  n e c e ss ity  in  terms o f  the v i t a l i t y  and v ia b i l i t y  o f  th a t  
n a t io n 's  c r i s i s  i n s t i tu t i o n s .  This i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  tru e  o f  
the French n a tio n . The development o f h e r  le g a l and governmen­
t a l  in s t i tu t io n s  provides an e x c e lle n t example o f  the in t e r ­
weaving o f  ex trao rd in a ry  procedures w ith  re g u la r  procedures in  
an a ttem pt to f in d  so lu tio n s  to  emergency s i tu a t io n s .  As 
re p re se n ta tiv e  p o l i t i c a l  in s t i tu t io n s  a re  u ltim a te ly  no s tro n g e r  
than th e i r  cap ac ity  to  cope w ith  c r is e s  w hether they be w ar, 
in te rn a l  subversion , economic h y p e r- in f la tio n  o r  d e f la t io n , o r 
d is so lu to ry  co lo n ia l in s u r re c t io n , the ex ten siv e  French expe­
rien c e  i s  o f v a lu e .
The a u th o r 's  purpose i s  to  analyze th is  French experience 
and to  p lace i t  in  p roper p ersp ec tiv e  in  r e la t io n  to the evolu­
tio n  and development o f  parliam en tary  i n s t i tu t i o n s .  I t  i s  a 
prim ary th e s is  o f th is  study th a t  in s t i tu t io n s  and devices 
designed to  cope w ith  ex cep tio n a l circum stances cannot be abs­
tr a c te d  from the re g u la r  o rd e r o f  s o c ie ty . Such devices are  
in d is so lu b ly  in te rtw in ed  w ith  the p ro g ressiv e  development o f  
le g is la t iv e  and execu tive powers and depend fo r  im plem entation 
upon e s ta b lish e d  c i v i l  o f f i c i a l s  and upon re g u la r  ad m in is tra tiv e  
p rocedures. These in s t i tu t io n s  have n o t developed s u p e r f ic ia l ly  
b u t have been woven in to  the  fa b r ic  o f  the  evolving c o n s t i tu ­
t io n a l  o rd e r . At the  same tim e, i t  should be recognized th a t  
these  procedures may be e i th e r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l ,  q u a s i-c o n s titu -  
t io n a l ,  o r  e x tr a -c o n s t i tu t io n a l . A sso c ia tio n  w ith  the  c o n s t i ­
tu t io n a l  o rd er does n o t guarantee c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty .
For purposes o f  c l a r i f i c a t io n  we s h a l l  r e f ra in  from
3using  the omnibus concept " c o n s ti tu t io n a l d ic ta to rs h ip ."  As 
defined  by C lin ton  R o s s ite r , " i t  i s  a gen era l d e s c r ip tiv e  term 
f o r  the whole gamut o f  emergency powers and procedures in  
p e r io d ic a l use in  a l l  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  co u n trie s  . , . "1 I t  i s  
f e l t  th a t  th is  phrase lacks the p re c is io n  necessary  to  describe  
the in te r r e la t io n s h ip  o f  re g u la r , e x c ep tio n a l, and i r r e g u la r  
procedures th a t  p e rs o n if ie s  the in t r i n s i c  n a tu re  o f  ex cep tio n a l 
p o l i t i c a l  p ro cesses .
At the same tim e, the concept o f  t r a d i t io n a l  "emergency 
powers" i s  deemed to be too c ircum scribed . I t  ioqplies the 
ex is ten c e  o f a fundamental execu tive  a u th o rity  to  dea l w ith  
n a t io n a l c r i s e s .  German and A ustrian  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  lawyers 
have lab e led  th is  power S ta a tsn o tre c h t and have d is tin g u ish e d  
i t  from the power to determ ine the e x is ten c e  o f such a s i tu a ­
t io n  S taa tsn o tran d .  The form er i s  a question  o f law, the  
l a t t e r  i s  a  question  o f  f a c t .  C le a r ly , i t  i s  o f the essence 
o f  "emergency power" th a t  i t  cannot be c a te g o r ic a lly  d escrib ed  
o r  defined—i t s  occurence i s  e x tra o rd in a ry . I t  i s  an a c tio n  
to  be taken by th e  Executive and some d is c re tio n  i s  to  be used . 
C urren t usage recogn izes two types o f  "emergency powers":
The f i r s t  i s  to  l e t  the Government a c t  a t  i t s  own 
p e r i l  and to  leave the red re ss  o f  in su ing  c o n s t i tu ­
t io n a l  i r r e g u la r i t i e s  in  the hands o f  P arliam ent . . .
The second way o f  d ea lin g  w ith  an emergency i s  to  
provide fo r  i t  in  advance . . .  T his im plies th a t  
F rance, who i s  governed by a w r i t te n  and r ig id
Ic iin to n  S o s s i te r ,  C o n s titu tio n a l D ic ta to rsh ip  (P rin ce to n : 
P rinceton  U n iv ersity  P re s s , 1948), p .  5 . -
c o n s t i tu t io n , can only make them by in s e r t in g  an 
emergency c lau se  in  h e r C o n s ti tu t io n .!
Thus, the  concept o f "emergency powers" comprehends the  use o f
emergency c lauses inco rpo ra ted  in  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  s tru c tu re
and /o r i r r e g u la r  procedures employed w ithout the approval o f
the sovereign  L e g is la tu re , bu t i t  does n o t recognize the value
of le g itim a te  ad hoc ex tensions of the re g u la r  o rder which are
o ften  employed to  a d ju s t to  c r i s i s  s i tu a t io n s .
As a r e s u l t ,  the term " c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s "  is  coined 
and i s  enqaloyed ra th e r  than "emergency powers" o r " c o n s titu ­
t io n a l  d ic ta to rs h ip ."  I t  i s  used in terchangeab ly  w ith  " c r is i s  
d ev ices" and "excep tional powers" and encompasses c o n s t i tu t io n a l ,  
s ta tu to ry ,  customary, and i l l e g a l  procedures a v a ila b le  to  the 
L e g is la tu re  and Executive of France w ithou t sp e c if ic  l im ita ­
t io n . However, th is  does no t suggest th a t  the th ree  concep ts— 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  d ic ta to rs h ip , emergency powers, and c r i s i s  in s ­
t i t u t i o n s —are m utually  ex c lu siv e . C e rta in ly  "emergency powers" 
c o n s t i tu te  a s ig n if ic a n t  p o rtio n  o f the c o te r ie  of devices 
a v a ila b le  to  the French government under i t s  " c r is is  i n s t i t u ­
tio n s  ."  I t  i s  a lso  tru e  th a t both concepts f a l l  w ith in  the 
broad purview o f " c o n s ti tu t io n a l d ic ta to rs h ip ."  I t  may be a 
v a l id  judgment th a t  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  democracy can no longer 
l iv e  w ithout c o n s t i tu t io n a l  d ic ta to rs h ip . However, French 
experience in d ic a te s  th a t  the  a b i l i ty  o f a n a tio n  to  a d ju s t to  
an emergency, which is  a f t e r  a l l  the fundamental t e s t  o f the 
v i a b i l i t y  o f a p o l i t i c a l  system , depends upon the e f f ic a c y  of
^M arguerite A. S ie g h a r t. Government by Decree (New York: 
F red erick  A. P raeg er, I n c . ,  1950), p . 301.
5re g u la r  as w ell as emergency procedures and upon Che in te r ­
a c tio n  o f the two areas  o f governmental power. I t  i s  impos­
s ib le  fo r  a v a l id  an a ly s is  to ignore th is  in te r re la t io n s h ip  
which i s  re c ip ro c a l in  the sense th a t  the a v a i la b i l i ty  and 
e f f ic ie n c y  o f re g u la r  procedures s tru c tu re  the a rea  in  which 
emergency powers a re  req u ired , w hile the adequacy and compe­
tence o f emergency procedures have a d ir e c t  ioqpact upon evolu­
tio n  o f the re g u la r  o rd e r o f  so c ie ty .
Several monographs are  a v a ila b le  which concern them selves 
w ith  aspec ts  o f th is  problem. The most well-known c r i s i s  
in s t i tu t i o n —the s ta te  o f  s ieg e—is  d e a lt  w ith  by C lin ton  
B o ss ite r  in  h is  C o n s titu tio n a l D ic ta to rsh ip . 1948. Government 
by Decree. 1950, by M arguerite A. S ieg h a rt p resen ts  a d e ta ile d  
h is to ry  o f the use o f  the ordinance power in  France to  1946, 
and P ie rre  Renouvin, The Forms o f  War Government in  F rance, 
1927, s tu d ie s  the in s t i tu t io n s  and procedures enq>loyed by 
France in  the G reat War to combat in te rn a l  subversion and 
fo re ig n  invasion . U nfo rtuna te ly , these  s tu d ie s  p re sen t the 
problem o f c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  m erely as a secondary considera­
t io n  in  conjunction  w ith  a prim ary endeavor. For exaaqple, 
R o s s i te r 's  in v e s tig a tio n  o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  d ic ta to rsh ip  as an 
in s t i t u t i o n ,  o r  S ie g h a r t 's  development o f  the h is to ry  o f  o rd i­
nance powers in  France which i s  p resen ted  as documentation o f 
h e r  p le a  fo r  ju d ic ia l  superv is ion  over the ad m in is tra tiv e  
o rg an iza tio n  o f B r i t i s h  government. In  f a c t ,  n e i th e r  French, 
E n g lish , o r  American sch o la rsh ip  has produced an a n a ly t ic a l
6study of the development, use , and im p lica tio n s of c r i s i s  in s ­
t i tu t io n s  as exem plified  by French experience since the ancien 
regim e. I t  i s  th is  void  which th is  d is s e r ta t io n  a t te n ^ ts  to  
f i l l .  Four r e la te d  themes are  analyzed.
A continuing and p e r s is te n t  co n s id era tio n  is  the  ev o lu tio n  
o f the re la tio n sh ip  between the le g is la t iv e  and the executive 
power. As the development of re p re se n ta tiv e  government produces 
a continuous and v a r ia b le  co n fro n ta tio n  between the p r im itiv e , 
a u th o rita r ia n  n a tu re  o f the Executive and the  lim itin g  p re te n ­
sions o f the e le c te d  Assembly, the r e s u l t  of th is  c o n f l ic t  
la rg e ly  determ ines the postu re  of p o l i t i c a l  so c ie ty . The use 
of c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  takes p lace w ith in  the framework e s ta ­
b lish ed  by law as the  w i l l  of the re p re se n ta tiv e  L eg is la tu re  
and o f ordinance as the statem ent of execu tive d is c re tio n . I t  
w i l l  be dem onstrated th a t  the p ro g ressiv e  dec line  of the sup re­
macy of the law and the concurren t unw illingness o f French L egis­
la tu re s  to delegate  adequate powers to  the Executive agency has 
provided s i tu a tio n s  which were opportune fo r  the c re a tio n  and 
employment o f c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s .
A second theme i s  concerned w ith  the  v a l id i ty ,  ap p ro p ria te ­
n ess , and a p p l ic a b i l i ty  o f the various c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s .  I t  
i s  recognized th a t  th e re  is  a g re a t d is p a r i ty  between " in s t i tu ­
t io n s ."  C erta in  devices such as the s ta te  o f siege and the 
s ta te  of emergency c o n s t i tu te  ra th e r  complete emergency p roce­
dures in  themselves w hile o th e rs , such as enabling  a c ts ,  decree 
laws, and cadre laws are  b a s ic a lly  processes fo r  the c re a tio n  
o f p o licy . These methods fo r  the s im p lif ic a tio n  o f the le g is la t iv e
7process may employ re g u la r  e s ta b lish e d  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  o r 
they may be used to  develop ad hoc procedures designed to  p ro ­
vide adequate adjustm ent to  a p a r t ic u la r  problem. Each c r i s i s  
in s t i tu t i o n  has i t s  own in d iv id u a l n a tu re  and y e t each possesses 
d i s t in c t ly  s im ila r  f e a tu re s .
R elated  to  co n s id e ra tio n s  of v a l id i ty  and a p p l ic a b i l i ty  
a re  judgments regard ing  the in te r r e la t io n s h ip  o f the re g u la r , 
the  ex tra o rd in a ry , and the  i r r e g u la r  o rder o f so c ie ty . The 
normal s te reo ty p es  o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty  and u n c o n s ti tu t io n a li ty  
w i l l  be shown to  be inadequate . There appears to  e x i s t  an a rea  
fo r  the expansion o f a u th o r ity  w ith in  the scope of the  reg u la r  
o rd er in  France. As in te rp r e ta t io n  plays a s ig n i f ic a n t  ro le  
in  the ev o lu tio n  o f any p o l i t i c a l  so c ie ty , i t  i s  suggested 
re p re se n ta tiv e  governments must look to  the p ro g ress iv e  e lab o ra ­
tio n  o f th e i r  re g u la r  in s t i tu t io n s  as w ell as to  excep tiona l 
c r i s i s  devices and i r r e g u la r  procedures fo r  the development of 
procedures adequate to  the defense of the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd e r.
A fo u rth  theme is  the  impact of the employment o f  c r i s i s  
in s t i tu t i o n s  upon governmental forms in  France. U nfortunately , 
th e re  i s  no c le a r -c u t  judgment th a t  can be drawn. In  c e r ta in  
in s tan ces  the use of c r i s i s  powers w il l  appear to  s u s ta in  rep ­
re s e n ta t iv e  government and in  o th e r in stan ces to  destro y  c o n f i­
dence in  l ib e r a l  dem ocratic p rocedures. I t  does appear, how­
ev e r, th a t  the continued use o f such devices dim inishes the respon­
s i b i l i t y  o f  re p re se n ta tiv e  in s t i tu t io n s  as w e ll as p u b lic  con­
fidence in  them.
8A study o f th is  ty p e , o f  n e c e s s ity , c u ts  across the 
h i s t o r i c a l - p o l i t i c a l  landscape and makes use o f  p e r t in e n t e le ­
ments from a  v a r ie ty  o f  r e la te d  su b je c ts :  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  law,
p u b lic  law , ad m in is tra tiv e  procedure, h is to ry ,  and contemporary 
p o l i t i c a l  p ra c t ic e .  As " c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s "  a re  to a g re a te r  
o r  l e s s e r  degree the concern o f  a l l  n a tio n s , th i s  study i s  
r e la te d  to  the com parative study o f p o l i t i c a l  system s. I t  
employs sem antic devices fo r  c la s s i f ic a t io n s —re p re s e n ta tiv e , 
assem bly, ex ecu tiv e , p a rliam en ta ry , c a b in e t, p erso n a l—w ith  
the r e a l iz a t io n  th a t  such term inology can s t u l t i f y  and becloud 
r a th e r  than c l a r i f y ,  y e t a lso  in  the firm  conv ic tion  th a t  i t  i s  
the duty o f the a n a ly s t to  d is t in g u is h , to  la b e l ,  and to  c la s ­
s i f y .  For w ithou t c r i t e r i a  and method o f id e n t i f ic a t io n ,  th e re  
can be no comparison—fo r  a l l  i s  one and one i s  a l l .  F in a lly , 
the au tho r has in troduced , where ap p ro p ria te , h is  own judgments 
as to  th e  im pact, s ig n if ic a n c e , and meaning o f in s t i tu t io n s  and 
e v e n ts .
CHAPTER I I
THE EMERGING CONFLICT BETWEEN ORDINANCE AND lAW
The French n a tio n  I s  an e x c e lle n t example o f  the s t r e s s  
under which re p re se n ta tiv e  government has been p laced . While 
h e r  experience i s  d is t in c t iv e  and cannot be used as the so le  
b a s is  f o r  meaningful g e n e ra liz a tio n s , the development o f  
French le g a l  and p o l i t i c a l  in s t i tu t io n s  do o f f e r  v a l id  in s ig h ts  
in to  the need fo r  c r i s i s  i n s t i tu t i o n s ,  th e  methodology o f  th e i r  
a p p lic a tio n , and the l im its  o f  th e i r  u se fu ln e ss .
Few i f  any would d isp u te  A e  f a c t  th a t  French h is to ry  
i s  a chronology o f em ergencies. S ince the Revolution o f 1789, 
France has au th en tica ted  s ix te e n  d if f e r e n t  c o n s titu tio n s  em­
bodying a  v a r ie ty  o f  governmental form s. Before the e s ta b l is h ­
ment o f  th e  F if th  R epublic, French p o l i t i c s  e A ib i te d  a t  l e a s t  
th ree  d iv e rg en t tendencies which t r a d i t io n a l ly  have been 
designated  as Republicanism, Monarchism, and Bonapartism.
For a n a ly t ic a l  purposes these  d is t in c t io n s  are  somewhat in ­
a p p ro p ria te . P rec is io n  d ic ta te s  (1) the fusion  o f  the second 
and th i r d  tendencies in to  a category  th a t  p roperly  may be 
c a lle d  E xecutive government and (2) the reco g n itio n  o f the  
d iffe re n c e  between Assembly and C abinet government as d ivergen t
9
10
stream s w ith in  the  Republican t r a d i t io n .
Through the  years s in ce  1789 the ev o lu tio n  and develop­
ment o f French p o l i t i c s  has given spasmodic b u t re c u rre n t 
b i r th  to  each o f  these  th ree  d iv e rse  c u r re n ts .  I n i t i a l l y  a 
rev o lu tio n ary  c u r re n t le d  to  government by Assembly—to d ic ­
ta to rs h ip  by the l e g i s la tu r e .  In  re a c tio n  to  the omnipotence 
o f  the Assembly a p re s id e n t ia l  and Im peria l c u rre n t developed. 
I t  tended to  s tren g th en  the ad m in is tra tiv e  branch o f the gov­
ernment and lead  to  d ic ta to rs h ip  o f  the E xecu tive . A th i r d ,  
perhaps the b e s t  known and le a s t  understood o f the  c u r re n ts , 
developed as a  re a c tio n  ag a in s t the  excesses o f  Assembly and 
Executive d ic ta to rs h ip  and emerged as mixed govermnent—the 
Parliam entary  o r  C abinet system .
When viewed as a sporad ic continuum. I t  appears th a t  
France has experienced two c o n s t i tu t io n a l  cy c les  s in ce  the 
ancien regim e. The f i r s t  began w ith  th e  C o n stitu en t Assembly 
o f 1789 and ended w ith  the Revolution o f 1848. Though the 
C o n stitu en t s t i l l  adhered to the Monarchy, I t  I n i t i a te d  the 
p rocess o f  subord inating  the  executive power rep resen ted  by 
the King and h is  M in is te rs  to  I t s  own power and re a l iz e d  th i s  
aim In  the  C o n s titu tio n  o f  1791. Assembly government became 
fu ll-b low n  when the  L e g is la tiv e  Assembly o f  1791 superseded 
Louis XVI from h is  fu n c tio n s , and the Convention o f 1792 
abo lished  the Monarchy and In s tig a te d  through I t s  committees 
the  Reign o f T e rro r . In  1795 a  moderate re a c tio n  s e t  In 
which led  to the  D ire c to r ia l  C o n s titu tio n  o f th e  sasm year
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w ith  I t s  emphasis upon se p a ra tio n  o f powers in  bo th  the exec­
u tiv e  and le g is la t iv e  b ranches, As th i s  c o l le g ia l  execu tive  
was d is c re d ite d  and i t s  rev o lu tio n a ry  elem ents gained the 
upper hand, France tu rned  again  to  a  v i r t u a l  d ic ta to rs h ip  o f  
the Executive under the C onsulate and the  Em pire. With the 
f a l l  o f  the f i r s t  Napoleon from power in  1814 th e re  follow ed 
the Bourbon R esto ra tio n  under a  C h arte r o f  the  same y ea r and 
the O rle a n is t  ascension  under the C h arte r o f  1830 which 
in troduced  a v a r ie ty  o f  C abinet governments which p rev a iled  
u n t i l  1848.
The second cyc le  commences w ith  the  R evolution o f  1848 
which rev iv ed  fo r  a  sh o r t p e rio d  th e  id e a ls  o f  1789. A 
C o n s titu en t Assenibly was e le c te d  by u n iv e rsa l su ffrag e  and 
i t  proclaim ed a  dem ocratic R epublic . The P re s id e n t ia l  system  
e n ta i le d  in  the c o n s t i tu t io n  vo ted  by th i s  Assembly was one 
o f  F ra n c e 's  most dem ocratic; y e t ,  w ith in  fo u r  y ears  i t  was 
p e rv e rted  by a P re s id e n t pledged to  i t s  continuance and the 
second Bonaparte le d  France to  a f u l l  d ic ta to rs h ip  o f  the 
E xecu tive . The t r a n s i t io n  to  P arliam en tary  government and 
the consequent com pletion o f  the  second cy c le  was achieved 
in  the  l a s t  saonths o f  th e  Second Eiqpire (C o n s titu tio n  o f May 
21, 1870) and p e rp e tra te d  in  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  laws o f  the 
T hird  Republic (C o n s titu tio n a l Laws o f  February 25, 1875) and 
the  C o n s titu tio n  o f  th e  F ourth  Republic (C o n s titu tio n  o f 
October 27, 1946). Thus, the ev o lu tio n  o f  governmental forms 
tw ice went f u l l  c i r c le  from Assembly to  E xecutive d ic ta to rs h ip
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to  C abinet g o v ern æ n t. For the  moment the  development la  
completed by the cu rio u s amalgam o f  P arliam entary  and P re s i­
d e n t ia l  forms c a lle d  the De G aulle R epublic .^
To d ea l w ith  re c u rre n t c r i s i s  w hether i t  be w ar, i n t e r ­
n a l subversion , economic h y p e r - in f la tio n  o r  d e f la t io n , o r  d is ­
so lu to ry  c o lo n ia l in s u r re c t io n , France has tu rned  again and 
again  to  the  use o f  c r i s i s  i n s t i tu t i o n s .  For the  most p a r t  
these  in s t i tu t io n s  d id  n o t develop s u p e r f ic ia l ly  o u ts id e  the  
fa b r ic  o f  the law. They have tended to  be woven in to  the 
evolving c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd e r . France has been a m aster a t  
in terw eaving the ex tra o rd in a ry  w ith  the  re g u la r  in  attem pts 
to  f in d  adequate so lu tio n s  to  emergency s i tu a t io n s ;  neverthe­
l e s s ,  no g re a t  consistency  has developed. A s p e c if ic  c r i s i s  
in s t i tu t i o n  may vary  in  leg itim acy  from p re c ise  c o n s t i tu t io n ­
a l i t y  to  q u a s i-c o n s t i tu t io n a li ty  to  p se u d o -c o n s titu tio n a lity ; 
in  procedure , from s tra in e d  fo rm a lity  to  loose in fo rm a lity ; 
and in  a p p lic a tio n , from so le  dependence upon normal and reg ­
u la r  techniques to  ^  hoc innovations in  th e  realm  o f the i r ­
re g u la r .
C r is is  in s t i tu t io n s  involve th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f form al 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  procedures, s ta tu to ry  law s, and th e  reg u la to ry  
power. T heir a p p lic a tio n  has fre q u en tly  involved d e leg a tio n s  
o f  l e g is la t iv e  competence »s w ell as expansions o f  the
^This term i s  employed to  v e rb a liz e  the  im pact o f  th is  
ch a rism atic  le a d e r  upon tne Republic o f  h is  c re a t io n . P h il ip  
W illiam s and M artin H arriso n , Pe G aulle*s Republic (London: 
Longman's, 1960), pp . 212-13. .
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a u th o r ity  o f  the E xecu tive . Aa a r e s u l t ,  excep tional proce­
dures have come in to  c o n f l ic t  w ith  th e  e s ta b lish e d  p r in c ip le s  
o f  French p u b lic  law.
An e s s e n t ia l  te n e t o f  p u b lic  law in  France i s  the con­
cep t o f  so v e re ig n ty . Rousseau, the  s p i r i tu a l  fa th e r  o f the 
C o n s titu tio n  o f  1791, regarded popular sovere ign ty  as in a l ie n ­
ab le and s tre s s e d  the n e c e ss ity  o f  ex e rc is in g  i t  d ir e c t ly  
w ithou t re p re se n ta tio n  o r d e leg a tio n . He id e n t i f ie d  th is  sov­
e re ig n ty  w ith  the vo lon té  g én é ra le . y e t he would only recognize 
a  d i r e c t  deaocracy as proper form fo r  the  ex e rc ise  o f  the 
le g is la t iv e  power. In  seeming in c o n sis ten cy , however, he ap­
proved o f  d e leg a tio n s  to  the ad m in is tra tiv e  o f f ic e r s  fo r  the 
e x e rc ise  o f  the  execu tive  power. In te r e s t in g ly ,  w ith  one ex­
ce p tio n , no French c o n s ti tu t io n  has attem pted to  in troduce a 
d i r e c t  democracy fo r  the ex e rc ise  o f  o rd in ary  le g is la t iv e  
powers, though re fe ren d a  and p le b is c i te s  have been rep ea ted ly  
used as a  form o f approval fo r  changes in  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  form. 
On the  whole the system o f in d ir e c t  re p re se n ta tio n  has been 
accepted as th e  only  workable one throughout the French con­
s t i tu t io n a l  h is to ry  in  the  modem e r a .
In  a system o f  pub lic  law founded upon sovere ign ty , 
s ta tu te  law i s  the c le a r e s t  m an ife s ta tio n  o f the w i l l  o f  
re p ré se n ta n t o f  the sovereign : the L e g is la tu re  which draws
i t s  leg itim acy  from u n iv e rsa l su ffra g e . I t  follow s th a t  the 
proper e x e rc ise  o f  th is  a u th o rity  must be in i t i a t e d  through 
the law ( l o i ) .  This type o f reaso n in g , ded icated  as i t  i s  to  
fo rm a lity  and co n s is ten cy , i s  th e  source o f  what Duguit
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properly  has id e n t i f ie d  as the f a n ta s t ic  worship o f s t a tu t  
( s ta tu te  law ). ^
Thus, in  i t s  t r a d i t io n a l  and c la s s ic  fo rm u la tio n , law 
( l o i ) i s  an expression  o f the general w il l  (v o lo n té  g én é ra le ) . 
I t  emanates from a sovereign Parliam ent and i s  the  fundamental 
le g a l form (rè g le  suprême) su p e rio r to  reg u la to ry  a u th o r i ty .% 
Law is  the i n i t i a l  and uncond itiona l a c t .  R egulation ( rè g le ­
ment) i s  the a c t o f execution which is  subord inate  and condi­
t io n a l  (ac te  de puissance su b a lte rn e ) . ^ I t  may be t r u e ,  as 
C arré de Malberg suggests^ and M. P. Durand r e c a l l s ,^  th a t  
th e re  is  no d iffe ren ce  in  substance between the  co n ten t o f law 
and reg u la tio n  and th a t  the two are u n ited  in  forming the 
reg u la r  o rder of the s ta te .^  N evertheless, the law has the
^Léon D uguit, Law in  the Modem S ta te  (New York: B. W.
Huebsch, 1919), p . 68.
^Jacques de Soto, "La lo i  e t  le  règlem ent dans la  con­
s t i tu t io n  du 4 octobre 1958," Revue du D ro it P u b lic . IXKV 
(M arch-April, 1959), p . 244.
^By paraphrasing the th i r d  A rtic le  of the C o n s titu tio n  o f 
February 25, 1875, De Malberg has developed a u se fu l philosophy 
o f the reg u la to ry  power: " . . .  Regulation i s  an a c t  of
subord inate  power which can be acconq>lished only under the 
g enera l s ta tu to ry  o rder c rea ted  by the laws . . .  To execute 
the laws, such i s  the only and in v a ria b le  province o f the regu­
la to ry  power." C arré de Malberg, C ontribu tion  à l a  th é o rie  
générale  de l 'E t a t  ( P a r is : L ib ra ir ie  de la  S o c ié té  du R ecueil
S irey , l920-22), p . 334.
4 lb id .
^M. P. Durand, "La décadence de la  lo i  dans la  C o n stitu ­
tio n  de la  V® République," J u r is  C lasseur P é rio d iq u e . 1959, 
1470.
^De Soto, LXRV, p . 244.
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cap ac ity  s t a t e  t a i r e —the c a p ac ity  to  nake re g u la tio n s . Con­
seq u en tly , fo r  c la s s ic a l  ju risp ru d en ce  the  law i s  sovereign 
and re g u la tio n  i s  su b o rd in a te . In  theory  French p u b lic  law 
has c le a r ly  d is tin g u ish e d  the  le g is la t iv e  power (pouvoir lé g i s ­
l a t i f ) to  make the  law ( lo i )  from th e  execu tive  power to  make 
ordinances and re g u la tio n s  (pouvoir rég lem en ta ire  ) . In  p rac­
t i c e ,  however, th e  f ro n t ie r s  o f  the law and ordinance o v e rla p , 
and though French ju risp ru d en ce  and d o c trin e  has s tru g g led  
m ig h tily  to  remain f a i th f u l  to  the i s f l i c a t i o n  o f  l e g is la t iv e  
sovere ign ty—the preem inence, the  primacy o f th e  law—in  
a c tu a l f a c t  long ev o lu tio n  and compromise has d ilu te d  i f  n o t 
negated th i s  p r in c ip le .
The gen era l a u th o r ity  to  make re g u la tio n s  in  the execu- 
tio n  o f  the  laws has developed p ro g re ss iv e ly  in  France s in ce  
the  R evolution . However, t h i s  development has been anything 
b u t c le a r  and p re c is e .  The C o n s titu tio n  o f  1791, based on 
the axioms o f  the  sovere ign ty  o f the  people and the se p a ra tio n  
o f  powers, con ferred  the le g i s la t iv e  power upon a re p re se n ta ­
t iv e  assembly and w ithheld  from the E xecutive any r ig h t  to  
make g en era l ru le s  in  the  execu tion  o f the law s. The C o n sti­
tu e n t Asseod>ly issu ed  the necessary  re g u la tio n s  ( In s tru c tio n s  
d é ta i l lé e s )  fo r  the  execution  o f  o rgan ic  laws which i t  had
passed and delegated  th i s  a u th o r ity  to  the  L e g is la tiv e  Assembly
2which succeeded i t .  However, the  coiqplete la ck  o f  o rd a in in g  
k b i d . .  m v ,  p . 245.
^A. Esmein and Henry Hézard, Elém ents De ] ^ i t  C o n s titu ­
tio n n e l (8 th  é d .;  P a r is :  R ecueil S ire y , 1927), - I I ,  p . 77.
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power led  to  inadequate c o n tro l because the L eg is la tiv e  
Assembly and i t s  committees found i t  im possible to  deal w ith  
a l l  ad m in is tra tiv e  d e ta i l s .  To combat th is  s i tu a t io n ,  the 
a u th o rity  of the King to  issu e  proclam ations^ was used to 
sp ec ify  d e ta ile d  reg u la tio n s  fo r  the implementation o f s ta tu te  
law, thus p e rv e rtin g  executive a u th o r ity  and re s u lt in g  in  the 
embryonic growth o f a lim ite d  o rdain ing  power recognized as 
capable of in te rp re t in g  th e  in te n t  o f s ta tu te s  and implement­
ing  th is  in te n t  through d e ta ile d  re g u la tio n s .
This type o f problem did  n o t a r is e  during the re ig p  o f 
the  Convention as a l l  p re ro g a tiv e s , both executive and le g is ­
la t iv e ,  were co n cen tra ted  in  the hands o f the Assembly. How­
ev er, w ith  the sepa,ration o f powers under the D ire c to r ia l  
C o n s titu tio n  o f the  Year I I I  (1795), the problem re a s se r te d  
i t s e l f .  A rt ic le  144 of th is  document s ta te d  c le a r ly  th a t :
" I t  ( th e  D irec to ry ) can make proclam ations conforming to  the 
laws fo r  th e i r  e x e c u t i o n . T h e  in te n t  was to provide the 
Executive w ith  a u th o r ity  to  issu e  ordinances in  the execution
^C o n stitu tio n  de 3 septembre 1791, T itre  I I I ,  ch. i v . ,  
s e c t .  1, a r t .  6: "Le pouvoir e x é c u tif  ne peut f a i r e  aucune
lo i ,  même p ro v is o ire , mais seulem ent des proclam ations con­
formes aux lo is  pour en ordonner ou rap p e le r  l 'e x é c u t io n ."
Léon Duguit and Henry Mbnnier ( e d s . ) .  Les C o n s titu tio n s ,
(P a r is :  L ib ra ir ie  généra le  de d ro i t  e t  de ju risp ru d en c e , 1925),
p. 96.
9 "C o n stitu tio n  du 5 F ru c tid o r An I I I , "  Léon Duguit and 
Henry Monnier ( e d s .) .  Les C o n s ti tu t io n s , p . 96.
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o f the  l«r and com pletely subord inate  to  the la s  in  both  l e t t e r  
and s p i r i t . 1 N everthe less, the D irec to ry  issu ed  ordinances in  
th e  form o f proclam ations and in  the  form o f departm ental 
decrees fa r r ê t é s ) , as v e i l  as ord inances based upon sp e c ia l 
d e leg a tio n s  from P arliasm nt and ord inances f o r  which no le g a l 
b a s is  seemed to  e x i s t .^  This l a s t  type d e a lt  w ith  the organ­
iz a t io n  o f the pub lic  se rv ic e s  and w ith  m atte rs  o f p o lic e .
T his power to  provide by ordinance fo r  the  o rg an iza tio n  o f the 
ad m in is tra tiv e  machine and fo r  th e  maintenance o f the p u b lic  
o rd e r formed an e s s e n t ia l  elem ent o f  s ta te  power which was 
o r ig in a l ly  considered  to  be p a r t  o f  the imperium. I t  i s  b e s t 
understood as a remnant o f  ab so lu te  government which surv ived  
in  England in  the form o f the  p re ro g a tiv e  ord inance, and in  
France in  the fozm o f  the règlem ent autonome.*^  Though on occa­
s io n  the  source o f a u th o r ity  fo r  the  re g u la tio n  was dubious, 
i t  was most s ig n i f ic a n t  th a t  during th i s  p erio d  none o f th ese  
o rd in an ces, whether based on the  power to  issu e  p roclam ations, 
on s p e c ia l d e leg a tio n s from P arliam en t, on standing  as rè g le ­
ments autonomes. attem pted to  suspend o r  to  rep ea l any e x i s t ­
ing  law .4
Ihe C o n s titu tio n  o f the  Year V III  (1799) which e s ta b lish e d
E sm ein  and Nézard, I I ,  p . 77.
^M arguerite A. S ie g h a rt, Government by Decree (New York: 
F red e rick  A. P raeger I n c . ,
^ Ib id . .  pp . 257-58.
4 lb id . .  p . 253.
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the C oatttlate c le a r ly  defined  what has become known in  more 
recen t tim es as the o rdain ing  power o f  the C hief o f  S ta te  o f  
France ( le  pouvoir rég lem en ta ire  da chef de l 'E t a t ï • The 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  form ulation  i s  sK>st p re c ise  (A r tic le  44):
"The Government proposes the  laws and makes the ru le s  neces­
sa ry  to  assu re  th e i r  execution  ( f a i t  le a  règlem ents n éc essa ire s  
pour a s su re r  le u r  ex écu tio n ). ^ When you add to  th is  the  r e s ­
p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  the Govemsmnt fo r  the in te rn a l  s a fe ty  and ex­
te rn a l  defense o f the country  (A rtic le  4 7 ),^  i t  i s  ev id en t 
th a t  a t  th is  p o in t the  Government was conceded a  g en e ra l power 
over a l l  p o lic e  fo rc e s ; a power to is su e  ordinances dea ling  
w ith  p o lic e  m a tte rs ; and the  a u ^ r i t y  to  organize the m il i­
ta ry  fo rces  by execu tive o rd inance . C o n s titu tio n a l procedure 
i s  becoming more re f in e d , b u t the scope o f  a u th o rity  i s  n o t 
new i f  one considers A r t ic le  144 o f  the C o n s titu tio n  o f  the 
Tear I I I  and the aforem entioned règlem ents autonomes.
When seeking o u t a c o n s is te n t p a t te rn ,  i t  i s  c ru c ia l  to  
no te th a t  the ord inances issu ed  under A r t ic le s  47 and 48, the 
l a t t e r  o f  which e n tru s ts  the Eaaemtive w ith  the o rg an iza tio n  
o f the garde n a t i o n a l e were n o t designed as o rd inances " in
^"C onstitu tion  du 22 F rim aire  An V III ,"  Duguit and 
Monnier ( e d s .) .  Les C o n s titu tio n s . p . 123.
^"Le Gouvernement p o u rv o it à  l a  sû re té  in té r ie u r e  e t  
à l a  défense e x té r ie u re  de l 'E t a t ;  i l  d is t r ib u e  le s  fo rces  
de te r r e  e t  de mer, e t  en rè g le  l a  d ire c t io n ."  I b id . . p . 124.
^"La garde n a tio n a le  en a c t iv i t é  e s t  soumise aux rè g le ­
ments d?adm in istra tion  pub lique; l a  garde n a tio n a le  sé d en ta ire  
n 'e s t  soumise q u 'à  l a  l o i . "  I b id .
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execution of the law" meant to  f i l l  in  the m inutiae no t reg ­
u la te d  by s ta tu te ,  but were règlem ents autonomes which la id  
down genera l ru le s  w ithout any s p e c ia l s ta tu to ry  b a s is . Of 
course they were circum scribed  in  terms of th e i r  su b je c t mat­
t e r  in  th a t they d e a lt  e i th e r  w ith  p o lice  m atters o r w ith  the 
o rg an iza tio n  o f the pub lic  s e rv ic e s . But c ircu m scrip tio n  is
o f l i t t l e  value h e re . The F i r s t  Consul, l a te r  to  be Consul
1 2 fo r  l i f e  and u ltim a te ly  Emperor, a lo n e , to  the exclusion  of
the L e g is la tu re , could i n i t i a t e  the laws. He appointed and
dism issed the M in isters  of S ta te  who were resp o n sib le  d i r e c t ly
to  him. Under A rt ic le s  44, 47, and 48 he provided fo r  the
pub lic  s a fe ty  and the defense o f the realm ; the m il i ta ry
estab lishm en t was su b je c t to  h is  o rdain ing  power; and the
C o n s titu tio n  could be suspended by h is  o rder in  the p lace and
fo r  the time he deemed necessary  in  case o f danger to  the
3
se c u r ity  o f the s ta te .
The S^natus- co n su lt o f A u ^ s t  2, 1802 proclaim ed Napoleon 
to  be Consul fo r  l i f e ,  and the  Senatus- co n su lt o f August 4 , 1802 
adapted the C o n s titu tio n  to  th e  requirem ents of the  l i f e -c o n s u la te  
and a t  the same time in v ested  the Senate w ith  d ic t a to r i a l  powers 
in  time o f emergency. These emergency powers inc luded : (1)
Suspend fo r  f iv e  years the fu n c tio n  o f departm ental co u rts  where 
these  measures a re  n ecessary ; (2) D eclare when and where these  
emergency s i tu a t io n s  e x i s t ;  (3 ) Determine the time in  which in d i­
v id u a ls  a r re s te d  in  v ir tu e  o f A r t ic le  46 o f the C o n s titu tio n  
("consp iracy  a g a in s t the s ta te " )  w i l l  be brought befo re  t r ib u n a ls ;  
(4 ) Annul the d ec isio n s o f tr ib u n a ls  when they c o n s t i tu te  a th re a t  
to  the  s e c u r ity  o f the  S ta te ;  (5 ) D issolve the Corps l é g i s l a t i f  
and the  T rib u n a t: (6) Name th e  Consuls. I b id . , pp. 131-40.
^The Sénatus- c o n su lt o f May 18, 1804 bestowed the  d ig n ity  
o f Eaq>eror upon Napoleon Bonaparte and e n tru s te d  him w ith  the 
Government o f France. I b id . , pp. 144-66.
^ A rtic le  92 o f the Proclam ation o f December 13, 1799:
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As Napoleon moved toward despotism  he tram pled upon the  
eaqsectatlons o f  h is  c o lla b o ra to r , the Abbe Siéyès* Sié^yès 
had env isioned  an executive power th a t  p e rso n if ie d  ac tio n  and 
a government which provided th o u g h tfu l a s s is ta n c e  and adm itted 
d e l ib e ra tio n . Following Boulay de l a  Meurthe and Roederer he 
had proposed a  supreme e le c t iv e  m a g is tra te , a  Proclam ateur- 
E le c to r  o r  G rand-E lecteur^to  assu re  harmony between the 
branches o f  government. To avoid anarchy on the one hand and 
despotism  on the o th e r , he had inven ted  A e  form ula: "Le
pouvoir v ien d ra  d*en h a u t, e t  l a  confiance d 'e n  b a s ."% As 
France moved to  a u th o r ita r ia n  and c e n tra liz e d  government under 
the F i r s t  Empire, the i n i t i a l  segment o f  th i s  fo rm ulation  be­
came r e a l i t y  b u t the coun terbalance, the confidence from be­
low, was s t i l l - b o r n .  The p u b lic  was allowed to  express i t s  
approval only  in  the form o f  l i s t e s  de confiance which were 
b u t l i s t s  o f  n o tab les  from which the  Senate (S^nat Conserva-
"In the  case o f  armed r e v o l t ,  o r  o f  tro u b le s  which menace th e  
s e c u r ity  o f  the  S ta te ,  the law can suspend, in  th e  p lace  and 
fo r  th e  time which s h a l l  be determ ined, th e  ascendancy o f  the  
C o n s titu tio n . TU.S suspension can be p ro v is io n a lly  dec lared  
in  th i s  type o f c a se , by an arrfetè o f  Government, the Corps 
lA g ia ln t if  being  in  re c e s s , provided th e  Corps i s  convoked 
w ith in  a  sh o r t time by an a r t i c l e  o f  the  same a rrA té ."  I b id . . 
p . 129.
^F e lix  P b n te il ,  Hyw.ldon I«y e t  
t a i r e  de l a  France (P a r is :  L ib r a ir ie  Armand C o lin , 1956),
pp. Ï6-Ï1, .
2 lb id .
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te u r)^  o r  the  Government chose m in is te rs , l e g i s la to r s ,  ad­
m in is tr a to r s ,  members o f  th e  Council o f  S ta te  (C onseil d- 
E t a t ) .^  and members o f  th e  Court o f C assation  (Cour de cas- 
s a t io n ) .^  The r ig h t  o f  su ffrag e  vas thus p e rv e rted  and con­
v e r te d  in to  a  r ig h t  o f  p re s e n ta tio n .^
"Confidence from belov" v as im portant to  Boniqsarte in
^"Le Sénat e s t  un grand corps v id e , sans v ie ,  sans con­
ta c t  avec l 'e x t é r i e u r ,  d 'u n  formalisme tw s  s t r i c t .  Maté- 
riellesÊBnt e t  moralement, i l  e s t  f a ib le .  A r t i f i c i e l  e t  p ré­
c a i r e ,  i l  ne t i e n t  pas se s  pouvoirs de l a  n a tio n  e t  ne rep ré ­
sen te  pas le s  v ra ie s  fo rc e s  n a t io n a le s . . .  I l  n 'a  pas de 
ra c in e s  dans l a  t r a d i t io n  p o li t iq u e  f ra n ç a is e s . I l  e s t  l ' ­
oeuvre d 'un  th é o r ic ie n , qu i ne correspond pas à  1^e s p r i t  
p u b lic ."  P o n te il ,  p . 32.
^The Council o f  S ta te  i s  charged "de ré d ig e r  le s  p ro je ts  
de lo i s  e t  l e s  règlem ents d 'a d m in is tra tio n  pu b liq u e , e t  de 
résoudre le s  d i f f i c u l t é s  qu i s 'é lè v e n t  en m atiè re  adm in istra­
t iv e ."  (A r tic le  52 o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f the Tear V II I .)
I t  i s  s i ^ i f i c a n t  th a t  in  i t s  second p a r t ,  th i s  A rt ic le .p ro v ­
id es  the  b a s is  fo r  the a d m in is tra tiv e  ju r i s d ic t io n  o f the 
Council o f  S ta te  in  modem tim es. E agu it and Honnier ( e d s .) ,  
p . 124.
^The Court o f C assa tion  (Cour de c a ssa tio n )  i s  above a l l  
o th e r  la v  co u rts  o f  c i v i l  and crim inaT ju r i s d ic t io n .  I t  con­
s i s t s  o f  c rim in a l and c i v i l  chambers. In  French le g a l theo ry , 
the fu n c tio n  o f  the Cour de ca ssa tio n  i s  lim ite d  to  c a ssa tio n — 
th a t  i s ,  the s e t t in g  asidSTor judgments fo r  e r ro r s  o£ lav  
appearing in  the opin ion o f  the co u rt belov , and r e fe r r in g  the  
case fo r  f in a l  determ ination  to  an a p p e lla te  c o u r t o th e r  than 
th a t  v h ich  re fe r re d  the judlgmant. Hovever, i f  a f t e r  the Cour 
de c a ssa tio n  s e ts  a s id e  a  judgm ent, the d ec is io n  o f  the second 
lo v e r  c o u r t i s  challenged  again  on the  same le g a l  grounds as 
b e fo re , th e  case must be decided in  i f  reu n ies  ( a t
l e a s t  th i r ty - f iv e  members being  p re s e n t) ,  A d ec is io n  s e t t in g  
a s id e  a  j u d j ^ n t  a  second tim e i s  b inding  on the is su e  o f  lav  
invo lved , and the  a p p e lla te  c o u r t to  vh ich  the case i s  then 
remanded must fo llo v  the  la v  o f  the case thus e s ta b lish e d  ^  
th e  Cour de c a s s a tio n . René David and Henry P . De V rie s , The 
French Legal Avstem (Hev York; Oceania P u b lic a tio n s , 1958), 
p « 3 5 . '  -
^ S ieg h a rt, p . 167.
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h is  va in  search  fo r  leg itim acy , b u t he d id  n o t equate co n fi­
dence w ith  meaningful re p re se n ta tio n  fo r  the  p opu la tion . The 
re p re se n ta tiv e  organs were d iv ided  in to  two chambers: the
T ribunate (T rib u n a t) . which was resp o n sib le  fo r  the i n i t i a l  
d iscu ssio n  o f le g is la t io n ,  and the Corps l é g i s l a t i f , which 
was resp o n sib le  fo r  the confirm ation  o r  r e je c t io n  o f p ro je c ts  
o f law. The Corns l é g i s l a t i f  was denied th e  r ig h t  o f  i n i t i a ­
t iv e ,  amendment, o r form al d iscu ss io n . I t  vo ted  in  s e c re t  
and was req u ired  to  make i t s  d ec ision  upon p re se n ta tio n s  p re s ­
en ted  to  i t  by the Tribunatre and the Govemsmnt. When one 
considers th a t  the r e c a lc i t r a n t  T ribunate was s p lin te re d  in to  
se c tio n s  and was forbidden to  smet in  g en era l session  and th a t  
the sess io n s  o f  the Corps l é g i s l a t i f  were exceedingly b r i e f ,  
i t  becomes in c reas in g ly  c le a r  th a t  the le g is la t iv e  organ was 
fragmented and rendered im potent.
The unique and most s ig n if ic a n t  in s t i tu t io n  o f th i s  e ra  
was the S enate . This lu r ie  c o n s t i tn t io n a ir e  o f Si6y6s was 
comprised o f n o tab les e le c te d  fo r  l i f e  terms and debarred from 
any o th e r  pub lic  fu n c tio n s . I t  was in tru s te d  w ith  the guard­
ian sh ip  o f the C o n s titu tio n  and in v ested  w ith  the coaq>etence 
to  annul a l l  a c ts  p resen ted  to  i t  by th e  L e g is la tu re . The 
S e n a te 's  p o s itio n  as a r b i t e r  o f  the s e c u r ity  o f  the S ta te  was 
employed by Napoleon to  amend the C o n s titu tio n . As examples, 
the  F i r s t  Consulship and the  Emperorship were c re a ted  by 
s e n a to r ia l  decrees (S én atu s-co n su lts  o rg an iq u e). On the  o th e r  
hand, i t  i s  in te re s t in g  to  no te  th a t  th i s  body proved s tro n g e r 
than die sum resp o n sib le  f o r  i t s  c re a t io n . For i t  was by
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s e n a to r ia l  decree th a t the Emperor was dethroned and the r ig h t  
o f  su c c e ss io n  in  h is  fam ily  a b o lish ed .
B onaparte  was w i l l i n g  and anx ious to  d i s p e r s e  and n u l ­
l i f y  l e g i s l a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  to  c r e a t e  g r e a t e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
and p o licy -m ak ing  freedom . He was e q u a l ly  w i l l i n g  to  exceed  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  upon th e  use  o f  o rd in an c e  powers in  
th e  p u r s u i t  o f  h i s  own o b j e c t i v e s .  Under th e  c lo a k  o f  p o l i c e  
o rd in a n c e s ,  he c r e a t e d  new p e n a l t i e s , ^  e s t a b l i s h e d  s p e c i a l  
j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  changed th e  laws o f  c r im in a l  p ro c e d u re ,  and 
l e v i e d  ta x e s  and d u t i e s .  In  su b s ta n c e  i t  appeared  t h a t  th e  
r e v o l u t io n  had  ended where i t  b e g a n - -w ith  a b s o lu te  monarchy. 
Though th e  d iv id in g  l i n e  between law and o rd in a n c e  was n o t  
a b o l i s h e d ,  i t  became b lu r r e d  because th e  u l t i m a t e  d e c i s io n  as 
to  th e  u se  o f  s t a t u t e  law s, S e n a tu s - c o n s u l t s , o r  th e  o rd in an c e  
power ( o rd o n n an c es . r è g le m e n t s , d é c r e t s , a r r ê t e s ) was h e ld  in  
th e  hands o f  the  Emperor. I f  one adds th e  r è g lem ents  p r e s ­
c r ib e d  under th e  r e g u l a r  p ro ced u re  o f  i n i t i a t i o n  by th e  Head 
o f  S t a t e  to  th e  m u l t i tu d e  o f  d é c r e t s  and a r r ê t a s  which were 
i s s u e d  by th e  Emperor w i th o u t  p re v io u s  c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  and a l s o  
c o n s id e r s  th e  r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t iv e  heads o f  departm en ts  
( p r e f e t )and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  heads o f  d i s t r i c t s  ( s o u s - p r e f e t ) 
to  i s s u e  r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  t h e i r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  u n i t s ,  one c a n ­
n o t  be v e ry  f a r  from wrong in  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  th e  r e ig n  o f  the
^For exam ple, se e  th e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  th e  e x t r a o r d in a r y  
s e s s io n  o f  December 26, 1800, in  which B onaparte  fo rc e d  th e  
C o u n c il  o f  S t a t e  to  approve  o f  the  c r e a t i o n  o f  an e x t r a o r d in a r y  
t r i b u n a l  to  d e a l  w i th  t e r r o r i s t s .  P o n t e i l ,  pp. 96-98.
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ordinance in  the F i r s t  Empire was in  substance not p a r t ic u ­
la r ly  d if fe re n t  from executive dominance under the ancien 
régim e.
At th is  p o in t the  use o f the o rdain ing  power by the 
Executive impinged deeply and co n tin u a lly  upon the primacy o f 
the law. Ordinances issu ed  o u ts id e  the co n tex t of c o n s t i tu ­
t io n a l  de leg a tio n  must be considered  as i l l e g a l .  However, a 
r e s t r i c te d  number were declared  to  be v a l id  by the Cour de 
c a s s a t io n .^  This group, issu in g  from the Head o f S ta te  w ith ­
out any p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f the re p re se n ta tiv e  assembly, q u a li­
f ie d  as ordinances in  form. But in  co n ten t they could be con­
s id e re d  as law ( l o i ) because they d e a lt w ith  su b je c t m atte r 
w ith in  the scope of the  le g is la t iv e  power. A lso, they were 
equipped w ith  the fo rce  of law ( l o i ) in  th e i r  a u th o rity  to 
a l t e r  o r to  re p e a l e x is tin g  s ta tu te s .  Consequently, law ( l o i ) ,  
defined  as the issu e  of the pouvoir l é g i s l a t i v e , could no 
longer be considered  supreme in  a l l  in s ta n c e s . Ordinances 
dea ling  w ith  the  competence o f the L e g is la tu re —decree laws 
(d é c re ts - l o i s ) —began to  make th e i r  im prin t upon c o n s ti tu t io n a l  
and p u b lic  law p ra c t ic e  in  France.
At the time o f the R esto ra tion  (1814) the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
d o c trin es  o f both the Revolution and the Empire had f a l le n
^The Cour de ca ssa tio n  declared  a number o f unauthorized  
decrees as validTHecause they had no t been annu lled  by the 
Im peria l Senate whose duty i t  had been to  safeguard  the Con­
s t i t u t i o n  from any breach. Many of these  decrees remained in  
e f f e c t  fo r  a long p erio d  of tim e. Thus, a  decree issu ed  on 
October 15, 1810, concerning "é tab lissem ents dangereux, in ­
commodes e t  in sa lu b res"  and con ta in ing  d ir e c t  l iM ta t io n s  on 
fundamental l i b e r t i e s  w ith  regard  to  in d u s try  and commerce was
n o t rep la ced  u n t i l  1917. S ieg h a rt, p. 254.
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in to  d is re p u te , and the p re v a ilin g  tendencies poin ted  e i th e r  
to  a re v iv a l o f the in s t i tu t io n s  o f the ancien régime o r to 
the in tro d u c tio n  of a c o n s ti tu t io n  based upon the E nglish  model.
The C harter of 1814 was an attem pt to f in d  a compromise between 
the two tendencies. I t  re in tro d u ced  the concept of k ingship 
by d iv ine  r ig h t  ( ju re  d iv ino ) - - th e  C harter being a conceded 
document (Charte oc troyée) r a th e r  than a fundamental law d e r iv ­
ing i t s  competence from a g ran t o f popular sovere ign ty . The 
C harter was a c o n tra c t between the  King and the Nation in  which i t  
was acknowledged th a t the Sovereign possessed a power e x te r io r  to  
the N ation; th a t  he was n o t a sim ple agent fo r  the execution of 
the n a t io n a l w i l l .  The King did n o t e x is t  by v ir tu e  of the law; 
the law e x is te d  by v ir tu e  of the ro y a l w i l l .  N otw ithstanding, 
the law regained  in  th is  p eriod  i t s  p r im o rd ia lity  v is - a -v is  
the reg u la to ry  power. A rt ic le  14 o f the C harter upon the King a 
gen era l power to issu e  ordinances "fo r the execution of the laws 
and the s e c u r ity  of the S ta te ."  L egally , reg u la tio n  was considered  
a derived  and in f e r io r  type o f le g is la t io n .  I t  had no a u th o r ity  to 
tran sg re ss  the boundaries p re sc rib e d  by the law and when p roperly  
decreed i t  became p a r t  of the law ( in s é re r  dans le  cadre de la  
lo i  proprement d i t ) . However, in  a c tu a l p ra c tic e  the Government
^Paul B astid , Les in s t i tu t io n s  p o lit iq u e s  de la  monarchie 
parlem en ta ire  f ra n ça ise  (1814-1848). (P a r is : E d itio n s du
R ecueil S irey , 1954), p. 183.
 ^ ^ A rtic le  14 of the C h arte r o f 1814: "Le r o i . . . f a i t  les
règlem ents e t  ordonnances pour l 'e x é c u tio n  des lo is  e t  la  
su re te  de l 'E t a t . "  Duguit and Monnier ( e d s .) .  Les C o n s titu ­
tio n s  , pp. 185-86.
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extended the reg u la to ry  au th o rity  given to i t  in  the C harter
to the p o in t where i t  was o ften  su b s t i tu te d  fo r  the  passage
of re g u la r  le g is la t io n . As L anju inais concluded concerning
the implementation of the C harter of 1814:
I t  i s  too evident th a t  fo r  a th ird  of a volume o f laws, 
th e re  a re  a dozen volumes o f ordinances and i f ,  as i t  
is  very  tru e , these ordinances have derogated the laws, 
they have been declared  abrogated, in  a word i f  they 
have been issued  in  the p lace o f laws, we f in d  our­
se lves under the le g is la t io n  not of the C harter and of 
the laws, but o f reg u la tio n s  and of o rd in an ces .!
On numerous occasions the Government d id  n o t consider i t  
necessary  to  be in v ite d  by s ta tu to ry  law to  issu e  sp e c if ic  
ordinances dealing  w ith  su b je c t m atte r w ith in  the  competence 
o f the le g is la t iv e  a u th o r ity . The use o f such reg u la to ry  
power (règlem ents spontanés) w ithout au th o riz a tio n  o f the law 
( l o i ) , became an e s ta b lish e d  f a c t .  The co n tro l o f the sa le  of 
tobacco, staaq)ed paper, and s a l tp e t r e ;  the g ran tin g  of p o s ta l 
f ra n c h ise s ; and the o rg an iza tio n  o f the ro y a l lo t t e r y ,  among 
o th e rs , was le g a lized  in  th is  fash ion . F u rth e r, the Govern­
ment d id  no t fe e l  compelled on a l l  occasions to  remain w ith in  
the framework of the o b je c tiv e s  envisioned by the law when 
delegated  au th o rity  by the L e g is la tu re . F in a lly , i t  should be 
noted th a t the reg u la to ry  power was o ften  ex e rc ised  by o th ers  
than the King or h is  M in is te rs . For example, the  D irec to r- 
General of Police issu ed  the c o n tro v e rs ia l ordinance o f June 
7, 1814, concerning the c e le b ra tio n  o f Sundays and ho lidays.
I t  was normal p ra c tic e  fo r  the reg u la to ry  power to  be delegated
^L anju inais, E ssa i su r la  Charte C o n s titu tio n n e lle  du 4 
ju in  1814, p . 311, as quoted in  B astid , p. 192.
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to  p re fe c ts  o r to  su b -p re fec ts  by e i th e r  law or o rd inance, to  
m unicipal co u n c illo rs  by the law, and to  ro y a l c o u n c illo rs  o f 
pub lic  in s tru c tio n  by ord inance.
One en te rs  another domain when one d iscusses ordinances 
fo r  the s e c u r ity  o f the S ta te  ( la  sd re te  de l 'E t a t ) .  Though 
i t  su rv ived  fo r  only s ix te e n  y ea rs , A r t ic le  14 of the C h arte r 
o f 1814 was a c la s s ic  form ulation  of the power o f emergency 
le g is la t io n  and "became the  p ro to type o f a l l  European emergency 
c la u s e s ." !  Though i t  mentioned only re g u la tio n s  and o rd in an ces, 
i t  provided the King w ith  an a u th o r ity  lim ite d  only by p o l i t i c ­
a l  and moral co n s id e ra tio n s . I t s  purpose could  no t be served  
un less i t  were recognized th a t  these  ordinances had the fo rce  
o f law and could suspend o r a l t e r  s ta tu to ry  p ro v is io n s .
A r t ic le  14 was in tended  ex c lu s iv e ly  fo r  emergency s i tu a t io n s ,  
bu t i t  was enq)loyed to  supply the Head of S ta te  w ith  a compe­
tence which was coo rd ina te  w ith , and no t subord inate  to ,  th a t  -  
o f the L e g is la tu re . By adding "sû re té  de l 'E ta t "  to  the  t r a ­
d i t io n a l  form ulation  "exécution des lo is "  and, th e re fo re , ad­
m ittin g  only a su b je c tiv e  t e s t  fo r  emergency o rd inances, the 
ex e rc ise  o f abso lu te  powers w ithout form al infringem ent o f the 
C harter was made p o s s ib le . As a r e s u l t ,  le g a l means fo r  e s ta ­
b lish in g  a d ic ta to rs h ip  under the very  c loak  of the C harter 
were e s ta b lish e d . Subsequently, A r t ic le  14 was used as the 
b as is  fo r  the  Royal Ordinance o f  Ju ly  13, 1815, which d isso lv ed  
the Chamber o f Deputies and reg u la ted  e le c t io n s ,  and fo r  the
^ S ieg h a rt, p . 172.
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c o n tro v e rs ia l  s a n ita ry  ordinances o f  September 27, 1821, The 
s ta r k  r e a l i t i e s  o f  u n lim ited  emergency power and the  p o ss ib le  
abuse th e re o f  d id  n o t f u l ly  im press i t s e l f  upon French p o l i t i c s  
u n t i l  C harles X and h is  u l tr a -R o y a lis t  ca b in e t d isso lv ed  the 
Chamber o f  Deputies tw ice w i& in  two months during the sumomr 
o f  1830 upon the questionab le  re p o r t o f  the  M in is te r o f  J u s t ic e ,  
a lle g in g  th a t  the Monarchy was in  danger o f  c o lla p s in g . Upon 
th i s  b a s is  censorsh ip  o f  th e  p re ss  was a r b i t r a r i l y  ap p lied  and 
th e  e le c to r a l  laws were rig g ed  by Royal Ordinance. However, 
th e  leg itim acy  o f  th ese  ord inances i s  a moot p o in t .  T heir 
immediate r e s u l t  was th e  overthrow  o f  the  House o f  Bourbon and 
th e  passing  o f  the  Crown to the House o f  O rleans under amend­
ments to  the C h arte r o f  1814, re - is su e d  in  the form o f  the 
C o n s titu tio n a l C h arte r o f  August 14, 1830,
With th is  res ta tem en t o f  the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd e r , the 
form ula fo r  the  ordinance power was changed from "Le Roi e s t  
l e  ch ef suprême de l * E t a t . . . f a i t  le s  règlem ents e t  ordonnances 
n é c e ssa ire s  pour l 'e x é c u tio n  des lo i s  e t  Le sû re té  de l 'E t a t " 
to  the  more lim ite d  A r t ic le  13 o f  the  C harter o f  1830: "Le
Roi e s t  l e  chef suprême de l 'E t a t . . . f a i t  le s  règlem ents e t  
ordonnances n éc e ssa ire s  pour l 'e x é c u tio n  des l o i s ,  sans pouvoir 
jam ais n i  suspendre le s  lo i s  elles-mêmes n i  d isp en ser de le u r  
e x écu tio n . "1 A c le a r e r  d e f in i t io n  o f th e  o rdain ing  power i s  
o b ta in ed  in  the  l a t t e r  s ta tem en t. A r t ic le  13 concedes to  the 
Government the  r ig h t  to  is s u e  ord inances Am execution  o f  the
^ A rtic le  13 o f  th e  C harte C o n s titu tio n n e lle  o f  14 août 
1830, Duguit and Mbnnier ( e d s . ) .  Les C o n s titu tio n s , p . 214.
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law s, irtiether based on the  C harter o r  on Parliam entary  in v i­
ta t io n ,  and a lso  im plied  a  power to  is su e  ordinances fo r  th e  
o rg an iza tio n  o f the p u b lic  se rv ic e s  (règlem ents autonomes) ; 
b u t i t  does n o t,  as p rev io u s ly , concede th e  r ig h t  to  issu e  
ordinances in  p o lic e  m a tte rs , a l im ita t io n  which was resp ec ted  
by Louis P h il l ip p e .^  I t  i s  here under the Government o f  the  
Ju ly  Monarchy th a t  the  concept o f  le  pouvoir rég lem enta ire  
reaches a  d e f in i t iv e  fo rm ula tion . The p ro h ib itio n  in  the 
l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  A r t ic le  13 which re fu ses  to  the Head o f  S ta te  
the  power to  suspend th e  laws ( lo i s )  o r  to  d ispense w ith  th e i r  
execution  re tu rn s  the  concept to  one th a t  i s  com pletely d is ­
t i n c t  from the pouvoir l é g i s l a t iv e . In  form al terms th is  o r ­
dain ing  power i s  subord inate  to the le g is la t iv e  power in  the  
sense th a t  i t  cannot abrogate o r  a l t e r  e x is t in g  laws; th a t  i s ,  
i t  cannot a c t  co n tra  legem. N everthe less, i t  i s  n o t a  power 
derived  from the L e g is la tu re . I t  i s  a  d i r e c t  and n o t a d e le ­
gated  power.^ A rtic le r  13 appeared to  make a reoccurrence o f  
such a s i tu a t io n  as th a t  o f  J u ly , 1830 im possib le . However, 
the  p r ic e  o f  such p ro sc r ip tio n  a g a in s t th re a ts  to s t r i c t  le g ­
a l i t y  can be very  g r e a t .  C e r ta in ly , in  timms o f  ex cep tio n a l 
and grave c r i s i s ,  i f  adhered to ,  th i s  d o c trin e  can r e s u l t  in  
the p a ra ly s is  o f  execu tive  a u th o r ity . The claim s o f  c o n s ti­
tu t io n a l i ty  and abso lu tism  demand m oderation and i t  i s  to  be
S ie g h a r t ,  p . 254.
^ I b id . ,  p . 259.
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doubted th a t  adherence to s t r i c t  le g a l i ty  in  a l l  circum stances 
can provide a v ia b le  adjustm ent to  th e i r  competing c la im s.
E ffo r ts  to  p reserve o rd er during the  O rlean is t p erio d  
(1830-1848) mere h ig h lig h ted  by appeals to  le g a l i ty  when pos­
s ib le  and use o f  re p re ss iv e  techniques when necessary . As 
e a r ly  as 1835, the Monarch induced the  Government to  pass the 
infamous lo i s  de septembre which provided fo r  m o d ifica tio n  o f 
in d iv id u a l r ig h ts  in  crim ina l p ro secu tio n s and fo r  l im ita tio n s  
upon o ra l  and w ritte n  pub lic  u tte ra n c e s . Popular in d ig n a tio n  
was g re a t  and u ltim a te ly  l ib e r a l  and dem ocratic re a c tio n  led  
to th e  Revolution o f  1848.
The th ird  French rev o lu tio n  was succeeded by the Second 
R epublic . I t  was proclaim ed by a p ro v is io n a l government con­
s i s t in g  o f Lamartine and s ix  c o lla b o ra to rs . This ^  fa c to  
government ex e rc ised  a  comprehensive le g is la t iv e  a u th o rity  in  
the form o f  d ecrees. These o rd ers  were issu ed  in  a p ro v is io n a l 
manner w ithou t any s ta tu to ry  o r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n — 
o th e r  than , th a t  i s ,  n e c e s s ity . A C o n stitu en t Assembly, e l e c t ­
ed on the p r in c ip le  o f  u n iv e rsa l su ffra g e , met on May 4 , 1848 
and announced the  c re a tio n  o f  a new R epublic. A u th o rity  was 
im m ediately in tru s te d  to  a P arliam entary  Committee which in  
th is  t r a n s i t io n  p erio d  rev ived  the  t r a d i t io n s  o f  the  Assembly. 
U ltim a te ly , on November 4 , 1848, a  new c o n s ti tu t io n a l  document 
was prom ulgated. The execu tive power was v es ted  in  the  P re s i­
den t o f  the R epublic. The ho lder o f  th i s  o f f ic e  was e le c te d  
by u n iv e rsa l su ffrag e  fo r  a  fo u r-y ea r term . The P re s id en t was 
n o t accorded the competence to  "san c tio n ” laws b u t was ob liged
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"to  promulgate the larns."^ He was given th e  a u th o rity  "de 
f a i r e  p re se n te r  des p ro je ts  de lo i  i  1*Assemblée n a tio n a le  
p ar le s  m in is tre s ,"  and " i l  s u rv e il le  e t  a ssu re  Inexécution  
des l o i s . The l a s t  s ta tem en t vas c o n s is te n t v i th  A r t ic le  13
of th e  C h arte r o f  1830 and provided the  Executive v i th  a gen­
e r a l  o rda in ing  pover in  th e  execution  o f the  lav s v i th in  the  
co n tex t o f  the l im ita t io n s  e s ta b lish e d  fo r  th i s  type o f  com­
petence by A r t ic le  13.
I t  should a lso  be recognized th a t  th i s  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
document attesqpted to  l im i t  the a u th o r ity  o f  the Government 
by means o f the Council o f  S ta te .  In  the language o f  the  
C o n s titu tio n : The Council o f S ta te ,  a f t e r  c o n su lta tio n  on 
p ro je c ts  o f  lav  by the  Government o r  upon the  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  
the Assembly, must “p rep are  the règlem ents d * ad m in istra tio n " 
and "alone make those re g u la tio n s  f o r  v h ich  the N ational 
Assembly has given i t  a sp e c ia l d e le g a tio n ."  F in a lly , " i t  
e x e rc ise s  w ith  regard  to  adscLnistrative decrees a l l  th e  povers 
o f c o n tro l vh ich  the  la v  has d e fe rred  to  i t . " ^  The obvious 
danger h ere  i s  the d e leg a tio n  o f o rd a in in g  povers to a  body 
vh ich  i s  n o t d i r e c t ly  re sp o n sib le  to  the  L e g is la tu re . This 
vas s tr e s s e d  during the C o n s titu en t A ssem bly's co n s id e ra tio n
^ A rtic le  35 and A r t ic le  56 o f  the  C o n s titu tio n  o f Novem­
b e r  4 , 1848. Duguit and Monnier ( e d s . ) .  Les C o n s titu t io n s , 
pp. 237, 240. . . .
^ A rtic le  49 o f  the C o n s titu tio n  o f  November 4 , 1848. 
I b id . .  p . 239.
^ A rtic le  75 o f the  C o n s titu tio n  o f  November 4 , 1848. 
I b id . . p . 242.
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o f  A r t ic le  75, b u t the p ro v is io n s were n ev e rth e le ss  adopted .^
The règlem ent dledw inis t r e t  ion nublieue i s  an ordinance 
made under sp e c ia l P arliam entary  d e leg a tio n —o r in v i ta t io n ,  as 
French c o n s t i tu t io n a l  lawyers p re fe r  to  c a l l  i t ^ —in  execution  
o f th e  law. Before being issu ed , such ordinances were d is ­
cussed  in  the f u l l  C ouncil o f  S ta te  ( l e  c o n se il d 'E ta t  en tendu). 
The C o n s titu tio n  o f  1848 c re a te d  two d if f e r e n t  v e rs io n s  o f  
règlem ent d »ad m in is tra tio n  pub lique . One, which p lays a major 
ro le  in  French p u b lic  lew to th i s  day, i s  the p a t te rn  o f  Gov­
ernm ental d ec is io n  aftrer co n su lta tio n  w ith  the Council o f  S ta te .  
The o th e r , which has n o t su rv ived  French c o n s t i tu t io n a l  lew 
development and which i s  unique w ith  th i s  document, i s  the 
procedure env isioned  in  A r t ic le  75 (2 ) wherein th e  Council o f 
Statze makes th e  ord inance i t s e l f .  T his type o f re g u la tio n  i s  
used in  the execu tion  o f laws; in  i t s  a p p lic a tio n  th e re  i s  no 
f l i r t a t i o n  w ith  the e x t r a - le g a l .3
The C o n s ti tu t io n .o f  1848, in  i t s  A r t ic le  106, gave cons­
t i t u t i o n a l  support to a  law re g u la tin g  the forms and the  e f ­
f e c t s  o f  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t i o n  known as the  s ta te  o f  s ieg e  ( é ta t  
de s iè g e ) .  T his promise was ioqplementzed w ith  the passage o f 
the  law o f August 9 , 1849.
This C o n s titu tio n  u n ite d  asp ec ts  o f  the P re s id e n t ia l  
form o f  government w ith  the  resp o n sib ilitzy  o f M in is te rs  to
S ie g h a r t ,  p . 178.
^L6on D uguit, T r^ t:6  de d r o i t  c o n s t i to t io n n e l  (2® e d .;  
P a r is :  Ancienne L ib r a i r ie  Fontemoing amd Company, 1924), Vol. 
IV, p .  714.
^ S ie g h a r t, p . 255.
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P arliam en t. I t s  p o l i t i c a l  weakness lay  in  the antagonism be­
tween a  P re s id en t e le c te d  by u n iv e rsa l su ffrag e  and a unicam eral 
le g is la t iv e  body composed p rim arily  o f  le g i t im is ts  and O rlean- 
i s t s .  On May 31, 1850 the L eg is la tu re  vo ted  a new e le c to ra l  
law which p resc rib ed  a th ree -y e a r  m unicipal dom icile f o r  each 
e le c to r .  By th is  p ro v is io n  a t  l e a s t  two and o n e-half m illio n  
Frenchmen were deprived o f  th e i r  v o te . I t  was on the b a s is  o f  
th i s  popular issu e  th a t  Louis Napoleon Bonaparte based the coup 
d*E tat o f  Deeeiri>er 2 , 1851. He d isso lv ed  the L eg is la tu re  and 
th e  Council o f  S ta te ,  d ec la red  a s ta te  o f  s ie g e  in  some inrenty 
departm ents, r e -e s ta b lis h e d  u n iv e rsa l s u ffra g e , and c a lle d  
upon the French people to  r a t i f y  these measures by p le b is c i te .  
L a te r  th e  same day, a  proclam ation and decree was issu ed  which 
s ta te d  th a t  " the  French people wish to  m ain tain  the  a u th o rity  
o f  Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and delegate  to  him the powers 
n ecessary  to  make a C o n s titu tio n  on the bases proposed in  h is  
proclam ation  o f  December 2 , 1851."^
The p le b is c i te  showed only 640,737 negative  vo tes in  some 
seven and o n e-h a lf  a d l l io n  vo tes c a s t .  As S ieg h a rt re p o r ts :
The v io la t io n  o f the C o n s titu tio n  o f Novesber 4 , 1848 
and o f  the  P re s id e n t ia l  oa th  were thus condoned; the  
P re s id e n t was in v e s ted  w ith  d ic t a to r i a l  powers com pris­
in g , a p a r t  from the ex ecu tiv e , n o t on ly  the le g is la t iv e  
power which he e x e rc ise d  in  the form o f  d é c re ts - lo is ,^  b u t
^ S ieg h a rt, p . 181.
d is t in c t io n  was made between decrees reg u la tin g  le g is ­
l a t iv e  m a tte rs  (d é c re ts  o m a n im ^ s l and decrees re g u la tin g  ad­
m in is tr a t iv e  m a tte rs  fd é c re ts  rd a le m en ta ire s ) .  The form er 
were r a t i f i e d  by A r t ic le  58 (2) o f  the  C o n s titu tio n  o f 1852 
and su rv ived  in  co n stitzu tio n a l h is to ry  under the  name d é c re ts -  
l o i s . I b i d . ,  p . 256.
34
a lso  the c o n s titu e n t pover, the  outcome o f which was 
the C o n stitu tio n  o f January 14, 1842
Louis Napoleon w rote: "When one bears  our name and when
one i s  a t  the head o f the government, th e re  a re  two th in g s one 
must do: s a t is f y  the  in te r e s t s  o f  the most numerous c la s se s
and a t ta c h  o n ese lf  to  the upper c la s s e s ." ^  The p o l i t i c s  o f  th is  
p erio d  appeared to  have two le v e ls :  th a t  o f the masses and
th a t  o f the  p o l i t i c i a n s .  The people could provide a s o l id  
b a s is  f o r  government, b u t they could n o t govern them selves.^ 
T h erefo re , the Second Empire was n o t,  n o r d id  i t  seek to  be , 
a mere d ic ta to rs h ip  o f  the m asses. I t  s tro v e  to combine a r i s ­
tocracy  w ith  democracy and to  b u ild  so c ie ty  in  the shape o f a 
pyramid, w ith  the people a t  the base and the h ie ra rc h y  o f  m e rit 
a t  th e  to p . The d riv in g  fo rce  w ith in  i t  was am bition and w orld­
ly  honor open to  a l l .  I t s  support was based upon peasan ts  and 
small-townsmen who were dominated by th e i r  mayors and p r e f e c ts .  
These circum stances no tw ith stand ing , the Second Empire con­
ta in ed  w ith in  i t s  bowels the seeds o f  a  more l ib e r a l  eaqpire. 
N otables across the land had ta s te d  the p leasu res  o f  P a r l ia ­
m entary government under the Ju ly  Monarchy and were n o t soon 
to  fo rg e t;  masses in  the  la rg e  c i t i e s  and towns had never 
accepted the  Empire; and these  cancers were to  prove to  be the
^ I b id . ,  p . 181.
^E. d 'H au te riv e , Napoleon I I I  e t  le  p rin ce  Napoléon, pp. 
58-59, quoted in  Theodore Z e ld in . The P o l i t i c a l  System o f 
Napoleon I I I  (London: MacMillan and C o., L td .,  1958), p . 10.
^Z eld in , pp. 44-45.
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seeds o f  d e s tru c tio n  f o r  author!tm rlm nism . As the seeds grew, 
d ls a f fe c tlo n s  from the  banner o f  the  second Napoleon became 
q u ite  numerous. The C aesarian  democrats th a t  remained began 
to  demand th a t  the Leader share h is  power w ith  the L e g is la tiv e  
Assembly. Under thé  p ressu re  o f  th i s  re a c tio n , the mayor# who 
had been the fountainbead  o f  government power were re fu sed  th e  
support th a t  had been th e  source o f t h e i r  power. The Govern­
ment appeared to  disown i t s  own. The o p p o sitio n  was given the 
power o f  organizing  in  every commune. Governmental e le c to r a l  
agen ts were thrown in to  confusion as were the  populace. What 
a c tu a l ly  happened i s  th a t  the Napoleonic p a r ty  found i t  neces­
sa ry  to  move toward a more l ib e r a l  em pire. To achieve th is  
goal e le c to r a l  reforms were in troduced  and a new c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
document was c re a te d ;^  however, the Government assured  i t s  
ascendancy by leav ing  i t s  own agents in  the f i e ld ,  though w ith ­
o u t d i r e c t  support, and by s t i f l i n g  the opposition  p ress  through 
a  system o f checks backed by th re a ts  o f  p ro h ib itio n  which cons­
t i t u t e d  a  very  e f f e c t iv e  cen so rsh ip .
The new c o n s t i tu t io n a l  document attesq>ted to u n ite  the 
P re s id e n t ia l  and P arliam en tary  type o f government. The c ru c ia l  
p o in t was the question  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .  The Emperor and th e  
M in is te rs  were both d ec la red  " re sp o n s ib le ,"^  b u t the problem
S^A natus-consults f ix in g  the  C o n s titu tio n  o f the Empire 
o f  May 21. U70T D uguit and Monnier ( e d s . ) .  Les C o n s titu tio n s , 
pp. 309-14.
^ A rtic le  13 o f  th e  S en a tu s-co n su lts  s ta te d  th a t  "L'Empereur 
e s t  responsable devant l e  Peuple f ra n ç a is e , auquel i l  a  to u jo u rs
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vas how the M in is te rs  conld be re sp o n sib le  to  the P arliam ent 
and to  the fiqperor a t  the  same tim e. Z eld in  i s  q u ite  c o r re c t  
when he emphasizes th a t  th is  new docus&ent d id  n o t in ten d  to 
e s ta b l i s h  P arliam en tary  government in  th e  modem sense and th a t  
the c o r re c t  analogy f o r  comqparison i s  n o t the  E ng lish  C o n s titu ­
tio n  o f  the n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  b u t th a t  o f  the latie seven teen th— 
when the King ru le d  as v e i l  as re igned  and vhen M in is te rs  had 
to p lease  th e  King and P arliam en t.^  Under the C o n s titu tio n  o f 
1852 the M in is te rs  had been m erely g randiose c i v i l  s e rv a n ts .
Rov, in  o rd er to  cement the u n ce rta in  a l l ia n c e  between P a r l ia ­
ment and Emperor, th e  Head o f S ta te  vas to  choose h is  M in is te rs  
from the le ad e rs  en joying  the confidence o f P arliam ent b u t 
vould  n o t tu rn  the execu tive  a u th o r ity  over to  them. T his vas 
made c le a r  vhen i t  was announced th a t  th e  Presidency o f  the 
Council o f  M in is te rs  vould  be re ta in e d  in  h is  own hands.
Napoleon I I I  f e l t  th a t  h is  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  vas to the  French 
peop le . The q uestion  o f dynasty vas p laced  o u ts id e  the povers 
o f P arliam ent and became a m a tte r between the people and th e i r  
Sovereign . The u ltim a te  appeal on fundamental is su e s  was to 
the  people by p le b i s c i t e .
The o rda in ing  pover (pouvoir rég lem en ta ire ) vas employed 
o f te n  and e x te n s iv e ly  under the Second Emq»ire and, on th e  whole, 
i t  remained c o n s is te n t  v i th  prev ious C o n s titu tio n s  and cons t i ­
le  d r o i t  de f a i r e  a p p e l .” A r t ic le  19 added th a t  ”l'Esq>ereur 
nomme e t  révoque le s  m in is tr e s . Les m in is tre s  d é l ib è re n t en 
c o n s e il  sous l a  p résidence  de l 'Emqxereur. I l s  son t respon­
s a b le s .” I b id . . p . 311.
^Z eld in , The P o l i t i c a l  System o f  Napoléon I I I . p . 153.
37
1
tu t lo n a l  usage. The bu lk  o f  the ord inances were employed to  
o rgan ize  the  pub lic  se rv ic e s  o r  were u t i l i z e d  In the execution  
o f  the  law s. A part from d é c r e t s - lo i s . th e re  were no decrees 
d ea lin g  w ith  m atte rs  o f  p o l i c e . 2 However, one new type o f  o r ­
dinance was In troduced: the Imqperlal decrees reg u la tin g  cons­
t i t u t i o n a l  Is su e s , such as the decree o f  November 24, 1860, 
g iv ing  to  the two Chambers o f  the L eg is la tu re  the r ig h t  to  
vo te  th e  A ddress, o r  th e  decree o f  February 3 , 1861, r e g u la t­
ing  the re la tio n s h ip  o f S enate , Corps l é g i s l a t i f , and the
r
E ^>eror. I t  I s  s ig n i f ic a n t  th a t  these  ord inances were Issued  
as sisqple Im peria l decrees d esp ite  the  a u th o r ity  g ran ted  to  
the  Senate by A r t ic le  27 (2 ) o f  the C o n s titu tio n  o f 1852 to  
re g u la te  by S én a tu s-co n su lts  " a l l  th a t  has n o t been a n tic ip a te d  
by the  C o n s titu tio n  and which Is  necessary  f o r  I t s  fu n c tio n in g .^  
T heir v a l id i ty  was n o t questioned In  the time o f  the Esqplre 
though th e re  seems to  be l i t t l e  question  th a t  they were uncons­
t i t u t i o n a l .^
The Second Empire f e l l  w ith  th e  c a p itu la t io n  a t  Sedan on 
September 2 , 1870. In  t r u th .  I t  d id  n o t f a l l  because o f  th e  
m il i ta ry  d is a s te r  a lone; nor because o f the  In tim id a tio n  o f  
the Senate and the Corns l é g i s l a t i f  by the P a r is ia n  mob; I t  
was Inexorably  d isso lv ed  as a  r e s u l t  o f  I t s  own Inadequacies.
S i e g h a r t ,  p . 256.
^D uguit, T ra ite  . . . IV, p . 686.
^Duguit and Monnier ( e ^ . ) .  Lea C o n s titu t io n s , p . 277.
S i e g h a r t ,  p . 256.
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Republican depu ties from the Corps l é g i s l a t i f , headed by 
Favre and Gambetta, hastened to  c o n s t i tu te  a P ro v is io n a l Gov­
ernment (Gouvernement p ro v iso ire  de la  defense n a tio n a le ) and 
to p lace the M ilita ry  Governor of P a r is , General Trochu, a t  
i t s  head. This choice appeared to be symbolic of the d e s ire  
fo r  a p a t r io t ic  union fo r  the public s a fe ty . The P ro v is io n a l 
Government undertook a dual r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  when i t  assumed con­
t r o l  of the S ta te : to  prosecute the war and to s u b s t i tu te  a regime 
of law ( lo i)  fo r  a regime of f a c t  (f a i t ) .  ^ On the f i r s t  p o in t, an 
a rm is tice  convention was signed w ith Germany, January 28, 1871; on 
the second, the P ro v is io n a l Government ex e rc ised  d ic ta to r ia l  powers 
u n t i l  the f i r s t  meeting of the Bordeaux Assembly, February 12,
1871. Five days a f t e r  convening, th is  Assembly appointed T h e irs ,
the conservative  lead er of the L eft-C en ter and a c o n s t i tu t io n a l
2
m onarchist, "Chief o f Executive Power o f  the French R epublic."
This function  he was to  ex erc ise  w ith the help  and a s s is ta n c e  of 
M in isters appointed by h im self and over whom he p resided . The 
excep tional p o in t of T h e irs ' p o sitio n  was th a t  he was the 
t i t u l a r  Head of S ta te  a t  the same time he was the leader of a 
resp o n sib le  government. He was not a P re s id en t o f the Republic 
independent o f the Assembly bu t acted  under th e i r  a u th o rity .
I t  was only a f te r  the Assembly had moved to  V e rsa ille s  and had 
w itnessed  the in su rre c tio n  o f the Commune th a t  i t  went a s tep
^Jean-Jacques C h e v a llie r , H is to ire  des in s t i tu t io n s  p o l i ­
tiq u es  de la  France moderne (1789-1945) (P a r is :  L ib ra ir ie
D alloz, 1058), p . 297.
2
R esolution o f February 17, 1871. Duguit and Monnier 
( e d s ,) ,  Les C o n s titu tio n s , p. 314.
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fu r th e r  in  organizing  the  executive power. The Loi R ivet o f 
August 31, 1871, remarkable in so fa r  as i t  combines m in is te r ia l  
p o l i t i c a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  w ith  p o l i t i c a l  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f the 
P re s id en t, made Thiers P re s id en t of the French Republic. The 
P resid en t continued to  a c t  under the a u th o r ity  o f the Assembly 
and remained a member o f i t .
On November 20, 1873, the  Assembly passed another p ro v i­
s io n a l c o n s t i tu t io n a l  law—the th ird  of the  new Republic. I t  
in v ested  General Macmahon w ith  the powers o f P resid en t o f the 
Republic fo r  a p eriod  o f seven years and provided fo r  the o rga­
n iz a tio n  o f  the Committee o f  the Assembly made up o f th i r t y  
members—La Commission des T ren te—commissioned to  examine the 
d ra f t  o f a new C o n s titu tio n . I t  i s  a t  th is  p o in t th a t  a sepa­
ra tio n  o f powers was achieved. By g iv ing  the P re s id en t a 
f ix ed  term  of o f f ic e ,  c a l le d  the se p te n n a t, and by making i t  
independent o f the du ra tion  o f the e x is t in g  Assembly, execu tive 
and le g is la t iv e  a u th o rity  were d iv ided and the d ic ta to rs h ip  of 
the Assembly was te rm in a ted .^
A fte r  innumerable delays the Republic was d e f in i te ly
e s ta b lish e d  by the acceptance, by a m a jo rity  o f one v o te , of
the amendment of M. Wallon:
The P resid en t o f the Republic i s  e le c te d  by an abso lu te  
m a jo rity  vo te of the Senate and the Chamber of D eputies 
jo in e d  to g e th er in  th e  N ational Assembly. He i s  e le c te d  
fo r  seven y ears . He i s  r e - e l i g i b l e .2
^S ieg h art, p. 185.
^C oubertin , E volution o f France Under the Third Republic 
(New York: Crowell and C o., 1897), p . 45.
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This was, as F in e r a s s e r ts ,  the rock  npon which the 
Republic re s te d .^  N onetheless, the  powers and the s ig n i f i c ­
ance o f the Presidency were to  change and evolve w ith  circum ­
s ta n c e s , and the P re s id en t o f th e  Council of M in is te rs , a p o s i­
t io n  n o t mentioned in  th e  th ree  basic  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  documents 
o f the Third Republic, was to  become the implementor o f the 
execu tive  power.
C h ev a llie r suggests th a t  the  underly ing  conception o f the
Presidency of the Third Republic can be expressed in  one
sen ten ce : the P re s id en t i s  "un c h e f - ro i ,  sau f le  nom e t  la
d u r é e . I t  i s  tru e  th a t  i f  one depended upon A rtic le s  3 and
5 o f the C o n s titu tio n a l Law o f February 25, 1875, r e la t iv e  to
th e  o rg an iza tio n  o f p u b lic  powers, to the  exclusion  o f a l l
e l s e ,  one could be persuaded by the log ic  o f C h e v a llie r ' s
reason ing . A rt ic le  3 s ta te s  th a t :
The P resid en t o f th e  Republic has the i n i t i a t i v e  of 
the  laws . . .  He prom ulgates the laws . . .  He super­
v is e s  them and in su re s  th e i r  execution . . .  He has the 
r ig h t  to  pardon. He commands the armed fo rc e s . He 
appoin ts a l l  c i v i l  and m il i ta ry  personnel. He p res id es  
a t  n a tio n a l ceremonies ; the  envoys and the ambassadors 
o f fo re ign  powers a re  ac c red ited  by him.^
A r t ic le  Five:
The P re s id en t o f the  Republic may, on the  advice o f the 
Senate , d isso lv e  the Chamber of Deputies before the 
e x p ira tio n  o f th e i r  normal te rm .4
^Herman F in e r , The Governments o f  G reater European Powers 
(New York: Henry H olt C o . ,  195&), p . 308.
^C h ev a llie r, p . 312.
^Duguit and Monnier ( e d s .) .  Les C o n s ti tu t io n s , pp. 319-20.
4 lb id . . p . 320.
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There I s ,  however, a  sm all paragraph a t  the conclusion o f 
A r t ic le  3 which should n o t be n eg lec ted : "Each o f  the  a c ts
o f the  P re s id e n t o f  the  Republic must be countersigned  by a  
M in is te r . Consequently, the g ra n t o f  conqsetence i s  th e o re t­
i c a l l y  la rg e  b u t p r a c t ic a l ly  q u ite  v a r ia b le ,  depending upon a 
v a r ie ty  o f  circum stances: the r e la t io n s h ip  bet^reen the P re s i ­
dent o f  the Council and the  P re s id en t o f  the Republic; the 
cap ac ity  and v ig o r  o f  the h o ld e r o f  the  p re s id e n tia l  o f f ic e ;  
the com plex ities o f  m u ltip a rty  government; and the t r u s t  o r  
d i s t r u s t  o f  the execu tive  agency by th e  v o tin g  p o p u la tio n .
To understand  the p o l i t i c s  o f  th e  T hird  R epublic, i t  i s  
necessary  to  remain cogn izan t o f  the  f a c t  th a t  in  r e a l i t y  i t  
con tained  no c le a r - c u t  se p a ra tio n  o f  powers: th a t  the  Execu­
tiv e  and L e g is la tiv e  elem ents bo th  stemmed d ir e c t ly  from the 
people and were designed to  be kep t in  eq u ilib riu m  by a s e r ie s  
o f  checks and b a lan ces . At most th e re  was a  sep a ra tio n  o f 
fu n c tio n s , b u t i t  i s  undeniable and im p era tiv e ly  im portan t th a t  
the s e a t  o f  n a tio n a l sovere ign ty  la y  so le ly  in  the N ational 
Assembly.
The primacy o f th e  law ( lo i )  had surv ived  b u t i t  was 
sev ere ly  b a t te re d  by th e  expansion o f the  o rdain ing  power o f  
the Head o f  S ta te .  At th is  ju n c tu re , c o n s t i tu t io n a l  d o c tr in e  
and ju risp ru d en ce  had come to  recognize fo u r d i f f e r e n t  types 
o f  ord inances : ord inances made in  the execution  o f laws; 
ord inances dea ling  e i th e r  w ith  the  o rg an iza tio n  o f the  p u b lic
h b i d .
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se rv ices  o r  w ith  m atters o f  p o lic e ; ordinances made npon sp e c ia l 
parliam entary  delegation  on m a tte rs  which a re  norm ally d e a lt  
w ith  by s ta tu te ;  and c o lo n ia l o r d i n a n c e s T o  th ese  ca teg o rie s  
must be added a f i f t h  group—decree laws f d ^ c re ts - lo is ) --^ h ich  
were exem plified  by the o v e r tly  u n c o n s titu tio n a l ordinances o f 
the F i r s t  Eapixe th a t  were accepted by the Cour de c a s sa tio n : 
by the decrees o f  the P ro v is io n a l Government o f  1848 which, as 
a  de fac to  government, lacked any c o n s ti tu t io n a l b a s is ;  and by 
the  decree o f  Louis Napoleon, issued  a f te r  the  coup d 'E ta t  o f 
1851 and r a t i f i e d  by the C o n s titu tio n  of 1852.
I t  i s  th is  c o n f l ic t  between the f ro n t ie r s  o f  ordinance 
and law—th is  interw eaving o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l ,  q u a s i-c o n s titu ­
t io n a l ,  and u n c o n s titu tio n a l forms—th a t  p a tte rn s  the back­
ground ag a in s t which we can observe the development and evolu­
tio n  o f c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  in  la te  n in e teen th  and tw en tie th  
cen tu ry  France.
^ i n c e  the time o f the  Consulate the Govermeent has exer­
c ise d  wide o rdain ing  powers in  the  co lo n ie s . Under the  Second 
Eaq>ire these powers were given  a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  foundation . 
A rt ic le  27 ( l )  o f  the C o n s titu tio n  o f 1852 au th o rized  the 
Senate to  make c o n s ti tu t io n s  fo r  the co lon ies and the  S faa tu s- 
eonsu lte  o f  May 3 , 1854, empowered the Ea^eror to  le g is la te  
w r  the  ’g re a te r  p a r t  o f  th e  c o lo n ia l eaqpire u n t i l  a  time when 
a  fu tu re  SA natus-consults would reg u la te  the whole m a tte r . In  
l ie u  o f fu r th e r  *ac tio n , th e  S dnatus-consu lts  o f  1854 remained 
the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  b a s is  f o r  a l l  c o lo n ia l oxdiavM es issu ed  by 
the  Government. S ie g h s r t, p . 258.
CHAPTER I I I  
PROCEBBEES FOR ABMIHISTRATIVE ACTION
Viewed in  p e rsp e c tiv e , i t  i s  apparen t th a t  during the 
l i f e  o f  the T hird Republic the o rdain ing  power o f  die French 
E xecutive was v a s t ly  inc reased  u n t i l  i t  c o n s ti tu te d  a forw id- 
ab le  source o f  s u b - le g is la t io n . In  the face o f  "perpe tua l 
esiergency" —w hether economic, s o c ia l ,  o r  m il i ta ry —and the  
growing in c a p a c ity  o f  P arliasm n t, r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  a  coher­
e n t  S ta te  p o lic y  was p laced  square ly  in  the hands o f the 
E xecu tive . I t  was im perative th a t  th is  agent secure the  to o ls  
and produce the  energy necessary  to  defend the Republic 
ag a in s t in te rn a l  as w e ll as e x te rn a l dangers. I t  was necessary  
to  attem pt to  in c rease  the a u th o rity  o f  the  Executive to  the  
e x te n t th a t  i t  would be able to  d ea l e f f e c t iv e ly  w ith  the 
problems o f  the day, w ithou t so d r a s t i c a l ly  decreasing  the  
competence o f  the L eg is la tu re  and the  c o n tro l o f  the Ju d ic ia ry  
as to  undermine the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  balance o f powers.
An a n a ly s is  o f  th is  development and the im p lica tio n s  
therefrom  should take in to  co n s id e ra tio n  the ev o lu tio n  o f the 
o rdain ing  power in  F rance. To r e i t e r a t e ,  as e a r ly  as 1799,
^ u n r a . . pp . 17-18.
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the pouvoir r^&lementmire became a recognized fa c e t  o f  the 
French p u b lic  law system* I t  has become accepted in  c o n s ti­
tu t io n a l  usage th a t  the E xecutive i s  e n tru s te d  w ith  a d i r e c t ,  
spoBtnaoua ordain ing  cosqxetence to  b rin g  s ta tu to ry  laws 
passed by co^> eten t le g is la t iv e  a u th o r ity  in to  execu tio n .
This a u th o r ity  was v es ted  in  the P re s id e n t o f  the  Republic 
during the T hird  R epublic. By t r a d i t io n ,  such a u th o r ity  has 
been c ircum scribed , being considered  subord inate  to  the le g is ­
la t iv e  power in  th a t  an ordinance was n o t considered  capable 
o f  suspending, a l te r in g ,  o r  rep ea lin g  e x is t in g  le g is la t io n ,  
nor being eoq>loyed in  any fash ion  th a t  could  be considered  
co n tra ry  to  s ta tu to ry  law . A t th e  same tim e, i t  was e s ta ­
b lish e d  th a t  th is  o rdain ing  power was a d i r e c t  coa^etence o f 
the E xecutive a u th o rity  r a th e r  than a  derived  coiq>etence 
re s u lt in g  from d e leg a tio n  o f le g is la t iv e  a u th o r i ty . As such, 
d i r e c t  ordinance power in  the execu tion  o f the laws was an 
a u th o r ity  o f  lim ite d  scope. C o n s titu tio n a l safeguards evolved 
ag a in s t i t s  abuse: P arliam entary  c o n tro l ,  ju r i s d ic t io n  o f the
Council o f  S ta te ,  and J u r is d ic t io n  o f the Common Law C ourts.
In  the in stan ce  o f P arliam en tary  c o n tro l ,  i t  was imme­
d ia te ly  apparen t th a t  ord inances proclaim ed under d ir e c t  
E xecutive a u th o r ity  need n o t be se n t to  the Chambers fo r  
approval. I f  Parliam ent was d i s s a t i s f i e d  w ith  the  manner in  
which the E xecutive eaq>loyed the  o rd a in in g  power, i t  had the 
a u th o rity  to  withdraw confidence from the Government and fo rce  
i t s  r e s ig n a tio n . For the  Government was resp o n sib le  to
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Parliam ent no t only fo r  i t s  own a c ts  b u t a lso  fo r  the a c ts  o f  
th e  P re s id en t o f  the R epublic, which fo r  th is  purpose have to  
be countersigned by a re sp o n sib le  M in is te r . A lso, under the 
o rgan ic  laws o f the  T hird  Republic th e re  i s  a penal m in is te r ia l  
r e s p o n s ib il i ty ^  which r e la te s  n o t only to  crimes recognized by 
c rim in a l law b u t a lso  to any se rio u s  abuse o f p o l i t i c a l  power. 
Such penal r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  was su c ce ss fu lly  invoked a g a in s t the 
M in iste rs  o f C harles X as the r e s u l t  o f the issuance o f  the 
u n c o n s titu tio n a l ord inances o f  Ju ly  25, 1830. No doubt, con­
s id e rin g  the law o f  Ju ly  16, 1875, th is  type of r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  
could be invoked again in  the event o f  any se rio u s  abuse o f the 
o rda in ing  power.
J u r is d ic t io n  by the Council o f  s ta te  r e fe r s  to the su r­
v e illa n c e  by th is  ad m in is tra tiv e  tr ib u n a l o f  ad m in is tra tiv e  
o rd in an ces. To c l a r i f y  the e x te n t o f th is  c o n tro l ,  i t  should 
be recognized th a t  the French c o n s t i tu t io n a l  system d if fe re n ­
t i a t e s  between two d if f e r e n t  asp ec ts  o f the  Executive power: 
governmental fu n ctio n s and ad m in is tra tiv e  fu n c tio n s . Govern­
m ental a c ts  (a c te s  de gouvernement) are considered  o u ts id e  the 
competence o f ad m in is tra tiv e  law . These p e r ta in  to domestic 
m a tte rs , as the re la tio n s h ip  between the Government and Par­
liam en t; s e c u r ity  measures such as decrees e s ta b lish in g  the 
s ta te  o f  s ieg e ; in te rn a tio n a l  a f f a i r s ,  com prising e i th e r
^ A rtic le  12 o f  the law o f Ju ly  16, 1875 provides th a t :
"• • «Les m in is tre s  peuvent e t r e  M s en accusa tion  p a r l a  Chambre 
des depu tes, pour crim es commis dahs I 'e x ^ c i s e  de le u r  fonc­
t io n s .  En ce c a s , i l  so n t jugéS p a r le  S én a t."  Duguit and 
Monnier ( e d s .) ,  Les C o n s ti tu t io n s , p . 325.
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dip lom atic  r e la t io n s  and the in te rp re ta t io n  o f  d ip lom atic  a c ts ,  
o r  a c ts  r e la t in g  to e x te rn a l s e c u r ity ;  e x te rn a l mar; o r  co lo ­
n ia l  a f f a i r s .  Jurisprudence^ accepts the n e c e ss ity  f o r  the 
e x e rc ise  o f  independent d is c re tio n a ry  powers in  these a rea s  
o f  h igh  S ta te  p o lic y . Such d is c re tio n  i s  n o t considered  to  be 
a th r e a t  to  the le g a l i ty  o f  French ad m in istra tio n  fo r  i t  o f fe r s  
the  g re a t  advantage o f prov id ing  the Government w ith  a  neces­
sa ry  minimum o f d isc re tio n a ry  powers, which makes i t  p o ss ib le  
to  su b je c t the  remaining ad m in is tra tiv e  ordinances to  the  c lo se  
c o n tro l o f  the ad m in is tra tiv e  c o u r ts . Such a d is t in c t io n  f a c i ­
l i t a t e s  a prime achievement o f  French ad m in is tra tiv e  law—the 
p ro v is io n  to  each and every c i t iz e n  o f the p r iv ile g e  o f defend­
ing  h i s  r ig h ts  before an im p a rtia l ad m in is tra tiv e  tr ib u n a l 
applying ju d ic ia l  methods. C o nsisten t w ith  th is  p r iv i le g e ,  a l l  
ad m in is tra tiv e  ordinances a re  su b je c t to  challenge befo re  
ad m in is tra tiv e  c o u r ts ,^
The r ig h t  o f  appeal in  ad m in is tra tiv e  m atte rs  (reco u rs
1Jurisprudence r e f e r s  to  the "decisions o f c o u r t s ,”
While th e re  i s  no form al d o c trin e  o f  s ta re  d e c is is  in  th e  French 
le g a l  system , th e re  i s  a  s tro n g  and growing tmideacy on the  
p a r t  o f  French j u r i s t s  to  fo llow  p reced en ts , e s p e c ia lly  those 
o f  h ig h e r c o u r ts . "This tendency i s  based upon v ario u s asp ec ts  
o f  the  ju d ic ia l  e s p r i t  de co rn s , among them the m aintenance o f  
p ro fe ss io n a l d ig n ity , t£e  sharing  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  d ec i­
s io n s  w ith in  the ju d ic ia ry  as a  whole, the saving o f  tim e and 
re se a rch  fo r  a t te n tio n  to  o th e r  m a tte rs  where no p receden t 
e x i s t s ,  the fu lf i l lm e n t  o f  the e a ^ c ta t io n s  o f  p a r t ie s  who have 
r e l i e d  upon previous d ec is io n s  o f  the c o u r ts , and the  avoidance 
o f  excessive  o r  prolonged l i t i g a t io n  where a  uniform  l in e  o f  
d ec is io n s  c l a r i f i e s  doubtdEul i s s u e s .” lead  David and Henry P . 
de V rie s , The French Legal System, pp. 113-21.
^Appeals a re  p o ss ib le  a g a in s t every  ad m in is tra tiv e  dec- 
s io n  re g a w le s s  o f  w hether o r  n o t the r ig h t  i s  co n ferred  by
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co n tea tlew t) I s  d iv id ed  in to  two c a te g o rie s  : the recours de
p le in e  ju r is d ic t io n  and th e  recou rs en a n n u la tio n . The recours 
djBL P le in e  ju r i s d ic t io n  i s  designed to  p ro te c t  the in te r e s t s  o f 
p r iv a te  persons a g a in s t damages done by a d m in is tra tiv e  a c ts  
and to make the  a d m in is tra tio n  l ia b le  fo r  such damages. This 
type o f s u i t  i s  u s u a lly  brought on the occasion  o f an executory  
d ec is io n  and i s  d ire c te d  a g a in s t the a d m in is tra tiv e  a c t i v i t i e s  
which r e s u l t  from such a d e c is io n . The enforcem ent o f  the 
d ec is io n I and the le g a l  consequences which ensue, a re  admin­
i s t r a t i v e  f a c ts  which can be challenged  befo re  an ad m in istra ­
t iv e  t r ib u n a l .  The reco u rs  de p le in e  ju r is d ic t io n  c o n s ti tu te s  
a  g en e ra l r ig h t  o f  a c tio n  a g a in s t a l l  ad m in is tra tio n  o p era tio n s  
and i s  the o rd in ary  procedure o f  a d m in is tra tiv e  l i t i g a t i o n .
The second and e x tra o rd in a ry  p ro cess , the recours en an n u la tio n . 
i s  designed to  p ro te c t  the le g a l  o rd e r  and to  p reven t d ec i­
s io n s—taken in  v io la t io n  o f e x is t in g  laws—from having e f f e c t .  
The recours en an n u la tio n  ch a llen g es the v a l id i ty  o f  executory
s t a tu t e .  "This r e s u l t  was brought about by evolv ing a  v ery  
su b tle  conception o f  th e  executory  d ec is io n  w hich, in  s h o r t ,  
i s  construed  as the  u n i l a t e r a l  a fr irm a tio n  o f  a  r ig h t  which 
the  ad m in ia tra tio n  in ten d s  to  e x e rc is e : (1) Each appeal
addreased to  a  p u b lic  a u th o r ity  must u lt im a te ly  r e s u l t  in  an 
executory  d ec is io n  because o f  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f  the law o f 
Ju ly  17, 1900, which imply such a  d ec is io n  in  s i tu a t io n s  where 
th e  ad m in is tra tio n  re fu se s  to  a c t .  (Modem development tends 
to  r e s t r i c t  the  use o f  d is c re tio n a ry  power, n o t on ly  w ith  
reg ard  to  p o s it iv e  a c ts  b u t a lso  w ith  reg ard  to  the f a c t  th a t  
the  ad m in is tra tio n  can , a t  i t s  d is c re t io n ,  deny iu a t ic e  by mere 
in a c tio n . Thus, i f  th e  a d m in is tra tio n , even i f  i t  has the  
d is c re tio n a ry  power to  do so , does n o t d ea l w ith  a  claim  
addressed to  the com petent a u th o r ity  w ith in  fo u r  months, a 
p a r ty  concerned i s  e n t i t l e d  to  r e g û d  i t s  c la im  as re je c te d  
and to  b rin g  a p la in t  b e fo re  the Council o f  S ta te  under th is  
io te rp r e ta 3 o n  o f  the  law o f  J u ly  17, 1900, A r t ic le  3 , and 
(2 ) each executory  d ec is io n  i s  open to  a  reco u rs  co n ten tieu x . 
S ie g h a r t ,  p . 214, n o te  4 , and 216.
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d ec is io n s  and «re aimed a t  annulment o f  d e c is io n s . They r a is e  
p r im a rily  a  question  o f law. Q uestions o f  f a c t  p lay  b u t a 
secondary ro le  and claim s fo r  damages are  n o t ad m issib le . Con­
seq u en tly , under the competence reco u rs  en annu la tion  « p la in t ,  
recou rs pour excès de p o u v o ir, may be addressed to  th e  Council 
o f  S ta te  req u es tin g  the  annulment o f  an ad m in is tra tiv e  d ec is io n  
considered  to  be u l t r a  v i r e s .^  D ecisions may be n u l l i f i e d  i f  
they l i e  o u ts id e  the competence o f  the agency which makes them;^ 
i f  they  v io la te  p re sc rib e d  forms o f  a d m in is tra tiv e  procedure; 
i f  they  c o n s t i tu te  a  s iisa p p lic a tio n  o f  power,^ o r  i f  they
^The c o n s t i tu t io n a l  foundations o f  the  u l t r a  v i r e s  p la in ts  
a re : (1 ) "Les réclam ations d'ineoaq>étence â  l^ e g a rè  des corps
a d m in is t ra t if s  me so n t en aucun cas du r e s s o r t  des trib u n au x , 
e l l e s  do iv en t ê t r e  p o rtée s  au r o i ,  ch ef de l 'a d m in is tra t io n
Sé n é ra le ,"  (Law o f O ctober 7 , 1900) and (2) "Le c o n s e il  'E t a t . . . s t a t u e  so u v e ra in em e n t...su r  le s  recours en annu la tion  
pour excès de pouvoir formes co n tre  le s  a c te s  des d iv e rs  
a u to r i té s  a d m in is tra tiv e s ,"  (Ordinance o f  Ju ly  31, 1945,
A r t ic le  3 2 ) . I b id . . pp . 217-18.
^Annulment by v i r tu e  o f  th e  incompetence o f  an adm inis­
t r a t iv e  agency i s  based on the  a s s e r t io n  A a t  a p u b lic  a u th o rity  
has made a  d ec is io n  in  excess o f  i t s  powers, th a t  i t  has usurped 
the a u th o r i ty  o f  ano ther agency. Examples o f  th is  s o r t  o f  in -  
competenc# a te  d a c ls lo a s  taken by th e  A dm in istra tion  which a re  
w itn in  th e  competence o f  e i th e r  th e  L eg is la tu re  o r  d ie  Ju d i­
c ia ry ;  o r  d ec is io n s  taken by an in f e r io r  r a th e r  than a  su p e rio r  
a u th o r i ty .  However, u l t r a  v i r e s  com plaints cannot be brought 
a g a in s t (a )  a c ts  which a re  n o t o f  an ad m in is tra tiv e  n a tu re , 
Æough they  emanate from an a d m in is tra tiv e  agency, such a# a c ts  
o f P re fe c ts  w id i reg ard  to  c r im in a l in v e s t ig a t io n s , o r  a c ts  o f 
Mayors w ith  regard  to  the c r im in a l p o lic e ;  (b ) a c ts  emanating 
from an ad m in is tra tiv e  agency which i s  n o t inc luded  e i th e r  in  
the a d m in is tra tiv e  h ie ra rc h y  o r  t u t e l l e ,  such as A cts o f  P ar­
liam en t, o r  d ec is io n s  taken by a  J u d ic ia l  a u th o r ity ; (c )  a c ts  
which do n o t have th e  c h a ra c te r  o f  executory  d e c is io n s , such 
as some m easures o f in te rn a l  ad m in is tra tiv e  d is c ip l in e ;  and (d) 
executory  d ec is io n s  which do n o t in f r in g e  upon any p r iv a te  . 
i n t e r e s t .  S ie g h a r t, p . 219.
^Decrees may be annu lled  f o r  m isap p lica tio n  o f  power i f  
the p u b lic  a u th o r ity  uses i t s  power f o r  purposes o th e r  than
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v io la te  the law .^ The powers o f  the Council o f  S ta te  w ith  
regard  to  u ltr&  v i r e a  p la in ts  c o n s is t  so le ly  in  the r ig h t  
e i th e r  to  d is sd ss  the  com plaints o r  to  annul the ad m in is tra tiv e  
d ec is io n  which i s  cha llenged . There can be no m od ifica tion  o r  
amendment o f  the a c t  in  question  because th is  would be ta n ta ­
mount to  tak in g  a new ad m in is tra tiv e  d ec is io n , which the Coun­
c i l  o f  S ta te  i s  n o t e n t i t l e d  to  do, although the  Council can 
pronounce a  p a r t i a l  annulment o n ly , which leaves the rem ainder 
o f  the a c t  in  fo rc e .
The c o n tro l o f  th e  Common Law Courts ( c iv i l  law) i s  le s s  
s ig n i f ic a n t  than  th a t  o f  the ad m in is tra tiv e  c o u r ts .  Any person 
sued o r  p rosecu ted  in  connection w ith  p ro v is io n s  contained  in  
an ad m in is tra tiv e  ordinance can claim  th a t  the ordinance i s
those which had been co n ferred  upon i t ,  no tw ithstand ing  the 
f a c t  th a t  s a id  p u b lic  a u th o rity  mav have been ac tin g  w ith in  
the scope o f  i t s  competence, had observed a l l  p re sc rib ed  form s, 
and was n o t v io la t in g  th e  law. Such a  n u l l i f i c a t io n  may be 
achieved when i t  i s  shown to  thé  s a t i s f a c t io n  o f the Council 
o f  S ta te  th a t  a  p u b lic  a u th o r ity  seeks a  purpose o th e r  than 
the safeguard ing  o f  the  p u b lic  in t e r e s t  and the  b e n e fitin g  o f 
the p u b lic  s e rv ic e s . Examples: (1 ) The C ouncil o f  S ta te
annu lled  a  governm ental decree which d isso lv ed  a  m unicipal 
co u n c il in  o rd e r  to  red re ss  e le c to r a l  i r r e g u la r i t i e s .  I t  was 
h e ld  th a t  th e  GovemÉmmt can d isso lv e  a  m unicipal co u n c il only  
fo r  th e  purpose o f  secu ring  p roper ad m in is tra tio n  fo r  a  commnne 
and th a t  th e  d is s o lu tio n  in  question  was a  m isap p lica tio n  o f 
power. (tecuejLL.de C oope^ d'EU&t, 1902^ p . 5 5 .)  (2 ) The
Council o f  S ta te  ann u lled  a  d ec is io n  o f G eneral Andre, the 
M in is te r  o f  Mar, who had excluded a  g ra in  d e a le r  from p a r t i c i ­
p a tio n  fo r  c o n tra c ts  issu ed  by th e  war o f f ic e  on the grounds 
th a t  h is  p o l i t i c a l  and r e l ig io u s  op in ions were d isag reeab le  to 
the M in is te r  o f  War. I t  was h e ld  th a t  th e  motive involved was 
w ithou t r e la t io n  e i th e r  to  the c o n tra c t involved o r  to  the 
m erchan t's  p ro fe s s io n a l cam acity.^ ( te c u e i l  de C onseil d 'E ta t ,  
1905, p . 7 5 7 .) Leon D uguit, L g J  
B.W. H nebsch,.1919), pp . 1 8 8 -W T
4 rh is  type o f  a l le g a tio n  i s  d ire c te d  a g a in s t any mis­
a p p lic a tio n  o f  a  law , w hether done w ith  o r  w ith o u t in te n t .
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ou tside the competence o f the ad m in is tra tiv e  ordinance power. 
The co u rt, i f  i t  holds the defense to  be v a l id , is  e n t i t l e d  to 
re fu se  the ap p lica tio n  o f the ordinance to  the p a r t ic u la r  case 
in  question . However, u n lik e  the ad m in is tra tiv e  ju d ic ia l  
h ie ra rch y , the Common Law Courts have ab so lu te ly  no a u th o rity  
to  annul ad m in is tra tiv e  o rd inances.
A second type o f ordinance which should be d is tin g u ish ed  
from the " d ire c t ,  spontaneous Executive ordinance" i s  the 
règlem ent d ' adminis t r a t io n  pu b liq u e . ^ which f i r s t  appeared in  
the C o n stitu tio n  o f the Year V III , bu t d id  not come in to  
frequent use u n t i l  the Second R e p u b l i c .  ^ In the Third, Fourth , 
and F if th  Republics a g rea t m a jo rity  of the s ta tu to ry  le g is la ­
tio n  contains a c lause requ estin g  th e i r  completion by the 
issuance o f a règlem ent d ' adminis t r a t io n  pub lique. Whether 
based upon parliam entary  delegation^ and as a consequence
The word "law" in  th is  connotation  includes ordinances which 
are  binding upon the A dm in istra tion . The A dm inistration is  
under an o b lig a tio n  to  re sp e c t judgments given e i th e r  by ju d i ­
c i a l  o r ad m in is tra tiv e  T ribunals and the v io la tio n  o f a r ig h t  
e s tab lish ed  by such a judgment can be challenged by a p la in t  
fo r  v io la tio n  o f a law. S ieg h a rt, p . 223.
l"Une règ le  o b lig a to ire , in sp iré e  par le  pouvoir exécu­
t i f ,  su r in v ita t io n  fo rm elle  du lé g is la te u r  e t  p r ise  après 
av is de l'Assem blée générale  du C onseil d 'E ta t .  Gasquet, La 
n atu re  ju r id iq u e  du règlemen t d ' a d m i n i s t r a t io n  pub lique, p. 12. 
S ieg h a rt, p 7 262.
^Supra. . pp. 31-32.
^"Le règlem ent d 'a d m in is tra tio n  publique e s t  c e lu i qui 
procède non des pouvoirs généraux gue le  Chef de l 'E t a t  t i e n t  
de la  C o n s titu tio n , mais d 'une délégation  sp éc ia le  qui e s t  
f a i t e  par une lo i  déterm inée, en vue de com pléter c e t te  l o i ,  
d 'é c l a i r c i r  ses d isp o s itio n s , de développer le s  p rinc ipes
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achieving  exemption from ju d ic ia l  co n tro l^  o r r e s u l t in g  from 
parliam en tary  in v ita t io n  to  the P resid en t o f the Republic to 
ex e rc ise  h is  own com petence,% the  règlem ent d 'a d m in is tra tio n  
publique has emerged in  the tw en tie th  cen tury  as a device whose 
so le  purpose is  the com pletion o f s ta tu to ry  law. I t s  o b jec tiv e  
is  " le  prolongement de la  l o i , a n d  as such i t  cannot suspend, 
amend, o r rep ea l any v a l id  s ta tu to ry  law. In th is  in te rp r e ta ­
t io n , then , the règlem ent d 'a d m in is tra tio n  publique becomes 
nothing more than a unique form o f the Executive ordinance in  
execution  o f the  law.
A th ird  type of Executive ordinance goes as f a r  back as 
the C o n s titu tio n  o f the Year I I I .  This form, the autonomous 
ord inance, i s  issu ed  n e ith e r  in  the execution of s ta tu to ry  laws 
by the Executive nor as the r e s u l t  o f sp e c ia l parliam en tary  
d e leg a tio n . I t  has evolved in  reco g n itio n  o f the cap ac ity  o f 
the  Executive to  superv ise  and to  re g u la te  i t s  own ad m in is tra tiv e
q u 'e l le  a posés, de décide comment e l l e  devra ê t r e  exécu tée ."  
L a f fe r iè re , T ra ité  de la  ju risp rudence  a d m in is tra tiv e . 2® ed. 
S ie g h a rt, p . 262.
^"Grandes compaignes des chemins de f e r , "  R ecueil de 
C onseil d 'E ta t  (December 6 , 1907), p . 1913.
2According to  Esmein the r e a l  meaning o f the eiq>owering 
c lau se  was to  in v ite  the P re s id e n t of the Republic to  ex e rc ise  
h is  own power and to  p re sc rib e  a sp e c ia l form in  which to  exer­
c is e  i t .  Thus, the le g is la to r  does no t c re a te  the  power bu t 
does, in  f a c t ,  l im it  i t  by p rov id ing  th a t  these  ord inances must 
be subm itted to  the Council o f S ta te .  I f  th e  règlem ents 
d ' adminis t r a t io n  publique a re  n o t laws but o rd in an ces , they are  
l ia b le  to  c o n tro ls  ap p licab le  to  ad m in is tra tiv e  o rd inances.
A. Esmein and H. Nézard, Eléments de d ro i t  const i tu t io n n e 1 . . . ,
I I ,  pp. 82-86. See a lso  A. Esmein, "De la  d é lég a tio n  du pouvoir 
l é g i s l a t i f , "  Revue p o li t iq u e  e t  p arlem en ta ire  (1894), p . 200.
3
Léon D uguit, T ra ité  de d r o i t  c o n s t i tu t io n n e l . IV, p . 7477.
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ag en ts . As the  L e g is la tu re  vas Incapable o f  coping w ith  the 
d e ta i le d  o rg an iza tio n  o f  adm inis t r a t i o n , i t  became necessary  
f o r  these  problems to  be d e a l t  w ith  by E xecutive o rd inance. 
T his was achieved in  an j d  hoc fash ion  u n t i l  January 1 , 1884, 
when the law o f  December 29, 1882, en te red  in to  fo rce  and 
provided th a t  the o rg an iza tio n  as w ell as any fu tu re  a l t e r a ­
t io n s  in  the s tru c tu re  o f  M in is tr ie s  must be achieved through 
the  issuance o f  règlem ents d « admf«is t r a t io n  n u b lia u e . S ince 
the  passage o f the law o f June 20, 1920, the c re a tio n  o f admin­
i s t r a t i v e  o rg an iza tio n  by ordinance i s  no lo n g er p o ss ib le  as 
i t  was h en cefo rth  req u ired  in  th e  form o f s ta tu to ry  law.
Autonomous ord inances a lso  comprehended p o lic e  m a tte rs . 
From 1923 onward, w i&  th e  autonomous issuance  o f a  u n if ie d  
Highway Code (Decree o f  December 31, 1922), th e  P re s id e n t o f  
th e  Republic ex e rc ise d  an o rd a in in g  power in  m a tte rs  o f  p o lic e  
competence, which being n e i th e r  a  de legated  power nor a  power 
based on A r t ic le  3 o f  th e  law o f  February 25, 1875, must be 
considered  to  have developed as th e  r e s u l t  o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
u sage .^  The p re c ise  l im i ts  o f  the  scope o f autonomous o rd i­
nances in  p o lic e  m a tte rs  a re  very  d i f f i c u l t  to  a s c e r ta in .  
Ihxquestionably, they may be challenged  b efo re  the  C ouncil o f 
S ta te  and the  Cour de c a s s a t io n , and i t  i s  to  the  sK>st com­
p l ic a te d  ju risp rudence  o f  th ese  bodies th a t  one must look fo r  
d e f in i t iv e  l im ita t io n s .  However, i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  autonomous
^Duguit, T ra i té . . .  IV, p . 736.
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ordinances may n o t a l t e r  e x is t in g  laws nor c re a te  new p e n a l t ie s .^
I t  was npon these th ree  a sp ec ts  o f  the  pouvoir rdelem sn- 
t a i r e  o f  the  E xecutive—spontaneous, d i r e c t  ord inances in  exe­
cu tio n  o f  the law s, rexlesients d ' adminis t r a t io n  p u b liq u e , and 
autonomous o rd inances—to g e th e r w ith  the  s ta te  o f  s ieg e  and 
enabling  p rocedures, th a t  French c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  o f  p re -  
1945 v in tag e  were b u i l t .  In  i t s  a t te s y t s  to  cope w ith  World 
War I ,  w ith  the economic and s o c ia l  convulsions o f  th e  in te r -  
war y e a rs , and w ith  World War I I ,  th e  Governments o f  France 
found i t  necessary  to  r e ly  upon v igorous expansions o f  E xecutive 
a u th o r ity . As a  foundation fo r  c r i s i s  government in  World War 
I ,  the s t a t e  o f  s ieg e  was invoked and an o rdain ing  power was 
claim ed from th e  im p lica tio n s  o f  th i s  p rocedure. The d i r e c t  
o rdain ing  power in  execution  o f th e  laws was extamdmd beyond 
the range o f  t r a d i t io n a l  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ra c t ic e  and enab ling  
laws were passed  by Parliam ent p rov id ing  fo r  Executive a u th o r ity  
in  areas norm ally rese rved  fo r  the le g is la t iv e  power (pouvoir 
l é g i s l a t iv e ) .
A t the  o u ts e t  o f h o s t i l i t i e s ,  the P re s id en t o f  the Repub­
l i c ,  on b e h a lf  o f  the resp o n sib le  Government, issu ed  a  s e r ie s  
o f  decrees r e s u l t in g  in  suspension and d ir e c t  derogation  of 
s ta tu te  law . These la titu d in o u s  ex ten sio n s  o f the a u th o r ity  
o f  the E xecutive to  c a rry  the laws in to  execution  w ere, from 
th e i r  in c e p tio n , o u ts id e  the  le g a l competence o f  the d i r e c t
k b i d . .  pp. 737-38.
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ordain ing  power o f  the P re s id en t o f  the Republic on which they 
were pu rported  to  be based. However, d esp ite  th e i r  ra th e r  
obvious i l l e g a l i t y ,  once these  ex trao rd in a ry  ord inances became 
a r e a l i t y  o f  French p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  th e re  was an attem pt to 
le g itim a tiz e  them. In  a n o tab le  attem pt to  equate law ( lad ) 
w ith  p o l i t i c a l  p ra c tic e  (n ra t io u e r ) . the Council o f  S ta te  dev­
eloped the  concept o f  pouvoir de guerre^ as le g a l bu t pseudo­
c o n s ti tu t io n a l  b a s is  fo r  ex tra o rd in a ry  ex tensions o f  Executive 
cooqpetence in  an eaergency. By the a r r ê te  o f  Ju ly  15, 1915, 
the Council d is tin g u ish e d  between prim ary and secondary law 
and allowed the P re s id en t o f the  Republic to suspend secondary
law, i f  obedience to  i t  was made iaqx>ssible by the conduct o f 
2
the w ar. However, th is  d is t in c t io n  was dropped in  1918 as 
was a  prev ious requirem ent o f  parliam en tary  r a t i f i c a t i o n .^  I t  
was fu r th e r  acknowledged, in  the a r r ê te  o f  May 14, 1920, th a t
^The concept o f  pouvoir de guerre achieves le g a l s ta tu re  
in  the sense th a t  i t  i s  the r e s u l t  o f p o s it iv e  d ec is io n s  ren­
dered by the Council o f S ta te  in  i t s  fu n c tio n  as an adm in istra­
t iv e  c o u r t .  I t  must be considered  a p se u d o -c o n s titu tio n a l con­
c e p t, however, as i t  c o n s t i tu te s  a most s tr a in e d  in te rp re ta ­
tio n  o f A r t ic le  3 o f  the  C o n s titu tio n a l Law o f  February 25, 
1875, which provides a u th o r ity  to  the P re s id en t o f d ie  Republic 
to execute the laws o f the S ta te .
law o f  1839 provided a u th o rity  to  the Government to 
p lace G eneral O ffic e rs  on the  r e t i r e d  l i s t  a t  i t s  d is c re t io n .
A supplem entary law o f 1912 amended th is  p re ro g a tiv e  w ith  the 
p ro v is io n  th a t  such power cou ld  be ex e rc ised  on ly  w ith  the 
opinion o f  th e  S uperio r Council o f  the  War. As i t  became im­
p o ss ib le  to  convene th is  body during the  e a r ly  p o rtio n  o f World 
War I ,  a decree was issu ed  suspending ^  p ro v is io n s  o f  the 
supplem entary law. This decree was upheld by the Council o f  
S ta te .  F rance. C onseil d 'E ta t .  30 j u i l l e t  1915, V e rr ie r , 
R ecu e il, p . 257.
^France« C onseil d 'E t a t . 28 ju in  1918, "H eyries,"
R ecu e il» p . 651.
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the P re s id en t o f  the Republic had the a u th o rity  to  take a l l
necessary  aeasu res  which were ind ispensab le  to the  execution
o f the laws and which conformed to  the goals o f  l e g is la t io n  as
1
proposed by the L e g is la tu re . This in te rp re ta t io n  was circum­
sc rib ed  in  th e  sense th a t  the a p p lic a tio n  o f Executive powers 
so recognized depended d i r e c t ly  upon p r a c t ic â l  p o l i t i c a l  c i r -  
cumstan ce . As a consequence o f  th is  approach, th e  Council
in  the aforem entioned d ec is io n  o f  May 14, 1920, d ec la red  v a l id  
a decree o f  Ebvesdber 30, 1917, which r e s t r i c te d  th e  manufac­
tu re  and s a le  o f  bskery p roducts which c le a r ly  in fr in g e d  upon 
the guaran tee o f  freedom o f  tra d e  which had been provided as
f a r  back as the  C o n s titu tio n  o f  1791. I t  approved o f govem -
3m ental c o n tro l o f  tra n sp o r ta tio n  o f g ra in  and guaran teed  to 
the  Government the p r iv ile g e  o f  choosing a t  w i l l  the  merchants 
to  be used as in te rm ed ia tes  between the  S ta te  and the  c i v i l
^France, C o n y i l  d 'E t a t . 14 mai 1920, "Syndicat N ational 
de l a  Boulangerie de P a r i s . ’' l e c u e i l .  p . 499. See a ls o ,  A.
Bosc, "Actes de gouvernement e t  th é o rie  des pouvoirs de g u e r re ,” 
Revue du N ro it P u b lic . E LIII (A p ril-Ju n e ) , p . 239.
^"En temps de guerre  ou ^  c r i s e  grave le s  pouvoirs ac­
cordés p a r l a  l o i  au gouvernement do iven t ê t r e  in te rp r é té s  de façon 
ex ten s iv e , mais p o r ta n t le  C onseil d 'E ta t  n 'adm et pas l a  l i b e r t é  
de 1 ' ad m in is tra tio n  dans le  choix  des moyens de c o e rc i t io n .
En cas d 'u rgence e t  de p é r i l  immédiat, au c o n t r a i r e ,  l e  C onseil^  
cHÊtat accep te que c e t te  l i b e r t é  s o i t  p lu s grande e t  i l  reco n n a ît 
i  1 ' ad m in is tra tio n  le  d r e l t  d 'u s e r  de moyens de c o e rc it io n  p lu s  
énten&M . La p lace  nous manque pour te n te r  un p a r a l l e l  p lus 
pousse de l a  th é o rie  des pouvoirs de guerre e t  de c e t te  s i tu a ­
tio n  d 'u rgence e t  de p é r i l  grave dans la q u e lle  l a  ju risp ru d en ce  
permet i  1 'ad m in is tra tio n  d 'u s e r  de 1 'exécution  fo rcée  p a r  l a  
vo ie a d m in is tra tiv e ."  Bosc, pp . 256-57.
^France, C onseil d 'E t a t . 4 ju in  1924, "S ég u ie r,"  R e cu e il. 
p . 370.
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population*^ In  fac t»  the C ouncil o f  S ta te ,  in  reco g n itio n  
o f the d e s i r a b i l i ty  o f  according g re a t  freedom to the  E xecutive 
in  execu ting  the law s, ru le s  in  i t s  a r r e te  o f  June 24, 1924, 
th a t  i t  was n o t p o ss ib le  fo r  a le g is la t iv e  d is p o s itio n  to  ob­
l ig e  th e  Government to  determ ine Ija advance the d u ra tio n  o f  a 
re g u la tio n  which i t  m ight le g a l ly  i n s t i t u t e .^
This p re d ile c tio n  in  fav o r o f  an ex tension  o f  the  d i r e c t  
o rd a in in g  power o f  the P re s id e n t o f  the  Republic in  tim es o f 
emergency was n o t shared  by the  Common Law C ourts o r  th e  m ajor­
i t y  o f  French c o n s t i tu t io n a l  lawyers* The Cour de c a s sa tio n  
took a more conven tional view o f  attem pts to in c re ase  the  com­
petence o f  the E xecutive and was q u ite  w illin g  to  d ec la re  
i l l e g a l ,  and re fu se  o b lig a to ry  fo rce  to ,  decrees which i t  con­
s id e re d  to  be in fringem ents upon th e  p ro v is io n s  o f  e f f e c t iv e  
laws*^ L e g a lis ts  such as Henry Nézard, the e d i to r  o f  the 
Esmein t r e a t i s e ,  s tro n g ly  contended th a t  the d o c trin e  o f  
pouvoir de guerre  as form ulated by the Council o f  S ta te  had no 
b a s is  in  th e  C o n s titu tio n a l Laws o f  the  Third Republic*^
Nézard a s s e r te d  th a t  the  C o n s titu tio n a l Law o f  February 25,
1875 charged the P re s id e n t o f  th e  Republic w ith  the  execu tion  
o f the laws—by le g a l means—and he in s is te d  th a t ,  w ith  th e  
excep tion  o f  budgetary m a tte rs  which could be d e a l t  w ith  by
^France, C onseil d 'E ta t .  8 Ju in  1923, "S ieu r M ichel," 
R ecu e il* p* 472*
^France, C onseil d 'E t a t . 27 ju in  1924, "Chambre sy n d ica le  
des p & tis s ie r s , co n fise u rs  ées A lpes-M aritim es,"  R e cu e il, p* 380*
^A* Esmein and Henry Nézard, D ro it C o n s ti tu t io n n e l. I l ,
(8 th  é d .;  P a r is :  R ecueil S ire y , 1 9 2 )), p* 103*
4 lb id .
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s p e c ia l laws y ^  the d o c trin e  advocated by the Council of S ta te  
could n o t be j u s t i f i e d  sh o rt o f  a g en e ra l law analogous to  
A r t ic le  14 o f  the C harter o f 1814. This type o f a u th o rity  
c e r ta in ly  was n o t provided fo r  by the  fundamental laws o f  the  
T hird  R epublic .^  The C o n s titu tio n a l Laws, in  Nézard*s in t e r ­
p r e ta t io n ,  provided no sp e c ia l powers ap p licab le  in  emergency 
s i tu a t io n s  o u ts id e  the conq>ass o f  o rd in a ry  procedures. Conse­
q u en tly , in  d ire  c r i s i s ,  the recourse  o f the  Government was 
o f n e c e s s ity  to  i l l e g a l  processes w ith  le g itim a tio n  to  be 
sought afte rw ards in  the form o f  a  b i l l  o f  indemnity o r  o th e r  
le g a liz in g  procedure,^  In  the d o c tr in a l  in te rp re ta t io n  o f 
Nézard, the Government o f the French Republic may in  grave 
c r i s i s  have the duty to  a c t  co n tra  leaem . though i t  never has 
th e  le g a l r ig h t  to  do so
Following th is  same l in e  o f approach, both Nézard and 
Léon Duguit r e j e c t  the attem pts o f  v a rio u s  French Governments 
to  deduce an ex cep tio n a l o rdain ing  power from the law o f 
August 9 , 1849, which in s t i tu te d  th e  modem s ta te  o f  s ie g e . 
T heir con ten tion  i s  th a t  the Government i s  empowered to  apply 
expressed  a u th o r ity  con ferred  upon i t  by the s ta te  o f s ie g e , 
b u t th a t  such powers do n o t in  any form inc lude  competence to  
is su e  g en era l ru le s  in  execution  o f  th e  law s.^  The s ta te  o f
l l b i d .
Z ib id .
^ Ib id . . pp . 104-05.
S b i d . . pp. 103-05; S ie g h a r t, p . 271.
5 lb i^ ,   ^ pp . 102—03; D uguit, T r a i t e . . .  « 11%, p . 752.
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sieg e  may provide a lim ite d  ordain ing  competence w ith in  the 
scope o f  I t s  clrcuBiscrlbed and defined  s ta tu to ry  a u th o r ity , 
bu t I t  o f fe r s  nothing more than th is  conq>etence to  the Exec­
u t iv e .
However, In c o n tra s t  to  Nezard, Duguit takes the p o s i­
tio n  th a t  the  Government has a r ig h t  and a duty to  Issue 
ord inances co n tra ry  to  o p e ra tiv e  law when such ordinances 
are  considered  necessary  to  the defense o f e s ta b lish e d  so c i­
e ty .^  In  th is  In te rp re ta t io n  I t  becomes the r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  
o f  the  Courts to  enforce E xecutive a u th o rity  based on d r o i t  
de n é c e s s ité  by su s ta in in g  ord inances In  m o d ifica tio n , sus­
pension , o r  even abrogation  o f  e x is tin g  s ta tu te s  provided 
th a t  c e r ta in  con d itio n s a re  f u l f i l l e d . % This a n a ly s is  does 
n o t g ive the Executive c a r te  blanche to extend the d ir e c t  
o rdain ing  power o f the P re s id e n t o f the Republic In  time o f 
c r i s i s .  I t  recognizes the  le g a l i ty  o f ex tra o rd in a ry  procedures 
In s p e c if ic  emergency s i tu a t io n s  and condemns the Ind iscrim ­
in a te  f la u n tin g  o f  le g a l form which tra n sp ire d  during the 
F i r s t  World War. I t  does n o t approve o f  the co n tin u a l use o f 
ex tra o rd in a ry  powers based upon the ex tension  o f  the  o rd a in ­
ing power when a  re sp o n sib le  L eg is la tu re  I s  In  se ss io n .^
^Duguit, T ra i té . . . .  I l l ,  pp . 752-53.
^Ordinances can be Issu ed  co n tra  legem only  I f  the follow ­
ing co n d itio n s  a re  f u l f i l l e d :  (1 ) I f  th e re  I s  a s ta te  o f  war 
o r  an armed In su rre c tio n  o r  $ g en era l s t r ik e  a f fe c t in g  the pub­
l i c  s e rv ic e s ; (2) I f  P arliam ent I s  n o t assembled and I t  proves 
im possible to  reassem ble I t  In  time to  pass the necessa i^  
measures; and (3 ) I f  the ord inances a re  subm itted  to  Parliam ent 
as soon as p o s s ib le . D uguit, Trad.t é . . . .  I l l ,  p . 755.
3
Ib i^
59
There i s  no g e s t i o n  th a t  the competence o f  the Exec­
u tiv e  under A r t ic le  3 o f  the C o n s titu tio n a l Law o f  February 
25, 1875, to " s u rv e il le  e t  a ssu re  l 'e x é c u tio n  [jdes l o i ^  " was 
expanded o u t o f  a l l  p ro p o rtio n  to t r a d i t io n a l  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
u sage.^  During the course o f  the F i r s t  World War, these ex­
pansions o f  Executive competence proved to be e f fe c t iv e  i f  no t 
wholly s a t is f a c to ry  c r i s i s  d ev ices . D espite th e  r a t io n a l iz a ­
tio n s  o f  the Council o f  S ta te  and re fe ren ces  to  the  f a c t  th a t  
n e c e ss ity  knows no law ,^ these  procedures remained e s s e n t ia l ly  
e x t r a - le g a l—f a i l in g  to  achieve in t r in s i c  l e g a l i ty — though 
co n tr ib u tin g  handsomely to the e f f ic ie n c y  o f  war government.
French d o c trin e^  was even le s s  w il l in g  to  accep t the 
concept o f  d e leg a tio n  o f  le g is la t iv e  coiq>etence to  the Exec­
u tiv e  than i t  was to  approve o f ex tra o rd in a ry  expansion o f  the 
o rd a in in g  power o f  th e  P re s id e n t o f the R epublic . The m a jo rity  
o f  French c o n s t i tu t io n a l  lawyers re je c te d  the concept o f
^ i n c e  the s u b s t i tu t io n  o f A r t ic le  13 o f  the C h arte r o f 
1830 fo r  A r t ic le  14 o f  th e  C harter o f  1814, predom inant cons­
t i t u t i o n a l  usage has eo^hasized  th a t  o rd inances in  execution 
o f  laws were w ithou t a u th o r ity  to v io la te  the  e x is t in g  law.
^The law o f  n e c e s s ity  rece ived  a  c la s s ic  s ta tem en t in  
Jo se f  E b h le r 's  Ijtot kennt ke in  Gebot which s e t  f o r th  a p h ilo ­
so p h ica l ju s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  G enun in v asio n  o f  Belgium.
3 p o c trin e , a term  in  use since  the  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry , 
s ig n i f ie s  the  body o f  op in ion  on le g a l m a tte rs  expressed  in  
books and a r t i c l e s .  The word i s  a lso  used to  c h a ra c te r iz e  
c o l le c t iv e ly  the peraons engaged in  th ia  a n a ly s ia , a y n th e s is , 
and ev a lu a tio n  o f  le g a l  source m a te r ia ls , members o f  the le g a l  
p ro fe ss io n  who devote s u b s ta n tia l  a t te n t io n  to  sc h o la r ly  work 
and acqu ire  re p u ta tio n s  as a u th o r i t ie s ."  As an organized  
body o r le g a l  op in io n , doctxrine i s  in  no sense a  b ind ing  guide 
to  ju d ic ia l  d e c is io n . I t s  persuasive  a u th o r ity  i s  com pletely 
dependent upon the reg ard  f o r  le g a l sc h o la rsh ip  in  France and 
the  need fo r  c r i t i c a l  ev a lu a tio n  in  modem case  law develop- 
sm nt. René David and Henry P. De V rie s , The French Imgal 
sy stem , pp . 122-26.
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d e leg a tio n  o f le g is la t iv e  power because they f e l t  th a t  i t  
could  n o t be reco n c iled  w ith  the e x is ten c e  o f  a  r ig id  con­
s t i t u t i o n  which e n tru s te d  the  le g is la t iv e  power to  P arliam ent 
and the execu tive  power to  the  Government. In  o rd er to ex­
p la in  the f a c t  o f  empowering s ta tu te s  they  evolved a  v a r ie ty  
o f  th e o r ie s  a l l  b u i l t  on the assumption th a t  enabling  a c ts  do 
no t in  r e a l i t y  t r a n s f e r  the le g is la t iv e  power b u t on ly  extend 
the  o rd a in in g  power o f  the E xecu tive . Thus, they accepted the  
f a c t  o f  enab ling  s ta tu te s  b u t denied th a t  th e  power a c tu a l ly  
tr a n s fe r re d  was le g is la t iv e  power—a s c a t  ingenious b u t un­
sound su b te rfu g e .
Ju risp ru d en ce . on the o th e r  hand, was q u ite  w ill in g  to  
accep t the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  d e leg a tio n  and o f  ju d ic ia l  c o n tro l .  
This should n o t be in te rp re te d  to iaq>ly th a t  the Council o f 
S ta te  considered  le g is la t iv e  d e leg a tio n  to  the  Executive as a 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p rocedure, fo r  th i s  i s  n o t a  d ec is io n  which the  
Council o f  S ta te  o r  the  Cour de c a ssa tio n  i s  e n t i t l e d  to make, 
as i t  i s  a  w e ll-e s ta b lis h e d  p r in c ip le  th a t  the  French C ourts 
are  n o t e n t i t l e d  to examine the  question  o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty .  
A dm in is tra tive  c o u rts  a re  n o t the guard ians o f  the C o n stitu ­
t io n —only  guardians o f  the p r in c ip le  o f  l e g a l i ty  w ith in  the  
a d fld n is tra tio n .^  As a consequence, ju risp ru d en ce  has never 
questioned  the  fo rce  o f  law o f  decrees is su e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  
enab ling  s t a tu te s .  Any decree w ith  a  s l i g h t  connection to  
the aims l a id  down in  enab ling  laws have been accepted as
^ S ieg h a rt, p . 287.
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v a l id ,^  a l th o u ^  ord inances unconnected o r  in  obvious excess 
o f  c le a r - c u t  l in d ta t io n s  o f the law have been dec lared  u l t r a  
v i r e s . 2
In  defense o f  th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f these  ex trao rd in a ry  
p rocedures, esqphasis was p laced  upon the ex tension  o f reg u la ­
to ry  powers v es ted  in  the  P re s id en t o f th e  Republic^ r a th e r  
than upon parliam en tary  d e leg a tio n : n e v e r th e le s s , the r e a l i ty  
o f  th e  in cap ac ity  o f  P arliam ent could n o t be hidden nor f u l ly  
defended. What the  French n a tio n  req u ired  a t  th is  time was 
v ia b le  and, i f  p o s s ib le , c o n s t i tu t io n a l  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  
capable o f  supporting  v igorous governmental a c tio n .
l l b i d . . p . 288. See a ls o : F rance. Cass. e % ^ .,  22 fév­
r i e r  1939, " iu b e r t ,  G runeberg.” R ecueil S ire y , 19##, I ,  p . 1.
^ Ib id . . p . 288. See a ls o :  F rance. C onseil d 'E ta t .  24 
j u i l l e t  1945, S ieu r  X," R ecueil, p . 166.
^But e f f e c t iv e ly  u t i l i z e d  by th e  head o f  th e  resp o n sib le  
Government, the  P re s id e n t o f th e  Council o f M in is te rs  and h is  
C ab inet.
CHAPTER IV 
THE STATE OF SIEGE AND WORLD VAR I
I t  vas hoped th a t  a  p a r t i a l  answer to  the need fo r  
vigorous ac tio n  could be found in  the s t a t e  o f s ie g e . A t the  
beginning o f  World War I ,  France tu rned  to  th is  c la s s ic  and 
most su c ce ss fu l o f  a l l  esiergency procedures in  the c i v i l  law 
w orld . I t  was in  the s t a t e  o f  siege th a t  France sought the 
means to  c o n tra c t c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s  and to adapt the lo c a l  le v e ls  
o f government to  the  requirem ents o f  n a t io n a l emergency.
In  C lin ton  R o s s i te r 's  a n a ly s is , i t  was in  th is  ty p ic a l ly  
French so lu tio n  to the competing claim s o f freedom and au thor­
i t y  w ith in  a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  government in  c r i s i s  " th a t  modem 
emergency government reaches i t s  peak o f  in s t i tu t io n a l  and 
le g a l p e r fe c tio n ." ^  R o s s ite r  eoqphasized th a t  the “s ta te  o f  
s ieg e  i s  em inently a  product o f  h is to ry  and em inently an in s ­
t i t u t i o n  o f law . . .  fo reseen  and methodized in  d e ta i l  by 
laws o f  P arliam ent . . .  and y e t fo r  a l l  i t s  r e g u la r iz a tio n  by 
law . . .  more a p roduct o f  h is to ry  than o f  le g is la t iv e  a c t i ­
v i ty , 1.2
C l in to n  R o s s ite r , ConsÜ tu tio n a l  D ic ta to rsh ip  (P rinceton ; 
P rin ce to n  R a iv e rs ity  P re s s , 1948), p7 19•
^ Ib id .
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I t  should be understood th a t  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  as we 
know them in  France developed a f t e r  the  Revolution o f 1789. 
Before th is  tim e, i t  was "unnecessary to  suspend r ig h ts  • . • 
th a t  j jd i^  n o t e x i s t  o r  to  augment powers th a t  • , .  were a l ­
ready absolute#"^
As an in s t i t u t i o n ,  the s ta te  o f  s ieg e  o r ig in a te d  as a 
s t r i c t l y  occasional m il i ta ry  dev ice , though i t  u ltim a te ly  
developed in to  a c i v i l  and p o l i t i c a l  procedure. This conver­
sion  began w ith  the law o f  Ju ly  10, 1791, which recognized  the  
s ta te  o f  siege as sosmthing more than an ad hoc in s t i t u t i o n .  
This law p resc rib ed  th a t  "concerning the conservation  and 
c la s s i f ic a t io n  o f m il i ta ry  a reas  . . .  a l l  a u th o rity  w ith  
which the c i v i l  o f f ic e r s  a re  c lo th ed  by the c o n s t i tu t io n  fo r  
the maintenance o f o rd e r . . .  w i l l  pass to  the m il i ta ry  com-
A
manders" in  event o f  a t ta c k . Though c le a r ly  a a i i l i t a r y  
d ev ice , in  th is  t r a n s f e r  o f  a u th o r ity  from the c i v i l  to  the 
m il i ta ry  one may f in d  the seed o f what we know today as the 
modem s ta te  o f  s ie g e .^
This evo lu tion  from a m il i ta ry  s ta te  o f  s ieg e  ( é t a t  de 
s iè a e  r é e l )  to  a p o l i t i c a l  s t a te  o f  s ieg e  ( é t a t  de s îd e e  p o l i ­
tiq u e )—l 'u n  qui e s t  un f a i t , e t  l 'a u t r e  qui e s t  un f ic t io n * — 
was g iven iaqpetus by the  law o f the te n th  F ru c tid o r  o f
^ Ib id . .  p . 80.
G a z e t te :  Im is A nnotées. 1 s t  s e r ie s  (1789-1830), p . 121, 
as quoted in  R o ss ite r , p .  80.
3 lb id .
*Joseph Barthélémy, "Le d r o i t  p u b lic  en temps de g u e rre ,"  
Revue du D ro it P u b lic , XXXII (January-K arch, 1915), pp . 139-49.
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th e  Year 5 (August 27, 1797), which provided th a t  re b e ll io n  
as w ell as fo re ign  invasion  could j u s t i f y  the estab lishm en t o f  
a s ta te  o f s ie g e . Based upon th is  i n i t i a l  d is t in c t io n ,  a d icho­
tomy was e s ta b lish e d  and although the p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f  s ieg e
1 2was g ro ss ly  abused by bo th  repub lican  and im peria l regim es, 
i t  emerged as more s ig n i f ic a n t  than th e  m il i ta ry  s ta te  o f 
s ie g e . The d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  between the s t a t e  o f s ieg e  in  i t s  
t r a d i t io n a l  sense (m il i ta ry )  and th a t  which is  considered  a 
p erv ersio n  ( p o l i t i c a l )  must be understood  as simple reco g n itio n  
o f the f a c t  th a t  th is  in s t i tu t io n  o r ig in a te d  as a device appro­
p r ia te  to  the defense o f a "besieged" a rea  and th a t ,  in  i t s  
e v o lu tio n , i t  expanded f a r  beyond the cpmpass of i t s  o r ig in a l  
prem ise.
In the p o l i t i c a l  s t a te  o f s ieg e  an open, c i v i l  a rea  
menaced by invasion  o r armed re b e ll io n  i s  regarded as besieged , 
which in  f a c t  i s  a f ic t io n  o f t r a d i t io n a l  usage. The prem ise 
in  the p o l i t i c a l  s t a te  o f s iege  is  th a t  the  Government should 
have a u th o rity  in  an a re a  comparable to  th a t  o f a m il i ta ry  com­
mander resp o n sib le  fo r  a beleaguered f o r t r e s s .  The d iffe re n c e  
between the two s i tu a t io n s  was exp la ined  by the deputy Bardoux 
befo re  the Chamber o f  Deputies on A p ril 3 , 1878, in  th e  fo llow ­
ing  manner:
There i s  the m il i ta ry  s ta te  o f s ie g e  and the p o l i t i c a l  
s t a te  o f s ie g e : the  former i s  a f a c t ,  the  l a t t e r  i s  a
f i c t io n ;  the  one has fo r  a goal th e  e f fe c tu a tio n  by
^Abuse by the  D irec to ry  as i t  sought ab so lu te  power.
2Napoleonic Decree o f A p ril 1, 1809, and December 24,
1811; see p a r t ic u la r ly ,  France, Jo u rn a l O ff ic ie l  de l a  Repub­
liq u e  f ra n ç a is e . Débats P arlem en taires (A p ril 3, 1878), p . 3890.
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a l l  w a n s , even those co n tra ry  to  r ig h ts  o f p ro p e rty , 
o f  the  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  honor o f  th e  command o f  a 
f o r t i f i e d  p la c e , and the  l a t t e r  has fo r  i t s  o b je c tiv e  
the s u b s t i tu t io n  o f an ex cep tio n a l p o l i t i c a l  s t a te  
f o r  a le g a l s ta te  in  o rd e r to  suppress pub lic  l i b e r t i e s .
The C o n s titu tio n  i n i t i a t i n g  th e  Second R epublic, th a t  of 
Noveitber 4 , 1848 (A r tic le  106), prosdsed  a fu n d aw n ta l law 
re g u la tin g  the forms and e f f e c ts  o f  the s ta te  o f s ie g e . When 
th is  pledge was red eew d  by th e  passage o f  the law o f  August 
9, 1849, the d is t in c t io n  between the s d l i t a r y  s ta te  o f  s ie g e , 
which was dependent upon laws and decrees handed down from the 
Empire and R evolutionary t i w s ,  and th e  p o l i t i c a l  s t a t e  o f  
s ie g e , based upon th is  new le g is la t io n ,  was embedded in  the  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd er o f  so c ie ty .
For the T hird  Republic the  e f f e c t s  o f  the imqplewnt a tio n  
o f  the p o l i t i c a l  s t a t e  o f  s ieg e  were reg u la ted  by the law o f 
August 9 , 1849 and th a t  o f  A p ril 16, 1916. This in s t i tu t i o n  
e x h ib its  th ree  predom inant c h a r a c te r i s t ic s .  F i r s t ,  the  m il i ­
ta ry  e s ta b l i s h w n t  i s  s u b s t i tu te d  fo r  the  c i v i l  power in  the 
e x e rc ise  o f  re g u la r  p o lic e  fu n c tio n s . The s u b s t i tu tio n  i s  a 
conqplete one although the c i v i l  a u th o r ity  may continue to  
e x e rc ise  those powers o f  which i t  i s  n o t d ispossessed  by the 
m i l i ta r y .  (A rtic le  7 o f the law o f  August 9, 1849.) In  
essence the G ovem w nt takes the m d lita ry  as i t s  ag en t. The 
r e s u l t  i s  a  system  o f  c o lla b o ra tio n  between the two a u th o ri­
t i e s .  Consequently, a r r ê té s  r e g le w n ta i r e s  o f p o l ic e , when 
taken by the m d lita ry  power, a re  sanctioned  in  the s a w  manner
F r a n c e . Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Débats P a r le w n ta ire s  
(A p ril 3 , 1878). p . 3892.
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as they would be i f  they were issued  by the  c i v i l  a u th o rity , 
and the c i v i l  a u th o rity  r e ta in s  i t s  competence in  areas not 
touched by the m il i ta ry .^
Second, based upon A rtic le  9 o f the law of August 9,
1849, sp e c ia l and ex cep tio n a l powers evolve upon the m il i ta ry  
a u th o r ity : to  make searches by day and by n ig h t in  the p r iv a te  
residences of c i t iz e n s ,  to  deport l ib e ra te d  convicts and p e r­
sons no t having residence  in  the areas p laced  under th is  spe­
c i a l  regim e, to  d ir e c t  the su rrender o f arms and m unitions and 
to  proceed to  search  fo r  and to  remove them, and to fo rb id  
p u b lic a tio n  and meetings which are judged to  be of a n a tu re  to 
in c i te  o r to  su s ta in  d is o rd e r .%
T hird , the d is t in c t io n  between the m il i ta ry  s ta te  of 
s ieg e  and the p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f s iege  i s  recognized. The 
m il i ta ry  s ta te  o f s ieg e  i s  ap p licab le  only to  p laces under 
a t ta c k  and is  uniquely  designed to  p ro te c t  besieged a reas .
I t  i s  reg u la ted  by the aforem entioned law of Ju ly  10, 1791, and 
by d iv e rse  decrees, no tab ly  those o f December 24, 1811 and of 
October 4 , 1891. In th is  type of s i tu a t io n ,  the m il i ta ry  com­
mander i s  the judge o f the  events which re q u ire  the im position  
o f the m il i ta ry  s ta te  o f s ie g e . He has the au th o rity  to  apply 
th is  in s t i tu t io n  in  s i tu a t io n s  where he concludes th a t  such 
im position  is  a b so lu te ly  necessary  to  the  defense o f the be­
sieged  area .
^Maurice Hauriou, P réc ise  é lém en ta ire  de d ro it  c o n s t l tu - 
tio n n e l (P a r is : R ecueil S irey , 1925), p . 166.
Z ib id .
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The l«w o f  August 9, 1849, re g u la tin g  the p o l i t i c a l  
s ta te  o f  s ie g e , d id  n o t conform in  i t s  o rg an iz a tio n a l aspects 
w ith  the government e s ta b lish e d  by th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  laws o f  
1875. Consequently, in  the sp ring  o f  1878 a  new law re g u la t­
ing th i s  in s t i tu t io n  was in troduced , debated , m odified , and 
passed in  the le g is la t iv e  Chambers. The law o f A p ril 3 , 1878 
d id  n o t supersede the t i t l e s  o f  the 1849 law which d e a l t  w ith  
the e f f e c ts  o f  th i s  dev ice . I t  siaqsly brought the  o ld  law 
in to  conform ity w ith  the new c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd er by d e ta i l in g  
procedures fo r  the  estab lishm en t and term ination  o f the p o li­
t i c a l  s ta te  o f s ieg e  which were c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  s t r u c tu r a l  
forms o f the T hird  R epublic. Thus, the  two s ta tu te s  combine 
to  form the  le g a l b a s is  fo r  the p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f  s ie g e . The 
law o f  August 9 , 1849 c o n tro ls  the a p p lic a tio n  o f th i s  i n s t i ­
tu t io n ,  w hile the law o f A p ril 3 , 1878 reg u la te s  i t s  o rgan izer 
t io n .
The s ta te  o f  s ie g e , under the  term s o f the law o f 1878, 
can be dec lared  only  in  the event o f  imminent danger—th a t  i s ,  
war o r  in te rn a l  armed in s u r re c t io n . In  th is  sense i t  i s  a 
p reven tive  device r a th e r  than a  re p re ss iv e  one. I t  must be 
d ec lared  by law fo r  a  f ix ed  p erio d  o f  time and ap p lied  to  a 
s p e c if ic a l ly  designated  a re a . At th e  ex p ira tio n  o f th e  s t i ­
p u la ted  p erio d  o f a p p lic a tio n , the in s t i tu t i o n  ceases to  e x i s t  
u n less  new le g is la t io n  rev iv es  i t s  a p p l ic a b i l i ty .  (A r tic le  1 
o f  the  law o f  A p ril 3 , 1878.) I f  th e  Chambers a re  in  se ss io n , 
the e f fe c tu a tio n  o f  the  in s t i tu t i o n  i s  by le g is la t iv e
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d e c la ra tio n ; but in  the event the L e g is la tu re  is  adjourned, 
the P re s id en t of the Republic may i n i t i a t e  the p o l i t i c a l  
s ta te  of s ieg e  on the advice o f the Council o f M in is te rs . In 
th is  circum stance the Chambers may assemble ^  p le in  d ro i t  two 
days a f te r  the o r ig in a l  d e c la ra tio n . (A r tic le  2 .)  With one 
most s ig n if ic a n t  excep tion , the p o l i t i c a l  s t a t e  o f s ieg e  can­
n o t, even p ro v is io n a lly , be implemented by the Head of S ta te  
i f  the  Chamber of Deputies i s  d isso lv ed . The im portant excep­
tio n  to th is  ru le  i s  the cond ition  of fo re ig n  war. In th is  
extreme circum stance the P re s id en t o f the R epublic, on the 
advice of the Council o f M in is te rs , may d ec la re  the p o l i t i c a l  
s ta te  of s iege  in  opera tion  in  areas th rea ten ed  by the enemy 
on the cond ition  th a t  the e le c to ra l  co lleg e s  are  convoked and 
the Chambers reassem bled w ith in  the s h o r te s t  p o ss ib le  p eriod  
of tim e. (A rtic le  3 .)  I t  then follow s th a t  in  the in stan ce  
of war, the reassem bled Chambers may make the u ltim a te  dec ision  
as to  any fu r th e r  a p p lic a tio n  o f the in s t i tu t i o n .
The technique used to term inate the p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  of 
siege  is  dependent upon the manner in  which the in s t i tu t io n  
is  implemented. I f  the d ec la ra tio n  is  by law, the Chambers 
being in  se ss io n , and the du ration  o f i t s  a p p lic a tio n  being 
determ ined by law, i t  i s  r a is e d  au to m atica lly  a t  the e x p ira ­
tio n  o f the le g a lly  approved p erio d  o f fo rc e , un less a new law 
is  passed prolonging i t s  e f f e c t .  (A r tic le  1 .)  On the o th e r 
hand, in  the cases covered by A rtic le s  2 and 3—the Chambers 
adjourned o r the Chamber o f Deputies d isso lv ed —the Chambers, 
as soon as they are reassem bled, have the a u th o r ity  to  m ain tain
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o r to  l i f t  the in s t i t u t i o n .  In  case o f  disagreem ent between 
the  two Chambers, th e  in s t i tu t io n  may be concluded ^  p le in  
d r o i t . (A r tic le  5 .)
The e f f e c t  o f  the  p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f siege i s  the c re a ­
tio n  o f an ex cep tio n a l regime based on the law. Under such 
circum stance c e r ta in  guaran tees o f  in d iv id u a l l ib e r ty  may be 
suspended and the c iv i l i a n  popu la tion  may be sub jec ted  to  the 
ju r i s d ic t io n  o f the m il i ta ry  c o u r ts ,  where crimes and o ffen ses  
a re  involved th a t  th re a te n  the s e c u r i ty  o f the  S ta te .  C iv il  
c o u rts  are  pow erless under such a regime i f  lo c a l m il i ta ry  
c o u rts  d e s ire  to  e x e rc ise  competence. I t  i s  w ell known th a t  
b efo re  a c o u r t-m a r tia l ,  the guaran tees th a t  the accused 
o rd in a r i ly  enjoys a re  s tr in g e n tly  r e s t r i c t e d ,  the p e n a lt ie s  
a re  more sev ere , and procedure becomes more rap id . The r e s u l t  
can be no o th e r  than the  expansion o f the  f a c i l i t i e s  to  guaran­
tee  p u b lic  o rd e r  a t  th e  expense o f  in d iv id u a l l ib e r ty .
On the lo c a l  le v e l the p re fe c t  no longer has the  prim ary 
duty o f m ain tain ing  o rd e r , i . e . ,  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  t r a n s f e r s  to 
th e  commanding m il i ta ry  o f f i c i a l  in  each d i s t r i c t .  The com­
munal mayor no longer is su e s  a r r ê té s  on m atte rs  o f m unicipal 
p o lic e .  These o rd e rs  are  issu ed  by th e  lo c a l army commandant. 
Thus, vigorous m il i ta ry  a u th o rity  i s  s u b s t i tu te d  fo r  co n sid era ­
tio n s  o f  lo c a l p o l i t i c s  and p u b lic  r e la t io n s .
As has been p o in ted  o u t,^  th e  law au th o riz in g  the  m il i ta ry  
to  e x e rc ise  these  powers does n o t o b lig e  them to do so in
^ u p r a . . p . 66.
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f u l l . ^  The mayor, as an exaiq)le, r e ta in s  the p o lice  powers 
o f  which he has n o t been ex p ressly  re lie v e d  by the m il i ta ry  
a u th o r ity .
The p ra c tic e  o f  World War I  shows th a t  under th is  type 
o f  a u th o r ity  the hd lv ldua l dom icile I s  no longer In v io la te . 
Summary searches and se iz u re s  become a normal occurence. The 
freedom o f assembly I s  p ro h ib ite d  In  o rd er th a t  the p o lic e  
might move quickly a g a in s t the p ro fe ss io n a l a g i ta to r .  The 
p ress  I s  superv ised , presumably In the  n a tio n a l I n te r e s t .
There can be no question  b u t th a t  the p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f s iege  
I s  a  severe regim e. I t  cannot be o th erw ise , as f a i lu r e  would 
mean the  d e s tru c tio n  o f the le g a l o rd e r . I f  the  s i tu a t io n  Is  
so d esp era te  as to deisand the  I n s t i tu t io n  o f the s ta te  o f  
s ie g e , the  l i f e  o f  the S ta te  would norm ally hang In th e  b alance . 
This I s  s u f f ic ie n t  reason fo r  the r e s t r i c t io n  o f In d iv id u a l 
l ib e r ty  and the use o f  summary procedures.
The p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f  siege emerged In  the tw en tie th  
cen tu ry  as an I n s t i tu t io n  o f p o s it iv e  law whose o b je c tiv e  was
^Only the ex cep tio n a l powers enumerated on page 6 6 -  
searches and s e iz u re s , d ep o rta tio n , su rren d er o f  arms and 
m unitions, p ro h ib itio n  o f  p u b lic a tio n s—p e r ta in  e s p e c ia lly  to 
the m i l i t a i^  a u th o r i t ie s ,  who may In  no case hand over the 
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  them to  the  c i v i l  a u th o r i t ie s .  See: 
"M in istère  de l a  g u e rre . In s tru c tio n  ré g la n t 1*ex e rc ise  des 
pouvoirs de p o lic e  de l 'a u t o r i t é  m i l i ta i r e  su r  le  t e r r i t o i r e  
n a tio n a l en é t a t  de s iè g e ,” (O ctober, 1913) as noted In  P ie rre  
Renouvln, The Foras o f W«.Govemment In  France (New Haven:
Yale U n iv ersity  P re ss , 1927), p . 12.
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the defense o f the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd e r  f l a pjl t l t »  défense de 
l 'E t a t ) . I t  made a b so lu te ly  no p ro v is io n  fo r  the suspension o f  
the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd e r . I t  was prem editated  on the assump­
tio n  th a t  the le g a l  powers o f  government are  s u f f ic ie n t  to  meet 
severe  th re a ts  to the  p u b lic  o rd e r . Consequently, as an I n s t i ­
tu t io n ,  t i l ls  procedure le g itim a tiz e s  the  temporary and s e le c t­
iv e  augm entation o f a d l l t a r y  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  according to  s ta tu ­
to ry  p r in c ip le s  and w ith in  the scope o f  the  e s ta b lish e d  regime 
o f  l e g a l i ty .  I t  I s  a  le g a l  procedure p repared  In advance o f 
d i f f i c u l ty  and d ed ica ted  to  the assurance o f o rd e r.
C o n s titu t io n a lly , during the regime o f the  p o l i t i c a l  
s t a te  o f  ^lege the E xecutive and L e g is la tiv e  powers remain In 
t h e i r  normal r e la t io n s h ip .  There I s  no fundamental a l te r a t io n  
o f th e  o rg an iza tio n  o f  the p u b lic  powers. As defined  by law, 
m o d ifica tio n  and tran sfe re n c e  o f  competence takes p lace  between 
two branches o f  the  E xecutive power. I . e . ,  the c i v i l  a u th o r ity  
and th e  m il i ta ry  a u th o r i ty .  The g re a t  va lue  o f the p o l i t i c a l  
s t a t e  o f  siege to the p ra c t ic e  o f  emergency government I s  th a t  
I t  p rov ides a  v eh ic le  f o r  the lé g itim a t:e t r a n s fe r  o f  s e le c te d  
p o lic e  and rep re ss iv e  a u th o r ity  to  the  m il i ta ry  under sp e c if ie d  
c ircum stances. In d efin ed  a re a s , and fo r  lim ite d  p erio d s  o f  
tim e.
I t  I s  a slxq»le f a c t  th a t  war and l ib e r ty  do n o t go w ell 
to g e th e r . When a sovereign  n a tio n  I s  In  a c r i s i s  s i tu a t io n ,  
the  p a r t ic u la r  demands o f  th e  In d iv id u a l tend to  recede In to  
the background. R espect f o r  t r a d i t io n a l  r ig h ts  become an 
encumbrance th a t  the S ta te  f in d s  most d i f f i c u l t  to  b e a r .
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C onsiderate  trea tm en t and wide indulgences are  a c o n tra d ic tio n  
to  a  "g a rriso n  s ta te "  f ig h tin g  fo r  i t s  l i f e  in  fo re ig n  war o r  
in  a  n a tio n  racked by in te rn a l  r e v o l t .  In  p a r t ic u la r ,  war 
demands s t r i c t  d is c ip l in e  and prompt obedience. An in c re a se  
in  governmental a u th o r ity  i s ,  by the very  n a tu re  o f th e  s i tu a ­
t io n ,  a necessary  c o ro lla ry  o f  major em ergencies. De T ocqueville  
w rote th a t :  "War cannot f a i l  to add enormously to  the  fu n c tio n s
o f c i v i l  government; alm ost in v a ria b ly  i t  co n cen tra tes  in  the 
hands o f  the  l a t t e r  the  d ire c tio n  o f the whole p o p u la tio n  and 
the  d isp o sa l o f  e v e ry th in g ."^  This miay be a w ell-understood  
d o c tr in e , bu t d ie  French co n s titu tio n -m ak crs  o f 1875 d id  n o t 
p rov ide fo r  such an e v e n tu a l i ty .
The d isp o s itio n s  inc luded  in  French law fo r  use a t  such 
a time were very  sp a rse  and fragm entary; th e i r  o b jec ­
t iv e  was very  l im ite d  and they d id  n o t a t ta c k  the main 
problems o f  ad m in is tra tio n  and government; A ey  d id  n o t 
modify the normal r e la t io n s  between the  Executive and 
the  L e g is la tu re .2
At the  ou tb reak  o f  World War I ,  in  an attem pt to  m ain ta in  
in te rn a l  o rd er during  th e  ch ao tic  p e rio d  o f g enera l m o b iliza­
t io n ,  France tu rned  to  the prim ary instrum en t in  h e r  c r i s i s  
a rse n a l—the p o l i t i c a l  s t a te  o f  s ie g e . On th e  second o f 
A ugust, 1914, P re s id e n t Poincare p laced  the  e n t i r e  French n a tio n  
under th is  ex cep tio n a l regim e. At the  same tim e, he convoked 
the  Senate and the Chamber o f  D eputies in to  e x tra o rd in a ry  se s­
s io n  though th i s  was n o t a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  n e c e s s ity , a s  the
^Alexis de T o cq u ev ille . Democracy in  America (New York:
The Appleton and Company, 19041.
^ Ib id .
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L e g is la tu re  had every r ig h t  to  meet two days a f te r  the im ple­
m entation o f the i n s t i t u t i o n . !  However, such reco g n itio n  o f 
th e  L eg is la tu re  was c o n s is te n t w ith  the  philosophy of coopera­
tio n  between elements o f government in h e ren t in  the concept of 
Parliam entary  government and i t  in d ic a te d  re sp e c t fo r  two s ig ­
n i f ic a n t  p o in ts : One, th a t  the p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f s ieg e  was a
le g a l instrum ent u ltim a te ly  resp o n sib le  to  the  holder o f 
n a tio n a l sov ere ig n ty , the L e g is la tu re , and, two, th a t the 
Executive is  dependent upon the coopera tion , indeed, upon the  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  and approval, o f the L eg is la tu re  i f  i t  expects 
to  c re a te  a v iab le  war o rg an iza tio n .
On August 5 , 1914 a law re g u la tin g  th e  o rg an iza tio n  of 
the  p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f s ieg e  was prom ulgated. I t  was passed 
in  the p rec ise  form s t ip u la te d  by the Government.^ In th is  
way France faced up to  the  emergency and implemented the a v a i l ­
ab le  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n  in  the  manner deemed expedient by the 
re sp o n sib le  Executive a u th o rity . I ro n ic a l ly ,  th is  procedure, 
d ed ica ted  to  the defense o f the le g a l o rd e r , was implemented
^A rtic le  2 of the law of A pril 3, 1878. R o ss ite r , p . 82.
2
The law of August 5, 1914, regard ing  the  s ta te  o f  s ieg e  
s t ip u la te s  th a t :  "The s t a t e  o f s iege  i s  dec la red  . . .  in  8b
French departm ents, the  t e r r i t o r y  o f B e lfo r t ,  the th ree  d ep a rt­
ments o f  A lgeria  and i s  hereby m aintained fo r  the du ra tion  o f 
the war. A decree o f the  P re s id en t o f  the  Republic, issu ed  on 
th e  advice o f the C ouncil o f  M in is te rs , can l i f t  the s ta te  o f  
s ieg e  and, a f t e r  i t  has been l i f t e d ,  r e e s ta b l i s h  i t  in  a l l  
p a r ts  o f  an a rea . The p re se n t law, d e lib e ra te d  upon and adopt­
ed by the  Senate and the Chamber of D epu ties, i s  to  be executed 
as the  law o f the S ta te ."  F rance. Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . .  (August 
6 , 1914), p . 7126.
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in  a fash ion  in c o n s is te n t w ith  p re v a ilin g  opinion and in te r ­
p re ta tio n  regard ing  the c o n tro ll in g  law o f A pril 3, 1878.
Three aspects of the  August, 1914 im plementation of the p o l i ­
t i c a l  s ta te  o f s iege  were in c o n s is te n t w ith  p rev iously  accepted 
usage: the ap p lic a tio n  of the regime to  the  t o t a l i t y  o f N ation;
i t s  implementation fo r  the  duration  o f the war; and the g ran t 
o f a u th o rity  to  the P resid en t o f the Republic to  l i f t  the in s ­
t i t u t i o n  and then to  r e e s ta b lis h  i t  i f  necessary . These were 
com pletely ou tside  the  purview o f the 1878 law. However, i t  
i s  im portant to  r e a l iz e  th a t  the France o f 1914 was not the 
France of 1849 or o f 1878. The war o f 1914-1918 tended to  be 
a c o n f l ic t  between n a tio n s and peoples involv ing  the t o t a l i t y  
o f  the  populations r a th e r  than dynastic co n fro n ta tio n s . New 
m il i ta ry  techniques were employed which involved la rg e r  number 
and g re a te r  areas than ever b efo re . With th e  French nation  
under d ir e c t  a t ta c k , i t  was lo g ic a l ,  indeed, ab so lu te ly  neces­
sa ry , to  expand the concept of "imminent danger"^ to  include 
the e n t i r e ty  o f the S ta te .
During th is  p eriod  the m il i ta ry  s ta te  of siege remained 
9a re p re ss iv e  in s t i tu t io n  av a ila b le  fo r  the defense o f a be­
sieged  a rea , w hile the p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f s iege  emerged as a
^A rtic le  1 o f the  law o f A pril 3 , 1878: "The s ta te  of
s ieg e  can only be dec lared  in  the event o f imminent danger 
r e s u l t in g  from a fo re ig n  war o r an armed in su rre c tio n  . . . "  
R o ss ite r , p. 82.
  ^Gaston Jèze , "L 'E ta t de S iège ,"  Revue du D roit P u b lic ,
XXXII (October-Décember, 1915), p. 704.
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preven tive^  I n s t i tu t io n  e v e ila b le  fo r  the  defense o f  m besieged 
a re a . I t  was under the procedures ap p licab le  through the in s ­
t i t u t io n  o f the p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f  s iege  th a t  th e  g re a t  p o rtio n  
o f France liv e d  from August 2, 1914 u n t i l  October 12, 1919.
In  response to  c r i t i c is m  regard ing  the len g th  o f  ap p lica ­
t io n  o f  the  p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f  s ie g e , th e  P re s id e n t o f  the 
Council o f  M in is te rs , V iv ia n i, to ld  the Chamber o f  Deputies 
th a t :
So long as th e re  siust be between the in t e r i o r  and the 
f ro n t ,  a co n s tan t movement o f tro o p s , a  i^ o le  system 
o f m il i ta ry  p re p a ra tio n s , o f tra n s p o r t o f  every kind 
in  o rd e r to  supply the  m il i ta ry  a u th o r i t ie s  w ith  what 
they need, w i l l  you t e l l  me how, looking a t  the  m atte r 
so le ly  from the o u ts id e  p o in t o f  view, I  am to  s e t  
about abo lish ing  the s t a t e  o f  s ieg e  w ith o u t r e a l  and 
se rio u s  detrim ent to  the  n a tio n a l defense?2
N ev erth e less , the C abinet decided , on September 1, 1915, to  
r e s to re  to  the p re fe c ts  and mayors o f  the i n t e r i o r  zones a l l  
o f  th e i r  normal p o lic e  fu n c tio n s . As a conseq[uence, command­
a n ts  in  these areas l o s t  th e  powers they had derived  from the 
law o f  August 5 , 1914,^ though they  d id  r e ta in  the enumerated 
s p e c ia l competences d e leg a ted  by th e  terms o f A r t ic le  9 o f  the 
law o f 1849.4 However, c i v i l  a u th o rity  was again  suspended in  
the departm ent o f L o ire - In fé r ie u re  in  Ju ly  o f  1917 in  o rder to 
p rev en t spying on the disem barkation o f American tro o p s , and
l l b i d .
2 ■
Renouvin, p . 32.
^Sunra. . p . 73, Note 2 . 
^Supra. . p . 66.
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the ex cep tio n a l powers o f  the  m il i ta ry  commandants were sim ul­
taneously  enlarged^ in  Nantes and S a in t  N azaire and in  n e a rly  
a l l  th e  arrondissem ents from Bordeaux to  B re s t, as w ell as 
those along the Channel and M editerranean c o a s t .%
At the  tifl»  o f th e  A rm istice , France could  be sa id  to  be 
d iv id ed  in to  th ree  zones in  terms o f the a p p lic a tio n  o f  proce­
dures fo reseen  by the s t a t e  o f  s ie g e . Near the a rea  o f  combat— 
the army zone—the Comoiander-in-Chief ex e rc ise d  a l l  the powers 
provided by the law o f  1849 and the  decree o f  August 10, 1914,3 
The c o a s ta l  zone was su b jec ted  to an " in te n s i f ie d ”^ program 
under which the  odLlitary enjoyed sp e c ia l powers sp e lle d  o u t in  
the decree o f  Ju ly  6 , 1917;^ and th e  rem aining a reas—the 
in te r i o r  zone—from September 1 , 1915 onward opera ted  under a 
conq>aratively l ib e r a l  regime w herein the c i v i l  a u th o rity  resumed 
the f u l l  e x e rc ise  o f  i t s  a u th o r ity .
C i r c u l a r  o f  the  M in is te r  o f  I n te r io r  o f  September 1 , 1915, 
and o f  the  M in is te r o f  War o f  Septeod>er 8 , 1915. Renouvin, p . 32.
2Renouvin, p . 33.
^The decree o f  August 10, 1914 p laced  the n o rth ea s te rn  
departm ents o f  France in  a  s t a te  o f  war ( é t a t  de g u e r re ) ; and a 
second decree , o f  September 3 , 1914, extended th is  to  th e  
e n t i r e ty  o f  th e  n a tio n . The m ajor purpose o f  these  decrees was 
th e  m od ifica tion  o f th e  procedures o f  c o u r ts -a w r tia l  in  the  
i n t e r i o r  o f  th e  co u n try , i . e .  a  person could  be a r re s te d  fo r  
s e d itio u s  l i b e l  o r  s e d it io u s  speech ( d é l i t  d*opinion) and could  
be t r i e d  w ith in  24 hours a f t e r  b e in g -summoneu.
^ ^ n o u v in , p . 33.
Ssnnra. . p. 75 f f .
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D espite the f a c t  th a t  re g u la tio n s  Issu ed  in  th e  a p p lic a ­
tio n  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f  s ieg e  tended to  have the p rac­
t i c a l  e f f e c t  o f  la * ,^  i t  can be s a id  th a t  the  s ta te  o f  s iege  
d id  n o t o f  i t s e l f  provide the French government w ith  any e x t ra ­
o rd in ary  powers o f  d ec ree . In  essence , th e  s ta te  o f  s iege  
remained an in s t i tu t i o n  ded icated  to  the defense o f  law. I t  
provided f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  s ig n i f ic a n t  t r a n s f e r s  o f  conqxetence— 
b u t tr a n s fe r s  w ith in  th e  regime o f  l e g a l i t y .  We conclude th a t  
d ev ia tio n s  from t r a d i t io n a l  in te rp r e ta t io n s  do no t negate  i t s  
fundam ental u se fu ln e ss  as a  prim ary emergency in s t i tu t i o n  o f 
c r i s i s  government.
In  judging the e f f ic a c y  o f c r i s i s  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  one comes 
face to  fa ea  w ith  th e  question  o f the  r e la t io n s h ip  o f  such 
in s t i tu t io n s  and P arliam entary  government. Are the two concepts 
m utually  exc lusive? In  the  l a s t  a n a ly s is  can mixed government— 
P arliam entary  and C abinet government^—cope w ith  a su s ta in ed  
emergency?
C e rta in ly , w arfare  i s  one severe  t e s t  o f  the s tre n g th  and 
adequacy o f a p o l i t i c a l  system . The very  circum stances o f  con­
f l i c t  tend  to  in v e s t  the  E xecu tive , in  r e la t io n  to the L egis­
la tu r e ,  w ith  s in g u la r  a u th o r ity .
I f  P arliam en tary  government i s  to  prov ide adequate le a d e r­
sh ip  in  a wartime c r i s i s ,  the  p r in c ip a l  agent o f  a u th o r ity  must
^ P a r tic u la r ly  w ith  regard  to  the a p p lic a tio n  o f  A r t ic le  9 
of th e  law o f August 9 ,
^S u p ra ., p . 10.
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be the Executive power. By World War I  the day had passed 
when Parliam ent could ex e rc ise  d i r e c t  tu te la g e  over the admin­
i s t r a t iv e  agencies o f government. In 1914 France looked not 
to  a d e l ib e ra tiv e  'Assembly w ith  i t s  in term inable delays but to  
an agency which promised immediate a c tio n —the Executive.
On August 4, 1914 the Parliam ent o f France confirmed the 
P re s id e n tia l  proclam ation o f August 2 e s ta b lish in g  the s ta te  
o f s ie g e ; expressed i t s  confidence in  the Government; passed 
le g is la t io n  to  p ro te c t c i t iz e n s  in  the m il i ta ry  se rv ice  from 
fo rec lo su re  and from dunning from c re d i to r s ;^  extended modest
a ss is ta n c e  to  fam ilie s  o f members of the armed fo rces who were 
2
in  need; au th o rized  the P re s id en t o f the Republic, upon the 
advice o f the Council o f S ta te  and th e  Council of M in is te rs , 
to  decree an in c rease  in  the number o f bank notes th a t  the  Bank 
of France could  issu e  and to  o rder the opening of supplementary 
c re d i ts  to  finance the war;^ and then adjourned. A war o f s ix  
months or le s s  was expected; the  lo g ic a l  rep o s ito ry  o f the 
f a i th  and confidence o f the Nation was the Executive power; 
Parliam ent p laced  i t s  confidence in  the Government and, under 
i t s  c o n tro l, in  the m il ita ry  might o f France ; and a su ccessfu l 
te rm ination  o f h o s t i l i t i e s  was expected in  the immediate fu tu re . 
Though some 200 P arliam en tarians jo in e d  th e i r  m il ita ry
^France, Jou rnal O f f i c i e l . . .  (August 6, 1914), p . 7127. 
Zib id .
3 lb id .
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regim ents,^  the le g is la t iv e  session  was no t c lo sed . I t  was 
p o ss ib le  fo r  the Chambers to reassem ble again on the summons 
of th e i r  re sp e c tiv e  P re s id e n ts . However, in  September, 1914 
the s i tu a t io n  became so c r i t i c a l  th a t  the s e a t  o f  Government 
was tra n s fe rre d  to Bordeaux and the P re s id en t o f  the Republic 
term inated  the se ss io n . He c i te d  "c ircum stances,"  the u rg en t 
needs "more numerous every day," and the presence under the 
co lo rs  o f a g re a t many members o f P arliam ent "who had n e i th e r  
the wish nor the a b i l i t y  to leave the r a n k s . T h e r e  were 
p ro te s ts  ag a in s t the pro rogation  o f  the h o ld e r o f  n a tio n a l 
sovere ign ty  in  a  time o f grave emergency. Such com plaints
^There was no adequate le g is la t io n  s e t t in g  fo r th  the 
functions o f Parliam ent during war. I t s  members were su b je c t 
to  m il i ta ry  s e rv ic e . In  the in te r e s t  o f  p rese rv in g  the tru ce  
between Republicanism and Reaction which the C o n s titu tio n  o f 
1875 rep resen ted , the Chambers had never taken the s tep  o f  
exempting i t s  members from m il i ta ry  s e rv ic e . To have done so 
would have in v ite d  the d e r is io n  o f the co n serv a tiv es  and th e i r  
m il i ta ry  a l l i e s ,  who in  the b e s t o f circum stances had a th in ly  
v e i le d  contempt fo r  "bourgeois p o l i t i c i a n s ."  Various h a l f ­
h ea rted  e f f o r ts  had been made to con fer upon the m obilized 
^ p u t i e s  a dual ro le  o f combatant and honorary l e g i s la to r ,  b u t 
n e i th e r  War M in is te r Georges Boulanger nor such successors as 
Maurice Berteaux and Louis L. K lotz succeeded in  g iv ing  d e f i ­
n i te  s ta tu s  to the wartime d u tie s  o f  the d e p u tie s . The only  
c la r i f i c a t io n  o f any s o r t  was the d ec is io n  o f Prem ier Paul 
Doumer and War M in is te r Eugène E tien n e , s ta te d  in  the m in is te r ­
i a l  c i r c u la r  o f  February, 1906, to g ran t d e p u tie s , in  event o f  
w ar, a period  o f e ig h t days w ith in  which to  jo in  th e i r  r e g i­
m ents. The inq>lications o f th is  p o licy  were tw ofold: (1) P ar­
liam ent was robbed o f many o f i t s  most v igorous members in  a 
period  of g re a t n a tio n a l c r i s i s  and (2) P arliam en ta rian s  se rv ­
ing in  the m il i ta ry  re tu rn ed  to  P a r is  when on leave and used 
c lo sed  committee sessio n s as p la tform s upon which to  c r i t i c i z e  
m il i ta ry  p o lic y . Je re  Clemens King, G enerals and P o l i t ic ia n s  
(Berkeley: U n iv ersity  o f  C a lifo rn ia  P re ss , 1951), pp. 16-17.
^Renouvin, p . 98.
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were based upon reasonably  sound le g a l ground, to o , as I t  
could  be argued convincingly  th a t  the s ta te  o f  s ieg e  isq»lied 
the permanence o f  le g is la t iv e  se s s io n s .^  But th e  v io len ce  o f  
war demanded a  Government o f a u th o r ity  and the N ation seemed 
w illin g  to  do w ithou t a  L e g is la tu re  fo r  a p e rio d  o f tim e. As 
a  r e s u l t ,  the Chambers were n o t reconvened u n t i l  D ecester 22, 
1914, and then th e  purpose was s i^ > ly  to g ive san c tio n  to  
decrees th a t  had been taken p rev io u sly  and to v o te  p ro v is io n a l 
c r e d i ts  f o r  the  co n tin u a tio n  o f  what was to  have been a  war o f  
on ly  a  few weeks. U ltim ate ly  they  reassem bled ^  p le in  d r o i t  
in  January , 1915, as was t h e i r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p re ro g a tiv e .
During th e  f a l l  o f  1914 i t  may have seemed th a t  the 
Executive governed "alone, w ith o u t the  coopera tion  o r  c o n tro l ' 
o f  the  L e g is la tu re .”^ In  an immediate and d i r e c t  sense th is  
judgment was n o t f a r  from the t r u th .  However, i t  should be 
recognized tiu it the  Chanters approved o f ,  in  f a c t  c re a te d , a 
m ajor p o rtio n  o f  the  f a c i l i t i e s  a v a ila b le  to  the E xecutive in  
th i s  p e rio d  o f  n a tio n a l emergency—th is  was co o p e ra tio n . A t 
the  same tim e, a  s u b s ta n tia l  p o rtio n  o f the decrees issu ed  by 
the E xecutive req u ired  P arliam en tary  confirm ation  upon the 
reassem bling o f  the  C hanters—th is  was c o n tro l ,  in d i r e c t  though 
i t  may have been . To i t s  c r e d i t ,  the V iv ian i regime had no 
in te n tio n  o f  evading the  o b lig a tio n s  o f  i t s  " re s p o n s ib il i ty "  
to  the  sovere ign  P arliam en t. N ev erth e less , the im position  o f
^ u p r a . . p . 79, Note 1 .
^In  a  n a tio n  faced  w ith  d ir e  emergency, th e  f i r s t  duty 
o f  a  re sp o n sib le  p o l i t i c a l  a u th o r ity  i s  to seek o u t methods 
adequate  to  th e  defense o f  th e  le g a l  o rd e r .
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th is  ex cep tio n a l regime suspended the t r a d i t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  o f  France and the Government was in v es ted , as much on i t s  
own a u th o rity  as by s t a tu t e ,  w ith  an au th o rity  tantam ount to  
v i r t u a l  d ic ta to rs h ip . This seeming co n tra d ic tio n —which i s  
a c tu a l ly  the problem o f  the  re la t io n s h ip  o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
d ic ta to rs h ip  to  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  democracy—was achieved by the 
a p p lic a tio n  o f  procedures which we la b e l c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  
to  a re p re se n ta tiv e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  democracy.
The convocation o f  the Senate and the  Chanter o f  D eputies 
in  the s in g u la r  co n d itio n s  o f th e  w in te r  o f  1913 underlined  
problems o f  parliam en tary  procedure whose so lu tio n  would d e te r ­
mine, to  a s u b s ta n tia l  e x te n t,  the ro le  to  be p layed by the 
L eg is la tu re  in  the  1915-1918 p e rio d . The organic procedure 
o f  the  re p re se n ta tiv e  assem blies was m odified in  an attem pt 
to  b rin g  these bodies in to  harmony w ith  the n e c e s s i t ie s  o f  the 
tim es. F i r s t ,  although P arliam ent r a r e ly  s a t  fo r  more than 
e ig h t  o r  n ine months a  y e a r , the Chambers remained in  permanent 
sessio n  a f t e r  January , 1915, u n t i l  the  c lo sin g  o f the o rd in ary  
se ss io n  in  1920.
Second, the Government now waived the p r iv i le g e  o f  
is su in g  decrees o f  p ro ro g a tio n . This may have been an a ttem pt 
to  remain c o n s is te n t w ith  the imqplications o f  the  p o l i t i c a l  
s ta te  o f  s ie g e , a lthough i t  seems more l ik e ly  th a t  the  Execu­
t iv e  wished to  in d ic a te  i t s  awareness o f  the in terdependence 
o f  ad m in is tra tiv e  and le g i s la t iv e  p o lic y .
T h ird , procedure was speeded up. L eg is la tio n  o f a  
permanent n a tu re  was req u ired  and t r a d i t io n  demanded th a t  the
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Chambers should c a rry  o u t some semblance o f th e i r  re g u la r  
fu n c tio n s . In  1917 a sp e c ia l procedure was in troduced  which 
allowed the C abinet to  req u ire  a  vo te  w ith in  tw enty-four hours 
o f  the in tro d u c tio n  o f  a  b i l l  i f  i t s  passage was deemed abso­
lu te ly  necessary  in  the judgment o f  the Government. In  th is  
way a strong  regim e, as th a t  headed by Clemenceau, was ab le  to 
gain  the unquestioned leg itim acy  which only  s ta tu to ry  procedure 
can provide and a t  the same time to  move quickly  and w ith  dec i­
s io n .
F ourth , e le c t io n s  were adjourned fo r  the du ra tion  o f  the 
w ar. With the  coun try  p a r t i a l ly  occupied, i t  was im possible 
to  ho ld  e le c t io n s .  When the  mandate o f one th i rd  o f  the  Senate 
exp ired  in  1915, th e  only  reasonable so lu tio n  under the circum­
stances was to  ex tend  th e  mandate. This was accomplished by 
the law o f  December 22, 1914. A s im ila r  so lu tio n  was adopted 
fo r  m unicipal c o u n c il lo rs ,  and in  1918, when the Chamber o f  
D eputies neared  the  end o f  th e i r  term , the same so lu tio n  was 
ap p lied .
Government and Army were charged w ith  the a c tiv e  conduct 
o f  the  war and as such they leaned s tro n g ly  toward the use o f 
a rb i t r a ry  m easures; w hile  P arliam en t, backed more and more by 
p u b lic  opinion as th e  war became drawn o u t over the y e a rs , 
provided a check upon these  ten d en c ies . The r e s u l t  was a 
somewhat uneven balance between power and l im i ta t io n s , between 
d ic ta to rs h ip  and democracy, between the demands o f  war and the 
demands o f  dem ocratic t r a d i t io n .^  Perhaps i t  i s  tru e  th a t
iR o s s i te r ,  p . 107.
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"the Importance of Parliam ent in  the  war government lay  more 
in  i t s  w ell-p layed  ro le  as defender of democracy than in  i t s  
le g is la t iv e  a c t i v i t i e s . Defender of democracy, l e g is la to r ,  
o r both—the ro le  of the Chambers and, consequently , the ro le  
o f the power o f the E xecutive, underwent s u b s ta n tia l  m odifica­
tio n  during the F i r s t  World War.
In normal cond itions the law can be modified only by vote 
o f the L e g is la tiv e  Chambers, and the au th o rity  to  in cu r expen­
d itu re s  and to  c o l le c t  taxes i s  av a ila b le  only under a y ea rly  
g ran t by Parliam ent. S p e c if ic a lly , these e s s e n tia l  fu n c tio n s 
were se r io u s ly  compromised during th is  p eriod .
In the f i r s t  p la ce , by the laws passed on August 4 and
published  on August 5 , 1914, the Government rece ived  from
the Chambers the au th o rity  to  make ordinances upon sp e c ia l
parliam entary  d elegation . This au th o rity  was no t in  the form
o f genera l enabling ac ts  but c o n s titu te d  sp e c if ic  de lega tions
of au th o rity  fo r  lim ited  purposes. Thus, a law of August 5
provided th a t :
. , . during the duration  o f h o s t i l i t i e s ,  the Gov­
ernment i s  au tho rized  to  tak e , in  the genera l i n t e r ­
e s t ,  by decree in  Council o f M in is te rs , a l l  the 
measures necessary  to  f a c i l i t a t e  the  performance or 
suspend the e f f e c t  o f commercial o r c i v i l  o b l ig a t io n s .3
The Government, as a r e s u l t ,  was given the au th o rity  to
in s t i t u t e  a moratorium by Executive decree. I t  was au tho rized
l l b i d .
^Supra. . pp. 73-74.
3France, Journal O f f ic ie l . . .  (August 6 , 1914), p. 7127.
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to  open supplementary and ex trao rd in a ry  c r e d i t s ,  in  the absence 
of the  Chambers, which i t  deemed necessary  fo r  the n a tio n a l
defense. There can be no question  th a t  th is  type o f a c t iv i ty
was o u ts id e  the realm  o f  re g u la r  p ra c tic e  and th a t  i t  c o n s t i ­
tu te d  an excep tio n a l expansion by the Cabinet o f the r i g h t - - 
v es ted  in  the P re s id en t o f  the  Republic—to  make ordinances in  
th e  execution  o f the law. C o n s titu tio n a l usage, which c o n t r i ­
bu tes s ig n if ic a n t ly  to  the development o f the o rdain ing  power 
in  the  execution of the  law s, had e s ta b lish e d  th a t  no ordinance 
issu ed  in  com pletion o f a law could  a l t e r  o r even suspend any
pro v is io n  contained  in  any e x is t in g  law; in  o th e r  words, such
ordinances have no fo rce  o f law ( l o i ) .  I t  was a lso  acknowledged 
th a t  no new pen a lty  and no new tax  could be e s ta b lish e d  by 
o rd inance, which i s  j u s t  another way o f s ta t in g  th a t  the  funda­
m ental r ig h ts  and freedoms of persons and p roperty  can be 
r e s t r i c t e d  by formal laws o n ly .l  Of co u rse , these measures 
were su b je c t to  parliam en tary  r a t i f i c a t i o n  upon the reassem bling 
o f the  Chambers. However, before r a t i f i c a t i o n  they d e a lt  w ith  
th e  su b je c t m atte r o f law w ithou t possessing  the form o f law.
I t  i s  tru e  th a t  u ltim a te ly  th e i r  v a l id i ty  depended upon a 
p o s te r io r i  approval. But th is  i s  p re c ise ly  the p o in t: confirm ­
a tio n  by Parliam ent came a f t e r  the f a c t ;  i t  follow ed ra th e r  
than preceded the a p p lic a tio n  of the p ro v is io n s of the o rd i­
nances. Q uite o ften  in  th i s  fast-m oving p erio d  of emergency
IS ie g h a rt, pp. 261-62.
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the o b je c tiv e s  env isioned  by these  decrees were capable o f  
achievement befo re  the  decrees were subm itted  to  P arliam en t. 
Thus, on many occasions the Government p resen ted  the  a u th o rity  
competent fo r  the  passage o f le g is la t io n  w ith  a f a i t  accom pli. 
Under th i s  regime decrees were issu ed  in  m o d ifica tion  and in  
derogation  o f th e  la v . For example, on September 27, 1914, 
the Government proclaim ed a decree fo rb idd ing  trad e  w ith  the 
enemy and on January 7, 1913, a decree was issu ed  p ro h ib itin g  
the s a le  o f  ab s in th  and the  opening o f  new prem ises fo r  the 
consunqption o f a lco h o lic  beverages. Perhaps these  ordinances 
were n ecessa ry , b u t w hether they were o r  n o t, they were in  
d i r e c t  derogation  o f  e x is t in g  law ( l o i ) .
O ther d ec rees , w ithou t going d ir e c t ly  coun ter to  the 
law, suspended i t s  a p p lic a tio n . This was tru e  o f the  decree 
o f September 6 , 1914, s e t t in g  up sp e c ia l and summary c o u r ts -  
m a r t ia l ,  and the  decree o f  Septend>er 9 , 1914, p e rm ittin g  the 
Government to  d ispense w ith  th e  se rv ic e s  o f  General O ff ic e rs , 
i r re s p e c tiv e  o f  guaran tees secured to  them by law. Conse­
quen tly , during th e  f i r s t  few months o f the w ar, w hile P ar­
liam entary  government was n o t suspended, i t s  s p i r i t  was teuqpo- 
r a r i l y  circum vented. This expansion o f  the reg u la to ry  power 
(pouvoir rég lem en ta ire ) o f  the  E xecutive moved the  Government 
fu r th e r  in to  the  a re a  o f the  competence o f P arliam en t. The 
p erversion  o f  re g u la r  procedure in  the f a l l  o f  1914 and the 
sp ring  o f 1915 could  n o t be com pletely le g itim a tiz e d  by the 
subsequent P arliam en tary  r a t i f i c a t i o n  and conversion o f these
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decrees In to  law, i . e .  the laws o f  March 30, A p ril 10, and 
August 3 , 1915.
I t  cannot be denied th a t ,  in  the m u ltifa r io u s  c o n s titu ­
t io n a l  background o f F rance, p recedent can be found fo r  e i th e r  
the m od ifica tion  o r  the  suspension o f the  law by decree . For 
example. A r t ic le  34 o f  th e  law o f September 17, 1814, perm itted  
the Goveimment to  allow  o r  to  suspend by decree th e  ex p o rta tio n  
o f  a g r ic u l tu r a l  p ro d u c ts . Decrees issu ed  under th is  a u th o rity  
became v a l id  upon prom ulgation b u t were u ltim a te ly  su b jec t to 
Parliam entary  r a t i f i c a t i o n —a t  the p re se n t sessio n  o r ,  i f  the 
Chambers were adjourned, a t  the succeeding se s s io n . This same 
type o f  a u th o r ity  was given to v ario u s Governments under anal­
ogous co n d itio n s  by the laws o f  June 13, 1861; March 29, 1887; 
January 11, 1892; December 17, 1897; and Ju ly  12, 1906. A lso, 
the  law o f  March 29, 1910, A r t ic le  3 , se c tio n  8 , con ferred  a 
s im ila r  la t i tu d e  o f d is c re tio n a ry  a u th o rity  upon th e  Council 
o f  M in is te rs  to  take ap p ro p ria te  ac tio n  v ia  decree ag a in s t 
fo re ig n  n a tio n s  g u i l ty  o f  in te r f e r in g  w ith  French commerce.^
N ev erth e less , the f a c t  remains th a t  a s u b s ta n tia l  p o rtio n  
o f th e  E xecutive ord inances issu ed  in  th is  p erio d  were issued  
w ithou t any p a r t ic u la r  san c tio n  in  s ta tu te  law o r  in  the Cons­
t i t u t i o n a l  Laws o f th e  T h ird  R epublic. The p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  
o f  s ieg e  con ferred  no g en e ra l a u th o rity  upon the  Government to 
undertake emergency le g is la t io n  and the s p e c if ic  d e leg a tio n s
^Barthélémy, p . 557.
87
by the L eg is la tu re  to  the C abinet, even i f  w idely co nstrued , 
were in s u f f ic ie n t  to  cover the Executive a c t iv i t i e s  in  the 
areas o f  m il i ta ry  m a tte rs , t a r i f f s ,  c o n tro l o f  raw m a te r ia ls , 
and fo o d -ra tio n in g .
In  the f i r s t  months o f World War I ,  the Government en­
croached upon the  t r a d i t io n a l  conqpetence o f the L eg is la tu re  
through ex tre s ttly  la t i tu d in a r ia n  co n s tru c tio n s  o f  i t s  reg u la ­
to ry  powers supplemented by i r r e g u la r  i f  n o t i l l e g a l  o rd in ­
ances. D espite the f a c t  th a t  the g re a t  m a jo rity  o f them were 
r a t i f i e d  subsequently  by Parliament on the presumption th a t  the 
L eg is la tu re  would have taken s im ila r  a c tio n  had i t  been in  
s e s s io n ,1 a t  the time o f  issuance many were b e re f t  o f  any b a s is  
in  le g a l i ty  w ith  the p o ss ib le  exception  o f  the Executive i n i ­
t i a t i v e —what the j u r i s t  Bartheleiqr has termed the " in i t i a t iv e  
envahissante de l 'e x é c u t i f ." ^
The e s s e n t ia l  problem here  i s  th a t  the Government, w ith ­
out rece iv in g  the competence p le in s  pou v o irs .^ undertook 
au th o rity  in  the doiaain reserved  to  the le g is la t iv e  power.
Not only  was the  t r a d i t io n a l  re la tio n s h ip  between law and 
ordinance u n d e n in e d , b u t the method o f  t r a n s f e r  o f coaq>etence 
was a t  b e s t q u a s i- le g a l .  N everthe less, the do c trin e  o f  n e c e ss ity
^ R o ss ite r , pp. 113-14.
^ Ib id . . p . 112.
^P le in s  pouvoirs r e f e r  to  laws which p ro v is io n a lly  en large  
the re g u la to ry  power f y u v o i r  rég lem en ta ire  i « They accord a 
reg u la to ry  a u th o r ity  o f  an ex cep tio n a l n a tu re  to the E xecutive— 
no tab ly  the a u th o rity  to  modify o r  to  ab rid g e , by means o f 
decree , laws th a t  a re  in  e f f e c t .
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(d g p lt de n é c e s s i té ) i s  meaningful in  s i tu a t io n s  in  which the 
se c u r ity  o f the  S ta te  i s  th rea ten ed  and le g a l  devices prove to 
be inadequate fo r  the  requirem ents o f  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rder 
o f  e s ta b lish e d  p o l i t i c a l  s o c ie ty . P re s id e n t o f  the  C ouncil, 
B riand, gave p rec ise  expression  to th i s  philosophy on the occa­
sion  o f a d e b i l i ta t in g  r a i l ro a d  s t r ik e  in  1910:
I f ,  in  the  face o f  an e v e n tu a lity  which would put 
the country  in  danger, the  government has no t found 
in  the law the  means to  defend the  ex is ten c e  o f the 
n a tio n  by safeguarding  i t s  f r o n t i e r s ,  i f  i t  had no t 
been ab le  to assu re  i t s e l f  o f th e  d is p o s itio n s  o f 
i t s  r a i l r o a d s ,  th a t  i s  to  say instrum en ts e s s e n t ia l  
to  the defense o f the  n a tio n —in  s h o r t ,  had i t  been 
necessary  to  r e s o r t  to  i l l e g a l  means, i t  would have 
re so r te d  to  them; i t s  duty would have been to  r e s o r t  
to  them. 1
Briand recognized  the  n e c e ss ity  o f th e  m aintenance o f govern­
m ental a u th o r ity  in  a c r i s i s .  In  1910 he was w illin g  to use 
i l l e g a l  means i f  req u ired  to  p ro te c t  the in te g r i ty  o f the 
S ta te .  When again P re s id en t o f  the C ouncil o f  M in is te rs  in  
December, 1916, Briand sought ex tra o rd in a ry  powers, b u t he 
recognized th e  value o f c lo th in g  th is  a u th o rity  in  a re g u la r ­
ized  p ro cess . On December 14, 1916 Briand demanded u rgen t 
co n s id e ra tio n  o f a b i l l  sponsored by the Council o f  M in is te rs  
which would, i f  passed , au th o rize  th e  Government:
to  ta k e , by decrees adopted in  C ouncil o f  M in is te rs , 
a l l  meamuras, w hether by ad d itio n  o r  excep tion  to  
th e  laws in  fo rc e , which s h a l l  be c a l le d  fo r  by the 
defense o f  the coun try , in  p a r t ic u la r  as regards 
a g r ic u ltu re  and in d u s t r ia l  p roduction , th e  equipment 
o f  h a rb o rs , tr a n s p o r t ,  food supply , hygiene and p u b lic  
h e a lth , the s a le  and d is t r ib u t io n  o f  commodities and
Icu s ta v  Mandry, Das Ausn*bm^recht in  F rankre ich  (Tubingen: 
H. Lapp, 1901).
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produce, «nd th e i r  consum ption.
I f  any o f  these decrees involved  the opening o f a 
c r e d i t ,  a p p lic a tio n  f o r  i t  should be made w ith in  a 
week.
To each o f  these  decrees p e n a lt ie s  may be a tta c h e d , 
n o t exceeding is^ risonm ent fo r  s ix  months and a  f in e  
o f  18,000 f r a n c s .1
Briand*s req u es t f o r  p le in s  pouvoirs was challenged  in  
the Chambers, and th e  Prime M in is te r  imm ediately made a  ca lcu -t
la te d  withdrawal* He announced th a t  due to  a c o p y is t 's  e r ro r  
the phrase " in  p a r t ic u la r "  had erroneously  been allowed to 
rem ain, whereas the Government had determ ined to  resK>ve i t .
Thus, the Government withdrew from th e  p o s itio n  o f demanding 
"general" enab ling  a u th o r ity  and lim ite d  i t s  req u es t to  the 
sphere d e ta i le d  in  th e  s t a tu te .^  N ev erth e less, the Government 
b i l l  was much b roader in  scope than anything the Parliam ent 
o f  the  T hird  Republic had been w il l in g , p rev io u s ly , to  vo te 
to  the  E xecu tive . The Chamber o f  D eputies made sh o r t work o f 
the  b i l l .  On December 29, 1916, the  committee which considered  
the  b i l l  rep o rted  to  the Chamber th a t  the "Govermsent i s  ask­
ing fo r  a  d e leg a tio n  o f  l e g is la t iv e  power," which, i f  enac ted , 
w i l l  mean "a rep u d ia tio n  o f  the  p r in c ip le s  o f  French p u b lic  
law and a re tu rn  to  a confusion  o f powers. To d e leg a te  the 
l e g i s la t iv e  power would be an abuse o f  th e  e l e c to r a te 's  con­
f id en c e , and a  v io la t io n  o f  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n ."3
^H erbert G in stea . Les P le in  P ouvo irs. t r a n s .  E . S oderlindh  
(P a r is :  L ib r a ir ie  S tock , 1Ü34), p , 19.
^Renouvin, p . 106.
3
F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . . Annales de l a  Chambre.
D ébats (December 13, 1916), p .  2678.
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T heir conclusion  was th a t  the Chamber had no power to  cede i t s  
p re ro g a tiv e s ; i t  could on ly  do so by a rev is io n  o f  the c o n s ti­
tu t io n .  ^
I t  was po in ted  o u t by the  rap p o rteu r o f  the committee 
th a t  the  Government "had been f r e e ,  fo r  two y e a rs , to  is s u e  a l l  
the decrees i t  w ished: i t  had issu ed  only 180; during th a t  time 
the Chamber had adopted 248 b i l l s ,  and 45 o f these  had passed 
a l l  s ta g es  w ith in  ten  days o f  subm ission."^ Consequently, the 
committee f e l t  th a t  the le g i s la t iv e  work had n o t been in f e r io r  
in  e x te n t to  the work o f  re g u la tio n , and the  Chamber had fu l ly  
dem onstrated th e i r  conqpetence to  d e l ib e ra te  and to  execute 
le g is la t io n  com petently and w ith  a l l  speed as the demands o f 
n a t io n a l su rv iv a l re q u ire d .
F in a lly ,  the d ep u ties  were n o t s a t i s f i e d  w ith  two m ajor 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  i r r e g u la r i t i e s  m an ifest in  the Briand enabling  
a c t .  F i r s t ,  i t  was most cu rio u s  th a t  the E xecutive agent 
competent to  issu e  such decrees—the P re s id e n t o f  the  Republic— 
was n o t mentioned in  the b i l l ; 3  and, secondly , th a t  th e re  was 
no p ro v is io n  fo r  r a t i f i c a t i o n  by the Chambers o f  d ec is io n s 
taken by the  Government under th is  proposed g ran t o f  a u th o r ity . 
Decrees so rendered went iam ndia te ly  in to  fo rce  and were n o t 
su b je c t to  abrogation  by P arliam en t by any means o th e r  than by
l l b i d .
^Renouvin, p . 106.
^Louis R olland, "Le pouvoir rég lem en ta ire  du P ré s id e n t de 
l a  République en temps de gue r r e  e t  l a  l o i  du 10 f é v r ie r  1918,” 
Revue du D ro it P u b lic , XXXV (October-Décember, 1918), p . 547, . 
Rote 1 . —— — •
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‘  1o rd in ary  le g is la t io n .  Reaction was overwhelming and the  b i l l  
was k i l l e d  In committee by a vo te o f 23 to 2 . As a r e s u l t ,  
France continued to combat aggression  w ithou t the questionab le 
b e n e f i ts  o f  a g en era lized  g ra n t o f  a u th o r ity  to the  E xecutive. 
The L eg is la tu re  d id  aamnd I t s  stand ing  o rders  to adm it a 
"sp e c ia l procedure In case o f  urgency"^ bu t I t  d id  n o t,  a t  
th is  tim e, embrace the enabling  a c t (p le in s  pouvo irs) as a 
c r i s i s  Instrum ent. .
The Chambers came c lo s e s t  to  a ren u n cia tio n  o f  th e i r  
le g is la t iv e  cap ac ity  a s in g le  y ea r l a t e r  when. In r a th e r  d ir e c t  
c o n tra d ic tio n  to th e i r  p o s it io n  o f 1916, they honored the 
Clemenceau C a b in e t 's  req u es t fo r  a genera l a u th o r ity  to  Issue  
decrees re g u la tin g  the n a tio n a l food supply . So I t  was th a t  
w ith  the  passage o f the law o f February 10, 1918, r e s p o n s ib i l i ty
^T lngsten , p . 20.
^Dhder the standing  o rd e rs  adopted by the Chamber o f  Depu­
t i e s  on January 27, 1917, I f  the Government d ec la red  a  b i l l  to 
be "urgent" th a t  b i l l  would be p resen ted  to  the  ap p ro p ria te  
parliam en tary  comodttee on the day a f t e r  I t s  p re se n ta tio n ; 
the committee had f iv e  days In which to  d iscu ss  i t  and to  con­
s id e r  amendamnts; a t  the p u b lic  s i t t i n g  only the ra p p o rte u r . 
on b eh a lf  o f  the m a jo rity  o f  the committee, a  sneaker se le c te d  
by A e  a d n o r ity , and the amvers o f  amendments th a t  had been 
re je c te d  in  the  course o f p re lla d n a ry  proceed ings, m ight be 
heard . As a r e s u l t ,  i t  was no longer p o ss ib le  to  im provise 
new amendments in  the course o f  the d isc u ss io n . However, in  
t ^  case  o f abso lu te  n e c e s s ity , the Government could  demand 
th a t  a  b i l l  be considered  and a  vote taken w ith in  tw enty-four 
hours.
^The law o f  February 10, 1918, regard ing  N ational Food 
C ontro l defined  i t s  scope and a u th o r ity  in  i t s  f i r s t  a r t i c l e :  
"During th e  d u ra tio n  o f the  war and the  s ix  aaonths which follow  
the  end o f  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  decrees can be issu ed  to  re g u la te  o r  
to  suspend, w ith  a view to  in su rin g  the  n a tio n a l food c o n tro l ,  
the  p roduction , the m anufacture, the c i r c u la t io n ,  th e  au c tio n .
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was p laced  upon the Head o f S ta te^  to  issu e  decrees upon su b je c t 
m a tte r which the Parliam ent had ceased , p ro v is io n a lly , to  re se rv e  
to  i t s e l f .  Thus, by a com paratively g en e ra lized  s ta tu te  law, 
the Executive moved s tro n g ly  in to  the sphere o f competence o f 
the  L eg is la tu re . C lea rly  th e re  was no attem pt a t  th is  p o in t 
to  e s ta b l is h  the Government as a second L eg is la tu re  and to  equip 
i t  w ith  le g is la t iv e  powers, o th e r than p ro v is io n a l sp e c if ie d  
tra n s fe rs  o f competence fo r  lim ite d  periods of tim e, although 
th is  law was the most ex ten siv e  ex trao rd in a ry  g ran t o f compe­
tence to th is  p o in t in  the  Third Republic. I t  q u a l if ie s  as a 
m ajor enabling s ta tu te  in  th a t  the reg u la to ry  power o f the 
Government is  p ro v is io n a lly  en larged  to  the e x ten t th a t  the
E xecutive, in  th is  in s tan ce  fo r  sp e c if ie d  m atte rs  and fo r  a
p resc rib ed  period  of tim e, i s  allowed to  deal by decree w ith  
problems norm ally w ith in  the realm o f the  le g is la t iv e  power, 
and by im p lica tion  may modify or abrogate laws th a t  a re  in  
e f f e c t .  In the sense th a t  the  a u th o rity  evolves from law ( l o i ) ,
the p u ttin g  up fo r  s a le ,  the deten tion  o r the  consumption o f 
a r t i c le s  o f food se rv in g  to  the nourishment o f man and o f
anim als. The in te n tio n s  of the p re se n t law is  ap p licab le  to
the decrees rendered concerning the supply o f fu e l  to  the 
c i v i l  population  . . . The in te n tio n s  o f the p re sen t A r t ic le  
w i l l  apply equally  to  th e  o th e r substances o f which purchasing 
by the  S ta te  fo r  the needs o f  the c i v i l  popu la tion  i s  au th o rized  
by the  law of A p ril 20, 1916, concerning the  ta x a tio n  o f the 
a r t i c l e s  o f food and substance . The decrees rendered  by the  
a p p lic a tio n  o f the p re se n t A r t ic le  w i l l  be su b je c t to  the  r a t i ­
f ic a t io n  o f the Chambers in  the  month which follow s th e i r  p ro ­
m ulgation ." France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . .  (February 12, 1918), 
pp. 1515-16.
^By s tr e s s in g  th e  use o f  decrees as the implementive 
device of the  law of February 10, 1918, the  s ta tu te  emphasizes 
th a t  i t  i s  only the  a u th o r ity  o f the P re s id en t o f  the  Republic
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th e  enab ling  a c t must be regarded  as a le g itim a te  c r i s i s  in s ­
t i t u t i o n .  D espite the aversion  o f most French j u r i s t s  to  the 
concept o f  delegatd.on, f o r  p r a c t ic a l  purposes i t  must be r e -  
eegaitêd th a t  the sovereign  French le g is la tu r e  delegated  com­
petence to  the E xecutive by the  Food C ontro l Law o f  1918 and 
th a t  th i s  t r a n s f e r  o f  a u th o r ity  was achieved w ith in  the regime 
o f l e g a l i ty .  True, such even ts may have been the r e s u l t  o f  
p r a c t ic a l  n e c e ss ity  and they may have been wiped from the 
s t a tu te  books a t  the  end o f  the w ar. N ev erth e less, th i s  law 
stan d s as a gu idepost to  fu r th e r  development o f th e  enab ling  
a c t  as a c r i s i s  d ev ice . Compared to  the unorganized i l l e g a l ­
i t y  o f  the 1914-1915 p e r io d , th i s  typeoof procedure o ffe re d  
the  p ra c t ic e  o f  emergency government some hope. I t s  m etal 
would be te s te d  again  and again  in  the coming y ea rs , and as 
i t s  s p i r i t  was p e rv e r te d , i t  u ltim a te ly  would make s u b s ta n tia l  
c o n tr ib u tio n  to  the d e s tru c tio n  o f  the regime whose defense 
had been ,i t s  ra iso n  d 'ê t r e .
th a t  i s  extended, n o t th a t  o f th e  M in is te rs , p r e f e c ts ,  m ayors, 
o r  any o th e r  execu tive  ag en t. R olland, "Le Pouvoir Réglemen­
t a i r e  Ou P ré s id e n t De La R é p u b liq u e ...,"  p . 565.
CHAPTER V 
ENABLING AUTHORITY
As im portant as enabling  s ta tu te s  became during the 
World War I  e r a ,  th e re  was never a coiqplete renuncia tion  by 
the Chambers o f  th e i r  le g is la t iv e  c a p a c ity . A genera l enab ling  
a c t  was re fu sed  to  th e  Briand Government in  1916, and the  only 
m ajor^instance o f  broad delegation  during the  War was the law 
o f February 10, 1918, which gave the Clemenceau regime an 
ordinance power in  th e  m a tte r o f  food supply .
The p ra c t ic e ,  which was developed in  the course o f the 
War, o f  extending the executive power in to  the le g is la t iv e  
domain e s ta b lish e d  techniques which were follow ed a f te r  the 
end o f h o s t i l i t i e s .  The f i r s t  major peacetim e example o f  what 
might be considered  a parliam entary  ev o lu tio n  i s  provided by 
the law o f  March 22, 1924. This p ro je c t  o f law, which was 
i n i t i a t e d  by the Poincaré Cabinet in  January  o f 1924, demanded 
from the L eg is la tu re  the delegation  o f sp e c ia l p lenary  powers 
(p le in s  pouvoirs spéciaux) to be employed to  combat severe 
economic d is t r e s s  and the imminent c o lla p se  o f  the  f ra n c . The 
Government sought to  issu e  decrees f a c i l i t a t i n g  a reduction  o f 
s ix  b i l l i o n  fran cs  in  th e  budgetary d e f i c i t  and, consequently .
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dim inishing the sums which had previom sly been envisioned  as 
necessary  fo r  the Government to  borrow. These red ac tio n s  were 
to  be re a liz e d  in  p a r t  by a tax  in c rease  o f  approxim ately 
twenty percent^  and in  p a r t  by ad m in is tra tiv e  reo rg an iz a tio n ,^  
d im inishing governmental expenditures by one b i l l io n  fra n c s .^
In  the a rea  o f  ad m in is tra tiv e  reo rg an iz a tio n , the Government 
requested  the a u th o r ity  to  tak e , p ro v is io n a lly , and notw ith­
stand ing  the laws in  fo rc e , the necessary  measures. A fte r  
f iv e  weeks o f debat» , th i s  p ro je c t  was passed . For our purposes 
i t s  F i r s t  A r t ic le  i s  s ig n i f ic a n t :
Some red u ctio n s o f  which the  t» t a l  must no t be 
le s s  than one b i l l io n  fran cs  w il l  be e ffe c te d  
in  1924 in  the expend itu res o f  the S ta te .
The Government i s  au th o rized , during the fou r months 
which follow  the prom ulgation o f the  p resen t law, 
to  proceed by decrees rendered in  Council o f  S ta te ,  
a f t e r  having been approved in  Council o f  M in is te rs ; 
w ith  a l l  the reform s and ad m in is tra tiv e  reo rgan iza­
tio n s  which w i l l  b r in g  about the r e a l iz a t io n  o f these 
economies; When th e  measures thus taken w i l l  have 
n e c e s s ita te d  the  m od ifica tion  o f  the lams in  fo rc e , 
the  decrees must be subm itted to  the sanction  o f  the 
L eg is la tu re  w ith in  a  p eriod  o f  s ix  months.4
^The increase  in  revenue was expected to  be 5 b i l l io n  
f ra n c s . Tings te n , p . 23. See, g e n e ra lly , Louis R olland, "Le 
p ro je c t  du 1/ ja n v ie r  e t  l a  question  des d é c r e ts - lo is ,"  Revue 
du D ro it P u b lic . XLI (1924), p . 42.
^A Commission under Louis Marin made an ex tensive  inves­
t ig a t io n  p f the ad m in is tra tiv e  o rg an iza tio n  o f the French gov­
ernment and in  Moveaiber o f  1923 issu ed  i t s  genera l r e p o r t ,  which 
env isioned  ex tensive  re o rg a n iz a tio n , p a r t ic u la r ly  the c u r t a i l ­
ing o f  the ad m in is tra tiv e  a u th o rity  o f  the a rrend issem sn ts .
I t  was expected th a t  such reo rg an iza tio n  would r e s u l t  in  savings 
o f  some 650 md.lliom f ra n c s . Tings te n , p . 22.
^ lo s s i t e r ,  p . 120.
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . .  (March 23, 1924), p . 2754.
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I t  Is  in te re s t in g  th a t  the Government is  given a minimum 
f ig u re  fo r  reduction  o f expenditures but no t a maximum. How­
ev e r, the c a p i ta l  p o in t here is  th a t  th e  Government is  n o t c i r ­
cum scribed in  the r e a l iz a t io n  of these  economies by the laws 
in  fo rce  a t  the tim e. E x p lic i t ly ,  the Government is  delegated  
th e  a u th o r ity  to  modify o r to  ab rogate , in  the form o f d ec rees , 
laws passed by the L e g is la tu re . But, i f  a decree issu ed  under 
th is  s ta tu te  m odifies a law in  the le g is la t iv e  domain, the 
measure must be subm itted  to  the Chambers fo r  r a t i f i c a t io n  
w ith in  s ix  months o f the  day of issu an ce . That such a s ta tu te  
was passed in  peacetim e i s  o f g re a t im portance.
Though circum stances p ro h ib ite d  i t s  im plem entation, the 
law o f March 22, 1924, e s ta b lish e d  a p recedent fo r p arliam en t­
ary  emergency ac tio n  in  the  in te rw ar p e rio d . I t  i s  rem arkable 
th a t  the French L e g is la tu re , only e ig h t years a f te r  i t  had 
b a tte re d  down the wartime Briand p roposals o f 1916 and s ix  
years a f t e r  i t  passed th e  more circum scribed  a c t of February 
10, 1918, was w ill in g  to  delegate  such competence to  the 
Poincare C abinet. On th e  o th e r hand, th e re  was a g re a t dea l 
o f opposition  to  the le g is la t iv e  f a c i l i t a t i o n  of such a c tio n . 
The Chamber of Deputies adopted the  c o n tro v e rs ia l F i r s t  A r t ic le  
o f the law by a vo te o f  333 to  205, and d esp ite  long debate 
and system atic  opp o sitio n  by the Communists, u ltim a te ly  passed  
th e  b i l l  on February 23, 1924, and sen t i t  to  the  Senate. In  
th e  Upper House the o p p o sitio n  was much more marked than in  
th e  Chamber. The Finance Commission announced ag a in s t the 
governmental p ro je c t by a  15 to  3 margin and i t  was only a f t e r
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posing the  question  o f  confidence th a t  th e  Government achieved 
a  meager 154-139 m a jo r i ty .^  In  h is  defense o f the req u es t fo r  
p le in s  pouvoirs « Po incaré  in s i s te d  th a t  th i s  p ro v is io n a l change 
in  the  re c ip ro c a l r e la t io n s  between the E xecutive and the 
L e g is la tu re  d id  n o t c o n s t i tu te  any derogation  o f b as ic  p a r l ia -  
mentary form s. In  th e  in te rp r e ta t io n  o f  the Government, these  
procedures were sim ply a method o f g iv ing  the Executive a par^ 
liam en tary  mandate to  execute the w ishes o f  the people and o f 
the e le c te d  re p re s e n ta tiv e  body by implementing c e r ta in  p ro v i­
s io n a l m easures. The P re s id e n t o f  the  Council assured  the 
Chambers th a t  the r ig h t  to  undertake d e f in i t iv e  d ec is io n s  would 
remain in  the  hands o f  the  e le c te d  P arliam en t. The problem as 
understood by the C ab inet was n o t j u s t  a  question  o f p rovid ing  
a  power which the law had n o t fo reseen ; i t  was "a question  
sim ply fo r  the L e g is la tu re  to  e n tru s t  to  the  Government, which 
i t  c o n tro ls  and which i t  can always o v e r ru le , the  r ig h t  to 
i n s t i t u t e  reform s which P arliam ent would remain fre e  afte rw ards 
to  accep t o r  to  r e j e c t . ”^ The Government emphasized th a t  i t  
had no in te n tio n  o f usurp ing  power; i t  [a sk e ^  only to ex e rc ise  
th e  req u ested  a u th o r ity  p ro v is io n a lly  and in  a r e s tr a in e d  domain, 
w ith  the a s se n t and under the c o n tro l o f  P a rliam en t.*
Poincaré f e l t  " th a t in  the f in a l analysis i t  was in  the
^T ingsten , p . 25.
^ Ib id . . p . 27.
S ib id .
4 lb id .
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I n te r e s t  o f  Pm rlism entary government th a t  the Chambers accept 
a te iqw rary  r e s t r ic t io n  o f  th e i r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r i g h t s . H e  
defended h is  r e q ^ s t  fo r  s p e c ia l p len ary  powers upon the lo g ic  
th a t  ex cep tio n a l powers were a reinforcem ent o f  p a r l ia a e n ta r i -  
anism which exesg»lified the v i t a l i t y  and i t s  fa c u lty  fo r  adap­
ta t io n  o f  P arliam entary  government.^ Under such an in te rp re ­
ta t io n  i t  was n o t necessary  to  weaken the i n i t i a t i v e  o f  the 
Government o r  to  d es tro y  the  s p i r i t  o f  a u th o r ity ,^  fo r  when 
n e c e s s ity  commanded, i t  was w ith in  the scope o f  P arliam entary  
government to  tu rn  to  governmental i n i t i a t i v e  in  the quest 
fo r  re sp o n sib le  a u th o r ity .
On the o th e r hand, the  opposition  from the L e f t , headed 
by H e rrio t^  and Panl-Boncour^ s tre s s e d  th a t  th e re  was an essen­
t i a l  in c o m p a tib ility  between the Poincaré p ro je c t  and the 
p r in c ip le s  o f  P arliam entary  govemamnt. They defended "pure" 
parliam entarism ^ as the b e s t  form o f government—the b e s t  even
^ t t o  K irchhelm er, "Decree Powers and C o n s titu tio n a l Law 
in  Prance Under the T h ird .R epublic,"  American P o l i t i c a l  Science 
Review. JÜULLV (December, 1949), p . ll@ C - -
2aid.
^T ingsten , pp. 27-28.
^Prance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Chmabre des D éputés. Débats
t  s ttiv . e t  
(D ey ris ) , p .
P a r l e m e n t a s . Session O ralm aire (1924), p . 338 e u
500 e t  s u lv . See p .  349 (Levy)? p . 367 e t  su iv .
430 (note).
^ Ib id . .  p . 486.
^In  th i s  conception the  le g is la t iv e  power (nomvoir l é g is ­
l a t iv e )  devolved mpem P arliam en t, which pessessed  a b so lu te ly  no 
r ig h t  to  t r a n s f e r  i t s  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  a u th o r ity  to  o th e r  organs 
o f  S ta te .  This in te rp r e ta t io n  re sp e c ts  th e  supremacy o f  the  
law f l o i ) . v is - a - v is  th e  ord inance power (ROmwoir ré g le m e n ta ire ) .
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in  ex trao rd in a ry  c ircum stances. They a ttack ed  the r a th e r  
obvious t r a n s fe r  to the  Executive o f competence norm ally p e r­
ta in in g  to  the le g is la t iv e  power and emphasized th a t  th e  adop­
tio n  o f  such procedures would e s ta b l i s h  s i tu a tio n s  tantamount 
to governmental d ic ta to r s h ip . To be su re , one could r e a l i s t i c ­
a l ly  contend th a t  the Poincaré le g is la t io n  was no t d ic ta to rs h ip  
a t  a l l ,  b u t a necessary  and le g itim a te  ex tension  o f execu tive  
power fo r  defined  su b je c t m atte r and w ith in  a lim ite d  p erio d  
o f time which was c o n s is te n t w ith  the p r in c ip le s  o f  P arliam en t­
ary  government. N otw ithstanding, numerous delegates o f  the 
l e f t  p re fe rre d  to  in te r p r e t  th is  t r a n s f e r  o f  coiq)etence as the 
i n i t i a l  s tep  in  an an tidem ocratic  and an tip a rliam en ta ry  evolu­
t io n . U ltim ate ly , as the  days o f Ju ly , 1940 v iv id ly  a t t e s t ,  
they were to be proved c o r re c t ;  and y e t ,  in  a na tion  faced  w ith  
d ire  emergency, the f i r s t  duty o f the  resp o n sib le  p o l i t i c a l  
a u th o rity  i s  to  seek o u t methods adequate to  the defense o f the 
le g a l o rd e r . I t  i s  q u ite  p o ss ib le  th a t  the  very n a tu re  of 
world a f f a i r s  demanded the a p p lic a tio n  o f these ex trao rd in a ry  
procedures re g a rd le ss  o f  th e i r  a c c e p ta b il i ty  w ith in  the confines 
o f  t r a d i t io n a l  parliam en tary  p o l i t i c a l  p ra c t ic e .
The tendency of the Executive agency to re so rt to demands 
fo r emergency powers when confronted w ith a s itu a tio n  which 
required immediate action  and upon which there was in su ff ic ie n t 
agreement or desire w ithin the Chambers to permit positive  
action was exemplified again by the Briand-Caillaux proposals
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o f J u ly , 1926.^ In  the face  o f  con tinu ing  economic p ressu re  
accen tuated  by the debacle o f  the German mark and by the In ­
s t a b i l i t y  evidenced by th e  French f ra n c , Briand and h is  M in is te r  
o f F inance, C a lllau x , subm itted  a p lan  fo r  f in a n c ia l  reform  
which Involved the ex ten siv e  use o f  ord inances based upon the  
d e leg a tio n  o f  enabling  a u th o r ity  from the L eg is la tu re  to  the 
E xecu tive . B riand, in  th i s  c a se , was as u nsuccessfu l In  push­
ing  h is  req u es ts  fo r  p le in s  pouvoirs spéciaux through the 
Chambers as he had been In  1916, N ev e rth e less , w ith in  a month, 
a  new C abinet headed by Folncar6 was su c cessfu l on a more 
lim ite d  sc a le  In o b ta in in g  g ran ts  o f  competence from the P ar­
liam en t. The Polncaré req u e s ts  became the law o f  August 3 ,
1926.^ In  I t s  most isqportant asp ec ts  th i s  enab ling  s ta tu te  
provided f o r  sweeping a d m in is tra tiv e  reform s and fo r  the a d ju s t­
ment o f  t a r i f f s  and d u tie s  to  the value o f  the  f ra n c . As In
^ A rtic le  1 o f  the B rland-C alllaux  p ro je c t :  "Le gouvem e-
nen t e s t  a u to r is é ,  ju sq u 'a u  30 décembre 1926, A p ren d re , p a r 
d é c re ts  d é lib é ré s  en C onseil de m in is tre s , to u te s  le s  mesures 
p ropres à  r é a l i s e r  le  redresseam nt f in a n c ie r  e t  l a  s t a b i l i s a ­
tio n  de l a  monnaie."
^ A rtic le  1 and 2 o f  the law o f  August 3 , 1926: "A rt. 1 .
Le gouvernement e s t  a u to r is é  A procéder p a r d é c re ts  ju sq u 'a u  
31 décembre 1926, à  to u te s  suppression  ou fu s io n s  d 'em p lo is , 
d 'é ta b lis se m e n ts  ou de s e rv ic e s .  Lorsque ces masures n é c e s s i­
te ro n t s o i t  des m o d ifica tio n s A des o rg a n isa tio n s , fo rm a lité s  
ou procédures fix ée s  p a r  l a  l o i ,  s o i t  des an n u la tio n s ou t r a n s ­
f e r t s  de c r é d i t s ,  e l l e s  devront ê t r e  soumlsés A l a  r a t i f i c a t i o n  
des Chambres dans un d é la i  de t r o i s  m ois. A r t .  2 . Le gouverne­
ment e s t  a u to r is é  A r a ju s t e r  p a r  d é c re ts  A l a  v a le u r  de l a  mon­
n a i e . . . :  Le t a r i f  des d r o i t s . . . e t ,  d 'une façon g é n é ra le , de
tous le s  d ro i ts  l iq u id e s  autrem ent que su r  des sommes e t  des 
v a le u rs ; La p r ix  de v en te  des p ro d u its  des monopoles f isc a u x ;
Les t a r i f s  des p o s te s , té lég rap h es  e t  té léphones; Les condi­
tio n s  d 'a p p lic a tio n  de ces nouveaux t a r i f s  s e ro n t f ix é e s  p a r 
d é c re ts ."  F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . .  (August 4 , 1926), p . 8786.
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th e  law o f March 22, 1924, the regime hoped to e f f e c t  economies 
by siiq> lify ing  the ad m in is tra tiv e  m achinery. To accom plish 
such reform s wide use was made o f the decree power. A substan ­
t i a l  number o f so u s-p ré fec tu re s  and tribunaux  d * arrondissem ent 
were abo lished  by rep lac in g  the c o n s e ils  de p re fe c tu re  de 
départem ent w ith  c o n se ils  rég ionaux , and by reo rgan iz ing  o th e r 
branches o f  the a d m in is tra tio n . The re o rg a n iz a tio n a l powers 
co n fe rred  upon the C abinet were s p e c if ic a l ly  lim ite d  as f a r  as 
im plem entation was concerned to a  five-m onth p e rio d . F u rth e r­
more, i f  the measures undertaken im plied  a m od ifica tion  o f 
o rg a n iz a tio n s , p rocedures, o r  fo rm a lit ie s  f ix ed  by law, o r  
annulments o r  t r a n s f e r  o f  c r e d i t s ,  i t  was necessary  to  submit 
them to  Parliam ent f o r  r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ith in  a three-m onth p e rio d . 
The a u th o rity  co n ferred  to  a d ju s t by decree the value o f  the 
f ra n c ; the p r ic e  o f  s a le  o f  the p roducts o f  monopolies; the  
tax es  upon the p o s ta l  s e rv ic e , te le g ra p h , and telephone se rv ic e  
was a  permanent power; and decrees is su ed  under th i s  competence 
were n o t req u ired  to  be subm itted  to  the  Chambers fo r  ap p ro v al, 
though c e r ta in ly  they could  be superseded by the  passage o f 
o rd in a ry  le g is la t io n .  A g re a t  many decrees were issu ed  under 
the  p ro v is io n s  o f th i s  law; none were ever r a t i f i e d  by the 
Chambers and, though fo r  a sh o r t p e rio d  much was accom plished 
in  lo c a l  governmental reform , the re p re se n ta tiv e  Changers under 
th e  p re ssu re  o f  lo c a l  v es ted  in t e r e s t  rep ea led  p r a c t ic a l ly  a l l  
o f  th ese  s ta tu te s .^
R o s s ite r , p . 121.
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I t  i s  worthwhile to  r e i t e r a t e  th a t  the un implemented 
law o f March 22, 1924, the B riand-C aillaux  proposals o f  J u ly , 
1926, and the law o f August 3 , 1926, c o n s ti tu te d  r a th e r  g en era l 
acceptance o f a p ra c tic e  th a t  would c o n tr ib u te  to the  d es tru c ­
tio n  o f the very  regime which they were designed to  defend.
From th is  time to  the death  o f  the T hird  Republic, the question  
demanding so lu tio n  in  bo th  ju risp ru d en ce  and p o l i t i c a l  p ra c tic e  
was no t one o f the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty  and leg itim acy  o f enab ling  
a c t s .  I t  was simply one o f degree and o f  method. D espite the 
p ro te s ta t io n s  o f such c o n s t i tu t io n a l  th e o r is ts  as Nézard, 
Esmein, and Hauriouÿ the enabling  procedure had come o f age. 
F rance, b a tte re d  by the economic and s o c ia l  c o n f l ic ts  o f  the  
1930 's ,  was to  tu rn  again  and again to  th i s  dev ice . Delega­
tio n  was to  le ad , in  the l a s t  a n a ly s is , to  ab d ica tio n . W ith­
o u t the s p i r i t  to  l iv e .  P arliam en tary  government was to  d ie .
Ordinance powers based on enab ling  a u th o rity  became more
than a temporary fe a tu re  o f  French p o l i t i c a l  p ra c tic e  in  1934,
1
when the D alad ier C abinet in s e r te d  an enab ling  c lause  in to  
A r t ic le  8 o f the Budget A ct o f December 22, 1933. D alad ier 
res ig n ed  before applying th i s  c la u se , b u t the f a c t  remained 
th a t  an enabling  s ta tu te  had become p a r t  o f  the  pezmanent 
le g is la t io n  o f the  French n a tio n .
The succeeding Doumergue-Tardieu government of "national
^These p ro v is io n s  were very  s im ila r  to  those env isioned  
in  the Poincaré sponsored law o f March 22, 1924. They en v i­
sioned ad m in is tra tiv e  reform s and economies in  the minimum 
amount o f 300 m illio n  f ra n c s . K irchheim er, p . 1106.
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u n ity "  attem pted to  implement d e f la tio n a ry  p o lic ie s  o f  the  
Bank o f  France in  o rd e r to  combat the  deep depression in  
which France found h e r s e l f .  Both bureaucracy and lab o r were 
so b i t t e r l y  opposed to  such a  po licy^  th a t  the Government 
tu rned  to  the enabling  procedure as the only p o ss ib le  means 
fo r  the  su ccessfu l im plementation o f  i t s  program. To th i s  end, 
under the General Budget Law o f February 28, 1934, the Govern­
ment was au thorized  "to  take a l l  measures necessary  to balance 
the  budget,"^  By th is  procedure i t  hoped to av e rt an acrimon­
ious parliam entary  f lo o r  b a t t l e ,  to  is su e  ordinances i t s e l f ,  
and then to  seek parliam en tary  approval. In  the sh o r t run , 
the a n tid e f la t io n a ry  fo rces  reigned  supreme as the "n a tio n a l 
u n ity ” government was overthrow n, and the subsequent F landin  
and Bottisson C abinets were re fu sed  ex trao rd in a ry  a u th o rity  to  
pursue the p o licy  l in e  i n i t i a t e d  by th e  Doumergue-Tardieu 
government. N otw ithstanding temporary se tb ack s, p o licy  o f 
d e f la tio n  and retrenchm ent supported by the Executive emerged 
v ic to r io u s  in  June o f  1935, when an enabling  a c t  in tended "to  
avoid monetary devaluation" au tho rized  the  new Laval M in is try  
to  "take u n t i l  October 31, 1935, a l l  d isp o s itio n s  in  o rd er tx> 
avoid the deva luation , to  f ig h t  a g a in s t sp e cu la tio n , and to
^ lo s s i te r ,  p . 122.
^ A rtic le  36 o f  the  General Budget Law o f  February 28, 1934; 
"Le Gouvernement e s t  a u to r is é ,  ju sq u 'a u  30 ju in  1934, a  p ren d re , 
nonobstant to u te s  d isp o s itio n s  lé g is la t iv e s  c o n tra ire s ,  p a r 
é w r e ts  rendus en c o n s e il  des m in is tre s  e t  co n tresig n és du 
p ré s id e n t du c o n se il e t  du m in is tre  du f in an c es , le s  mesures 
d*économe qu*exigera l 'é q u i l ib r e  du budget. Ces d éc re ts  s e ro n t 
soumis a  l a  r a t i f i c a t i o n  des Chambres avant le  31 octobre 1934. 
I l s  au ron t fo rcé  ex écu to ire  ju s q u 'à  d éc is io n  du Parlem ent." 
F ra n ce , Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . ,  Débats P arleam nta ires (March 1 , 
1934), p . i0 2 l .  ■ ;
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defend the  francc"^
The Laval decrees were Issued  during a recess  p e r io d .
They In troduced a  d e f la t io n i s t  program which d id  n o t re sp e c t 
the  p r in c ip le  o f  the in v io la b i l i ty  o f  p r iv a te  e n te rp r is e  and 
went f a r  beyond the  l im its  iaq>lied by the  economic p o licy  
p re sc rib e d  by the enab ling  a c t  i t s e l f . ^  U ltim ate ly , some 500 
decrees were employed as the d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  & is  t r a n s f e r  
o f  c o n s ta n c e .  P u b lic  pensions and s a la r ie s  were lowered; 
in te r e s t  on government s e c u r i t ie s  were reduced; re n ts  and 
u t i l i t y  r a te s  were f ix e d ; v a rio u s a r t i c l e s  o f  the Code o f  c i v i l  
procedure we're m odified , as was the Code o f  m il i ta ry  j u s t i c e ;  
laws dea ling  w ith  p u b lic  h e a lth  and s a n ita ry  co n d itio n s were 
co d if ie d ; even the method o f  noadnation o f  m a g is tra te s  was 
a l te r e d  by Governmental decree .^  Consequently, o p era tin g  
under a g en era l enab ling  s ta tu te  which sp e c if ie d  only  th e  pu r­
pose and time l im i t  o f  powers co n fe rred , the Laval government 
issu ed  ord inances in  a  g re a t  many a reas  o f  p u b lic  l i f e — 
decrees only  in d i r e c t ly  r e la te d  to the  s ta te d  o b je c tiv e  o f  the 
enab ling  le g is la t io n  g ran ted  to  L aval. I t  i s  tru e  th a t  the
^Law o f  June 8 , 1935: " . . . e n  vue d 'é v i t e r  l a  dév a lu a tio n
de l a  monnaie, le  S énat e t  l a  Chambre des députés a u to r is a n t  
le  gouvernement à p rendre p a r d é c re ts ,  ju sq u 'a u  31 oc to b er 
1935, to u te s  d isp o s itio n s  ayant fo rcé  de l o i  pour l u t t e r  co n tre  
l a  s ^ e u la t io n  e t  défendra le  f ra n c . Ces d é c re ts , p r i s  en 
C onseil de m in is tre s , se ro n t soumis â  l a  r a t i f i c a t i o n  des 
Chambras avant le  1®* ja n v ie r  1936. F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . . 
(June 9 , 1935), p . 6298.
^ R o s s ite r , p . 123.
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (O ctober 31, 
1935), pp. 1140T-1T74Ô. “ :
105
Douaergiie-Tardleu la »  o f February 28, 1934, fo r  the f i r s t  
time ex p ressly  g ran ted  to  th e  Government the a u th o r ity  to  
is su e  ordinances c o n tra  leeem w ith  the v a l id i ty  ^  i n i t i o , 
b u t i t  was here w ith  th e  Laval le g is la t io n  o f 1935 th a t  the  
L e g is la tu re  opened a  b road , p r a c t ic a l ly  un lim ited  a re a  to 
E xecutive superv is ion  by d ec ree . I t  i s  in te re s t in g  th a t  the 
debate over the Laval program d id  n o t con ju re  up an im passioned 
defense o f  parliam en tary  p r in c ip le s  and r ig h t s .  "The qubstion  
debated  was n o t w hether decree powers ought to  be g ran ted  a t  
a l l ,  b u t whether such powers should be g ran ted  to  [ t h i ^  
s p e c if ic  government and to  fu r th e r  [ t h e s ^  s p e c if ic  a im s."^  
There i s  l i t t l e  question  th a t  the g ra n t to  Laval o f  " a l l  
d isp o s it io n s  in  o rd er to  avoid d ev a lu a tio n , to  f ig h t  a g a in s t 
sp e c u la tio n , and to  defend th e  f r a n c c o n s t i t u t e d  a  b roader- 
based au th o rity  than th e  Eoumergue-Tardieu a u th o riz a tio n  to 
" take  a l l  measures n ecessary  to  balance the  b u dget."^  The 
1934 deleg a tio n  tended to  be lied .ted  to  the  f i s c a l  a re a , 
w h ile  the  a p p lic a tio n  o f  th a t  o f 1935, c o r re c t ly  o r  in c o r re c t­
ly ,  encoaq>assed a  la rg e r  a re a  o f  the  economy. In  c o n tra s t  to  
th e  parliam en tary  trea tm en t o f  the Poincare ord inances o f  
1926, the  Laval decrees rece iv ed  no se rio u s  e f f e c t iv e  le g i s ­
l a t iv e  opposition  during  th e  l i f e  o f  th e  Laval M in is try . I t
^ i e g h a r t ,  p . 278.
^Kirchheimer, p . 1107.
^Supra. . pp . 103-04.
4sunra. . p . 103, Note 2 .
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was on ly  w ith  the I n s t i tu t io n  o f the Popular F ront regime o f
L6on Blum th a t  the  b i t t e r  opposition  aroused by the so -c a lle d
" f a s c ia t ic "  p ra c t ic e s  o f  the  Laval program vented  i t s e l f  in
i t s  f u l l  fu ry . The Popular F ron t o f  the  L eft-C en te r, basing
i t s  power upon the r e s u l t  o f  new e le c t io n s ,  was su ccessfu l in
ach iev ing  the  rep ea l in  1936 o f  the bu lk  o f the Laval measures
which remained in  e f f e c t .  However, in  June o f  1937 these
"opponents o f  d ic ta to rsh ip "  reversed  th e u e lv e s  and sought fo r
them selves enab ling  a u th o rity  to  devalue the  fra n c , r a is e
ta x e s , and e s ta b l i s h  exchange c o n tro ls  in  o rd e r to cope w ith
new f in a n c ia l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .^  The Chamber o f  Deputies complied
w ith  the  Popular F ro n t demands, b u t the  more conservative
Senate re je c te d  the Blum req u es ts  and s u b s t i tu te d  i t s  own v e r -
2sion  o f  enab ling  p rocedures . Thus c h a s tis e d , the Blum M inis­
t r y  re s ig n e d .
I t  i s  most s ig n i f ic a n t  th a t  th i s  req u es t fo r  enabling  
powers by the Blum Government documents th e  acceptance by a l l  
f a c e ts  o f  French p o l i t i c s  o f  the enabling  a c t  as a le g itim a te  
device o f  c r i s i s  government.
The Popular F ron t was succeeded by a  r a th e r  hybrid  min­
i s t r y  headed by Chsutemps. This arrangem ent was grounded on 
S o c ia l i s t  siqpport b u t con tained  no S o c ia l i s t s  in  prim ary le ad ­
e rsh ip  p o s i t io n s .  In  June o f  1937 Chau temps demanded and was 
g ran ted  a u th o rity  to  "assu re  the  rep re ss io n  o f  attem pts to
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Chambre des Députés. Débats 
(1937), p . 2048.
^ Ib id . . p . 695.
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undermine the public c r e d i t ,  to  f ig h t  ag a in s t sp ecu la tio n ,
to  fu r th e r  economic recovery , p r ic e  c o n tro l, and budget b a l-
1ancing, and w ithout c o n tro l o f exchange to defend the gold 
holdings of the Bank o f F rance." Such decrees were "to be 
p laced  before the Parliam ent fo r  r a t i f ic a t io n  w ith in  three 
months follow ing the prom ulgation o f the a c t ,  o r , a t  any r a te ,
3
a t  the f i r s t  ex trao rd in ary  session  of 1937."
For the f i r s t  time in  the h is to ry  of French enabling 
le g is la t io n ,  a clause  was in s e r te d  th a t expressly  forbade a 
c e r ta in  form of p o s itiv e  governmental a c tio n . To be su re , the 
law o f March 22, 1924 and the enabling c lause in s e r te d  in 
A r t ic le  8 of the Budget Act o f December 22, 1933 had provided 
fo r  monetary minimums fo r  the consequences of ad m in is tra tiv e  
and f i s c a l  reform s, but never b e fo re , nor in  f a c t  s in c e , has 
th is  type of le g is la t io n  provided such l im ita tio n s . In th is  
manner the Chautemps delegation  was unique.
I f  one looks back a t  the progression  of enabling le g is ­
la t io n  passed in  the 1924-1937 p erio d , i t  becomes apparent 
th a t  inc reased  competence was requested  by the E xecutive, 
again and aga in , on the b as is  of immediate and compelling 
requirem ents, p r in c ip a lly  by the  need fo r  f i s c a l  and economic 
re d re s s . N ational defense requirem ents were n o t a fa c to r  up 
to  th is  p o in t, nor were any demands fo r s t r u c tu r a l  changes in  
French economic and labor le g is la t io n  considered . Such a
^A uthor's underlin ing
. _ .^France. Jou rnal O ff ic ie l  . . . ,  Chambre des Députés, Debats
(1937), p. 204^--------------- -------  ---------------------- -------  ---------
3
Ib id .
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fu n c tio n a l approach aimed a t  the immediate sho rt-range  so lu ­
tio n  o f p ress in g  problems^ was follow ed during the f i r s t  
months o f  the D alad ier Government, i n i t i a t e d  on A p ril 10, 1938.
IWo days a f t e r  rece iv in g  approval by the Chambers, th i s  
C abinet was in v ested  w ith  power to  take a l l  measures necessary  
fo r  the  n a tio n a l defense and the econosdc recovery o f  the 
n a tio n .^  This competence was to  be term inated  a t  the end o f  
the parliam en tary  se ss io n  and n o t l a t e r  than Ju ly  31, 1938.
I t  should be noted th a t  th e  decrees which the D alad ier Govern­
ment issu ed  under th i s  a u th o rity  were in  no way r e s t r i c t e d  to  
the immediate aims o f  th e  p a ren t enabling  s ta tu te .  Although 
the  L e g is la tu re  remained in  sessio n  u n t i l  June 17, 1938, a 
cosq»arison between the o u tp u t o f  the le g is la t iv e  branch and 
th a t  o f  the  execu tive  c le a r ly  in d ic a te s  th a t  the Chambers were 
lo s in g  a s u b s ta n tia l  p o rtio n  o f  th e i r  s ig n if ic a n c e  as a le g i s ­
la t iv e  body. While the  le g is la t iv e  o u tp u t f e l l  to a  v ery  low 
le v e l ,  th e  D alad ier M in is try  d e a lt  by means o f  decree w ith
^Labelled the "compromise l in e  o f  form er y ea rs ."  K irch- 
h e ia e r ,  p . 1108.
^ lo i  tenden t au redresseam nt fin an c ie r^ d e  12 août 1938:
"Le Gouveraeamnt e a t  a u to r is é ,  ju s q u 'à  l a  c lo tu re  de l a  se ss io n  
o rd in a ire  des Chambres e t  au p lu s  ta rd  ju sq u 'a u  31 j u i l l e t  
1938, à  p ren d re , p a r d é c re ts  d é lib é ré s  en c o n se il des m in is tr e s ,  
le s  mesures q u 'i l  juge  in d isp en sab le  pour f a i r e  face aux dépen­
ses n é c e ss ité e s  p a r l a  défense n a tio n a le  e t  re d re s se r  le s  f i n ­
ances e t  l'économ ie de l a  n a t io n . Ces d é c re ts  se ro n t soumis a  
l a  r a t i f i c a t i o n  des Chambres au cours de l a  session  e x tra o rd i­
n a ire  e t  au p lu s  ta rd  le  31 décembre 1938. La p résen te  l o i ,  
d é lib é ré e  e t  adoptée p a r  le  Sénat e t  p a r  l a  Chambre des d ép u tés , 
s e ra  executee comme l o i  de l 'E t a t . "  F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  
Débats P arlem en ta ires (A p ril 14, 1938), p . 442é.
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p u b lie  u t i l i t y  r e j e t i o n s ,  reo rg an iza tio n  o f  the  French Red 
C ross, reform  o f  lo c a l  f in a n c e s , coo rd ina tion  o f  tra n sp o r ta ­
t io n ,  customs d u tie s , reo rg an iz a tio n  o f  the m il i ta ry  h ie ra rc h y , 
housing , a g r ic u l tu re ,  and th e  e n t i r e  defense e f f o r t .
D alad ier turned  away from th is  "compromise” approach in  
the l a t e  summer and f a l l  o f  1938. In  the  T hird  Republic the  
l a s t  o f  the  enabling  a c ts  which were aimed s p e c if ic a l ly  a t  
the p ro v is io n  o f  the n ecessary  powers to  dea l w ith  f in a n c ia l  
and economic em ergencies were passed on October 8 , 1938, as 
the r e s u l t  o f  rep ercu ssio n s from the European p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  
which u p se t the  French n a tio n a l economy. Under the terms o f  
th is  second g ra n t to  h is  M in is try , D alad ier was empowered to  
use decrees " in  o rd er to  e f f e c t  an immediate recovery  in  the  
f in a n c ia l  and economic s i tu a t io n  o f  the  c o u n try .”^ T h eo re tic ­
a l ly ,  decrees issu ed  in  consequence o f th is  d e leg a tio n  were 
designed " to  reco n c ile  th e  re -e s ta b lish m en t o f  a  g re a te r  l ib e r ty  
fo r  eaqployers and o f th e  in v e s tin g  p u b lic  in  g enera l w ith  
e f f i c i e n t  war p re p a ra tio n ."^  By th e i r  very  n a tu re  th ese  two 
o b je c tiv e s  were c o n tra d ic to ry  and, a t  the same tim e, both  
m otives le d  to  a v i r t u a l  n u l l i f i c a t io n  o f the Blum s o c ia l  
refo rm s.^  In  in d u s tr ie s  v i t a l  to  the  n a tio n a l d efense , the
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . . Débats P arlem en ta ires 
(O ctober 2 , 1938), pT 1529.
^Kirchheim er, p . 1110.
^See F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Débats P arlem en ta ires 
(November 13, 1938), pp . 1^855-61 ; and the k m g li^  t r a n s la t io n  
in  th e  London Economist o f  November 19, 1938, p . 363 s e a .
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D alad ier lU a is try  extended the fo rty -h o u r week to  f i f t y  hours.
In  p r o te s t  ag a in s t th i s  Infringem ent o f  what they considered  
to  be th e i r  hard-won r i g h t s , French lab o r s tru c k  on Nowember 30, 
1938. D alad ier moved a g a in s t th i s  d e re l ic t io n  o f  p u b lic  r e s ­
p o n s ib i l i ty ,  no t through the  tim e-honored s ta te  o f  s iege  bu t 
by maaat o f  the law on th e  g en e ra l o rg an iza tio n  o f the n a tio n  
In  time o f war o f  Ju ly  11, 1938.^ % d er A r t ic le  14 o f  th is  
law ,^ a  decree was Issu ed  m obilizing  a l l  la b o re rs  o f  a  p u b lic
3
c h a ra c te r  and re q u is i t io n in g  the r a i lro a d s  fo r  p u b lic  u se .
To In su re  the coopera tion  o f  those c iv i l ia n s  whose occupations 
were considered  o f  a p u b lic  c h a ra c te r , the  ju r i s d ic t io n  o f  the 
m il i ta ry  co u rts  was expanded to Include crim es o f  a pub lic  
n a tu re .^  Thus, a sp ec ts  o f  the s t a te  o f  s ie g e  were laqplemented 
w ithou t the  a p p lic a tio n  o f  the I n s t i tu t io n  I t s e l f .  As was the 
tendency o f the tim es, governmental decrees based upon g en e ra l­
ized  s ta tu to ry  p ro v is io n s  rep laced  more c ircum scribed , s p e c ia l­
ized  emergency a u th o r i ty .
F ra n c e .  Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . .  Débats P arlem en taires fJu lv  
13, 1938), pp. Ï33’W 7 .  -----------
^ A rtic le  14 o f  the  law o f Ju ly  11, 1938: " . . .P e a t  ê t r e
égalem ent soumis à  r e q u is i t io n ,  chaque Ind iv idu  conservan t sa  
fo n c tio n  ou son em ploi, l'ensem ble  du personnel f a is a n t  p a r t ie  
d 'un  se rv ic e  ou d 'u n  e n tre p r is e  considère  comme Ind ispensab le  
pour a s su re r  le s  beso ins du p a y s . . ."  I b i d . ,  p . 8332.
^ A rtic le  50 o f the  law o f Ju ly  l i ,  1938: "A l a  m o b ilisa ­
t io n ,  ou dans le s  cas  prévus It I f  a r t i c l e  1 er de l a  p résen te  
l o i ,  l e s  d iv e rs  s e rv ic e s  de tra n s p o r ts ,  ta n t  en ce qui concerne 
l a  s a t is f a c t io n  des b eso in s  des fo rces  a n ^ e s  que c e l le  des 
beso ins du pays, so n t c e n t r a l i s é s  e t  p laces  sous l 'a u t o r i t é  
d 'un  m in is tre  un ique. . . "  I b ld . . p . 8336.
^See A r t ic le  30 o f  th e  law o f  Ju ly  11, 1938. I b id . . p .
8334.
Ill
New emergency powers were voted  to the D aladier regime 
In March o f 1939. In the debate preceding the passage o f th is  
th ird  enabling  g ra n t to h is  Government, D alad ier f a i le d  to 
o f fe r  to  P arliam ent a morsel o f hope fo r  re tu rn  to t r a d i t io n a l  
parliam entary  p r a c t ic e .  He f a i le d  to  propose a coord inated  
program bu t o ffe re d  only g e n e ra liz a tio n s  s tre s s in g  the v ir tu e s  
o f  a u th o r ita r ia n  govermeent—Independence, r a p id i ty ,  secrecy 
o f a c tio n —as compared w ith  the Inadequacies o f dem ocratic gov­
ernm ent.^ I t  I s  probable th a t  D alad ier sought a workable 
c r i s i s  a l te rn a t iv e  to parliam entary  In cap ac ity . However, what 
he achieved was an open f lau n tin g  o f the Chambers to  which he 
was u ltim a te ly  re sp o n s ib le . In d ig n ity , re sp e c t, se lf-e s teem , 
and most im portant In the a b i l i ty  to  le g is la te  d e c is iv e ly , 
French parllam en tarlan lsm  was on a  r o l le r - c o a s te r  o f  d e c lin e .
In  s p i te  o f th is  a t t i tu d e ,  D alad ier was su ccessfu l In 
gain ing  m ajo rity  support w ith in  bo th  Chambers. At th is  la te  
d a te , as the w orld raced  toward a co n fla g ra tio n , the French 
Government sought more than the a u th o r ity  to  a d ju s t to f in an ­
c i a l  and economic upheavals. I t  demanded v i r tu a l ly  un lim ited  
p lenary  powers to  provide fo r  the  defense o f  the coun try . In  
the only o p e ra tiv e  c lau se  o f  the th i r d  D alad ier enabling  a c t ,  
March 19, 1939:
The Government . . .  |wa£] au th o rized , u n t i l  November 
30, 1939, to  ta iœ , by decrees determ ined In Council 
o f M in is te rs , the measures n ecessary  fo r  the defense 
o f the co u n try .
These decrees are to  be subm itted  to  the Chambers fo r
^Le Temps, March 19, 1939, p . 2.
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r a t i f i c a t i o n  before December 31, 1939.
The p re se n t la v . determ ined and adopted by the Senate 
and by the C lH w er o f.D ep u tie s , w i l l  be executed as 
the law o f  the S ta te .^
E xtensive use was made o f  th is  a u th o rity  e s p e c ia lly  a f t e r  
the ou tb reak  o f w ar, b u t th is  was n o t the end o f le g is la t iv e  
g ran ts  to  th e  E xecu tive . There remained one m ajor incumbrance 
upon the E xecutive agency. The law o f  March 19, 1939, as had 
o th e r enab ling  laws before  i t ,  provided only fo r  the t r a n s f e r  
o f  a u th o rity  w ith in  narrow time l im i t s .  The D alad ier C ab inet, 
as th a t  o f  B riand, f e l t  th a t  the ex igencies o f  modem w arfare  
made Governmental competence in  the realm  o f the le g is la t iv e  
power a paraswunt n e c e s s ity . As a r e s u l t ,  the Prime M in is te r  
proposed the  c re a tio n  o f  a permanent b a s is  fo r  the  ex e rc ise  o f  
such powers. By the law o f Ju ly  11, 1938, P arliam ent had a l ­
ready provided fo r  the o rg an iza tio n  o f  the  n a tio n  in  w artim e.
In i t s  A r t ic le  36,^  th is  s ta tu te  de lega ted  a u th o rity  f o r  the 
opening o f  war c r e d i ts  a t  a  time when the  Chambers were n o t
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Débats P arlem en ta ires (March 
20, 1939), p . 3?%?:
^ A rtic le  36 o f  the law on the g en era l o rg an iza tio n  o f  the 
n a tio n  in  time o f war o f  Ju ly  11, 1938: Les re g ie s  b u d g é ta ires
normales so n t maintenues â l a  a m b ilisa tio n  ou dans le s  cas 
prévus à  l ' a r t i c l e  1^^ de l a  p résen te  l o i .  En cas d 'absence 
des C haibm s, s i  le s  beso ins de l a  défense n a tio n a l l 'e x ig e n t  
e t  s ' i l  y a  urgence, des c r é d i ts  supplém entaires non com>ris 
dans l a  nom enclature, annexée i  l a  l o i  de finances e t  des 
c r é d i ts  e x tra o rd in a ire s  pourant ê t r e  o u v ert p rov iso irem en t, à  
l a  s u i te  d 'une communication aux commissions des fin an ces du 
Sénat e t  de l a  Chambre des d ép u tés , p a r  d éc re ts  rendus en con­
s e i l  d 'E ta t  après a v o ir  é té  d é lib é ré s  e t  approuvés en c o n s e il  
des m in is tr e s . Ces d éc re ts  devront ê t r e  soumis dans le  mois h 
l a  r a t i f i c a t i o n  des Chambres réu n ie s  au beso in  2 c e t  e f f e t .  
F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Débats P arlem en ta ires (Ju ly  13,
1939), pT33347
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assembled. N everthe less, a fo u rth  enabling  d elegation  was 
g ran ted  to D aladier on December 8, 1939, which expanded Execu­
tiv e  a u th o rity  in to  a w holesale t r a n s fe r  of powers, r e s t r ic te d  
only in  time to  the du ra tion  o f h o s t i l i t i e s  and in  purpose to 
the immediate n e c e s s it ie s  o f n a tio n a l defense.^  I t  i s  im port­
an t to  note th a t  th is  c lau se  co n ferred  upon the Government a 
permanent o rdain ing  power, to  be ex e rc ised  in  times o f war 
on ly , on a l l  m atte rs  connected w ith  n a tio n a l defense fo r  which 
an immediate n e c e ss ity  might a r i s e .  Thus, fo r  the f i r s t  time 
in  the Third Republic the Government rece ived  emergency powers 
which i t  could invoke a t  any time a t  i t s  p leasu re  as long as 
h o s t i l i t i e s  were in  p ro g ress . The Government was now f re e  to 
issu e  decrees on su b je c t m a tte r w ithout being s p e c if ic a l ly  
au th o rized  to  do so , and i t  could issu e  these decrees w ithout 
the ra th e r  narrow time lim its  o f previous enabling  a c t s .
The gradual e c lip s e  of parliam en tary  le g is la t io n  had now 
developed in to  an ab so lu te , fu ll-b low n  s u b s t i tu t io n  o f Execu­
t iv e  decree power fo r  L e g is la tiv e  a u th o r ity . S ig n if ic a n tly , 
th is  evo lu tion  was e s s e n t ia l ly  a peacetim e phenomenon. The 
enabling  ac ts  o f 1924 and 1926, confined  as they were to 
r a th e r  narrowly lim ited  f ie ld s  o f a c t iv i ty  and fo r  sh o r t 
periods of tim e, had e s ta b lish e d  precedents which in  1934 
and 1935 were drawn upon by Doumergue and Laval. Grants to  
l a t t e r  Governments, though s t i l l  t ie d  to  concre te  o b jec tiv es
^Law of December 8, 1939, in s e r te d  in  the law of Ju ly  11, 
1938: "Pendant la  durée des h o s t i l i t i e s ,  le s  Chambres exercen t
le u r  pouvoirs en m atiè re  lé g is la t iv e  e t  budgéta ire  comme en 
temps de paix . T o u te fo is , en cas de n é c e s s ité  immédiate, le
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o f  I n te n t ,  tended in  r e a l i t y  toward all-em bracing  o b je c tiv e s .
At th e  culm ination o f  th i s  development—the fo u r D alad ier 
enab ling  a c ts —the s p e c if ic a t io n  o f lim ite d  o b je c tiv e s  became 
a secondary c o n s id e ra tio n , and the time period  fo r  the a p p lic a ­
tio n  o f  decrees was only  a vague g e n e ra li ty . P arliam entary  
in c ap ac ity  had demanded Executive a c tio n s , and th e  decree based 
upon g en era lized  enab ling  le g is la t io n  became the  u ltim a te  v e h ic le  
provided by French democracy befo re  World War I I .  As devices 
c re a te d  to  su s ta in  P arliam en tary  government, enab ling  procedures 
were to  f a i l ,  b u t th i s  may w ell have been due more to the e x i­
gencies o f  the tim es than to  th e i r  in cap ac ity  as instrum ents 
o f  c r i s i s  government.
The Government o f  France in  1939-40 was a conscious
1
im ita tio n  o f  the World War I  regim e. The s ta te  o f  s ieg e  was 
invoked throughout the n a tio n  and the  c i v i l  r ig h ts  o f  French 
c i t iz e n s  were again p laced  a t  the mercy o f  the  m il i ta ry  au th o r­
i t i e s .  In d u stry  and la b o r were c o n tro lle d  c lo s e ly . The Cham­
b e rs ,  w hile having renounced th e i r  p re ten sio n s  as a  lawgiving 
body in  the 1937-1939 p e r io d , re ta in e d  and e x e rc ise d  A e i r  
power o f  o v e rs ig h t. They were in  se ss io n  fo r  most o f  th is
gouvernement e s t  a u to r is é  â p ren d re , p a r  d é c re ts  d é lib é ré s  en 
C onseil des m in is tre s , le s  mesures iaq^sées p a r le s  ex ig en cies 
de l a  defense n a t io n a le . Ces d éc re ts  so n t soumis à  l a  r a t i f i ­
c a tio n  dans un d é la i  d 'u n  mois e t ,  en cas d 'absence des Chas&res, 
des le u r  prem ière ré u n io n .” F rance, J o u c t s I  O f f ic ie l . . . .  Débats 
P arlem en ta ires (December 9 , 1939), p . 1031.
^ k o s s i te r , pp. 127-28. See a ls o . Soger Bonnard, "Le d ro i t  
p u b lic  e t  l a  g u e rre ,"  Sevue du D ro it P u b lic . L?1 (Oetober-Movem- 
ber-D eeenber, 1939). n . 549. and Sevw  du b r o i t  P u b lic , LVII 
(January-February-K areh, 1940), p .  90,
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p eriod  and were c lo tu re d  only once, October 5 to  November 30, 
1939, to  enable the  Government to  d ea l h arsh ly  w ith  Communist 
depu ties thus deprived o f th e i r  parliam en tary  immunity from 
a r r e s t .
The method o f parliam entary  c o n tro l used was in v e s tig a ­
tio n  by s p e c ia l Committee and the in te rp e l la t io n  o f the Govern­
ment in  s e c re t  se ss io n . On March 19, 1940, the D alad ier Cabi­
n e t was vo ted  "confidence” by an overwhelming m a jo rity , 239-1, 
b u t w ith  some 300 a b s te n tio n s . D alad ier re s ig n ed , thus docu­
menting the continuance o f C abinet r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .  Confidence 
was vo ted  to the  succeeding Reynaud Government, and as the war 
p rogressed  in to  i t s  l a s t  weeks, le g is la t iv e  support o f the 
Government in c reased . The Chambers d id  r e ta in  u ltim a te  co n tro l 
over the ac tio n s  o f  th e i r  ag en ts , the C abinet: y e t ,  fo r  a l l
p r a c t ic a l  purposes the conqaetence to  p repare the n a tio n  fo r  
c o n f l ic t  and to  f ig h t  the war was p laced  in  the hands o f the 
Executive agency.
The re su lt  was a wholesale propagation of decree-laws by 
the Government—a procedure which was a pronounced departure 
from the system followed during the F ir s t  World War. In the 
la s t  months before the darkness of German occupation and the 
b lig h t o f Vichy co llaboration , France was governed conq»letely 
by Executive decree. In d irec t con trast to the experiences 
of the f i r s t  war, the Cabinet became the one re a l source of 
authority  in  the Republic.
Consistent with c iv i l  law tra d itio n , the Legislature had 
provided ra th e r system atically and minutely fo r changes in
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government end edm ln le tre tlo n  to  be e f fe c te d  in  time o f  w er.^  
These pxogrems were drewn upon, b u t e s s e n t ia l ly  what they 
achieved was the le g a liz a t io n  o f  the e x tra - le g a l  and b la ta n t ly  
i l l e g a l  procedures o f  the 1914-1915 p e r io d . As in  th a t  e r a ,  
the decree ru led  supreme.
The use o f  p le in s  pouvoirs reached a  lu d ic ro u s  extreme 
on Ju ly  9 and 10, 1940. The Chanter o f  D eputies and the 
S enate, meeting to g e th e r as the N ational Assembly, which alone 
was v es ted  w ith  the r ig h t  to amend the C o n s titu tio n  o f 1875, 
passed a  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  law in troduced  on b e h a lf  o f  the P d tain  
Government. In  i t s  s in g le  A r t ic le  th is  amendment sp e c if ie d  
th a t :
The N ational Assembly g ives complete power to  the 
Government o f  the  R epublic, under the s ig n a tu re  and 
a u th o rity  o f  Marshal F d ta in , P re s id e n t o r the Council 
o f  M in is te rs , f o r  the purpose o f  prom ulgating by one 
o r  more a c ts ,  the new c o n s ti tu t io n  o f the French 
S ta te .  This c o n s t i tu t io n  s h a l l  guaran tee  the r ig h ts  
o f  Labor, the Fam ily, and the  F a th e rla n d . I t  a h a ll  _ 
be r a t i f i e d  by the assem blies which i t  s h a l l  c re a te .^
This a c t ,  o f i t s e l f ,  d id  n o t in  any form al manner t e r -  
a in a te  the  ex is ten ce  o f  the Third  R epublic, no r d id  i t  attexmpt 
to  sp ec ify  the changes which were to  be in tro d u ced . What the  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  amendment o f  Ju ly  10, 1940 accomplished was to  
con fer upon the Government by way o f a  f u l l  d e leg a tio n  o f 
powers (p le in s  pouvo irs) the ta sk  o f  d ra f t in g  a new c o n s t i tu t io n .
^"Loi su r  1*o rg an iza tio n  généra le  de l a  nattLon pour l a  
temps de g u e rre ,"  F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets 
(Ju ly  13, 1938), pp . 8330-371
^Paul Farmer, Vichv (New York: Columbia U n iversity
P re ss , 1955), p . 141.
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But th e re  was an e s s e n t ia l  d iffe re n ce  between th i s  d e le ­
g a tio n  and the g ran ts  o f 1935, 1937, 1938, and 1939, under 
which D alad ier and Reynaud, i f  n o t Chautemps and L aval, had 
av a ile d  them selves o f " q u a s i-a u th o r ita r ia n "  methods. A ll p re­
vious g ran ts  had involved l im ita t io n s  as to  su b je c t m a tte r  and 
p erio d  o f  a p p lic a tio n . Even the most severe o f th e se—th a t  
of December 8 , 1939—provided broad time r e s t r ic t io n s  fo r  the 
d u ra tio n  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  and some l im ita tio n  on purpose to  the 
immediate n e c e s s i t ie s  o f  n a t io n a l defense. Most inq>ortant, 
however, was the  f a c t  th a t  P arliam en t, before the debacle a t  
Vichy, had ex e rc ised  a co n tin u a l su rv e illa n c e  over governmental 
a c t iv i ty .  This was n o t tru e  a f t e r  Ju ly  10, 1940. The c o n s t i­
tu t io n a l  amendment o f  th a t  d a te  tra n s fe r re d  f u l l  powers to  the 
Government (rei pub licae  co n stitu en d ae  causa) ,  un lim ited  in  
both time and scope.
Thus, the p r in c ip le  o f  d e leg a tio n  o f le g is la t iv e  powers 
which had been so w idely used in  the f i e ld  o f o rd in ary  l e g i s ­
la t io n  was ap p lied  to  the t r a n s f e r  o f  the c o n s titu e n t power 
(pouvoir c o n s t i tu e n t)^ from th e  N ational Assembly to  the Head
^"By way o f im ita tio n  and r e p e t i t io n ,  the u n re s tr ic te d  
t r a n s f e r  o f  th e  pouvoir c o n s t i tu e n t  to  an a u th o r ita r ia n  gov­
ernment has become th e s te r e o ty p e d  v e h ic le  fo r  s u b s t i tu t in g  
a u th o r i ta r ia n  fo r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p rocesses o f government. The 
p a r a l l e l  to  th e  t r a n s i t io n  from th e  Weimar system to  the H i t l e r  
regime i s  too s t r ik in g  to be m issed ." (See, the E nabling A ct 
o f  March 24, 1933, A r t ic le  2 , sen tence 1 and th e  R econstruction  
Act o f  January  30, 1934, A r t ic le  4 : "The Government o f the
Reich may en ac t new c o n s t i tu t io n a l  la w .") K arl Low enstein,
"The Dexùse o f  the French C o n s titu tio n  o f 1875. " A f r ic a n  P o l i­
t i c a l  -Science Review. XXXIV (O ctober, 1940), pp. 885-86.
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and Government o f  the S ta te .  The d e leg a tio n  o f c o n s titu e n t 
power was e x p l ic i t ly  given to  the Government "under the signa­
tu re  o f  Marshal P i ta in ,"  thus s ig n ify in g  n a tio n a l t r u s t  in  one 
"who i s  be lieved  to  be the custod ian  o f  the French fu tu re ." ^  
France had no t learned  th a t  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  re p re se n ta tiv e  gov­
ernment does n o t func tion  w e ll "w ith such a f ix a tio n  o f a gen­
e r a l  ru le  o f  law on d e f in i te  p e rso n s."^
Marshal P é ta in  moved im m ediately to apply h is  p re ro g a tiv e  
to  is su e  organic d ec rees . On Ju ly  11, 1940 he au th o rized  th ree  
decrees rep ea lin g  p o rtio n s  o f  the  C o n s titu tio n a l Laws o f  the 
Third  Republic and in s t i tu t i n g  a new framework o f government. 
C o n s titu tio n a l Act Number One merged the two o f f ic e s  o f  P ré s i­
den t o f the Republic and P re s id en t o f  the Council o f M in is te rs  
in to  one and designated  Marshal P é ta in  as "Chief o f the French 
S ta te ."  C o n s titu tio n a l Act Number Two e s ta b lish e d  the genera l 
procedures o f  government th a t  were to  p re v a il  u n t i l  such time 
as a new c o n s ti tu t io n  should be prom ulgated. Under i t s  p ro v i­
s io n s  the Chief o f  the French S ta te  assumed the r ig h t  to  appoin t 
a l l  p u b lic  o f f i c e r s ,  to  have u ltim a te  command o f  the armed 
fo rc e s , and to  issu e  laws and to  conclude t r e a t i e s  under h is  
own s ig n a tu re . C o n s titu tio n a l A ct Number Three dec lared  th a t  
th e  Chamber o f  D eputies and the Senate should " su b s is t"  u n t i l  
th e  prom ulgation o f the d e f in i t iv e  new c o n s t i tu t io n . They were 
n o t to  meet ag a in , as the  proposed c o n s t i tu t io n  was drawn up
l l b i d .
2 lb id .
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b u t never p u t in to  fo rc e . In  f a c t ,  the pub lic  vas never in ­
formed o f  i t s  c o n te n ts . These th ree  C o n s titu tio n a l A cts , 
though in tended  to  be only  in te rim  m easures, were to  p rov ide , 
to g e th e r w ith  o th e r  amendments by decree, the b a s is  o f  govem - 
isent a l l  through the  Vichy p e rio d .
Thus, by the  g ra n t o f  to t a l ly  u n llad ted  p le in s  pouvo irs , 
the  N ational Assembly made p o ss ib le  the demise o f  the  c o n s ti­
tu t io n a l  system o f  the T hird  R epublic. The d e s tru c tio n  o f 
repub lican  government was achieved w ith  a consuma t e ,  even 
eTCessive sense o f  l e g a l i ty ,  and in  coaqplete accord w ith  the 
requirem ents^ o f  the c o n s ti tu t io n  which was being d e s t r o y e d .2 
I t  was only  by i t s  f a i lu r e  to seek r a t i f i c a t io n  by popular 
vo te th a t  the Vichy Government destroyed  i t s  re la tio n s h ip  w ith  
the  previous regiam and turned i t s e l f  from a  de lu re  to  a  de 
fac to  Govermsent.
iThe C o n s titu tio n a l Laws o f  the T hird  Republic were con­
s id e red  the supresm law o f  the land , capable o f being abrogat­
ed only  by a le g is la t iv e  a c t  o f  equal rank , ("La c o n s ti tu t io n  
A crite  e t s n t  une l o i  e t  sÉse une l o i  supérieu re  e t  nffise immu­
a b le , ne d e v a it jam ais pouvoir ê t r e  abrogée que p a r une nouv­
e l l e  l o i  c o n s t i tu t io n n e l ,  rendue dans l a  fonae vou lue."  A. 
Esmein and H. MSzard, Elements du d ro i t  c o n s t i tu t io n n e l .  7@ 
é d . ,  I ,  p . 597. The a c tu a l  rev is io n  procedure f e l l  in to  two 
d i s t i n c t  phases: (a )  sep a ra te  re so lu tio n s  o f the Chambers
th a t  a re v is io n  s h a l l  take p la ce ; (b) enactment o f  th e  re v is io n  
by the Chambers Jo ined  to g e th e r in  the N ational Assembly by a 
m aloritA  absolue de vo ix—th a t  i s ,  a m a jo rity  o f a l l  mehbers 
v o tin g . (A r tic le " ?  o i  th e  Law o f  February 25, 1875.) The law 
o f  Ju ly  10, 1940 was passed by a 385 to 3 in  the Chasd>er, 225 
to  1 in  the  S enate , and 569 to  80 in  the N ational Assead>ly. 
Thus, the procedure follow ed was fu l ly  c o n s t i tu t io n a l .
^Lowenstein, p . 894.
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The dangers im p lic it  in  u n re s tr ic te d  delegation  o f  p lenary  
powers can be c le a r ly  seen. By the passage o f the law o f  Ju ly  
10, 1940, the French L eg is la tu re  undertook what was tantamount 
to  an a c t o f abd ication  and c rea ted  a d ic ta to rsh ip  o f the Exec­
u tiv e  by c o n s ti tu t io n a l  means. The r e s u l t  was the le g a l demise 
o f  the Third Republic.
The events o f the summer o f 1940 term inated the second 
• 1
cycle o f  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  development o f the French n a tio n . 
For the major p a r t  o f h e r ex is ten ce  in  modern tim es, France 
had been ru led  by governments r e s t r i c te d  in  th e i r  competence 
by some type o f sep ara tio n  o f  powers. U nfortunately , a l l  too 
o ften  the consequence o f such d iffu s io n  was the enfeeblem ent 
o f  p o l i t i c a l  power av a ila b le  fo r  e f fe c t iv e  use in  defense of 
the le g itim a te  order o f s o c ie ty . Experience in d ic a te s  th a t 
French government, in  time o f emergency, tends to  tr a n s fe r  
power to  a s in g le  agent, an agent which o ften  moves o u tside  
o f  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  framework in  the ap p lica tio n  o f i t s  au thor­
i t y .  Consequently, in  o rd er to  su s ta in  leg itim a te  governmental 
p ro cesses , France has faced a chronic need fo r  v ia b le , c o n s ti­
tu t io n a l  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  capable o f implementing vigorous 
governmental p o licy  in  an e f f ic a c io u s  manner.
I t  i s  apparent th a t  the Third Republic could no t f in d  
an adequate c r i s i s  p ro cess . The s ta te  o f siege proved to  be 
a u se fu l c r i s i s  device in  bo th  World Wars—a device fundamental 
to  the p rep ara tio n  o f the country  fo r  h o s t i l i t i e s .  But, des­
p i te  the evo lu tion  o f the p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f s ie g e , th i s  process
1
Supra. , p . 11.
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remained e s s e n t ia l ly  a sp e c ia liz e d  procedure ap p licab le  only 
In sp e c if ic  circum stances fo r  sp e c if ie d  a c t iv i t ie s »  The various 
ex tensions o f  the o rd a in in g  power o f  the Executive were n o t a 
s a t is f a c to ry  so lu tio n  e i t h e r ,  as they u ltim a te ly  moved the 
Executive o u ts id e  the realm  o f  le g a l i ty  and c o n s ti tu te d  a 
r a th e r  complete derogation  o f  parliam en tary  form s. P lenary  
powers de lega ted  to  th e  E xecutive su ff ic e d  as long as these 
g ran ts  were p ro v is io n a l and r e s t r ic t io n s  upon su b je c t m a tte r 
and p eriod  o f a p p lic a tio n  were resp ec ted ; however, lim ite d  
g ran ts  le d  to broad d e leg a tio n s  and then to v i r tu a l ly  un res­
t r i c t e d  d e leg a tio n s tantam ount to  ab d ica tio n  o f P arliam entary  
le g is la t iv e  power to  Executive decree . A fu l l- f le d g e d  c o n s ti­
tu t io n a l  emergency c lau se  such as A r t ic le  14 o f  the C h arte r o f 
1814 was no t employed. The emergency ex tensions o f  th e  Exec­
u tiv e  o rdain ing  power came c lo s e s t  to th is  h i s to r ic  procedure.
D espite th e i r  u ltim a te  f a i lu r e  to  s u s ta in  the  rep resen ­
ta t iv e  government, th ese  c r i s i s  I n s t i tu t io n s  employed In  the 
Third Republic provide a g re a t  deal o f  va luab le  experience In 
the a p p lic a tio n  o f c r i s i s  government which modem rep re se n ta ­
t iv e  I n s t i tu t io n s ,  w hether P re s id e n t ia l  o r  P a rllaa ien ta ry , 
should no t overlook . I t  I s  the  f a te  o f  governments In our 
time to be faced  w ith  th e  n e c e ss ity  o f applying these  o r  sim­
i l a r  tech n iq u es. Circum stance demands th e i r  u se . C r is is  gov­
ernment I s  o r  must be an In te g ra l  p a r t  o f  re p re se n ta tiv e  In s­
t i t u t i o n s .  The unhappy agony and death  o f the T hird  Republic 
should n o t condemn the I n s t i tu t io n s  employed to  s u s ta in  I t s  
l i f e —fo r  I n s t i tu t io n s  are  no s tro n g e r  than the s p i r i t  w ith
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which they are implemented. At the same tim e, in s t i tu t io n s  
provide no c u r e - a l l  fo r  the i l l s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s o c ie ty . They 
are  only forms in to  which i s  poured the substance o f  p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e .  I n s t i tu t io n s ,  a t  b e s t ,  provide s tru c tu re  and method 
through which can be channelled  the e f fe c t iv e  w i l l  o f  so c ie ty . 
Y et, when the continuance o f f re e  so c ie ty  depends upon the 
e f f e c t iv e  use o f  c r i s i s  government, the s e le c tio n  o f c r i s i s  
weapons becomes a most c ru c ia l  ta sk  indeed. For an im portant 
key to success o f any re p re se n ta tiv e  government i s  the a b i l i ty  
to  d is t in g u ish  between v ia b le  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  and those 
w ithou t m e rit . The French T hird Republic was unable to  make 
th is  d is t in c t io n .  Whether o r  n o t the  Republic would have been 
ab le  to su rv ive i f  braced by adequate c r i s i s  dev ices i s  a moot 
p o in t;  what i s  apparen t i s  th a t ,  f a i l in g  to have v ia b le  c r i s i s  
in s t i tu t io n s  c o n s is te n t w ith  i t s  le g a l o rd e r , the T hird  Repub­
l i c  had le s s  chance o f  su rv iv a l than i f  th i s  a rea  o f  govern­
m ental r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  had been more adequately  provided fo r .
CHAPTER VI 
THE EXPANSION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY
The C o n s titu tio n  o f October 27, 1946, e s ta b lish in g  the 
F ourth  Republic, m irro red  s u b s ta n tia l  disenchantm ent w ith  the  
p ra c t ic e  o f  c r i s i s  government in  the T hird  R epublic. This 
disenchantm ent vas evidenced in  i t s  rin g in g  proclam ation:
"The N ational Assembly alone s h a l l  adopt the  la v s . I t  may 
n o t d e leg a te  th is  r i g h t . A  l i t e r a l  read ing  o f th is  te x t  
g iv es  the iaq>ression th a t  th e  C o n s titu tio n  vas designed to 
inqplement the su b stan tiv e  and m a te r ia l , as v e i l  as the  fo n aa l, 
supremacy o f the la v . I t  appeared th a t  a  su p e rio r  normative 
a u th o r ity  vas v es ted  in  th e  N ational Assembly and th a t  th is  
competence vas no t su b je c t to  m o d ifica tio n , d e leg a tio n , o r 
t r a n s f e r .  To be su re , such a re ac tio n  a g a in s t the t a c i t  ab­
d ic a tio n  o f  le g is la t iv e  conqpetence vh ich  occurred  in  the la te  
1930*s might have been expected  and could be v e i l  understood, 
consid erin g  the inadequacies o f  French parliam entarism  in  the  
face  o f  economic, f in a n c ia l ,  and so c ia l  d is lo c a tio n s  and v a r .  
Hovever, a  vigorous p arliam en tary  regime cannot be su s ta in ed  
by l e g a l i s t i c  r e s t r ic t io n s  upon the  t r a n s f e r  o f  a u th o r ity .
^ A rtic le  13 o f the  C o n s titu tio n  o f  October 27, 1946.
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I t  must be embedded in  « s ta b le  consensus, organized in  a 
v ia b le  sumner, and enunciated  by resp o n sib le  m ajo rity  c o a l i ­
t io n s  .
Post-World War I I  France req u ired  immediate, p o s i t iv e ,  
and responsib le  a c tio n  on the p a r t  o f  govermaent. The ach ieve­
ment o f  vigorous lead ersh ip  was p o ss ib le  only in  c e r ta in  c i r ­
cumstances: i f  the s ta te  was t o t a l i t a r i a n ;  i f  the s ta te  was
able to produce th is  "m ajority  c o a li t io n "  on a  r e la t iv e ly  su s­
ta in ed  b a s is  w ith in  an adequate parliam en tary  system; o r , i f  
the s ta te  was endowed w ith  and was in  a p o s it io n  to u t i l i z e  
workable d isc re tio n a ry  a u th o r ity . France o f  the Fourth  Repub­
l i c  sought co^>etence w ith in  the realm  o f  re p re se n ta tiv e  P ar­
liam entary  government. However, she f a i le d  to  produce a func­
tio n in g  coherent m a jo rity  over any p erio d  o f  time o r  an ade­
quate parliam entary  system . Her b e s t hope, th e re fo re , lay  in  
the evo lu tion  and development o f  a c le a r ly  defin ed , y e t circum ­
sc rib e d , system o f  ex cep tio n a l powers and d e leg a tio n s designed 
to  b u ttr e s s  the d e f ic ie n c ie s  o f  the re g u la r  process o f  govern­
ment.
In  f a c t .  A r t ic le  13 o f  the 1946 C o n s titu tio n  d id  n o t 
l im it  the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  the d e lega tion  o f  le g is la t iv e  compe­
tences to  the Executive through the estab lishm en t o f the i l l e ­
g a l i ty  o f  the d e leg a tio n  o f the su b s tan tiv e  su b je c t m a tte r o f  
the  law to the possesso r o f  the  ordinance power. I t  c o n s ti tu te d  
a p u r i s t ic  sta tem ent o f  the form al re la tio n s h ip  o f the ordinance 
and the law as mummified in  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  t r a d i t io n .  The 
A r t ic le  i s  re p re se n ta tiv e  o f  the re a c tio n  a g a in s t the excesses
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o f the T hird R epublic, b u t i t  was never intended to l im i t  a l l  
law-making functions to the N ational Assembly. Such a r e s t r i c ­
tio n  would no t square w ith  the r e a l i t y  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p ra c t ic e , 
fo r  ad m in is tra tiv e  re g u la tio n s  have always involved lim ite d  
d is c re tio n  in  the in te rp r e ta t io n  and ap p lic a tio n  o f  the  law.
The i n i t i a l  p o rtio n  o f  A r t ic le  13 th a t  the "N ational 
Assembly alone s h a l l  adopt the laws" can be more p ro p erly  un­
derstood  in  terms o f the re la tio n s h ip  between the N ational 
Assembly and the Council o f  the R epublic. Though the L eg is la ­
tu re  was b icam eral, the prim ary and, i f  n ecessary , abso lu te  
re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  the v o tin g  o f the law was v es ted  in  the 
lower house. The upper house served to provide l im ita t io n  
upon the u ltim a te  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  the N ational Assembly.
In  a l l  phases o f  the le g is la t iv e  p ro cess , the upper house 
o f  the Fourth Republic, the Council o f the R epublic , occupied 
one o f the weakest p o s it io n s  ever assigned to a European second 
chamber—c e r ta in ly  f a r  weaker than the B r i t i s h  House o f  Lords. 
The Council was allowed to  i n i t i a t e  le g is la t io n  b u t such b i l l s  
were req u ired  to  be sen t i n i t i a l l y  to the N ational Assembly 
where they could be k i l l e d  o r  p o l i t e ly  re tu rn ed . Consequently, 
the  i n i t i a t i v e  o f the Council was la rg e ly  reduced to  the sug­
g es tin g  o f amendments to  le g is la t io n  in i t i a t e d  in  the  N ational 
Assembly. In the f in a l  enactm ent o f le g is la t io n ,  the  p o s itio n  
o f th e  Council was even w eaker. A fte r  a measure had passed 
i t s  f i r s t  read ing  in  the N ational Assembly, i t  was se n t to  the 
Council which was given two months to  r e g is t e r  i t s  op in ion—
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l e s s , i f  the Assembly designated , fo r  finance o r  emergency 
le g is la t io n .  I f  the opinion was favorab le  o r  i f  none was 
re g is te re d  in  the req u ired  tim e, the measure was fo rth w ith  
d ec lared  "as passed by the Assembly." However, i f  the opinion 
o f the Council was unfavorable and amendments were proposed, 
the Assembly was req u ired  to  g ive the measure a second read­
in g , e i th e r  accepting o r  r e je c t in g  the amendments. But the 
outcome remained the same. The measure became law by the vo te 
o f the  N ational Assembly a lo n e .^  The l a t t e r  p o rtio n  o f the 
A r t ic le  th a t  the N ational Assembly "may n o t d e leg a te  th is  
r ig h t"  appears very s p e c if ic  and s te m ,  b u t in  r e a l i ty  i t  was 
su b jec ted  to  a kale idoscop ic  v a r ie ty  o f in te rp r e ta t io n s .  As 
a su b s tan tiv e  l im ita t io n , i t  was in te rp re te d  to  mean th a t  any 
de leg a tio n  o f a u th o rity  comprehended w ith in  the scope o f the 
le g is la t iv e  power was fo rb idden . As a form al l im ita t io n , i t  
was in te rp re te d  to  mean th a t  the  h ie ra rch y  o f s ta tu te s  in  
French p u b lic  law must be adhered to  bu t th a t  the su b stan tiv e  
co n ten t o f  the law was su b je c t to  d e leg a tio n . This su b stan tiv e  
l im ita t io n  would appear to  d es tro y  any p o s s ib i l i ty  o f le g is la ­
tiv e  d e leg a tio n  even in  terms o f the in te rp r e ta t io n  o f the 
law, w hile the fo rm a lis t ic  l im ita t io n  would p ro te c t  the supre­
macy o f  law in  form b u t would n o t defend the in v io la b i l i ty  o f  
the supremacy o f the su b je c t m a tte r recognized as app rop ria te  
to the h ie ra rc h ic a l  ca tegory  o f law.
A good in s ig h t in to  the p re v a ilin g  a t t i tu d e  toward these
Igee A r t ic le  20 o f the C o n s titu tio n  o f October 27, 1946.
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r e s t r i c t io n s  i s  to be found in  the d iscu ssio n s o f  the two 
commissions on the C o n s titu tio n  which proceeded w ith  the r e ­
je c t io n  o f the d r a f t  c o n s t i tu t io n  o f  June 2, 1946 and the 
acceptance o f the C o n s titu tio n  o f October 27, 1946.
In  the  Commission on the C o n s titu tio n  fo r  the d r a f t  con­
s t i tu t io n  o f  June 2 , 1946, the dangers in h e ren t in  the use o f  a 
system o f decree-law s as employed in  the Third Republic came 
under thorough sc ru tin y . A s u b s ta n tia l  number o f  d e leg a te s , 
p a r t ic u la r ly  those rep re sen tin g  the moderate and extreme L e f t, 
were adamant th a t  the N ational Assembly should n o t be perm it­
ted  to  au th o rize  the Government to  undertake decree le g is la ­
t io n .  For example, the  Communist deputy. C alas , proposed th a t  
the Council o f  M in is te rs  should be e x p l ic i t ly  forbidden from 
making any law even p ro v is io n a lly . I t  s h a l l  make only "p roc la­
m ations conforming to  th e  laws and decrees in  ap p lic a tio n  o f 
the laws fo r  o rdering  o r  rep ea lin g  ap p lica tio n "^  o f le g i s la ­
t io n .  At th e  same tim e, the S o c ia l i s t  p a r ty  announced i t s  
support o f  a  formula which would allow  "the N ational Assembly 
alone . . .  to dispose o f the  le g is la t iv e  power. She cannot 
d e leg a te  i t  . . . No law can be m odified by d ecree ."^  Never­
th e le s s ,  d e sp ite  these vigorous e f f o r t s  to  para lyze  the  process 
o f the  m od ifica tion  o f parliam en tary  law by decree l e g is la t io n ,
^This formula was e x tra c te d  from A r t ic le  6 , Section  1, 
Chapter I ? ,  T i t le  I I I  o f  the C o n s titu tio n  o f  1791. As quoted 
in  Roger P in to , "Loi du 1 7 '&o$t 1948 e t  redressem ent économique 
e t  f in a n c ie r ,"  Revue du D ro it P ub lic  (October-Oecember, 1948), 
p • 537 0
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th is  F i r s t  Commission on the C o n stitu tio n  approved a compromise 
proposal which did n o t ru le  out the p o s s ib i l i ty  of decree le g ­
i s l a t io n ,  The proposal emanating from the c lo sed  session  of 
the Commission read; "There can be no laws o th e r  than those 
voted by the Assembly. The Assembly cannot delegate  in  a l l ,  
o r  in  p a r t ,  the r ig h t  to  le g is la te  in  i t s  p l a c e . T h i s  was 
the unanimous decision  o f the F i r s t  Commission;, however, as 
the r e s u l t  of p ressu re  brought to  bear in  the pub lic  sessions 
of the C onstituen t Assembly, the wording was u ltim a te ly  modi­
f ie d  in  form though 'not in  meaning. The f in a l  version  declared  
th a t :  "The N ational Assembly alone s h a l l  adopt the laws. I t
cannot delegate  th is  r ig h t  to another agency in  a l l  o r in  
p a r t . "2
The N ational Assembly enacts le g is la t io n .  The Council 
o f M in isters through i t s  agents app lies the law to e x is tin g  
circum stances. This i s  normal procedure under the French p a r ­
liam entary system. This sta tem ent is  very broad and in e x p l ic i t .  
To g e t a t  the inner workings o f the system , one must in q u ire  
in to  the degree to which le g is la t io n  is  sp e lle d  ou t in  d e ta i l  
by the le g is la t iv e  organ and the degree of d isc re tio n a ry  com­
petence av a ila b le  to and employed by the E xecutive. A r tic le  
13 sheds some l ig h t  on th is  problem. From the i n i t i a l  meetings 
o f the F i r s t  Commission on the C o n s titu tio n , i t  was c le a r  th a t
1
I b id . , p. 538, Note 3.
2
I b id . This c o n s ti tu te s  A rtic le  66 o f the  p ro je c t of 
A p ril 19, 1946. See Note 1, page 88.
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th is  p ro v isio n  o f the b as ic  document was no t in tended as a 
d r a s t ic  cu rta ilm en t o f  execu tive  competence and d is c re t io n .
To be su re , the wording o f  the c lause  was v igorous, and th e re  
was the im p lica tio n  th a t  th e  Council o f  M in is te rs  proposed and 
the N ational Assembly enacted ; and, as a consequence, le g is la ­
t iv e  a u th o rity  could no t be delegated  o r  m odified by decree.
From die o u tse t th is  sim ple and, on the s u rfa c e , d i r e c t  a s s e r ­
tio n  d id  n o t su f f ic e  as a working p r in c ip le  upon which to base 
the p rocedural re la tio n s h ip  o f the execu tive and le g is la t iv e  
branches o f  government. The nuances o f ad m in is tra tio n  were too 
complex fo r  so c le a r - c u t  a d o c tr in e . This c lau se  was s u f f ic ie n t  
to serve only as a s ta r t in g  p o in t .  For in  the  l a s t  a n a ly s is , 
the r e la t io n s h ip  between P arliam ent and the E xecutive—between 
ordinance and law—was to be determ ined by the p ro g ressiv e  in ­
te rp re ta t io n  and the r e s u lt in g  d ilu t io n  o f  th i s  p r in c ip le .
In  t r u th ,  w hile appearing to  follow  p u b lic  opinion in  
condemning the excesses o f  the  p a s t ,  the F i r s t  Commission in  
a c tu a l i ty  o ffe re d  only a symbolic d isapproval o f the  decree-law  
procedure. There was no concise sta tem en t o f  condemnation; 
the focus was s h if te d  to  an emphasis upon form ra th e r  than con­
te n t .^  The F i r s t  Commission was q u ite  aware th a t  a d e f in i t iv e
iT h is  emphasis upon form ra th e r  than co n ten t was accentu­
a ted  by the  amendment suggested by the deputy Giraudoux to  
A r t ic le  66 o f the p ro je c t  o f  A p ril 19, 1946 (th e  p re lim inary  
form o f  A r t ic le  13}, which s t ip u la te d  "son t o b lig a to irem en t 
p r is e s  formes des lo i s  le s  mesures r e la t iv e s  aux l ib e r t é s  pub­
l iq u e , aux s ta tu t s  de personnes e t  le s  b ie n s , à 1 'o rg an iza tio n  
des se rv ic e s  p u b lic s , 3 1 'o rg an iza tio n  ju d ic ia r e ,  aux im pdts. 
Sauf d isp o s itio n s  lé g is la t iv e s  c o n tra ir e s ,  to u te s  a u tre s  mesures 
peuvent ê t r e  p r is e s  p a r  vo ie  de d isp o s itio n s  rég lem en ta ire s . 
I b id . ,  p . 538.
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so lu tio n  to  the  problem o f de legation  and the r e la te d  co n si­
d e ra tio n s  o f the in te ra c t io n  o f ordinance and law could n o t be 
achieved in  the w ritin g  o f a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  document. There­
fo re , they req u ired  re sp e c t fo r  the form o f the law and chose 
to leave the determ ination  to p o l i t i c a l  ev o lu tio n . As the 
deputy Cot remarked in  h is  p re se n ta tio n  to  the  F i r s t  C o n stitu ­
e n t Assembly:
La question  de sa v o ir  ce qui e s t  du domaine de l a  lo i  
e t  ce qui e s t  du domaine du règlem ent d o it  ê t r e  
ré g lé e  par l a  p ra tiq u e , p ar l a  coutume, selon le s  
c i r c o n s ta n c e s . . .  Nous ne pouvons é t a b l i r  c e t te  d is ­
t in c t io n  p a r une d isp o s itio n  c o n s t i tu t io n n e l le .1
This approach was adopted by the Second Commission on 
the C o n s titu tio n  which approved the f in a l  conclusions o f the 
F i r s t  Commission on th is  su b je c t w ith  only  one amendment, the 
words "another agency i n . a l l  o r  in  p a r t"  were removed.^ The 
Second C o n stitu en t Assembly approved the  v ersio n  as p resen ted  
by the  Second Commission and i t  became A r t ic le  13 o f the Con­
s t i t u t i o n  o f October 27, 1946.
The in te rp re ta t io n  given to A r t ic le  13 by the Second 
C o n s titu e n t Assembly i s  b e s t  exem plified  in  the answer supp lied  
by th e a p p o r te u r  o f  the c lau se  in  response to a demand fo r  an 
a n a ly s is  o f  the word "law" as i t  was to  be employed in  the 
a fo re sa id  a r t i c l e .  The ra p p o rteu r , speaking in  response to  the
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . ,  Assemblée C o n stitu en t Na­
t io n a le .  Débats CApriT IzT 1^46). pp. 1883-04.
2 p in to , p . 538.
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challenge of the deputy Ramadler, advised th a t  " i t  i s  neces­
sa ry  to  understand the word ' law' in  the formal sense ra th e r  
than in  the m a te r ia l sense. That i s  to  say , the l im it  between 
what i s  le g is la t iv e  su b je c t m atter and what is  w ith in  the com­
petence o f the decree a u th o rity  can be v a r i a b l e . T h u s ,  i t  
i s  c le a r  th a t  the Second Commission on the C o n s titu tio n , w ith  
th e  approval of the Second C o n stitu en t Assembly, foresaw no 
p o s it iv e  m a te ria l l im ita tio n  to  su b je c t m atte r th a t could f a l l  
w ith in  the competence o f the executive agency. A rt ic le  13 im­
p lie d  th a t  any a u th o r ity  not c o n s t i tu t io n a lly  in  possession  of 
the  le g is la t iv e  competence was p ro h ib ite d  from c re a tin g  p o licy  
w ith  the value o f law. I t  d id no t p ro h ib it  the delegation  of 
m a tte rs  normally w ith in  the competence o f the le g is la t iv e  power 
to  th e  executive power. A pparently, A r t ic le  13 was designed 
to  function  as a l im ita tio n  upon form ra th e r  than upon substance 
o r co n ten t.
The Council of S tate sustained th is  in te rp re ta tion  in  i t s  
opinion (av is) of February 6, 1953.  ^ The Council maintained 
the trad itio n a l system founded upon the concept of le g is la tiv e  
determination of the competence of the regulatory power to be 
a va lid  system. However, i t  was recognized that in ce rta in  
m atters the le g is la tiv e  power has the competence to delegate 
authority  to the regulatory power to "modify, abrogate, or to
^P in to , pp. 570-71.
Zju r i s  C lasseur P ériod ique . 1953, I I I ,  17697.
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rep lace  le g is la t iv e  d is p o s itio n s ." ^  The Council o f  S ta te  d id  
n o t o b je c t to the simple a c t o f  the t r a n s f e r  o f competence 
from the L eg is la tu re  to  the E xecutive. What i t  condemned was 
excessive  d e leg a tio n . "Excess" was defined  as the delegation  
by th e  L eg is la tu re  o f i t s  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  fu n c tio n s : "su b jec t
m a tte r  th a t  i s  reserved  to  the law in  v ir tu e  o f  the  d isp o s itio n s  
o f th e  C o n s titu tio n ,"  su b jec t m a tte r th a t  i s  reserved  to  the 
l e g is la t iv e  competence "by c o n s t i tu t io n a l  repub lican  t r a d i t io n  
re s u lt in g  no tab ly  from the Preamble o f  the C o n s titu tio n  and 
the D eclaration  o f the R ights o f  Man o f  1789, o f which the 
p r in c ip le s  have been reaffirm ed  in  the  Preainble," and su b je c t 
m a tte r  th a t  was co n tra ry  to  A r t ic le  3 o f  the 1946 C o n s titu tio n  
which g ran ted  n a tio n a l sovere ign ty  to the N ational Assembly.^ 
Thus, A r tic le  13 i s  l im itiv e  only  in  th e  sense th a t  the  N ational 
Assembly may n o t (1) v io la te  the  form al h ie ra rch y  o f the law 
and (2 ) de legate  competence th a t  has been reserved  to  the  law 
by th e  C o n s titu tio n , by repub lican  t r a d i t io n ,  o r which would 
c o n s t i tu te  an abandonment o f  the ex e rc ise  o f  the n a tio n a l sov­
e re ig n ty .
France f a i le d  to  achieve h e r  in te rd ic t io n  so len n e lle* not
l l b i d .
^ Ib id . See a ls o :  Jacques Donnedieu De V abres, "L'a r t i c l e
13 e t  le s  d é c re ts - lo is ,"  R ecueil D a llo z . Chronique. XXV (1953), 
p . 137.
^René C ap itan t warned the N ational C o n stitu en t Assembly 
th a t  the d e fea t and abd ica tio n  o f  re sp o n sib le  government o f  
the T h ird  Republic to g e th e r w ith  the obvious r e s u l t s  o f  the 
infamous law o f  Ju ly  10, 1940, made i t  abundantly c le a r  th a t  
i t  was ab so lu te ly  necessary  fo r  France to  abandon the procedures
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1to employ the p ra c tic e  o f  decree le g is la t io n .  I t  was ev id en t 
from the o u tse t o f  the Fourth Republic th a t  n e i th e r  the exces­
ses to  which the enhancement o f  execu tive  au th o rity  was c a rr ie d  
in  the  l a s t  years o f  the  Third Republic nor the p ro h ib itio n s  
undertaken by A r t ic le  13 o f the C o n s titu tio n  o f October 27,
1946, would be s u f f ic ie n t  to  d e te r  the expansion and development 
o f the  ordinance power in  the Fourth R epublic. As the p o l i t i ­
c ian s  turned to the postw ar ta sk  o f  c re a tin g  a v ia b le  p o l i t i c a l  
organism  based upon th e  s p e c if ic s  and g e n e ra l i t ie s  o f  th e i r  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  document, they tu rned , perhaps by n e c e s s ity , to 
the expansion o f the reg u la to ry  a u th o r ity  as one o f the  most 
prom ising areas in  which to develop to o ls  adequate to cope w ith  
the complex requirem ents o f  modem re p re se n ta tiv e  government in  
s t r e s s .  The development o f  in c reased  reg u la to ry  a u th o r ity  d id  
n o t le ad  in e v ita b ly  to  renewed dependence upon ex cep tio n a l pro­
cedures nor to parliam en tary  in c ap ac ity ; n e v e rth e le ss , the  ten ­
dency was in  th is  d ir e c t io n . C e rta in ly , the f a i lu r e  o f  postwar
o f enabling  le g is la t io n  in s t i tu te d  in  1924. He in s i s te d  th a t  
one o f  the co rnerstones o f  the new c o n s ti tu t io n  must be an 
in te rd ic t io n  so le n n e lle  never again to  appeal to the system o f 
decree le g is la t io n • F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Assemblée 
N a tio n a le . Débats (August 9 , 1948), p . 5568.
^"Decree le g is la t io n "  which r e f e r s  to  the sem antic ph rase­
o logy , "decree law ," has been defined  in  a v a r ie ty  o f  ways, each 
o f which h i t  a t  the essence o f the concep t. For example, René 
C ap itan t simply r e fe r re d  to  " reg u la tio n  which m odifies a  law ." 
While P re s id en t o f  the  C ouncil, René Mayer ch a ra c te riz e d  decree 
le g is la t io n  as "a procedure by which the  le g is la tu r e  d e leg a tes  
i t s  power to  the execu tive  to undertake measures in  p u r s u it  o f 
a sp e c if ie d  o b je c tiv e ."  A more ex ten siv e  sta tem ent was given 
by th e  Marie government in  support o f  the  law o f  August 17,
1948. In  th is  a n a ly s is  decree laws were " reg u la tio n s  which em­
body w ith in  th e i r  scope the  m a te r ia l conq>etence o f  the l e g i s la ­
tu re  in  th a t  P arliam ent en larges the a rea  o f competence o f th e
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France to p r o f i t  from h e r  in te rw ar experiences o f fe rs  a nega­
tiv e  index to the a b i l i t y  o f  the French people to p r o f i t  from 
p a s t experience and upon th is  b a s is  o f ex p erien ce , tempered by 
a r e a l i s t i c  ev a lu a tio n  o f  c u rren t c ircum stances, to b u ild  cons­
t r u c t iv e ly  toward the  f u tu r e . Indeed, i t  can be argued th a t  
because France was unable to  deal e f f e c t iv e ly  w ith  the compet­
ing claim s o f law and o rd in an ce , she faced  the  postwar fu tu re  
unprepared to undertake a coheren t program fo r  le g itim a te  ac tio n  
when confron ted  w ith  re c u rre n t parliam en tary  in cap ac ity  and 
w ith  a u th o r i ta r ia n  ch a llen g e  to the e s ta b lis h e d  o rd e r o f  so c ie ­
ty .  For a n a tio n  d e s tin e d  to  l iv e  c o n tin u a lly  w ith  parliam en­
ta ry  "immobilisme"^ and to  face  o v e rt re v o lu tio n ,^  the sustenance
execu tive  by a u th o riz in g  i t  to modify form al laws which a re  by 
th e i r  n a tu re  re g u la to ry  (m atières ré g le m e n ta ire s ) ."  André eê 
Laubadère, "Des 'p le in s  p o u v o irs ' aux ' d e m i-d é c re ts - lo is ' , "  
R ecueil D allo z . Chronique. XXIV, 1952, pp . 37-38.
^The co n s tan t tu rn o v er o f ca b in e ts  and the ex is ten ce  o f 
a m u ltitu d e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  and parliam en tary  groups under 
the  Fourth  Republic has obscured the underly ing  p o l i t i c a l  s ta ­
b i l i t y  o f  the system ; a s t a b i l i t y  so profound th a t  many French 
observers  have used the  term  "immobilisme." C abinet upheavals 
during the Fourth R epublic , r a th e r  than rep re se n tin g  d i s t i n c t  
m o d ifica tio n s o f p o lic y , in  r e a l i ty  on ly  m irrored  s h i f t s  in  
emphasis among the m oderate L e f t, C en ter, and moderate R igh t.
The ex is ten ce  o f a s tro n g  Communist P a r ty  and o th e r  n o n p a r tic i­
p a tin g  r a d ic a ls  and r e a c t io n a r ie s ,  n o tab ly  the P o u jed ic ts  during 
th e i r  ascendancy, condemned the p a r t ie s  o f  f i d e l i t y  to  the  Rep­
u b lic  to  l iv e  to g e th e r  in  unhappy compromise. The r e s u l t  was 
a regime o f  equ ivocation  and p ro c ra s t in a t io n . Issu es  o f  fo re ig n  
p o lic y , s o c ia l  l e g i s la t io n ,  c o lo n ia l r e l a t i o n s , ed u ca tio n , and 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  reform  were never s e t t l e d .  Fundam entally, th is  
c a b in e t i n s t a b i l i t y  i t s e l f  was an e g r e s s io n  o f im m obility  as 
more o f te n  than n o t a v o te  o f  no-confidence simply r e s u l te d  in  
the shake-up o f c a b in e t p o s ts  and the re te n tio n  o f e s s e n t ia l ly  
the  same d iv ided  m in is try .
^The events o f May 13, 1958, which brought to  power a 
Committee o f P ub lic  S a fe ty  fCmmî té  de S a lu t  P u b lic ) in  A lg e r ia , 
le d  to  th e  dow nfall o f  the government o f  P ie r re  P fim lin  and to 
th e  in v e s t i tu re  o f C harles De G aulle on June 1 , 1958.
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o f  l i f e  was u ltim a te ly  to depend more and more upon o ld , r e ­
modeled, and new ex cep tio n a l techn iques: expansion o f the reg­
u la to ry  a u th o r ity , the s ta te  o f s ie g e , th e  s ta te  o f  emergency 
(é t a t  d 'u rg e n ce ) ,^  and the use o f broad-based framework laws 
( lo i - c a d r e ) .^
C e rta in ly , procedures fo r  expanding the reg u la to ry  author­
i t y  o f  the  Executive became more im aginative and so p h is tic a te d  
during the l i f e  o f the Fourth Republic. At le a s t  fo u r d iffe r*  
en t techniques ap p ro p ria te  to the p r a c t ic a l  achievement o f  
th i s  expansion can be d if f e r e n t ia te d .
F i r s t ,  decrees g ran tin g  s u b s ta n tia l  d isc re tio n a ry  author­
i t y  to  the  Executive in  m od ifica tion  o r abrogation  o f s ta tu to ry  
law became normal procedure under the regimes o f the C onstitu ­
e n t Assemblies o f  1945 and 1946, and such p ra c tic e s  were c a rr ie d  
over in to  the Fourth Republic i t s e l f .  In  th is  f i r s t  category  
we m ight d is t in g u ish  a p rocess through which the Government 
rece iv ed  the power to  modify o r to  abrogate the e f f e c ts  o f 
form al laws by means o f  decrees fo r  sp e c if ie d  su b je c t m atte r 
and during  circum scribed  periods o f  tim e. For example, the 
laws o f  December 12, 1945, and o f February 8 , 1946, au thorized  
the  Government to modify o r to  reduce c r e d i ts  p rev io u sly  voted 
in  th e  budget o f 1946. The law o f Deceaiber 12, 1945 ordered
^The procedure o f  the s ta te  o f  emergency ( é t a t  d 'u rgence) 
was promulgated on A p ril 3 , 1955 and ap p lied  on th a t  date  to 
s p e c if ie d  a reas in  A lg e r ia .
^The procedure o f  framework laws ( lo i-c a d re )  was applied  
f re q u e n tly  in  the l a t t e r  years o f  the Fourth  R epublic . Excel­
l e n t  examples a re : th e  law o f March 16, 1956 prov id ing  fo r
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the Commission o f Finance o f the N ational C o nstituen t Assembly, 
a f t e r  the adoption o f c r e d i ts ,  to cooperate w ith  the M in is te r 
o f Finance and o th e r responsib le  M in is te rs  in  the o v e rs ig h t o f 
the re sp e c tiv e  chap ters  of the budget, and in  m odification  o f 
the c r e d i ts  o r ig in a l ly  opened when circum stance rendered such 
ac tio n  necessary . Reform was to be achieved by decree issu ed  
in  the Council o f M in is te rs  in  in stan ces  in  which the Commission 
o f F inance, the M in is te r  o f F inance, and the responsib le  M in is te r 
were in  agreem ent.^ The law o f February 8 , 1946, which m odified 
and completed the law o f December 12, 1945, s t ip u la te d  th a t  in  
in stan ces where proposals fo r  m od ifica tion  o f c r e d i ts  were p re ­
sented  by the Commission o f Finance and approved by the Council 
o f  M in is te rs , implementation might be achieved through decrees 
taken by the P re s id en t o f  the P ro v is io n a l Government upon the  
proposal o f the M in is te r o f  Finance and w ith  the coun tersigna­
tu re  o f  the resp o n sib le  M in is te r. Consequently, under th is
m od ifica tion  the d i r e c t  approval o f the Commission o f Finance
2would n o t be req u ired . As a r e s u l t ,  in  th is  period  o f d is lo ­
c a tio n , the c o n s titu e n t le g is la t iv e  organ g ran ted  to the Prov­
is io n a l  Executive the a u th o rity  to reo rgan ize  f in a n c ia l  a l lo c a ­
tio n s  as changing circum stance d ic ta te d . Somewhat l a t e r  a law
economic and ad m in is tra tiv e  reform in  A lg e ria ; the law o f June 
23, 1956, concerning French overseas t e r r i t o r i e s ;  and the  law 
o f February 5, 1958, concerning in s t i tu t io n s  in  A lg eria .
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (December 
13, 1945), p . 8245:
^France, Journal O f f i c i e l . . . .  L o is e t  D écrets (February
9 , 1946 ), p . 1122:
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o f October 7 , 1946 allowed the es tab lish m en t by decree o f a 
s o c ia l  s e c u r ity  program fo r  mining w orkers, ^ In defense of 
th is  procedure, the Council o f S ta te  ru le d  th a t  the  "L eg isla­
tu re  had Intended to  co n fer on the Government the most extended 
powers. Including th a t  o f  derogating  the  genera l regime e s ta ­
b lish e d  by the le g is la t io n  In fo rc e .
This tendency was c a rr ie d  over In to  the Fourth Republic 
I t s e l f .  Under A r t ic le  6 o f the law o f August 17, 1948, the 
Government was accorded a u th o rity  to  take d ecrees, rendered  In 
Council o f  M in is te rs , a f t e r  the advice o f the Council o f  S ta te ,  
and upon the re p o r t o f  the M in is te r  o f  Finance and o th e r  I n te r ­
e s ted  M in is te rs , capable o f  "ab rogating , m odifying, o r  re p la c ­
in g , the laws In f o r c e . I n  a p p lic a tio n  o f th is  a u th o r ity , 
the  Government was empowered by v i r tu e  o f  A r t ic le  5 , S ection  I ,  
o f the same law to  " a l le v ia te  the burden o f the French economy 
by means o f red u c tio n , suppression , o r  fusion  o f the d u tie s , 
r ig h t s ,  and taxes a c tu a l ly  In f o r c e . I m m e d i a t e l y  th e re a f te r ,  
by the law o f  September 24, 1948, the ordinance a u th o r ity  was 
broadened fu r th e r  to  Include the  "m odification  o f the  ru le s  o f
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (October 8 , 
1948), pp. 8499-85ÔÔ.
^De Laubadère, p . 35.
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . ,  Lois e t  D écrets (August 18, 
1948), P» 8083. See a ls o , Roger P in to , "La lo i  o u l 7  aou t 1948 
tenden t au redressem ent économique e t  f in a n c ie r ,"  Revue du D ro it 
Public « LXIV (October-December, 1948), p . 521.
F r a n c e ,  Journal O f f i c i e l . . .  « L ois e t  D écrets (August 18 ,
1 9 4 8 ), p . 8083.
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c o l le c t io n  o f taxes p e r ta in in g  to Incomes and s a l a r i e s . I t  
m ight a lso  be re c a lle d  th a t  as the r e s u l t  o f  parliam en tary  
a u th o riz a tio n  the Government took vario u s o th e r  d is c re tio n a ry  
d ec re es , no tab ly  th a t  o f  November 8, 1948, suppressing the 
r ig h t  to  tax  tra n s fe ra b le  s e c u r i t ie s ,^  and th a t  o f  October 1, 
1948, modifying f i s c a l  c o n tro ls  o f s a la r ie s  and w ages,3 the 
l a t t e r  v is ib ly  exceeding th e  au th o riz a tio n  p resc rib ed  by the 
p arliam en tary  g ran t o f  competence, b u t becoming Immediately 
u n a s sa ila b le  before  the Council o f  S ta te  because o f I t s  In co r­
p o ra tio n  In the law o f December 30, 1948. Thus, In the  f i s c a l  
realm , the e a r ly  Governments o f the Fourth  Republic provided 
s t r ik in g  examples o f  p o s i t iv e  d e leg a tio n s o f competence to the 
E xecutive to  modify form al laws by decree o r  to derogate th e i r  
d is p o s i t io n . This technique was a lso  ap p lied  through the  law 
o f  Ju ly  11, 1953, which g ran ted  sp e c ia l powers to  the Govern­
ment to  suspend o r to  postpone, from October 1, 1933 to  January  
1 , 1955, the f in a n c ia l  e f f e c t  o f a l l  le g is la t iv e  d isp o s itio n s  
e n ta i l in g  expenditu res by the S ta te .4 This prim ary technique 
o f en la rg in g  the reg u la to ry  power cannot be considered  novel 
o r  o r ig in a l ,  fo r  I t  was employed p e r io d ic a lly  throughout the 
T h ird  R epublic. I t  I s  n o t o u ts id e  the confines o f  A r t ic le  13
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (September 
25, 1948), pp. 9426-28.
G. Morange, "La r e a l i s a t io n  de l a  réform  f i s c a l  p a r 
v o le  rég lem en ta ire ,"  R ecueil D a llo z . Chronique (1948), p . 177.
3lb ld .
^Rene Chapus, "La l o i  d 'h a b i l i t a t io n  du 11 j u i l l e t  1953 
e t  l a  question  des d é c r e t s - lo i s ,"  Revue du D ro it P u b lic , LXIX, 
p . 1005.
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o f the C o n s titu tio n  as i t  n e i th e r  v io la te s  the h ie ra rch y  o f 
law nor d e leg a tes c o n s t i tu t io n a lly -s p e c if ie d  le g is la t iv e  com­
p eten ce . The im portance o f th is  technique r e s ts  in  i t s  s ta tu re  
as an unquestionable dem onstration o f the lack  o f su b stan tiv e  
and m a te ria l r e s t r i c t io n  upon the t r a n s fe r  o f competences by 
A r t ic le  13 o f the C o n s titu tio n  o f  October 27, 1946.
Second, th e re  was observable in  the 1946-1953 p eriod  a 
lim ite d  innovation in  the methodology o f  the im plem entation 
o f the pouvoir rég lem en ta ire . Through th is  technique le g is la ­
t iv e  g ran ts  were made to the E xecutive to  modify form al laws 
by decree in  circum stances in  which the Parliam ent d id  n o t a c t 
i t s e l f  before a sp e c if ie d  d a te . For example, the law o f Jan­
uary  8, 1951, which au thorized  a program of rearmament and 
n a tio n a l defense ex p en d itu res , a lso  provided in  i t s  A r t ic le  1, 
S ec tio n  I I ,  th a t  the  Government p re se n t before February 15, 
1951, a p ro je c t o f law designed to  r e a l iz e  a 2 5 -b ill io n -f ra n c  
red u ctio n  in  the n a tio n a l defense budget. This p ro je c t  was 
to be d iscussed  under the ru le s  o f  urgency in  the L eg is la tu re  
and was to be promulgated in to  law by March 15, 1951. I f  the 
L e g is la tu re  f a i le d  to  pass o r  amend the p ro je c t ,  the Government 
i t s e l f  was au th o rized  to take the necessary  s tep s req u ired  to 
implement the in te n t  o f  th is  law by means o f decree to  be 
issu ed  a f te r  the dead line  o f  March 15, 1951.^ The g ra n t to 
Parliam ent o f a p e rio d  o f grace in  which to a c t  p o s i t iv e ly  i s
^France, Journal O f f i c i e l . . . ,  L o is e t  D écrets (January 9 ,
1 9 5 1 ), pp. 338-W :
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im aginative and novel, bu t such a procedure is  in the same 
s p i r i t  as previous enabling le g is la t io n . This procedure ex h i­
b i ts  skep ticism  concerning the a b i l i ty  of the L eg is la tu re  to 
undertake responsib le  a c tio n . I t  does no more than provide a 
period  of delay before s u b s t i tu tin g  executive ac tio n  fo r  le g is ­
la t iv e  in e ffe c tiv e n e ss .
A th ird  technique, th a t o f the Government modifying form al 
laws by decree in  m atte rs  considered w ith in  the realm  of the 
reg u la to ry  power (m atières réglem entaires par n a tu re ) , fin d s 
i t s  source in  the delegations to the Blum government in  the 
Third Republic. I t  was not u t i l i z e d  in  the Fourth Republic 
u n t i l  August of 1948 when the government o f Andre Marie con­
fe r re d  upon the M in ister of Finance and Economic A ffa irs ,  Paul 
Reynaud, the re s p o n s ib il i ty  of p resen ting  to  the L eg is la tu re  a 
p ro je c t of law fo r  economic and f in a n c ia l r e v i ta l iz a t io n .
Faced w ith  economic d e te r io ra tio n  and the n ec e ss ity  of u rgen t 
reform  and reo rg an iz a tio n , the Marie government sought, w ith in  
the framework of the C o n s titu tio n , a means of ac tin g  quickly  
and re s o lu te ly  in  a number o f d iverse a re a s . The r e s u l t  of 
these  plans was the req u es t fo r  the passage o f what was to be­
come the  law of August 17, 1948. This law was a s t a tu te — 
b r ie f  in  te x t  but broad in  scope—wherein the Parliam ent enabled 
the Executive to proceed w ith  independent d is c re tio n  toward 
reform  in  areas th a t  were by natu re  w ith in  the reg u la to ry  com­
petence. With the exception of f i s c a l  refo rm s,  ^ r e v i ta l iz a t io n  
was to  be achieved by the Executive by decrees in  areas which
^ A r t i c l e  5 of the law of August 17, 1948, e s ta b lish e d  
sp e c ia l procedure which f a l l s  under category  four o f th is  enum eration.
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were by r ig h t  w ith in  the scope o f the pouvoir rég lem en ta ire .
As the b as ic  te x t  s ta te d ,  " le s  te x te s  ayant fo rce  de l o i ,  
r e l a t i f s  â ces m a tiè res  Inum erêes. . .  se ro n t repu tes av o ir  sim­
plem ent v a leu r rég lem en ta ire  quant au pouvoir du gouvernement 
de le s  m o d ifie r."^
This c a te g o riz a tio n  o f  ad m in is tra tiv e  a u th o rity  by sub­
j e c t  m atte r was unique to French c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro cesse s , and 
from the moment o f in tro d u c tio n  in  the N ational Assembly a 
deluge o f c r i t ic is m  descended, question ing  the le g a l i ty  o f  
such procedures. The Commission o f Finance o f the N ational 
Assembly lay  aside  q uestions o f  i l l e g a l i t y  in  i t s  co n s id e ra tio n  
o f  the b i l l  on the b a s is  th a t  such a l le g a tio n s  c o n s ti tu te d  
r e f le c t io n s  o f p o l i t i c a l  opportunism designed to u n ju s t ly  l im i t  
th e  powers in h e ren t in  and req u ired  by the E x ecu tiv e .% This 
defense was brushed as id e  in  debate on the Assembly f lo o r .
The posing o f the p re lim in ary  question  le d  immediately to  a 
d iscu ss io n  o f  the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty  o f  the proposed l e g i s l a ­
t io n .  The e x tre m e -le f t invoked A r t ic le  13 and proclaim ed th a t  
th e  Government was proposing decree le g is la t io n  th a t  was con­
demned in  the C o n s titu tio n  and which was com pletely unacceptab le
3
to  the  N ational Assembly. On the  o th e r  hand, the Government
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (August 18, 
1948), pp. 8082-Sy. See a ls o , P in to , pp. 5l'?-ÏÔ.
2France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Assemblée N atio n a le . Docu­
m ents, No, 5206, p . 91.
^France, Journal O f f i c i e l . . . ,  Assem blée N a tio n a le , Débats
(August 9 , 1948), pp . 5520-22 .
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took the p o s itio n  th a t  the question  a t  p o in t was one o f admin­
i s t r a t i v e  law and th a t  e s s e n t ia l  l e g a l i ty  was n o t invo lved . 
André Marie assured  the depu ties th a t  the Government was j u s t  
as opposed to the re - in tro d u c tio n  o f the  system o f decree-law s 
as was the N ational Assembly and th a t  the  in te n tio n  o f  the 
execu tive  agency was only  the " d is t in c t  es tab lishm en t o f the 
re sp e c tiv e  domaines o f the P arliam ent and Government, to  sup­
p ress  the confusion c rea ted  by vagueness as to the boundaries 
o f the  le g is la t iv e  power and the reg u la to ry  power, and to  pu t 
an end to the d i f f i c u l t i e s  th a t  one encounters in  attenq)ting  
to  d is t in g u is h  between th a t  which i s  in  the domain o f the 
L e g is la tu re  and th a t  which i s  in  the ju r is d ic t io n  o f the  Exec­
u t i v e . T h e r e  i s  some question  th a t  the P re s id en t o f the 
Council encouraged the r e c a lc i t r a n t  members w ith  th i s  d ec la ra ­
t io n .  F or, i f  by " d is t in c t  estab lishm ent" he inqalied th a t  i t  
was w ith in  the province o f the pouvoir rég lementa i r e  to  e s ta ­
b l i s h  a d i s t in c t  regime by su b je c t m a tte r fo r  the E xecu tive , 
then he c e r ta in ly  was tread in g  h eav ily  upon the t r a d i t io n -  
en c ru sted  p r in c ip le  o f  the supremacy o f  the law. F o r, i f  th e re  
e x is ts  a domain ex c lu siv e  by su b je c t f o r  the reg u la to ry  power, 
then th i s  domain i s  o u ts id e  the puxvue o f the law. In  such an 
in s ta n c e , reg u la tio n  i s  n o t subord inate  to law, and the  h ie r ­
archy o f laws i s  v io la te d .
In  opposition  to  the assurances o f the P re s id en t o f the 
C ouncil, the eloquen t René C ap itan t d ram atica lly  evoked the
l l b i d . . pp. 5525-26.
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spec to r  o f  the i l l - f a t e d  decree-law s o f the  T hird  Republic and 
developed a meaningful argument ag a in s t "one o f the causes of 
our n a tio n a l d e fea t and the co llap se  o f  repub lican  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s . H e  v igo rously  condemned the concept th a t  su b jec t 
m a tte r  i s  reg u la to ry  by n a tu re  (m atières rég lem entaire  p ar 
n a tu re  ) ; " , , .B y  the term inology th a t  i t  en^ïloys, the Gov­
ernment g ives the im pression th a t  i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  have . . . 
a reas  o f  competence which a re  c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  reserved  to  the 
reg u la to ry  power, and which, as a consequence, are  forbidden 
to the law ( i . e . ,  d i r e c t  le g is la t iv e  competence) . . . Law 
dnd ordinance are defined  by an e s ta b lish e d  h ie ra rch y  o f law, 
r a th e r  than by any co n s id e ra tio n  o f the su b je c t m atte r w ith  
which they d e a l. Ordinance (règlem ent) i s  uniquely  d is tin g u ish ed  
by i t s  subord ination  to  the law ( lo i )  and does n o t, indeed can­
n o t, possess an a rea  o f  competence d i s t in c t  from the law. Des­
p i te  the th e o re t ic a l  v a l id i ty  o f  C a p ita n t 's  reason ing , the 
f a c t  remains th a t  the e n t i r e  h is to ry  o f French ad m in is tra tiv e  
p ra c t ic e  shows p e rio d ic  m odification  o f th i s  p r in c ip le .  From 
time to time the Executive has m odified s ta tu to ry  law by decree. 
A r t ic le  13 apparen tly  was n o t in tended as an unequivocable gua­
ran tee  o f  the supremacy o f law over d ec ree . In  th is  in stan ce  
i t  was f e l t  th a t  France req u ired  extended execu tive a u th o rity  
and th is  a u th o rity  was found in  the development o f  an essen­
t i a l l y  reg u la to ry  ca tegory  o f co n ten t. That th i s  process 
su rv ived  was due as much to the in ep tn ess  o f the  reg u la r  regime
l l b i d . . pp. 5566-68. 
2l b i d . . p . 5569.
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as to the m erit o f th is  o r  the o th e r  th ree  ca te g o rie s  d is t in g ­
uished in  th is  a n a ly s is . In  th is  in s tan ce , as i s  o ften  the 
f a te  o f the o p p o sitio n , they reasoned, p leaded, th rea ten ed , 
c a jo le d , and invoked l e g a l i ty ,  bu t d id  no t o f f e r  a su ita b le  
a l te rn a tiv e  to  the proposals under co n s id e ra tio n , and th e re fo re  
f a i le d  to c a rry  the day.
The debate in  the Council o f the Republic took on a more
p o l i t i c a l  ten o r than the l e g a l i s t i c  d iscussions in  the N ational
Assembly. This was in d ic a ted  by the Communist P a rty  spokesman,
Zyromski, who illu m in a ted  th e  s ig n ific an c e  o f f a i lu r e  to pass
the Government b i l l :
I f  we re fu se  to g ive our approval to these reg u la to ry  
dec rees , to these  s p e c ia l powers, to these measures 
which are  c a lle d  'd e c re e - la w s ';  then one must recog­
n ize  th a t  one has taken a  choice and th a t  th is  choice 
i s  n o t s in g ly  made fo r  le g a l and c o n s ti tu t io n a l con­
s id e ra tio n s ;  th a t  i t  i s  very  c le a r ly  a choice th a t  we 
ipake to express our lack  o f confidence in  the govern­
ment p resid ed , over by Andr^ Marie and which includes 
Paul Reynaud.^
Thus, a vo te o f confidence as w ell as the m erits  o f the proposed 
le g is la t io n  was involved.
In  the caldron  from which p o l i t i c a l  d ec isio n s emerge, 
co n s id e ra tio n s  o f  le g a l form, p o l i t i c a l  supremacy, immediate 
circum stance, t r a d i t io n a l  p rocedure, and pragmatism a l l  v ie  fo r  
prominenceo The r e s u l t  i s  norm ally compromise. In  th is  p o l i ­
t i c a l  d e c is io n , the law o f  August 17, 1948, sh o rt-te rm  accomo­
d ation  was achieved between the  competing claim s o f t r a d i t io n  
and pragmatism, le g a l i ty  and p o l i t i c a l  co n s id e ra tio n s .
^France, Journal O f f i c i e l . . . .  C on se il de l a  R épublique.
Débats (August 12 , 1948), p . 2319.
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The u ltim a te  r e s u l t  was, in  r e a l i t y ,  compromise, innovation , 
and ev o lu tio n . For here  we have the s e t t in g  in to  motion o f a 
development which w i l l  le ad  to  acceptance in  1958^ o f a sphere 
o f competence o u ts id e  th e  purview o f  t r a d i t io n a l  French le g a l 
p r a c t ic e .  In  August o f  1948, the n e c e ss ity  o f  th é  moment over­
whelmed the a b i l i ty  o f  re g u la r  procedures to r e a c t  w ith  v i t a ­
l i t y  to  th e  pressingpcoblesw  o f  the day. T his inadequacy gave 
ioq>etus to  the ev o lu tio n  o f new procedures—p a r t ly  borrowed 
from the  p a s t  y e t d i s t in c t ly  modem because o f  th e i r  su b tle  y e t 
unique nuances—designed to  provide the n a tio n  w ith  the ade­
quate to o ls  fo r  cosqpeteat le a d e rsh ip .
In  view o f  the debatab le  v a l id i ty  o f  th e  concept xmatiëres 
rég lem en ta ires war n a tu re  and the d e s ire  o f  th e  Government to  
conceal what was a lle g e d  to  be a recourse to  th e  system o f 
decree le g is la t io n ,  the law o f  August 17, 1948, fo r  economic 
and f in a n c ia l  reform  was n o t co n s tru c ted  in  a  p a r t ic u la r ly  
lo g ic a l  and c le a r - c u t  fa sh io n . This rendered  a n a ly s is  q u ite  
d i f f i c u l t ;  however, d e sp ite  the  lack  o f  c l a r i t y  in  th is  p iece 
o f  le g is la t io n  two approaches to  the problem o f  reform  can he 
d is tin g u ish e d .^  One s e r ie s  o f  procedure has th e  c h a ra c te r  o f  
parliam en tary  re so lu tio n s  en jo in in g  the Government to  develop 
concise p lan s  fo r  reform  and to  d ep o sit these  p roposals w ith
^ A rtic le  34-37 o f the C o n s titu tio n  o f  O ctober 4 , 1938.
2 p in to , pp. 520-21.
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the N ational Assembly befo re  a s p e c if ie d  d a te .^  A second 
s e r ie s  g ran ts  to the Government an en larged  reg u la to ry  compe­
tence in  a d m in is tra tiv e , economic, and f in a n c ia l  su b je c t m a tte r . 
In  a l l  a reas excep t th a t  e s ta b lish e d  by the sp e c ia l regime fo r  
f i s c a l  reform  under A r t ic le  5 th e  law o f  August 17, 1948 r e s ­
pected the e s ta b lis h e d  procedures fo r  the  ex e rc ise  o f  the 
pouvoir rég le m en ta ire . C onsequently, the two d ispu ted  asp ec ts  
o f the law a re  (1) the v a l id i ty  o f  the category  m atiè res r é g le ­
m entaires p ar n a tu re  and (2) the a c c e p ta b il i ty  o f the e x tra o r ­
dinary  competence made p o ss ib le  by the p ro v isio n s o f  A r t ic le  5 .
A r t ic le  6 provided th a t  on the re p o r t  o f the M in is te r  of 
Finance and Economic A ffa irs  and o f o th e r  in te re s te d  M in is te rs , 
and a f te r  the advice o f the Council o f  S t a t e ,% decrees could
O
be taken by th e  Council o f  M in is te rs  which "ab ridge , modify,
^A g en era l s ta tu te  fo r  n a tio n a liz e d  e n te rp r is e s  befo re  
December 31, 1948 (A r tic le  2 ); f o r  a g r ic u l tu r a l  s o c ia l  s e c u r ity  
before A p ril 30, 1949 (A rtic le  3 ) ;  a p lan  fo r  the m odernization 
o f the Union F ran ça ise  befo re  January  1, 1949 (A rtic le  4 ) ; a 
s ta tu te  fo r  the Agence F rançaise  de P re sse , fo r  H y a s -P u b lic i té  
and fo r  the S o c ié té  p ro fe s s io n e lle  des p re s se , befo re  DecemoeF” 
31, 1948 (A r tic le  à ) ,  i b id . .  p 7 T 2 T T N o te X
2Though accep ting  the advice o f  the Council o f  S ta te ,  the 
government o f André Marie r e je c te d  the  p o l i t i c a l  amendment o f 
M. O 'C ottereau  which looked toward the c re a tio n  o f a co n su lta ­
t iv e  commission fo r  f i s c a l  reform  com prised o f in te re s te d  Sec­
r e ta r ie s  o f  S ta te ,  C ouncillo rs o f  the  R epublic, and D eputies o f 
the N ational A s s e ^ ly .  The P re s id e n t o f  the Council o f  M inis­
te r s  emphasized th e  p o s it io n  o f th e  Government th a t  the e x e rc ise  
o f  the compétence rég lem en ta ire  was w ith in  the ju r i s d ic t io n  o f 
the Executive alone in  h is  response . F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  
Assemblée N a tio n a le . Débats (August 9 , 1948), p . 5621.
^A q uestion  was ra is e d  as to  the  E xecutive approval nec­
essary  fo r  the im plem entation o f these  d ec rees . The o r ig in a l
so lu tio n  was to  conform to  the t r a d i t io n a l  p ra c t ic e  o f s ig n a tu re
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o r rep lace  the laws in  fo rce"^  in  m a tte rs  having fo r  th e i r  
na tu re  a reg u la to ry  c h a ra c te r . In  the economic realm  the sub­
j e c t  m a tte r re le v a n t to  the competence o f the reg u la to ry  power 
as in te rp re te d  by A r t ic le  6 was q u ite  broad: the o rg a n iz a tio n ,
tran sfo rm atio n , o r  merging, as w e ll as the ru le s  o f o rgan iza­
tio n  fo r  in d u s t r ia l  o r  commercial p u b lic  e n te rp r is e s ;  the  d i r ­
ec tio n  o f the u t i l i z a t i o n  o f p u b lic  reso u rces; the a l lo c a tio n  
o f prim ary m a te r ia ls  and in d u s t r ia l  p ro d u cts; the estab lishm en t 
o f p r ic e  and economic c o n tro ls ;  and the  e q u a liz a tio n  o f exchange- 
a l l  were considered  e s s e n t ia l ly  reg u la to ry  m a tte rs .^  But th is  
was by no means a b lan k et g ran t o f  a u th o rity  to the E xecu tive . 
True, A r t ic le  7 l i s t e d  a d m in is tra tiv e  reform  as a m a tte r  r e le ­
van t to  the reg u la to ry  competence; however. A r t ic le  1 circum ­
sc rib ed  th is  competence by sp ec ify in g  th a t  such reo rg an iza tio n  
must have as i t s  goal the rendering  o f a le s s  c o s tly  and more 
e f f ic a c io u s  p u b lic  s e rv ic e . I t  a lso  forbade the w ritin g  o f a 
g enera l s ta tu te  f o r  the c i v i l  s e rv ic e , fo r  the genera l
by the P re s id e n t o f  the R epublic, P re s id e n t o f  the C ouncil, and 
o f the re sp o n sib le  M in is te r . However, to  underline  the  excep­
tio n a l  n a tu re  o f  the procedure here fo llow ed, i t  should be 
noted th a t  a m od ifica tion  o f th is  system evolved: non-ob liga-
to ry  decrees req u ired  on ly  the s ig n a tu re  o f  the P re s id e n t o f  
the C ouncil, the c h ie f  o f  the re g u la to ry  power ( t i t u l a i r e  du 
pouvoir rég lem en ta ire )—A rtic le  47 o f  the C o n s titu tio n . On 
the o th e r  hfrnd, th e T re s id e n t  o f  the Republic who p re s id e s  over 
the Council o f  M in is te rs  (A rtic le  32 o f the  C o n s titu tio n )  was 
req u ired  to  s ign  o b lig a to ry  d ec rees . P in to , p . 521, Note 3 .
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (August 18. 
1948), p , 8083. :
^France, Journal O f f i c i e l . . . .  Assem blée N a tio n a le . Débats
(August 9 , 1 9 4 8 ), pp. 5591-92 .
148
o rg an iza tio n  o f n a tio n a l defense , o r  fo r  the armed fo rc e s .^
In  the same manner, the fundamental reg u la tio n  o f rad io , t e le ­
v is io n , and the  p ress  remained w ith in  the exc lu sive  domain o f 
the law. On the o th e r  hand. A rt ic le  1 au tho rized  the Govern­
ment to  modify and to t r a n s f e r  c re d i ts  which i t s  reforms ren­
dered ind isp en sab le—th is  w ith in  the confines o f  the to ta l  
budget and before January 1, 1949,3 Y et, aga in , r e s t r ic t io n  
ra ise d  i t s  head as the Government was req u ired , in  each s ix -  
month p e rio d , to submit to the  sc ru tin y  o f the L eg is la tu re  the 
budgetary  ram ifica tio n s  o f i t s  ad m in is tra tiv e  and economic r e ­
o rg a n iz a tio n .^
In  the f in a n c ia l  realm  the Government was au thorized  to 
re g u la te  the issuance o f  T reasury lo an s, the s e c u r i t ie s  m arket, 
and to modify the f in a n c ia l  p o s itio n  o f the S ta te  by decree .^
F in a l ly , under the unique procedures e s ta b lish e d  by 
A r t ic le  5 , the Government, in  o rd er to ease the burden o f the 
economy, was empowered to undertake the necessary  reduction  
and l im ita t io n  of im port d u tie s ,^  to s im p lify  the procedure fo r
^France, Jou rnal O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (August 18, 
1948), p . 8083.
Z ib id .
3lb id . . pp. 8082-83.
^ Ib id . . p . 8082.
^ Ib id . . pp. 8082-83.
G ib id . . p . 8083.
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c o lle c tin g  income ta x e s ,^  to  remodel e x is te n t  f i s c a l  codes and 
te x ts  In  o rd er to  reduce the  m u l t ip l ic i ty  o f  ta x e s , to  re g u la te  
and norm alize th e i r  ru le s  o f  a p p lic a tio n , to  s im p lify  th e  form­
a l i t i e s  req u ired  o f the taiqpayer as w e ll as the governmental 
ad m in is tra tiv e  agency, and to  co o rd in a te  procedures f o r  f i s c a l  
c o n tro l and l i t i g a t i o n T h e s e  m odifying codes and te x ts  were 
to be a ttach ed  to  the f in a n c ia l  budget f o r  1948 which was p re s­
en ted  to  the  N ational Assembly on December 10, 1948, However, 
th ese  renovations d id  n o t req u ire  s p e c if ic  p a rliam en tary  ap­
p roval before en te r in g  In to  e f f e c t .  I t  was s t ip u la te d  th a t  I f  
th e re  was no le g is la t iv e  ac tio n  on the  budget b e fo re  January 
1 , 1949, the reg u la to ry  measures undertaken under A r t ic le  5 
must go In to  fo rce  as o f  January 1, 1949, o b l ig a to r i ly .  Such 
decrees could  be p resen ted  to  P arliam en t a f t e r  t h e i r  e f fe c tu a ­
tio n  and th i s  ex trao rd in a ry  competence could  be overridden  by 
a neg a tiv e  opin ion o f  the L e g is la tu re . N ev erth e less , s h o r t o f  
a  n eg a tiv e  vo te  o f  the L e g is la tu re  th e  re g u la tio n s  Issued  under 
A r t ic le  5 stood  w ithou t fu r th e r  approval; In f a c t ,  the s ile n c e  
o f th e  L e g is la tu re  su ff ic e d  to  s t ib s ta n tla te  the  execu to ry  n a tu re  
o f decrees Issued  under th is  a u th o r i ty .3
A r t ic le  5 o f  the lav  o f  August 17, 1948, may be considered  
an example o f  a  fo u rth  technique employed to  expand the  reg u la ­
to ry  a u th o r i ty .  This technique was c h a ra c te r iz e d  by th e  Issuance
l l b l d .
Z ib ld .
^ Ib ld . While the Government was opposed to  a l l  amend­
ments which Isqxlled the n e c e ss ity  f o r  a  vo te o f  P arliam en t
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o f  decrees In  the m o d ifica tio n  o f  form al laws in  in s tan ce s  in  
which the s p e c if ic  and d e ta i le d  co n ten t o f  the decree was known 
to  the  L e g is la tu re . With th i s  technique two d i s t i n c t  procedures 
were p o s s ib le . In  one v a r ia t io n  e i th e r  the Government req u es t­
ed th e  au th o riz a tio n  to  implement by decree the te x t  o f  a p ro j­
e c t  o f  law pending befo re  the  L e g is la tu re , o r  th e  L e g is la tu re  
enabled  the Government to  undertake such a u th o r ity  under i t s  
own coaq>etence.^ In  a second v a r ia t io n  the Government was 
enabled to  undertake the  w ri t in g  o f  decrees in  a sp e c if ie d  a rea  
w ith  th e  s t ip u la t io n  th a t  such decrees would n o t e n te r  in to  
fo rce  u n t i l  in co rp o ra ted  in to  le g is la t io n  to  be p resen ted  to 
th e  N ational Assembly. This was p re c is e ly  the procedure f o l ­
lowed in  the  in co rp o ra tio n  o f the f i s c a l  reform s decreed by 
the  Marie government on December 9 , 1948, in  the finance law 
p resen ted  to  the N atio n a l Assembly one day l a t e r .  This proce­
dure appears to  be the most scrupulous o f  the fo u r  analyzed;
bafo re  the  en try  in to  fo rc e  o f  th e  f i s c a l  codes allow ed under 
A r t ic le  5 , i t  m ight be no ted  th a t  in  the  p re lim in ary  co n sid er­
a tio n  o f  the law o f  August 17, 1948, the Assembly went co n tra ry  
to  the w ishes o f  th e  Government and adopted the  amendment 
Meunier which req u ired  p arliam en ta ry  approval o f  f i s c a l  codes 
undertaken by o ru in an ce . A t th e  same dime, th i s  amendment 
m aintained th a t  codes is su e d  under A r t ic le  5 became executory  
as o f  January 1 , 1949, th u s e s ta b lis h in g  a  d i r e c t  c o n tra d ic tio n . 
I t  was on ly  a f t e r  a  q uestion  o f  confidence was posed befo re  th e  
N ational Assembly th a t  the  C ouncil o f  th e  Republic v e rs io n , 
ca rry in g  the o r ig in a l  Governmental p o s i t io n , was adopted.
^This technique was employed by v ir tu e  o f  A r t ic le  2 o f 
th e  Pleven-Mayer p ro je c t  r e l a t iv e  to  s o c ia l  s e c u r i ty .  The 
Government was empowered f o r  a six-m onth p e rio d  to  isqplement a 
p ro je c t  o f  reform  r e la t iv e  to  "budget s o c ia l  de l a  n a tio n "  and 
to  en ac t by decree a  nuuher o f  measures concerning d iv e rse  
d efined  and enumerated a sp ec ts  o f  "régime de l a  S e c u r ité  so c ia le  
e t  de l 'A s s is ta n c e  p u b liq u e ."  De Lanbadère, p . 36.
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however, i f  the decrees were allow ed to  e n te r  in to  fo rce  o b li­
g a to r i ly  in  in s tan ces  in  which th e  L eg is la tu re  f a i l s  to  a c t 
before  a sp e c if ie d  d a te , i t  should be recognized th a t  th is  
technique could e a s i ly  be moved o u ts id e  the domain o f r e s t r i c t ­
ed a c t iv i ty .
In  o rd er to judge the v a l id i ty  o f  the charge o f "appeal 
to decree-law s" and to  assess  th e  impact o f the law o f August 
17, 1948, on the ev o lu tio n  o f the  pouvoir rég le m en ta ire . i t  
i s  necessary  to  r e c a l l  the o u tstand ing  c h a ra c te r i s t ic s  o f  the 
system  th a t  developed under the T hird  Republic. As f a r  as c i r ­
cumstance was concerned, in s tan ce s  in  which governments turned 
to  the use of decree le g is la t io n  were norm ally s i tu a t io n s  in  
which the re g u la r  implements fo r  p o l i t i c a l  a c tio n  were o r  ap­
peared  to  be incapable o f  o f fe r in g  adequate so lu tio n s  to  p re ss ­
ing problems in  a  number o f  d iv e rg en t areas when such so lu tio n s  
were o r  appeared to be in d isp en sab le . In  the T hird Republic, 
these decrees were considered  a c te s  a d m in is t r a t i f . They were 
e lab o ra te d  in  the Council o f  M in is te rs  and were su b je c t to 
the advice o f  the Council o f  S ta te .  T heir in te n t  was defined  
by the laws which e s ta b lish e d  them: ad m in is tra tiv e  and economic 
reform  in  1924, 1926, andl933; f in a n c ia l  and economic reorgan­
iz a t io n  in  1934, 1935, 1937, and 1938; and n a tio n a l defense in  
1939. Normally, they were req u ired  to  be subm itted  to  the 
Chambers fo r  r a t i f i c a t i o n , b u t in  p ra c t ic e  q u ite  o f te n  th is  
requirem ent was overlooked and enunciated  decrees remained 
v a l id  and in  e f f e c t  un less o therw ise abrogated by competent 
le g is la t iv e  a u th o r ity . The d u ra tio n  o f d e leg a tio n s  and ex tensions
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o f power to the Executive depended upon the len g th  o f the cur­
re n t l e g is la t iv e  session  although fo r  the most p a r t  these 
g ran ts  ran  from two to  s ix  months. At the onse t o f su sta in ed  
c r i s i s  In  the l a s t  years o f  the Third Republic, the leng th  o f 
parliam en tary  sessio n s was prolonged and Consequently the dura­
tio n  o f sp e c ia l decree a u th o rity  was e f f e c t iv e ly  extended.
I t  I s  apparent th a t  the law o f August 17, 1948, employed 
many o f  th e  procedures used In e a r l i e r  y ea rs . C e rta in ly , the 
circum stance which rendered th is  b i l l  necessary  was very sim i­
l a r  to  th a t  which In the p a s t was used as ju s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  
recourse  to  decree le g is la t io n :  economic and f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s
so grave and severe th a t  o rdered  so c ie ty  could no t depend upon 
u n stab le  parliam entary  c o a li t io n s  fo r  the prom ulgation o f the 
necessary  reform s. In the second p la ce , ordinances taken under 
th i s  law had the appearance o f decree-law s as they have the 
f a c i l i t y  o f modifying a n te r io r  le g is la t io n  (d isp o s itio n s  en 
v ig u eu r) . ^ and, again as In the case o f  decree-law s, the s ta tu ­
to ry  Instrum ents e s ta b lish in g  th is  au th o rity  sp e c if ie d  the 
In te n t  o f  the envisioned o rd in an ces. T h ird ly , an overwhelming 
co n s is ten cy  was co n tin u a lly  apparent In a comparison o f t r a d i­
t io n a l  decree-law  procedure and the procedure follow ed In the
^Two e a r l i e r  examples a re  p e r t in e n t:  before the accept­
ance o f the C o n s titu tio n  o f 1946, the Government was au thorized  
to  modify c e r ta in  d isp o s itio n s  having the  fo rce  o f law—the law 
o f  February 8 , 1946, and the law o f  October 7 , 1946, concerning 
th e  o rg an iza tio n  o f lo c a l  assem blies In the  overseas t e r r i t o r i e s , 
A lso, a f t e r  the e f fe c tu a tio n  o f the C o n s titu tio n , the law o f 
September 20, 1947, on the s ta tu s  o f  A lg eria  enabled the 
A lgerian  Assembly to "complete o r  modify fo r  adap ta tio n  to  th e i r  
lo c a l  c ircum stances, the laws passed between the en try  In to  
fo rce  o f  the C o n s titu tio n  o f 1946 and the prom ulgation o f the 
p re se n t law ."
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enunciation  and im plem entation o f the law o f August 17, 1948— 
in  a l l  cases , whether p o l i t i c a l l y  ab le  to ex e rc ise  i t s  compe­
tence o r n o t, the P arliam ent remained the u ltim a te  le g a l au thor­
i t y .
On the o th e r  hand, c e r ta in  in c o n s is te n c ie s  may be n o tic ed . 
In  the Third and Fourth  R epublics, decree-law s were undertaken 
in  Council o f M in is te rs  a f t e r  c o n su lta tio n  w ith  the Council o f  
S ta te .  But whereas, in  the case o f  decree-law s, d ep o s it w ith  
P arliam ent was n o t n e c e s s a r ily  req u ired , in  the case o f  the 
law o f August 17, 1948, even the sp e c ia l ordinances issu ed  
under A rtic le  5 were req u ired  to be deposited  w ith  the  Assembly 
twenty o r more days befo re  th e i r  en trance  in to  fo rc e . T h is, 
th e o re t ic a l ly ,  p erm itted  parliam en tary  c o n tro l although we are  
a lready  aware th a t  i f  the  L e g is la tu re  re fu sed  to  a c t ,  these  
decrees went in to  fo rce  o b l ig a to r i ly .  A lso, the new law f a i le d  
to employ tiM l im ita t io n  t r a d i t io n a l  to e a r l i e r  p ra c t ic e —th a t  
succeeding Governments may n o t req u ire  o f the L eg is la tu re  the 
renewal o f enabling a u th o r ity . This d id  n o t seem to be a h ind­
rance as the N ational Assembly remained firm  and re fu sed  amend­
ments a t t r ib u t in g  continued competence to  succeeding govern­
m ents.^ N everthe less, d e sp ite  these  d iffe re n ce s  between the 
c la s s ic  system o f decree-law s and the decrees au tho rized  by 
the  law o f August 17, 1948, one comes in e v ita b ly  to the  con­
c lu s io n  th a t  th is  law marks the re tu rn  o f the regime o f  d e le ­
gated  le g is la t io n  to French p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  C lea rly , the o u t­
^France, Journal O f f i c i e l . . . .  Assem blée N a tio n a le . Débats
(August 9 , 1948), pp. 5585-87 .
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stand ing  Innovation o f th is  le g is la t io n  was the in tro d u c tio n  
o f the  concept o f  the ex is ten ce  o f su b je c t m a tte r  which i s  
reg u la to ry  by n a tu re . To be su re , th is  no tion  was q u ite  novel; 
indeed, i t  should be recognized as co n tra ry  to  any previous 
p ra c t ic e  and ab so lu te ly  fo re ig n  to  the e s ta b lish e d  system o f  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  law. N either the  C o n s titu tio n  o f  October 27,
1946, nor any o th e r  fundamental document to th i s  time had ever 
recognized a sphere o f  competence (competence n a tu re l le )  r e s ­
erved e x p l ic i t ly  to the Executive a u th o r ity . Had n o t th e  Con­
s t i tu t io n  consecrated  the  rev o lu tio n a ry  p r in c ip le  o f the  supre­
macy o f the law^ in  i t s  d e c la ra tio n  th a t  "N ational sovere ign ty  
belongs to  the  French people . . . The people may ex e rc ise  i t
in  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  m a tte rs  by the vo te  o f  th e i r  re p re se n ta -  
2
t iv e s  • . o ” and assured  i t s  execution  by the s t ip u la t io n  
th a t  the P re s id e n t o f the  Council o f  M in is te rs  " s h a ll  in su re  
the execution  o f the law s."^ Y et, the concept m atiè res ré g le ­
m entaires p a r  n a tu re  was e s ta b lish e d  and was to  become an 
in te g ra l  p a r t  o f  the French le g a l  system . To be su re , a t  th is  
p o in t th is  ca tegory  was no t c a r r ie d  to  i t s  lo g ic a l  conclusion .
The Government d id  n o t a ttem pt to  e s ta b l i s h  a d e fin ab le  and 
s tan d ard ized  ca tegory  o f  competence. Indeed, th e  P re s id e n t o f 
the Council o f  M in is te rs  was most anxious to  a ssu re  the N ational
^ ^ ilo n s titu tio n  o f 1791: " I I  n 'y  pas en France d*a u to r i té
su p érieu re  a c e l le  de l a  l o i . "
^ A rtic le  3 o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f October 27, 1946.
L ionel H. Laing e t  a l .*  Source Book in  European Government, p . 98.
^ A rtic le  47 o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  October 27, 1946.
Ib id . . p . 104.
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Assembly th a t  th e re  was no in te n t  on the p a r t  o f the Govern­
ment to  define  a r b i t r a r i l y  the boundaries o f  Executive and 
L e g is la tiv e  competences. In  p r a c t ic a l  term s, the enum eration 
o f to p ic s  l i s t e d  in  A r t ic le  7 o f  the law o f  August 17, 1948, 
was n o t conducive to the e x tra c tio n  o f any s o r t  o f  gen era l ru le  
upon which s ta n d a rd iza tio n  could  be based. In  f a c t ,  the only 
r e a l  p o s s ib i l i ty  was the  ca tegory  o f pub lic  serv ice.% However, 
i f  th is  a rea  were to be considered  p re c is e ly  w ith in  the confines 
o f  m atiè res rég lem en ta ires p a r  n a tu re . i t  would follow  th a t  the 
o th e r  enumerated sp h eres, fo r  example, the es tab lish m en t o f 
p r ic e  and economic c o n tro ls ,  and the o rdering  o f  the u t i l i z a ­
tio n  o f  energy and the co n d itio n s fo r  the d is t r ib u t io n  o f 
prim ary m a te ria ls  and in d u s t r ia l  p ro d u cts ,^  must a lso  be con­
s id e red  p a r t  o f  th is  compétence n a tu r e l le . Though p o ss ib le  in
^Andre M arie, P re s id en t o f the Council o f  M in is te rs , in ­
formed the N ational Assembly: "En e f f e t  en vue de r é t a b l i r ,
dans le u rs  a t t r ib u t io n s  p ro p re s .le  l é g i s l a t i f  e t  l 'e x é c u t i f ,  
le  Gouvernement a u r a i t  pu demander au Parliam ent de renouncer, 
d 'une manière générale  a t e l l e  m atière  qui s e r a i t  t r a d i t io n a l le -  
ment ou organiquement du domaine rég lem en ta ire . I l  ne l ' a  pas 
f a i t . . .  Nous a llo n s  p lus lo in .  Nous vous demandons ^  éé liim lter 
vous-méme, bien entendu, le s  domaines dans le sq u e ls  le  pouvoir 
rég lem en ta ire  s 'e x e rc e ra  d 'a p rè s  le  nouvel aménagement propose." 
F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . ,  Assemblée N atio n a le . Débats 
(August 8 , 1948), p . 5526.
2A rtic le  6 o f  the  law o f  August 17, 1948 s t ip u la te d  th a t  
on the  date  o f  the prom ulgation o f the p re se n t law in  su b je c t 
m a tte r having by i t s  n a tu re  a re g u la to i^  c h a ra c te r , as d e te r ­
mined by A r t ic le  7 fo llow ing , " . . .  pour ab roger, m o d ifie r ou 
rem placer le s  d isp o s itio n s  en v ig u eu r,"  decrees might be taken 
in  the  Council o f  M in is te rs  a f t e r  the adviea o f  the Council o f  
S ta te .  A r t ic le  7 in  i t s  enum eration o f  aiü>Jàct matter re le v a n t 
to  th e  reg u la to ry  competence l i s t e d  the  "O rgan isa tion , suppres­
s io n , tran sfo rm atio n , fu s io n , règ le s  de fonctionnem ent e t  con­
t r ô le  de l'ensem ble des se rv ic e s  de l 'E t a t . . . "  F rance, Jo u rn a l 
O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (August 18, 1948), p . 8083.
3lbid.
156
form, th i s  would appear to  be im possible in  p ra c tic e  as these 
economic reform s had as th e i r  o b jec tiv e  the m od ification  o f 
parliam en tary  d isp o s itio n s  by delegated  le g is la t io n  ra th e r  than 
the  es tab lish m en t o f  a  d i s t in c t  m a te r ia l Executive competence. 
Moreover, such a category  o f s ta n d a rd iz a tio n  would req u ire  ex­
ten siv e  powers o f  i n i t i a t i v e  and dec ision  w ith in  th i s  a rea  on 
a permanent b a s is ,  and the Government made no attesqpt a t  th is  
t in e  to  e s ta b l i s h  such a u th o r ity . At the  same tim e, the Legis­
la tu re  d id  n o t l im i t  i t s e l f  from in te rp o s in g  i t s  power in  these 
areas in  th e  fu tu re  and, th e re fo re , the  p o s s ib i l i ty  remained 
th a t  the l e g is la t iv e  agency could  in te rv en e  a t  i t s  d is c re tio n  
to  reduce o r  to  d es tro y  th is  domain.^ Ve conclude, then , th a t  
th is  law marked the estab lishm en t o f  the  concept o f  domain 
m atiè res rég lem en ta ires  p a r n a tu re . A domain w ith  id e n t i f ia b le  
con ten t in s o fa r  as th e  law o f  August 17, 1948 extended, b u t 
w ithou t s ta n d a rd iz a tio n  in  the h ie ra rch y  o f  French law. One 
can be su re th a t  the  u ltim a te  e f f e c t  o f  th is  d i r e c t  a f f ro n t 
to  the supremacy o f  the  law was n o t c le a r ly  fo reseen  in  the 
summer o f  1948. I t s  vagueness aw aited s p e c if ic a t io n :  i t s  fu r ­
th e r  a p p lic a tio n  aw aited the  demands o f  c r i s i s .
Such a  c r i s i s  arose in  the  e a r ly  summer o f  1953 idien the 
L sn ie l government, faced  w ith  a  severe balance o f  payments def­
i c i t  and a  budgetary  imbalance o f  some 733 b i l l io n  f ra n c s , 
requested  and rece iv ed  from the  N ational Assembly d e leg a tio n s 
o f  competence th a t  had sin ce  1948 been su ccess iv e ly  denied to
^ § u 2 r a .,p . 149 .
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the Mayer, Raynaud, Mendès-France, B id au lt, and Marie regim es. 
The passage o f the Governmental p ro je c t of Ju ly  2 , 1953, which 
became the law of Ju ly  11, 1953, extended the a p p lic a tio n  of 
the law o f August 17, 1948, bu t w hile enumerating sp e c if ic  sub­
j e c t  m a tte r as w ith in  the m a te r ia l competence o f the reg u la to ry  
power^ f a i le d  to  make a fu r th e r  c o n trib u tio n  toward the e s ta ­
blishm ent o f a definab le  ca tegory  compétence n a t u r e l l e . % This 
concept was no t to  come to  f u l l  f ru i t io n  u n t i l  the w ritin g  o f 
the C o n s titu tio n  o f the F if th  Republic.^
From th is  p o in t forw ard, one could say w ithou t fe a r  of 
being in accu ra te  th a t  the p rocess of decree le g is la t io n  which 
evolved in to  a prim ary process fo r  governmental ac tio n  in  the 
Third Republic had been tra n sm itte d  in  i t s  f u l l  scope w ithout 
l im ita t iv e  refinem ent to  the Fourth Republic. Varying nuances 
and innovations had been added, to  be su re , bu t e s s e n t ia l ly
^"L 'o rgan isa tion  ad m in is tra tiv e  des se rv ices  de la  ju s ­
t ic e  e t  des fo rces armées; l 'o rg a n is a t io n ,  le  fonctionnem ent 
e t  le  co n trô le  des so c ié té s  ou organismes fra n ç a is  dont le s  
c o l l e c t i v i t é s ; . . .Les ré g ie s  généra les ap p licab les  à l 'a v a n c e ­
ment des personnels c i v i l s  e t  m i l i ta i r e s ;  le s  lim ite s  d 'âge 
des personnels c iv i l s  e t  m i l i t a i r e s ,  des agents des adm inis­
t r a t io n s  . . .  Les règ le s  concernant la  re s p o n s a b ilité 'd e s  compa- 
ta b le s  p ub lics  e t  le s  o b lig a tio n s  ad m in is tra tiv es  des ordon­
n a te u rs ; Les cond itions d 'ém ission  des emprunts des départe­
ments, communes e t  é tab lissem en ts  p u b l i c . ' René Chapus, "La 
lo i  d 'h a b i l i ta t io n  du 11 j u i l l e t  1953 e t  la  question  des 
d é c re ts - lo is ,"  Revue du D ro it P u b lic , Vol. 69 (1953), p . 1005.
^Supra. , p . 138.
3see A rtic le s  34-37 o f th e  C o n stitu tio n  o f th e  F if th  
R epublic. P e te r Campbell and Brian Chapman, The C o n s titu tio n  
o f the F if th  Republic; T ra n s la tio n  and Commentary (Oxford;
B asil B lackw ell, 1 9 5 8 ) ,pp. 2?-2$.
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the process o f  decree le g is la t io n  upon which France staked  h e r  
l i f e  in  1939 and 1940 had re-em erged by the summer o f  1953 and 
was again  a v a ila b le  w ith  a l l  i t s  i ^ l l c a t i o n s  to  the Government 
in  power. G ranted th a t  the L e g is la tu re  must open the  door to  
th i s  p le n itu d e  o f  power, the s ig n i f ic a n t  f a c t  was th a t  the 
system was a v a ila b le .
Law, in  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  sen se , remained su p e rio r  to  o rd i­
nance. I t  appeared th a t  when faced  w ith  c r i s i s  f o r  which the 
re g u la r  le g i s la t iv e  p rocesses were inadequate , French govern­
ments were once again moving toward the  employment o f  a rb i t r a r y  
and r e la t iv e ly  u n re s tr ic te d  p rocedures . To be su re , experience 
and n e c e s s ity  d ic ta te d  the d e leg a tio n  o f  competence to  the 
Executive in  emergency s i tu a t io n s —b u t w ith in  what l im i t s ,  f o r  
what p e rio d  o f  tim e, and w ith in  what scope? France d esp e ra te ly  
needed a  c le a r ly  defined  program fo r  the expansion o f  the  regu­
la to ry  power w ith in  e x p l ic i t ly  defined  c o n te n t, a re a , and time 
l im ita t io n s .  E volu tion  between 1945 and 1953, u n fo rtu n a te ly , 
o ffe re d  l i t t l e  more than v a r ia t io n s  upon the t r a d i t io n a l  p a t­
te rn s  e s ta b lis h e d  in  th e  T h ird  Republic : (1) a u th o r ity  to
xsodify form al law when P arliam en t f a i le d  to  take a c tio n  w ith in  
a s p e c if ie d  p e rio d  o f  tim e; (2 )a u th o r ity  to  modify form al laws 
w ith in  a s p e c if ie d  p erio d  o f  time and f o r  s p e c if ie d  purposes;
(3) a u th o r ity  to  modify fo n sa l laws in  in s tan ce s  in  which the  
proposed ord inances have been considered  by th e  L e g is la tu re ; 
and (4) a u th o r ity  fo r  the Government to  modify form al laws by 
decree in  m a tte rs  w ith in  th e  m a te r ia l  competence o f  th e  re g u la ­
to ry  power. Only th e  l a s t  p rov ided  a  p o s it iv e  s te p  toward th e
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so lu tio n  o f  the  dichotongr o f  le g is la t iv e  sovere ign ty  employed 
by an in e f fe c tiv e  and o f te n  immobile L e g is la tu re  and o f Execu­
tiv e  d is c re tio n  ap p lied  w ithou t broadly  accepted  leg itim acy  in  
l ie u  o f parliam en tary  a c t io n . However, i t  (m atières ré glemen­
ta i r e  p a r  n a tu re )  was employed w ith  s p e c if ic a l ly  lim ite d  co n ten t 
as s p e c if ie d  by a  p a r t ic u la r  law ra th e r  than as a category  o f 
su b je c t m a tte r  e x p l ic i t  in  co n ten t and perm anently a v a ila b le  
to  the  h o ld e r o f  the re g u la to ry  power. Vagueness, lim ited  
c o n te n t, and profound disagreeam nt in  the N ational Assembly con­
cern ing  the  leg itim acy  o f  th i s  procedure—a l l  co n trib u ted  to  
the n u l l i f i c a t io n  o f  i t s  p o s it iv e  a t t r i b u te s .
France was n o t ab le  to  c re a te  a s ta b le  government fo r  
h e r s e l f  in  the Fourth  R epublic . She had n o t produced a broad 
fundamental consensus about th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f  French so c ie ty  
and th e  n a tu re  o f  French government. W ithout such an agreement 
any c o n s t i tu t io n a l  s t ru c tu re  i s  shalqr a t  b e s t .  F rance, the 
N ation , was one th in g : F rance, the S ta te ,  was an o th er. The
Afo were n o t accepted as co n cen tric  in  th e  minds o f  aumy French­
men. The Army was fe rv e n tly  lo y a l to  France b u t n o t n e c e ss a r ily  
to  the  repub lican  government o f  F rance. In  the mid-1950*a 
treaso n  was in  the  a i r .  Government a f te r  Government stro v e  
m ig h tily  to  solve p re ss in g  economic, s o c ia l ,  and c o lo n ia l prob­
lems w ithou t success. P o l i t i c a l  France c a s t  about f o r  proce­
dures adequate to  the  tim es and found in  th e  expanded pouvoir 
rég lem en ta ire  a  u se fu l b u t l im ite d  techn ique . New approaches 
were sought. They were found. They were in g en io u s. But they  
f a i le d  to  su s ta in  the S ta te .  In  the long run sustenance can only  
be found in  agreement and v igorous ac tio n  based upon agreem ent.
CHAPTER VII 
THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND THE LOI-CADRE
The outbreak in  November, 1954 o f v io lence  in A lgeria  
underlined  the inadequacy o f excep tional procedures as they 
had evolved in  French a d m in is tra tiv e  p ra c t ic e  and provided 
ra t io n a le  fo r  the immediate im plementation of new dep artu res . 
The Mendès-France cab in e t considered  req u estin g  emergency 
powers to  expedite a firm  re a c tio n  to th is  in su rre c tio n , but 
th is  regime did no t remain in  power fo r  a s u f f ic ie n t  period  
of time to  be able to  i n i t i a t e  a coheren t A lgerian program.
I t  remained fo r  the succeeding Faure government to demand the 
invocation  of excep tional in s t i tu t io n s  in  A lg eria .
In A p ril, 1955 the Parliam ent acceded to  the demands o f 
the Faure government and le g a liz e d  the implementation of new 
emergency techniques—the s ta te  o f  emergency (é t a t  d 'u rgence) . 
This innovation  expanded the French c r i s i s  a rse n a l. In a 
s in g le  s tep  France added an o v e rt c i v i l  excep tional a u th o rity  
to the t r a d i t io n a l  and accepted procedures of the s ta te  of 
s ieg e  and the expansion of the normal executive re g u la to iy  
a u th o r ity .
The Government described  the s ta te  o f emergency as a 
regime in term ediary  between re g u la r  common law procedures and
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the s t a t e  o f siege in  which c i v i l  powers are  transferee! to 
the m il i ta ry  agency.^ As envisioned  by the Faure ca b in e t, 
th is  in s t i tu t io n  was designed to provide an a rea  o f  d is c re ­
tio n a ry  competence a v a ila b le  to the Government in  response to 
th re a ts  to the pub lic  o rd e r  in  in stan ces  in  which the c r i te r io n  
fo r  th e  estab lishm en t o f  the s ta te  o f  s ieg e  cannot be s a t i s ­
f ie d  o r  in  which the a p p lic a tio n  o f th is  predom inantly m il i­
ta ry  regime would be e i th e r  in ap p ro p ria te  o r  inconven ien t.
I t  was a s se r te d  th a t  the s t a t e  o f emergency corresponded to the 
n a tu re  o f th in g s . Faure f e l t  th a t  from time to  time modem 
so c ie ty  req u ired  the in te rv e n tio n  o f ex cep tio n a l au th o rity  o f  
a c i v i l  n a tu re , and th a t  i t  was p re fe rab le  to le g i s la te  in  a 
g enera l manner in  a period  o f r e la t iv e  calm than to a r r iv e  a t  
c r i s i s  s i tu a t io n s  unprepared to  deal e f f e c t iv e ly  w ith  se rio u s  
th re a ts  to the pub lic  o rd e r . The Government concluded th a t  i t  
was f a r  more app rop ria te  to  pass genera l le g is la t io n  in  the 
calm o f re g u la r  circum stance than to  depend upon sp e c ia l le g is ­
la t io n  passed  under the duress o f immediate danger. The m erits  
o f th is  argument are com pelling; however, i t  i s  to  be doubted 
th a t  the  s ta tu te  e s ta b lis h in g  the s ta te  o f  emergency was passed 
in  a p e rio d  o f r e la t iv e  calm o r  th a t  the p r in c ip a l  in te n t  o f 
the p arliam en ta rian s was to c re a te  a "framework law" ap p licab le  
to a l l  p o te n t ia l  c ircum stance. This ex cep tio n a l le g is la t io n ,  
as a l l  such pronouncements in  modem F rance, ^  was conceived in
^France, Jo u m a l O f f ic ie l . . . ,  Assemblée N a tio n a le . Debats 
(March 30, 1955)7 P. 2130.
^The law o f August 9 , 1849, reg u la tin g  the a p p lic a tio n  o f 
the s t a t e  o f  s ieg e  was im pregnated by memories o f  the co llap se
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response to a sp e c if ic  problem, and in  th is  in s tan ce  the s i tu a ­
tio n  had th e  disadvantage o f being o u ts id e  the M étropole. Con­
tr a ry  to th e  e lab o ra te  a n a ly s is  o f  the rap p o rteu r o f  the Com­
m ittee  o f the I n te r io r  o f  the  N ational Assembly, the s ta te  o f  
emergency was conceived by the  Faure government as a measure 
spécifiquem ent a lg é r ie n n e . ^ I t  was a measure designed to p ro ­
v ide the to o ls  to  deal w ith  a p a r t ic u la r  problem—the m ainten­
ance o f o rd e r in  A lg eria—th a t  i t  was app lied  to France h e r s e lf  
in  May o f 1958 and in flu en ced  th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  the F if th  
Republic i s  only testam ent to  the im p lica tio n  o f such le g is ­
la t io n  .
In  form al terms the s t a te  o f  emergency (6‘t a t  d*urgence) 
is  a le g a l  regime ( s i tu a t io n  lé g a l)  designed to make excep­
tio n a l  powers a v a ila b le  to the  ad m in is tra tio n  w ith in  the  bound­
a r ie s  o f  the  law. N ev erth e less , in  a le g a l  so c ie ty  which ad­
heres to the p r in c ip le  o f  the p le n itu d e  o f parliam en tary  com­
petence by v i r tu e  o f i t s  p o s it io n  as the re p o s ito ry  o f n a tio n a l
o f the Ju ly  Monarchy and by th e  demise o f the C h arte r o f 1830. 
C e rta in ly , the  commendable performance o f  G eneral Covaignac in  
the ad m in is tra tio n  o f the "commissioned d ic ta to rs h ip "  o f  June 
24, 1848, in flu en ced  the  w illin g n e ss  o f  le g is la to r s  to  in s e r t  a 
p ro v isio n  provid ing  fo r  the  s t a t e  o f  s ieg e  in  the  C o n s titu tio n  
o f November 4 , 1848. As we know, the August 9 law e s ta b lis h in g  
the s ta te  o f  s ieg e  was the d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  th is  p ro v is io n . In 
the same manner, the law o f  A p ril  3 ,1878, which m odified the 
1849 law and e s ta b lish e d  new procedures fo r  the o rg an iza tio n  o f 
the s ta te  o f  s ie g e , was enacted  by depu ties  who knew the commune 
and had a f ir s t -h a n d  awareness o f  both  the  excesses o f  unres­
t r i c t e d  execu tive  a u th o r ity  and the  im p lica tio n s  o f  inadequate 
execu tive power in  c r i s i s  s i tu a t io n s .  In  th e  same way, the law 
o f A p ril 3 , 1955, in s t i tu t in g  th e  s ta te  o f  emergency, i s  in sepa­
rab le  from the events in  A lg e r ia .
^France, J o u m a l O f f i c i e l . . . ,  Assem blée N a tio n a le . Débats
(March 3 0 , 1 9 5 5 ), p . 2130.
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so v e re ig n ty , th is  regime i s  j u s t l y  considered  an ex cep tio n a l 
law ( l o i  d 'ex cen tio n ) .  as i t  perm its the ad m in is tra tio n  to  move 
o u ts id e  i t s  normal realm  o f coaqsetence. Like the s ta te  o f  
s ie g e , i t  p resen ts  i t s e l f  as a c o n c il ia t io n  between ex cep tio n a l 
n e c e s s i t ie s  req u ired  in  the defense o f  o rd er and the  fundamental 
r ig h ts  o f  the c i t iz e n s  o f  the s ta te .^  For p r a c t ic a l  purposes, 
i t  i s  a  sta tem ent o f  the Government's d e s ire  to r e f r a in  from 
having recourse to the  s ta te  o f s ie g e .
The a p p lic a tio n  o f  extreme measures to  defend the pub lic  
o rd e r  i s  no t new to  le g a l  p ra c t ic e  in  F rance. The no tion  o f 
"imminent p e r i l"  i s  w e ll known to  French ad m in is tra tiv e  law 
and has o ften  been used as the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  a r b i t r a r y  
p o lic e  p ra c tic e s  by the  Council o f  S ta te .  In  the case o f  the 
s ta te  o f  emergency, th e  appeal to  imminent danger to  the pub­
l i c  o rd e r  takes on expanded dimension and s ig n if ic a n c e . For 
th is  ex cep tio n a l p rocedure , though re se rv in g  the d e c la ra tio n  
o f  the regime to the  le g is la t iv e  a u th o r ity , a l lo c a te s  abso lu te  
d is c re t io n  to the ad m in is tra tio n  fo r  determ ining th e  a p p lic a ­
t io n  o f  the in s t i tu t i o n —th a t  i s ,  the degree to  which the pub­
l i c  o rd e r  i s  in  danger and the p roper le g a l  methods to  be em­
ployed in  the so lu tio n  o f  the problem. On the su rface  the 
regime would n o t appear to  be beyond the  c o n tro l o f  the L egis­
l a tu r e ,  f o r ,  a f t e r  a l l .  Parliam ent i s  sovere ign . I t  can modi­
fy  a t  any moment th e  co n d itio n s  fo r  th e  estab lishm en t o f  the
^Roland Drago, " L 'E ta t d 'urgence (Lois des 3 a v r i l  e t  7 
aoû t 1955) e t  le s  l i b e r t i e s  p u b liq u e ,"  Revue du D ro it P u b lic . 
LBŒ, pp . 672-73.
164
s ta te  o f emergency. N everthe less, experience in d ic a te s  th a t  
in  such m atte rs as these  the L eg is la tu re  tends to e x h ib it  a 
re lu c tan ce  to  modify e s ta b lish e d  emergency le g is la t io n , even 
though assu red ly  i t  has the a u th o r ity  to  do so . The con tinua­
tio n  o f the s ta te  o f s ieg e  through th e  g re a t d iv e rs i ty  o f 
regimes since 1849, w ith  only one m od ifica tion—th a t  o f  1878— 
is  testim ony to  th is  tendency. A more compelling argument, 
however, can be b u i l t  around a reco g n itio n  o f the r e a l i t y  o f 
the re la tio n s h ip  between emergency le g is la t io n  and the  L egis­
la tu r e .  The attem pt to  c re a te  permanent emergency in s t i tu t io n s  
i s  p red ica ted  upon an awareness o f  the need fo r  p o s it iv e  ex­
ce p tio n a l procedures in  a time o f c r i s i s .  Such procedures are 
norm ally employed in  s i tu a t io n s  in  which the re g u la r  regime 
o f p o licy  form ation and ap p lic a tio n  i s  regarded as being  in ­
capable o f  dea ling  conc lusive ly  w ith  the problem a t  hand. In  
such s i tu a tio n s  i t  would no t be reasonab le  to expect th a t  a 
Parliam ent which has turned to  the excep tional in  an e f f o r t  
to defend the e s ta b lish e d  o rd er o f  so c ie ty  would have the  fo r ­
t i tu d e ,  a b i l i t y ,  o r  cap ac ity  to serve as an e f fe c t iv e  check 
upon the a p p lic a tio n  o f  such p rocedures.
The law o f A p ril 3 , 1955 i s  a most unusual document.
In  one p iece o f le g is la t io n  i t  s p e c if ie s  the a rea  in  which the 
regime may be ap p lied ;^  defines the  procedures a v a ila b le  and
^In the terms sp e c if ie d  in  A r t ic le  1 o f  the law o f  A p ril 
3 , 1955, the s t a te  o f  emergency may be declared  "in  a l l  o r  in  
p a r t  o f  the m etropo litan  t e r r i t o r y ,  in  A lg e ria , o r  in  the 
overseas departm ents." France, Jo u m a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  
D écrets (A pril 7 , 1955), p . 3479.
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the l i a l t e t l o n s  req u ired ; and iaq»lement8 th e  regime in  a  s e l ­
ec ted  a re a .^  Thus, co n tra ry  to  re g u la r  l e g is la t iv e  p r a c t ic e ,  
a g en e ra l and broadly  ap p licab le  procedure and i t s  s p e c if ic  
ap p lic a tio n  to a  p a r t ic u la r  a rea  was debated and implemented 
in  a  s in g le  le g is la t iv e  enactm ent.
The s ta te  o f emergency was dec lared  fo r  a l l  the t e r r i t o r y  
o f A lg e r ia . I t  i s  notew orthy th a t  the N ational Assembly was 
n o t w ill in g  to  c u r t a i l  the  a re a  o f d e c la ra tio n  o f  the s ta te  o f  
emergency in  A lg e ria . I t  p a id  l i t t l e  a t te n t io n  to th e  amend­
ment in i t i a t e d  by the Moslem deputy B e n je llo u l, which c a l le d  
fo r  th e  l im ita tio n  o f  the  a rea  o f  d e c la ra tio n  to the Auras 
Mountains which had been the a rea  in  which most o f the  d i f f i c ­
u l ty  had occurred . I t  i s  c le a r  th a t  from the o u ts e t th e  L egis­
la tu re  was w illin g  to extend the ex cep tio n a l competence o f  the 
Government to  r a th e r  broad a reas  so long as i t  re ta in e d  an u l ­
tim ate check upon a p p lic a tio n  in  terms o f  p o l i t i c a l  re sp o n s ib i­
l i t y .
The s ta te  o f  emergency was viewed w ith  mnch concern .
Many f e l t  th a t  i t  would r e s u l t  u ltim a te ly  in  a  more a u th o r i ta ­
r ia n  regime than was p o ss ib le  under the  s ta te  o f  s ie g e . In  
the  debate on the law o f  A p ril 3 , 1955, bo th  Moslem and L e f t-  
wing d e leg a tes p ro te s te d  vehemently a g a in s t what they co n s i­
dered to  be the g ran tin g  o f ex cep tio n a l a u th o rity  w ith o u t ade­
quate p ro v isio n s fo r  defense o f  in d iv id u a l r ig h ts .  The Commun­
i s t  deputy , Kosan G ira rd , p e rso n if ie s  th is  o p p o sitio n . G irard
^ A rtic le  15 o f  th e  law o f  A p ril 3 , 1955 s ta te s  th a t :  "The
s ta te  o f  emergency i s  d ec la red  in  the t e r r i t o r y  o f  A lg e ria  f o r  
a p e r io d  o f  s ix  m onths." I b i d . .  p . 3480.
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in s i s te d  th a t  th i s  new regime would be more a r b i t r a r y  than the 
s ta te  o f s ie g e , because i t  departm enta lized  a p p lic a tio n  and, 
th e re fo re , was le s s  su sc ep tib le  to parliam en tary  o v e rs ig h t. 
G irard  and h is  co h o rts  were p a r t ic u la r ly  dubious about the d is ­
t in c t io n  between the d e c la ra tio n  (d é c la ré )  o f  the s t a t e  o f  emer­
gency and the a p p lic a tio n  (ap p liq u e r) o f  the regim e. I t  was 
th e i r  con ten tion  th a t  the  guaran tees im p l ic i t  in  the  i n i t i a l  
s tag e  o f the d e c la ra tio n  were n o t c a r r ie d  over to the c r i t i c a l  
s tag e  o f  a p p lic a tio n . Consequently, in  the view o f  th e se  c r i ­
t i c s ,  the p o te n t ia l i ty  f o r  abuse was g re a te r  in  an u n re s tr ic te d  
execu tive  a p p lic a tio n  o f ex cep tio n a l procedures under the s ta te  
o f emergency than under s p e c if ic  d e leg a tio n s  to the m il i ta ry  in  
the im plem entation o f  the  s ta te  o f  s ie g e . However, a comparison 
o f the  a p p lic a tio n  and e f f e c t  o f the two regimes w i l l  demons­
t r a t e  th a t  the i n i t i a l  form o f the  s t a t e  o f  emergency was based 
upon d e lega tions as c le a r - c u t  and defined  as those employed as 
j u s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  the  s ta te  of s ie g e ; and one would expect th a t  
the  c i v i l  a u th o rity  would be le s s  a r b i t r a r y  in  the a p p lic a tio n  
o f  r e s t r a in t s  than the  m il i ta ry  would be.
At th is  p o in t a comparison between the p ro v is io n s  o f  the 
law o f  1878 re g u la tin g  the  o rg an iz a tio n  o f the s ta te  o f  s ieg e  
and the  s ta tu te  e s ta b lis h in g  the s t a t e  o f emergency becomes 
re le v a n t.  The law o f  A p ril 3 , 1878 s t ip u la te d  th a t :
Only a law can d e c la re  the s ta te  o f  s ie g e .
This law w i l l  d es ig n a te  the communes, a rrond issem en ts,
^France, J o u m a l O f f i c i e l . . . .  Asseiabl^e N a tio n a le . Debats
(March 3 1 , 1 9 5 5 ), p . 2217.
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and departm ents to  which i t  i s  to apply . I t  w i l l  
f i x  the period  o f  i t s  d u ra tio n .
At the  e x p ira tio n  o f  th is  p erio d  th e  s ta te  o f s ieg e  
c e a se s ,a u to m a tic a lly , u n less a new law s h a ll  pro­
long i t s  e f f e c t s .
2 . In  the event th e  Chambers a re  adjourned, the 
P re s id e n t o f the  Republic can d ec la re  the s ta te  of 
s ie g e , on the advice o f the Council o f  M in is te rs ; 
b u t then the Chandlers meet au to m atica lly  two days 
l a t e r .
3 . In  the event th e  Chamber o f  D eputies i s  d isso lv ed , 
and u n t i l  e le c t io n s  s h a l l  have been e n t i r e ly  com­
p le te d , the s ta te  o f  siege canno t, even p rov ision ­
a l ly ,  be dec lared  by the P re s id en t o f  the R epublic.
N ev erth e less, in  the event o f fo re ig n  war, the 
P re s id e n t, on th e  advice o f  the  Council o f M in is te rs , 
can dec lare  the  s t a t e  o f  s iege  in  the  t e r r i t o r i e s  
menaced by th e  enemy, on the co n d itio n  th a t  he 
convoke the e le c to r a l  co lleg es  and reassem ble the 
Chambers in  the  s h o r te s t  p o ss ib le  de lay .
4 . In  the event th a t  communications w ith  A lg eria  
a re  in te r ru p te d , the  governor can dec la re  a l l  o r 
p a r t  o f  A lg eria  in  a  s ta te  o f  s ie g e , under the con­
d it io n s  o f  th i s  law.
3 . In  the occasions foreseen  by A r t ic le s  1 and 2, 
the  Chambers, as soon as they s h a l l  have reassem bled, 
s h a l l  m aintain  o r  l i f t  the s ta te  o f  s ie g e . In  the 
even t o f  disagreem ent between them, the s ta te  of 
s ieg e  i s  l i f t e d  au to m a tica lly .^
In  th is  same s p i r i t ,  the law o f  A p ril 3, 1955 provided
th a t  th e re  was no way to  dec la re  a s t a te  o f  emergency except
by law ;^ th a t  th is  law e s ta b lish e d  the  du ra tion  o f th e  s ta te
o f emergency and th a t  i t  might no t be prolonged excep t by a
new law;^ and th a t  in  the case o f  d is s o lu tio n  o f the N ational
^ R o ss ite r, p . 82.
^France, J o u m a l O f f i c i e l . . . ,  L o is e t  D écrets (A p r il 7 ,
1 9 5 5 ), p . 3479.
^ Ib id .
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Assembly, the law th a t  had e s ta b lish e d  the s ta te  o f  emergency 
was to  be abrogated de p le in  d r o i t .^  I f  a government resigned  
o r  th e re  was a vacancy in  the presidency  o f the Council o f 
M in is te rs , the incoming government was req u ired  to ask P a r l ia ­
ment fo r  confirm ation  o f the s ta te  o f emergency w ith in  f i f te e n  
days, counted from the  day in  which the government rece ived  the 
confidence o f the N ational Assembly.^ The b as ic  d is t in c t io n ,  
and the  one re fe r re d  to  by Rosan G irard ,^  r e s t s  upon the r e ­
quirement o f the s ta te  o f siege th a t  the "law w i l l  designate  
the  communes, arrondissem ents, and departm ents to  which i t  i s  
to  apply"^ and the s ta te  o f emergency s p e c if ic a tio n  th a t  dec­
la r a t io n  w il l  be made by law, bu t th a t  a f t e r  the broad imple­
m entation o f the regim e, the ^ te rm in a tio n  o f the  d i s t r i c t s  
and the  areas w ith in  the  d i s t r i c t s  to  which the s ta te  o f  emer­
gency w i l l  apply i s  w ith in  the competence o f  the Executive 
r a th e r  than the L e g is la tu re .^
This d is p a r i ty  o f  method which might be considered  a 
d is t in c t io n  between le g is la t iv e  a p p lic a tio n  and ad m in is tra tiv e  
a p p lic a tio n  i s  n o t u n r e a l i s t i c .  The proper ro le  o f the L egis­
la tu re  in  modem so c ie ty  i s  no t and cannot be an in tim ate  
d ire c tio n  o f a f f a i r s  concerned w ith  the  m inutiae o f  a p p lic a tio n
l l b i d .
Z ib id .
^Supra. . pp. 165-66.
^ R o ss ite r , p . 82. Supra. . pp. 166-67.
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (A pril 7 , 
1953), p . 3479.
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b u t, r a th e r ,  o u s t be a  broad o v e rs ig h t concerning i t s e l f  w ith  
ap p ro p ria te  o b je c tiv e s  and methods. In  c r i s i s  s i tu a t io n s  th e  
o b je c tiv e  o f  le g is la t iv e  p o licy  must be th e  estab lishm en t o f  
c le a r - c u t  d e leg a tio n s to  responsib le  a u th o r ity  w ith in  defined  
lisdLts o f  competence and fo r  sp e c if ie d  periods o f  a p p lic a tio n . 
Anything more o r anything le s s  w i l l  tend  to  destroy  the c o n t i­
n u ity  o f  p o lic y  form ulation  and a p p lic a tio n  so im portant in  
perio d s o f  s t r e s s .
V iable ex cep tio n a l government demands a f o r th r ig h t  des­
c r ip t io n  and understanding  o f eoaqpetences. The bankruptcy o f  
m ake-sh ift arrangem ents in  parliam entary-governm ental r e la t io n s  
i s  nowhere b e t te r  documented than in  F ra n c e 's  own h is to ry  dur­
ing the  1914-1916 p e r io d . As Je re  Clemons King wrote in  h e r 
d e sc r ip tio n  o f th is  p e rio d :
The a p r io r i  method o f reg u la tin g  p o lic y  and s tra te g y  
by assign ing  the  p o l i t i c a l  ends o f  war to  the c iv i ­
l ia n  power, and the fo rc ia b le  achievement o f  those 
aims to  the m il i ta ry  had been abandoned in  a c tu a l 
p r a c t ic e .  The m il i ta ry  a t  f i r s t  invaded the  govern­
m en t's  sphere . Then Parliam ent encroached upon the 
power o f  the government and the command, and f in a l ly  
the  government, under Clemenceau, became the dominant 
f a c to r .  This s h i f t  in  power from the command to 
P arliam ent to  government was q u ite  unforeseen , b u t 
alm ost inescapab le  in  the c ircum stances. Pragmatic 
te s t in g ,  b lin d  g rop ing , and t r i a l  and e r r o r  took the 
p lace  o f any ru le  o f  thumb form ula la id  down fo r  
sep a ra te  spheres o f  a u th o r ity . 1
The c l a r i f i c a t io n  o f  le g is la t iv e -e x e c u t iv e -m il i ta ry  re sp o n s ib i­
l i t i e s  was d e s ira b le  in  1914; i t  was d e s ira b le  in  1940; and i t  
was d e s ira b le  in  1955 as  i t  i s  today. The co n trib u tio n  o f the
^Jere  Clemons King, G enerals and P o l i t ic ia n s  (B erkeley: 
U n iv ers ity  o f  C a lifo rn ia  P re ss , 1951), p .
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s ta te  o f  emergency to  th is  o b je c tiv e  can only be answered 
a f t e r  f u r th e r  a n a ly s is .
S ince th e  s ta te  o f  emergency, a t  le a s t  according to  the 
Faure government, was conceived as a moderate device ap p licab le  
to  modem circum stance and a  device le s s  a u th o r ita r ia n  than the 
s ta te  o f  s ie g e , i t  does n o t seem in ap p ro p ria te  th a t  P arliam ent 
should de lega te  coaqpetence fo r  th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f such an in s ­
t i t u t i o n  to  a  p o l i t i c a l l y  resp o n sib le  govemsmnt. To be su re , 
abuse was p o ss ib le , even p robab le , in  a s i tu a t io n  o f  s t r e s s .
But such i s  always th e  case in  c r i s i s .  I f  re sp e c t f o r  th e  m le  
o f  law i s  l o s t ,  i f  those in  a u th o r ity  (whether m il i ta ry  o r  c iv i ­
l i a n ) ,  seek u n a tta in a b le  ends through v io le n t means and re fu se  
to  e n te r  in to  c o n s tru c tiv e  co^>romise, then the r e s u l t  a t  b e s t 
can be abuse. At w orst i t  w i l l  be anarchy.
In  summation, the  procedures f o r  the d e c la ra tio n  and ap­
p l ic a t io n  o f the  s ta te  o f  emergency were nothing more than an 
enunc ia tion  in  p r a c t ic a l  te rn s  o f  the d is t in c t io n  between l o i  
fo rm elle  end l o i  m a té r ie lle  ^  as recognized  by th e  emerging 
in te rp r e ta t io n  o f A r t ic le  13. The s t a t e  o f emergency i s  w ith ­
in  the formal competence o f the  L e g is la tu re  and th e re fo re  must 
be d e a l t  w ith  by the  passage o f  le g is la t io n  (law o f  A p ril 3 , 
1955). However, s u b s ta n tia l  d e leg a tio n s  o f  the m a te r ia l con­
te n t  o f  th is  le g is la t iv e  comqmtence may be extended to  the 
Executive f o r  e la b o ra tio n  by d ec ree . (A rtic le  2 o f  the  law o f 
A p ril 3 , 1955: " . . .  In  the l im i ts  o f  i t s  d e c la ra t io n , the
^ u n r a . .  p p .  131-34.
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zones where the s t a te  o f  emergency w i l l  be ap p lied  are  to be 
e s ta b lis h e d  by decree taken in  Council o f  M in isters on the 
r e p o r t  o f  the M in is te r  o f  th e  I n t e r i o r . ”) The l e g a l i s t i c  
s tan d a rd , then , i s  one o f  form ra th e r  than co n ten t. I t  i s  
dangerous b u t no more i l l e g a l  than th e  laws o f  1948 and 1953.
As in  the case  o f  the  o rg an iza tio n  o f  the two ex cep tio n a l 
r e g ia e s ,  th e re  a re  c e r ta in  cosqparisons which can be made which 
serve to  e lab o ra te  and s e t  in  p e rsp ec tiv e  the e f f e c ts  o f  the  
s ta te  o f  emergency. F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  i t  should be noted th a t  th e  
s ta tu te  reg u la tin g  the  e f f e c t s  o f  the  s t a t e  o f  siege^ s tr e s s e d  
th e  co n tin u a tio n  o f normal guaran tees o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r ig h ts  
excep t in  in#tam e## in  which they were suspended by law in  
defense o f  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd e r . The law o f  A p ril 3 , 1955, 
e s ta b lis h in g  the s t a te  o f  emergency, d id  n o t co n ta in  a s im ila r  
p ro v is io n , bu t i t  would n o t be amiss to  presume th a t ,  in  view 
o f th e  emphasis p laced  upon le g a l i ty  by the s ta te  o f  emergency, 
such a l im ita tio n  was, by d e f in i t io n ,  understood .
The p o l i t i c a l  s t a te  o f  s ie g e , to  which the s ta te  o f  emer­
gency i s  most com parable, p erm itted  th re e  types o f consequences: 
(1) the  m il i ta ry  a u th o r ity  i s  p a r t i a l ly  o r  to ta l ly  in v ested  
w ith  the  p o lic e  power norm ally ex e rc ised  by the c i v i l  au th o r­
i t y ;  (2) the  re g u la r  powers a re  re in fo rc e d  by the sim ultaneous 
o p era tio n  o f the m il i ta ry  a u th o r ity , th e  two powers complement 
each o th e r  in  s i tu a t io n s  in  which the t o t a l i t y  o f  c i v i l  compe­
tence i s  n o t tr a n s fe r re d  to  the  m il i ta ry ;  (3) m il i ta ry  tr ib u n a ls
^ A rtic le  11 o f  th e  law o f  August 9 , 1849. R o s s ite r , p . 8 2 .
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are  allowed to  s i t  In  judgment o f  non m ilita ry  o ffenders whose 
ac tio n s  th rea ten  the s e c u r ity  o f  the s t a t e .  C lea rly , the p r in ­
c ip le  upon which the p o l i t i c a l  s ta te  o f  siege was based was the 
tran sfe ren c e  o f c iv i l i a n  cosqpetence to  the m il i ta ry  a u th o r ity .
As designed and p resen ted  by the Faure government, the s ta te  
o f emergency was to  be q u ite  d i f f e r e n t .  In  the s ta te  o f  emer­
gency, the method was to  be the ex tension  and txaasfozm ation 
o f coiqpetences w ith in  the  scope o f  the c iv i l ia n  a u th o r ity . The 
o b je c tiv e s , n o n e th e le ss , were the same— the assurance o f  the 
o rd e r o f  e s ta b lish e d  so c ie ty .
As a r e s u l t  o f A r t ic le  15 o f  the law o f A p ril 3 , 1955, 
the  s ta te  o f  emergency was dec lared  in  the  th ree  departm ents 
o f  A lg ie r , Oran, and C onstan tine , under th e i r  re sp e c tiv e  P re­
fe c t^  as w ell as in  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  th e  South under the  
d i r e c t  superv is ion  o f  the Governor-General. As a d i r e c t  con­
sequence o f  the d e c la ra tio n , the departm ental c i v i l  a u th o r i t ie s  
were g ran ted  the competence to :  (1 ) p ro h ib it  the movement o f
people and v eh ic le s  in  the a reas  and during the hours p re sc rib ed  
by th e  p r e f e c to r ia l  a r r ê t e . (2) i n s t i t u t e  zones o f p ro te c tio n
^"The p r in c ip a l arm o f  the  Government a t  the  g ra ss  ro o ts  
o f  th e  p o licy  process i s  the P re fe c t fP rm fe t). a  h i ^  c i v i l  se rv ­
a n t ,  employed by the  M in istry  o f  the I n te r io r ,  who re s id e s  in  
the audLn town o r each departm ent. I t  i s  he who i s  u ltim a te ly  
resp o n sib le  fo r  a l l  a sp ec ts  o f  lo c a l  gove r nment and th e  execu­
tio n  o f n a tio n a l p o l ic ie s  lo c a l ly .  Although e le c te d  dapar(men­
tio n  w ith  h is  m in is try  o r  ano ther P a r is  a u th o rity . Samuel H. 
Beer and Adam B. Ulan ( e d s .) ,  P a tte ra s  o f  Government (Sad. ed . 
r e v . ;  Hew York: Random House, 1962), pp. 449-50.
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and s e c u r ity , and (3 ) to  p ro h ib it  w ith in  these a rea s  o f  secu­
r i t y  the r ig h t  o f  dom icile to  a l l  persons who seek to  in te r ­
fe re  w ith  the normal o p era tio n  o f the pub lic  pow ers.!
The a u th o rity  to  p ro h ib it  the movement o f persons and 
v eh ic le s  i s  no t new to  modem France. The re g u la r  p o lic e  
a u th o r ity  r e ta in s  th e  ü q x l ic i t  r ig h t  to  p ro h ib it  such c i r c u la ­
t io n .  This power i s  norm ally v es ted  in  the mayor o f  a  commune 
o r  in  the departm ental p re fe c t  when circum stance demands such 
r e s t r i c t io n  in  a number o f  communes o r  in  the e n t i r e ty  o f  a 
departm ent. This i s  n o t to  say th a t  the Council o f  S ta te  has 
accepted  a genera l and permanent p ro h ib itio n  o f th i s  type to 
be le g a l ,  fo r  th is  i s  n o t the ca se . I t  has only  accepted  th is  
s o r t  o f a rb i t r a ry  r e s t r i c t io n  in  s i tu a t io n s  which may be le g i ­
tim a te ly  considered  to  be e x c ep tio n a l. T herefore , in  o rd e r to 
guaran tee the cooq>lete a p p l ic a b i l i ty  o f  such a u th o r ity  during 
the d ec la ra tio n  o f  the  s ta te  o f  emergency, i t  was necessary  
to  include th is  g ran t o f  a u th o rity  in  A r t ic le  5 , S ec tio n  1 , o f 
the law o f A p ril 3 , 1955. I t  can be w ell argued th a t  i t s  
imqplemen t a t  ion c o n s t i tu te s  grave incumbrances upon the p r in ­
c ip le  o f  the f re e  movement o f c i t iz e n s  ( l ib e r té  d 'a l l e r  e t  
v e n ir ) and makes p o ss ib le  the a p p lic a tio n  o f a curfew , a  device
^ e e  the a r r ê te  o f  the p re fe c t  o f  C onstantine o f  A p ril 
17, 1955, f ix in g  m e co n d itio n s  f o r  the  moveomnt o f  persons and 
v eh ic le s  in  the arrondissem ent o f  Batna and in  th e  commune o f 
Tebessa. (Journa l d f ^ i e i a i .*77. l o i s  e t  P e c re ts . May 3 , 1955.) 
See a lso  the sjrîretès o r tSe p re fe c t  o f  A lger o f  May 5 and 6 , 
1955, e s ta b lisn in g  the co n d itio n s  o f  movement in  the a rro n d isse - 
rnant. o f  d'Aumale and o f  Tiai-^Ouzou. (Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . ,  Lois 
e t  D écre ts. May 10, 1955.)
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n o t mentioned by name in  the law b u t which i s ,  n e v e rth e le ss , 
th e  o p e ra tiv e  method o f the p ro h ib itio n s  p re sc rib e d .
The a u th o rity  to  i n s t i t u t e  zones o f  p ro te c tio n  and secu­
r i t y ,  on the co n tra ry , i s  n o t an e lab o ra tio n  o f competence im­
p l i c i t l y  a v a ila b le  under re g u la r  procedure. I t  i s  e n t i r e ly  an 
ex cep tio n a l g ra n t which does n o t proceed from any ex tension  
o f common law p ra c t ic e s .  The in s t i tu t io n  o f these  "zones" 
f a c i l i t a t e  necessary  ex tensions o f  c i v i l  a u th o r i ty , com prising 
n o t only  the p ro h ib itio n  o f  dom icile (A r tic le  5) and the as­
signment o f  residence  (A r tic le  6) b u t a lso  th e  im position  o f 
p u n itiv e  measures (A r tic le  13).
The th ird  procedure, the p ro h ib itio n  o f  dom icile , i s  
a lso  an ex cep tio n a l measure which may be implemented over the 
t o t a l i t y  o f  the a rea  o f  the  d é c la ra tio n  o f  th e  s ta te  o f  emer­
gency which, in  th is  in s ta n c e , was the  e n t i r e ty  o f A lg e ria .
A ll persons "suspected  o f impeding the fu n c tio n in g  o f the  pub-
1 .
l i e  powers" were su b je c t to  the d ep riv a tio n  o f  the r ig h t  o f 
dom icile in  A lg eria—the consequence was the in s t i tu t io n  o f 
th e  a u th o rity  o f the Government to  deport "suspected" in su r­
r e c t io n i s t s .  Legal recou rse  was a v a ila b le  to  those so charged 
b u t i t  was n e c e ss a r ily  a f te r  the  f a c t .
In  ad d itio n  to the  im p lica tio n s  o f  the d é c la ra tio n  o f 
the s ta te  o f emergency. A r t ic le s  6 and 8 o f  th e  law o f A p ril 
3 , 1955, provided ex ten sio n s o f  a u th o rity  as the  r e s u l t  o f the
^France, Journal O f f i c i e l . . . .  Assem blée W a^ on ale . Débats
(March 3 1 , 19 5 5 ), p . 2217. See a l s o ,  Drago, p . 682 .
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a p p lic a tio n  fap p lio n e r) o f  the excep tional regime to a p a r t i ­
c u la r  a rea  w ith in  the scope o f  the parliam en tary  d e c la ra tio n . 
This a p p lic a tio n  was considered  the le g a l b a s is  fo r  the regu­
la t io n  o f the use o f p u b lic  p la c e s , the hold ing  o f  p u b lic  
m eetings, the  suspension o f e le c t io n s ,  and the reo rg an iz a tio n  
o f c i v i l  and m il i ta ry  powers w ith in  the a rea  o f  a p p lic a tio n . 
Furtherm ore, i f  the a p p lic a tio n  was described  as aggravd. 
c e r ta in  o th e r  ex cep tio n a l measures became a v a ila b le  : s p e c if ic ­
a l ly ,  res id en ces could be searched  by day o r  n ig h t;  and the 
p re s s , r a d io , motion p ic tu re s ,  and the le g itim a te  th e a te r  were 
su b je c t to  cen so rsh ip . When one adds the a u th o r ity  g ran ted  
under (1) th e  parliam en tary  d é c la ra tio n  o f the  s ta te  o f  emer­
gency; (2) th e  governmental a p p lic a tio n  (ap p liq u e r)  o f  the 
regime to  a p a r t ic u la r  a re a  w ith in  the  scope o f  the  d ec la ra ­
t io n ; and (3 ) the iim plications o f  the s ta te  o f  emergency ag­
g rave . i t  i s  immediately apparen t th a t ,  when f u l ly  a p p lied , 
the s ta te  o f  emergency b rin g s  to  bear under c iv i l i a n  tu te la g e  
a c o te r ie  o f  ex cep tio n a l powers n o t g re a t ly  d i f f e r e n t  in  scope 
from those supp lied  in  A r t ic le  9 o f the law o f August 9 , 1849,^ 
which d e ta i l s  the e f f e c t  o f  th e  s ta te  o f s ie g e .
^ A rtic le  9 o f  the law o f  August 9 , 1849: "The m il i ta ry
a u th o r ity  has the power: (1 ) to  conduct searches by day o r  
n ig h t in  th e  hosms o f  c i t i z e n s ;  (2) to  d epo rt l ib e ra te d  con­
v ic t s  and persons who do n o t have residence  in  th e  a rea s  p laced  
under the s ta te  o f  s ie g e ; (3 ) to  d i r e c t  the su rren d er o f  arms 
and mmmitions, and to  proceed to  search  fo r  and remove them;
(4) to  fo rb id  p u b lic a tio n s  and m eetings which i t  judges to  be 
o f  a n a tu re  to  in c i te  o r  to  s u s ta in  d iso rd e r ."  R o s s ite r , p . 83,
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N everthe less, in  i t s  o r ig in a l  design the s ta te  o f emer­
gency was conceived to  be something q u ite  d i f f e r e n t .  Under 
the s ta te  o f  eaergency in  i t s  extreme in s ta n c e , 6 t a t  d*urgence 
aggravé. couq*etence renudLned w ith  the M in is te r  o f  the I n te r io r  
and the  Governor-General. This a u th o rity  could  be de lega ted , 
b u t the r e c ip ie n t  was an ap p ro p ria te  c i v i l  se rv an t ra th e r  than 
a a d l i t a r y  commander. In  the  case o f the d isc re tio n a ry  over­
s ig h t o f  dom icile fa ss ig n a tio n  â ré s id en ce ) , th e  cosq*etence to  
assig n  accep tab le  p laces o f  residence  to  in d iv id u a ls  whose ac­
t i v i t i e s  were adjudged to  be dangerous to  the p u b lic  o rd er was 
de lega ted  to  a  D irec to r and A s s is ta n t D ire c to r  o f  S ecu rity  ap­
po in ted  by the M in is te r o f I n te r io r .
R esp o n sib ility  f o r  the c o n tro l o f p u b lic  m eetings and 
th e  management o f  the  use o f  p u b lic  p laces  r e s te d  in  a c tu a l 
p ra c tic e  w ith  the ap p ro p ria te  p re fe c t  o r  h is  de legee . A ll 
om etings, en te rta in m en ts , and amusements which caused the g a th e r­
ing o f  people case under th i s  tu te la g e , and w hile such co n tro ls  
were r a th e r  standard  in  normal tim es as ex ten sio n s o f  the c i v i l  
a u th o r ity  to  re g u la te  t r a f f i c ,  in  ex cep tio n a l tim es the au toc­
r a t i c  use o f th is  a u th o rity  was, on the one hand, necessary  to 
th e  p re se rv a tio n  o f o rd e r and, on the o th e r , d i s t in c t ly  d e t r i ­
m ental to  p u b lic  l i b e r t i e s .  There was so much concern over 
the  l a t t e r  problem th a t  the  prim ary a p p lic a tio n  o f  these prov­
is io n s  was h e ld  up u n t i l  a f t e r  the  May, 1955 e le c t io n s .
In  th is  same ve in  i t  should be noted  th a t  the regiiee 
aggravé had a s ig n i f ic a n t  e f f e c t  upon the  e le c t io n  process
177
(é le c tio n s  p a r t i e l l e s ) » An amendment to suspend e le c tio n s  
sponsored by tiie depu ties G au tier and B allanger was defea ted  
in  the debate o f March 31, 1955, and i t  was understood a t  th a t  
time th a t  the s ta te  o f  emergency would cease during e le c t io n  
tim e. The u n re a l i ty  o f th is  p o s it io n  was quickly  re a l iz e d , 
and in  the law o f August 7, 1955, i t  was determ ined th a t  
"é le c tio n s  p a r t i e l l e s  are  suspended in  the zones where the 
s ta te  o f emergency i s  a p p l i e d , I t  was n o t p r a c t ic a l  to 
remove ex cep tio n a l procedures during an e le c t io n  p eriod  and 
then to reapp ly  them. This would d is ru p t the c o n tin u ity  o f 
the Im position o f  an ex trao rd in a ry  regime as w ell as remove 
fa c to rs  necessary  to the maintenance o f  o rd e r a t  a time when 
maximum s t a b i l i t y  was most d e s ira b le . As e le c t io n s  could n o t 
be held  p roperly  during an ex cep tio n a l regim e, the  N ational 
Assembly had no a l te rn a tiv e  b u t to  suspend e le c t io n s  and recog­
n ize  th a t  they could n o t be h e ld  in  a reas in  which the s ta te  
o f emergency had been declared  and ap p lied .
The é t a t  d*urgence aggravé. in  the t r a d i t io n  o f  the s ta te  
o f s ie g e , provided two fu r th e r  ex cep tio n a l measures : searches
o f in d iv id u a l dom iciles by day o r  by n ig h t and censure o f the 
means o f communications.^ The governmental p ro je c t  prov id ing  
fo r  th is  c i v i l  a u th o r ity  made th is  competence ap p lica b le  to  
a l l  t e r r i to r y  to which the s ta te  o f emergency had been ap p lied . 
Searches could  be ordered  by the re g u la r  c i v i l  a u th o r i t ie s  (as
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (August 14, 
1955), p . 8171.
^ Ib id . (August 7 , 1955 ), p . 3480.
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e s ta b lis h e d  In  A rt ic le  8 o f  the  law o f  A p ril 3 , 1955).^ Con­
seq u en tly , the re g u la r  c i v i l  a u th o r i t ie s  were enabled to  make 
searches and se izu re s  a t  any hou r, in  any p lace w ith in  the zone 
e s ta b lish e d  under the s ta te  o f  emergency. Thus, fo r  the  f i r s t  
time such a u th o r ity  was co n fe rred  upon c iv i l ia n  a u th o r i ty . I t  
had been p o ss ib le  fo r  m il i ta ry  a u th o r i t ie s  to  exped ite  th is  
competence under A r t ic le  9 o f  the  law o f August 9 , 1849,% bu t 
u n t i l  A p ril 3 , 1955, c i v i l  a u th o r i t ie s  were c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  
lim ite d  by th e  precedent o f  A r t ic le  76 o f  the  C o n s titu tio n  o f 
the Year V III , which unequivocably decreed th a t  " th e  homes o f 
a l l  persons liv in g  in  French t e r r i t o r y  a re  inviolable."3 The 
only  excep tions p erm issib le  during  the  n ig h t were circum stances 
o f  f i r e ,  f lo o d , o r  req u es t from in s id e  the house. In  the  day­
time c i v i l  a u th o r i t ie s  could  e n te r  f o r  sp e c ia l reasons "d e te r­
mined by law o r  as a r e s u l t  o f  o rd e rs  emanating from p u b lic  
a u t h o r i t i e s ."4 This p receden t had continued as p a r t  o f  French 
p u b lic  law as the r e s u l t  o f  i t s  in co rp o ra tio n  in to  A r t i c l e s .9 
and 16 o f th e  Code o f C rim inal In s tru c tio n  and in  A r t ic le  184 
o f  the Penal Code.^
^ Ib id .
^ A rtic le  9 o f the law o f  August 9 , 1849: "The m il i ta ry
a u th o rity  has the power to  conduct searches by day o r  by n ig h t 
in  the  homes o f c i t iz e n s  . . . " R o s s ite r , p . 83.
^ A rtic le  76 o f  the C o n s titu tio n  o f the Year V III , Duguit 
and N onnier, p . 127.
^Ibido
^Duguit and H onnier, p . 127.
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Thus, th is  a p p lic a tio n  o f the s i tu a t io n  aggravé emerged 
as an exception  to  the  e s ta b lish e d  p r in c ip le s  o f common law .^
Under the p ro v is io n  fo r  censorsh ip  the resp o n sib le  c i v i l  
a u th o r i t ie s  were enabled to "take a l l  measures to assu re  the 
c o n tro l o f  the p ress and o f  p u b lic a tio n s  o f  a l l  n a tu re  as w ell 
as the [c e n su r^  o f rad io  b ro ad casts , o f  motion p ic tu re  produc­
t io n s ,  and o f th e a t r ic a l  p r e s e n t a t i o n s , T h i s  a u th o r ity  was 
q u ite  comprehensive and a rb i t r a ry  because the L eg is la tu re  d id  
n o t see f i t  to e s ta b l is h  adequate d e f in i t io n  o f means and ends. 
A dm in istra tive  a p p lic a tio n  was n o t su sc e p tib le  to the e f f e c t iv e  
j u d ic ia l  co n tro l a v a ila b le  in  normal tim es. However, these  
were n o t normal c ircum stances. The problem was one o f the 
e f f e c t iv e  expansion o f a u th o r ity  w ith in  l im its  advantageous to 
the  c o n tin u ity  of the s t a t e .
On A pril 21, 1955 the  Governor-General o f  A lg e ria  o rdered  
the  re sp o n sib le  o f f i c i a l s  o f  newspapers and o th e r  p u b lic a tio n s  
to subm it proofs o f th e i r  forthcoming is su e s  to the c i v i l  au th o r­
i t i e s  f o r  approval. The consequence o f  the s ta te  o f emergency 
was, as a  r e s u l t ,  the es tab lish m en t o f  a p reven tive  censorsh ip  
q u ite  analogous to  th a t  allow ed by the  laws o f 1849 and 1878 
b u t com pletely unknown to  reg u la r  c i v i l  p ra c t ic e .
F in a lly ,  i t  should be recognized th a t  the  p r a c t ic a l  a p p lic ­
a t io n  o f  the s ta te  o f  emergency aggravé involved p o s it iv e  innova­
tio n s  in  a d m in is tra tiv e , ju d ic i a l ,  and m il i ta ry  o rg an iz a tio n .
^Drago, p . 687.
F ra n c e ,  Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (A p ril 7 , 
1955), p . 3480.
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Although the  law o f A p ril 3 , 1955 had nothing to say on th is  
su b je c t, the  proclam ation applying the regime p erm itted  the 
c re a tio n  o f new o rg a n iz a tio n a l s tru c tu re s  designed to  coord inate  
both the use o f  rep re ss iv e  measures and the le g a l guarantees 
o f  le g itim a te  a p p lic a tio n . For example, by the a r r ê te  o f A p ril 
16, 1955, the Governor-General delegated  to the so u s-p re fe t 
( a s s i s ta n t  ad m in is tra to r)  in  the arrondissem ent o f  Batna the 
conqpetence to prepare and to coo rd ina te  " a l l  measures necessary  
to  the rees tab lish m en t o f  o rd er . • • and the a u th o r ity  to 
apply these measures in  th is  zone."^  This te x t req u ired  th a t 
d iv e rse  c i v i l  and m il i ta ry  fu n c tio n s  be placed in  the hands of 
the s o u s -p rê fe t: the consequence being the fusing  o f c i v i l  and
m il i ta ry  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  under the  delegee o f the c e n tr a l  c iv i l  
a u th o r ity .^  However, th is  procedure was hard ly  c rea ted  before 
i t  was r e c a s t .  A decree o f  A p ril 22, 1955 placed  a genera l ^
o f f ic e r  a t  the  d isp o sa l o f the Governor-General, and an o f f i ­
c i a l  communique sp e c if ie d  th a t  th e  purpose o f the appointment 
was the assurance o f m il i ta ry  cooperation  w ith  the c i v i l  au thor-
o
i t y  in  c o n tro l o f  a l l  a d m in is tra tiv e  and se c u r ity  endeavors. 
A pparently  the  Government expected th a t  th is  m od ifica tion  would 
r e s u l t  in  a "streng then ing  o f the  c i v i l  and m il i ta ry  s tru c tu re "^  
in  the  departm ent o f  C onstan tine , However, th is  "streng then ing"
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . ,  Lois e t  D écrets (A pril 22, 
1955), p . 4652.
^Drago, p . 686. See a ls o . Le Monde  ^ A p ril 23, 1955, pp. 1 -3 .
^France, Journal O f f i c i e l . . . .  L ois e t  D écrets (A p ril 22,
1 9 5 5 ), p . 4166.
^Drago, p . 686.
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was most curious and paradoxical»  fo r  i t  brought the m il i ta ry  
agency in to  d ir e c t  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  the employment o f  the 
s ta te  o f  emergency. True, the subord inates o f  th e  genera l 
o f f ic e r  were to only cooperate w ith  the re sp o n sib le  p re fe c ts  
o r  u n d er-p re fec ts  in  the zones in  which the c i v i l  regime had 
been ap p lied . N evertheless » in  a s t r i f e - to m  land  as A lg eria  
the  im p lica tio n s o f such cooperation  were v a s t .  The p ro fe s­
s io n a l m il i ta ry  lead e rs  d id  n o t have the g r e a te s t  re sp e c t fo r  
the government o f  the R epublic. They tended to  f e e l  th a t  
A lg e ria  o ffe re d  the l a s t  b e s t  opportun ity  f o r  France to  r e ta in  
both  d ig n ity  and d es tin y  and fo r  the Army to  r e ta in  i t s  fu tu re . 
They were determined th a t  th e  ignominy o f Indo-China should 
n o t be rep ea ted . In  such a  s i tu a t io n  the coopera tion  o f  the 
m il i ta ry  in  the im plem entation o f a supposedly c i v i l  i n s t i t u ­
tio n  p laced  the v e ra c ity  o f  the in s t i tu t io n  i t s e l f  in  grave 
doubt. Once the m d lita ry  was brought in to  the p ic tu r e ,  the 
tendency was to r e v e r t  to  dependence upon th is  more a u th o r ita ­
r ia n  elem ent. This i s  p re c is e ly  what happened in  A lg eria  dur­
ing 1955 and 1956. The paradox i s  q u ite  c le a r .  The g re a t 
m a jo rity  o f  the suppo rters  o f  the in s t i tu t io n  o f the s ta te  o f 
emergency based th e i r  enthusiasm  upon the assumption th a t  th is  
in s t i tu t i o n  would provide th e  means fo r  an adequate c i v i l  
answer to  the mushrooming d iso rd e r  in  the overseas p rovince.
The meve toward cooperation  between the c i v i l  and the m il i ta ry  
tended to  b lu r  the d is t in c t io n  betmeen the s t a te  o f  emergency 
and th e  s ta te  o f  s ie g e . When one considers the  r a th e r  unencum­
bered  d isc re tio n a ry  a u th o r ity  possessed by the  adm dn istra tion .
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the re se rv a tio n s  p rev io u sly  expressed  by c r i t i c s  o f  the s ta te  
o f emergency become more com pelling.
To some, the  s ta te  o f  emergency appeared to  be d ic ta to r ­
i a l .  As the deputy Fayet p u t i t ,  "In e f f e c t  the  ru le  o f  the 
p o lic e  i s  s u b s t i tu te d  fo r  the  ru le  o f law . . .  The ap p lic a tio n  
w i l l  be a r b i t r a r y  and q u ite  a b so lu te ." ^  The M in is te r  o f  the 
I n te r io r ,  the Governor-General in  A lg e ria , can by d isc re tio n a ry  
measures w ithou t op era tin g  under the law, d es tro y  in d iv id u a l 
r ig h ts  "w ithout the  c o n tro l o f  any judge , ju d ic ia ry ,  o r  admin­
i s t r a t io n ." ^  This a t t i tu d e  th a t  the s ta te  o f emergency would 
be most a r b i t r a r y ;  th a t  th e re  were no ap p ro p ria te  le g a l guaran­
te e s  to  le g itim a te  a p p lic a tio n  o f  ex cep tio n a l powers by c i v i l  
a u th o r i t ie s ;  and th a t  in d iv id u a l l ib e r ty  would be o ffe re d  up 
on the pyre o f  s ta te  s e c u r i ty ,  became a popular b e l i e f  among 
p o l i t i c a l  sk e p tic s  and o p p o r tu n is ts . I t  cannot be doubted th a t  
the  very  n a tu re  o f  an ex cep tio n a l regime p rov ides le g itim a te  
grounds fo r  concern fo r  the  p re se rv a tio n  o f human r ig h ts .
Events were to  prove th a t  such fe a rs  were b a s ic a l ly  j u s t i f i a b l e .
A r t ic le  7 o f  the  s t a tu te  in s t i tu t i n g  the  s ta te  o f  emer­
gency provided fo r  the estab lish m en t o f  c o n s u lta tiv e  commissions 
in  the v ario u s departm ents in  A lg e ria  in  which the regime had 
been ap p lied . These commissions co n s is te d  o f p ré fe c to ra l  ap­
p o in tees  as w ell as re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f  the two co lleg e s  o f 
c i t iz e n r y .  I t  was hoped th a t  they  could focus a t te n t io n  upon
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Assemblée N a tio n a le . Débats 
(March 31, 1955)7pT  “
Z ib id .
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In stan ces o f  g ross in ju s t ic e  and neg ligence and thus s t i f l e  
the excesses which tend to  come w ith  excep tiona l p rocedures. 
T heir a u th o r ity  was nothing H»re than c o n s u lta t iv e , and a l l  
a u th o r ity  f o r  the determ ination  o f a p ^ a l t  r e s te d  w ith  the 
c o o p te n t  a u th o r i t i e s . T heir achievements were a t  b e s t  mode­
ra te  and uneven. In  some in s ta n c e s , as in  the departm ent o f  
C onstan tine , commissions were n o t e s ta b lish e d  u n t i l  th ree  o r  
fou r months a f t e r  the a p p lic a tio n  o f  the s ta te  o f  emergency.
As in  th is  in s ta n c e , claim s, o f  abuse began to p i le  up and in  
some cases were never reviewed by the  ap p ro p ria te  group.^
D espite the f a i lu r e  o f  the c o n su lta tiv e  commissions, the 
e s s e n t ia l  form al le g a l c h a ra c te r  o f  the ad m in is tra tiv e  process 
in  France should n o t be overlooked. Ren^ Mayer to ld  the Na­
t io n a l  Assembly th a t  he knew o f  no te x t  in  the le g is la t io n  o f 
the Fourth  Republic which p e ro d tte d  c i v i l  o r  ad m in is tra tiv e  
tr ib u n a ls  (c o n se ils  de p re fe c tu re . ad m in is tra tiv e  tr ib u n a ls ,  
o r  the  C onseil d 'E ta t )  to  question  the  d is c re tio n  involved in  
the a p p lic a tio n  o f c i v i l  re p re s s iv e  m easures: th a t  th e re  was
r e a l ly  no need fo r  such a te x t  because the laws o f March 2 and 
March 17, 1900, which a re  s t i l l  in  e f f e c t ,  "perm itted  to  a l l  
persons who a re  the o b je c ts  o f  an ad m in is tra tiv e  oeasuxre the 
r ig h t  to  a t ta c k  the ad m in is tra tiv e  competence on the grounds 
o f i l l e g a l i t y . "2 Mayer was c o r re c t  fo r  as long as the  c i v i l
^Drago, p . 688, Note 2 .
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . ,  Assemblée N ationa le , Débats 
(March 31, 1955), p . 2198.
184
c o u rts  remained in  o p e ra tio n , and in so fa r  as they would accep t 
ap p ea ls , the ex cep tio n a l regime remained under ju d ic ia l  l im ita ­
t io n .  The co u rts  in  c a ssa tio n  were q u ite  r e lu c ta n t  to accep t 
cases in  th is  s i tu a t io n ,  b u t such was n o t the case in  the  admin­
i s t r a t i v e  law h ie ra rch y ; consequently , the most e f f e c t iv e  method 
o f c u r ta i l in g  in d isc rim in a te  perv ersio n s o f  ex cep tio n a l powers 
became the appeal by method o f  excès de pouvoir^ w ith  the  claim  
o f  u l t r a  v i r e s . 2
On the o th e r  hand, i t  should be recognized th a t  th i s  c i v i l  
c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n  e n ta i le d  some a t t r ib u t io n  o f coaqsetence to  
m il i ta ry  tr ib u n a ls .  C o n sis ten t w ith  A r t ic le  8 o f the law o f 
August 9 , 1849,3 as in te rp re te d  by the law o f A p ril 27, 1916, 
m il i ta ry  t r ib u n a ls , " in  case o f  imminent p e r i l  r e s u lt in g  from 
armed in su rre c tio n "  were considered  competent to  dea l w ith  non­
m il i ta ry  m a tte rs . However, th i s  ex cep tio n a l coaqpetence was ap­
p lic a b le  on ly  to  crim es and o ffen ses  fo reseen  by the Code o f 
M ilita ry  J u s t ic e  and by those a r t i c l e s  o f the Penal Code which 
d ea l w ith  o ffen ses a g a in s t the p u b lic  w e lfa re . In  p r in c ip le ,  
th is  ju r i s d ic t io n  could n o t be in s t i tu te d  except in  time o f war 
(A rtic le  125 o f  the Code o f  M ilita ry  J u s t i c e ) .  However, A r t ic le  
12 o f the law o f A p ril 3 , 1955, as augmented by A r t ic le  2 o f th a t  
o f  August 7 , 1955, extended a u th o rity  under c i v i l  competence to
, pp. 48-49.
^S u p ra ., p , 48, no te  1.
^ A rtic le  8 o f  th e  law o f August 9 , 1849: "The m il i ta ry
c o u rts  may take ju r i s d ic t io n  over crim es and o ffen ses  a g a in s t 
the s a fe ty  o f  the R epublic , a g a in s t the  C o n s titu tio n , a g a in s t the 
p u b lic  peace and o rd e r , w hatever be the s ta tu s  o f  the p r in c ip a l 
p e rp e t r a to r s  and th e i r  accom plices."  R o s s ite r ,  p . 83.
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m il i ta ry  ju r is d ic t io n  in  a manner coaq>arable w ith  the  1849 and 
1916 s ta tu te s*  Consequently, when the s ta te  o f emergency was 
in s t i tu te d  in  a  zone, the c i v i l  a u th o rity  was empowered "to 
au th o rize  m il i ta ry  ju r i s d ic t io n  to  concern i t s e l f  w ith  crim es 
and r e la te d  v io la tio n s  o f  the law p e rta in in g  to the  conqpetence 
o f  the cour d 'a s s is e ^  in  the departm ent."2 Appeals in  ca ssa ­
tio n  were suspended. The r e s u l t ,  in  e f f e c t ,  was the isqposition 
o f m il i ta ry  tr ib u n a ls  in  the p lace  o f ca ssa tio n  c o u r ts .^  This 
m od ification  o f ju d ic ia l  p ro te c tio n  ra ise d  questions concerning 
the  moderate na tu re  o f  the in s t i tu t i o n .
A fte r  the le g is la t iv e  d e c la ra tio n  o f the s ta te  o f  e s e r -  
gency, the responsib le  execu tive  a u th o r it ie s ^  met to  determ ine 
the  l in e  o f  p o licy  to be follow ed in  the sp e c if ic  a reas  o f  ap­
p l ic a t io n .  The immediate r e s u l t  o f  th is  conference^was the 
form ation o f a m il i ta ry  command in  the department o f  C onstantine 
under the d ire c tio n  o f General Par lange. The ensemble o f  the 
s e c u r ity  fo rces in  the departm ent (p o lic e , gendarmery, A lgerian  
co n tin g en ts , supplementary s t a f f )  were p laced  a t  the  d isp o sa l
^The cour d*assise  i s  a  c i v i l  tr ib u n a l o f  the f i r s t  in s ­
ta n ce . These co u rts  have ju r i s d ic t io n  over a l l  c i v i l  cases ex­
ce p t those sp e c if ie d  in  the  laws as belonging to  o th e r  c o u r ts . 
They a re  appeals co u rts  f o r  the  J u s t ic e s  o f  the Peace and the 
in d u s t r ia l  co u rts  (c o n se il de prud'hommes) as w ell as f o r  labo r 
d isp u te s . As th e re  i s  no d is t in c t io n  bedreen c i v i l  and c rim in a l 
co u rts  in  France, they a lso  have ju r is d ic t io n  in  c r im in a l m atte rs .
^France. Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (A p ril 7 . 
1955), p . 3480. “
^France. Jou rnal O f f i c i e l . . . .  Assamblée N atio n a le . Debats 
(Ju ly  19, 1955), p“. 45Î4’. .
P r e s id e n t  o f the  C ouncil, M in is te r o f  Defense, and the  
Governor-General fo r  A lg e ria .
^The con feren ce met on A p r il  26 , 1955.
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o f the m il i ta ry  commander. C iv il  defense was o rgan ized  and 
temporary internm ent camps were s e t  up d esp ite  the expressed  
condemnation o f the  N ational Assembly. Censorship o f  the 
p ress  was e s ta b lish e d  and a  zone o f  p ro te c tio n  was extended to 
the south o f C onstantine to  inc lude the mixed communes o f Biska 
and El-Oued.^ In  e a r ly  May a s e r ie s  o f new m il i ta ry  measures 
concerning A lg eria  were adopted accom plishing: (1) a major
in c rease  in  the m il i ta ry  and gendarmery con tingen ts  in  A lg eria ,
(2) a re -ev a lu a tio n  o f the  use o f  the con tingen ts a lread y  a v a il­
ab le , (3) p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f the  Navy in  the  m aintenance o f  o rd e r,
(4) the immediate in c re ase  o f  a irp lan e#  and h e lic o p te rs  a v a il­
ab le  in  A lg e ria , (5) the  r e c a l l  to a c tiv e  duty o f  a l l  o f f ic e r s  
w ith  tra in in g  in  Moslem q u es tio n s , (6) the immediate employment 
o f  supplementary A lgerian  troops to a s s i s t  the r u r a l  p o lic e ,
and (7 ) the immediate t r a n s f e r  o f  p o lic e  co n tin g en ts  from the
2M étropole to A lg e ria .
C e rta in ly , these measures b u ttre s se d  the c i v i l  and m il i ­
ta ry  coerc ive a u th o r ity ; n e v e r th e le s s , the French colons r e ­
ac ted  in  an unfavorable manner toward these  d is p o s i t io n s .  D is­
s a t is f a c t io n  was expressed , n o t because th e re  was s u b s ta n t ia l  
use o f  m il i ta ry  fo rc e s , b u t because i t  was f e l t  th a t  governmen­
t a l  ac tio n  a g a in s t the t e r r o r i s t s  was inadequate. Jacques 
C h e v a llie r , the deputy-mayor o f  A lger, speaking fo r  th e  Federa­
tio n  o f Mayors o f A lg e r ia , warned the  Government th a t  "moderate" 
s tren g th en in g  o f the  a r b i t r a r y  power in  A lg e ria  was n o t s u f f ic ie n t
^L'Année P o lit iq u e  (P a r is :  P resses U n iv e rs ita ire s  de France,
1955), p . 276.
Z ib id . . p . 233.
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to the ta sk  a t  hand. In  the  view o f th is  re p re se n ta tio n  o f 
s e t t l e r  o p in ion , the " f lu id i ty  and ub iqu ity"  o f  the re b e ls  
demands "the a s so c ia tio n  o f the e n t i r e  popu la tion  in  an a n t i ­
t e r r o r i s t  a c t io n ."1 In  th is  s p i r i t  the F ederation  m eeting in  
i t s  g en e ra l assembly approved a motion d e c la r in g :
. . . C onsidering the  ex cep tio n a l g ra v ity  o f  the 
events o f  which A lg e ria  i s  the th e a te r  . . . , th a t  
the es tab lish m en t o f  o rd e r and o f peace cannot be 
achieved except by p a r t ic u la r ly  firm  measures—a l l ,  
unanimously, the mayors o f  A lg e ria  a ff irm  th e i r  
determ ination  to  o b ta in  from the government the ap­
p l ic a t io n  o f  the means capable o f  o b ta in in g  in  the 
l e a s t  delay  and by ex cep tio n a l measures the r e s to ra ­
tio n  o f French a u th o r i ty ,  the  d isp en ser o f o rd e r and
p eace .2
To implement th is  in te n tio n  the F edera tion  o f Mayors demanded: 
the s tro n g e s t p o ss ib le  punishment (châtim ent suprême) fo r  in d i­
v id u a ls  conv icted  o f c r im in a l a c ts ,  the severe c o n tro l o f  the 
e n t i r e ty  o f  the p re s s , the a p p lic a tio n  o f the s ta te  o f  emergency 
in  the th ree  departm ents o f  A lg e r ia , and the p ro h ib itio n  o f  the 
A lgerian  Communist P a rty  ( th e  refuge o f a l l  ex tre m is t and sepa­
r a t i s t  e lem en ts).^  For the F edera tion  th e  ta sk  was q u ite  c le a r .  
S trong ac tio n  was req u ired  im m ediately. The Government, through 
the  s ta te  o f  s iege  and the s t a t e  o f  emergency, to  say noth ing  o f 
i t s  c o n tro l o f the armed fo rc e s , had the means a v a ila b le  to  q u e ll 
r e b e l l io n . I t  was the Government's r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  to  a c t  d ec i­
s iv e ly  and w ith  d isp a tc h .
For the  Faure government, th e  s i tu a t io n  was much more
l l b i d .
Z ib id .
^ Ib id .
188
cogqplex. The Government recognized the n e c e ss ity  o f tig h ten in g  
s e c u r i ty .  The in tro d u c tio n  o f the  s ta te  o f  emergency was p re ­
d ica te d  upon th is  p reodse . The same i s  tru e  o f  the buildup o f 
m il i ta ry  and p o lic e  fo rces  in  May, 1955. Edgar Faure had a s ­
sured  the N ational Assembly on June 21 th a t  " these rep re ss iv e  
measures w i l l  be m aintained as long as the du ra tion  o f t e r r o r ­
ism ."^ But, a t  the same tim e, he had reminded them th a t  the  
Government had given i t s  approval to  a memorandum presen ted  by 
Jacques S o u s te lle  which condemned any v a c i l la t io n  from the h igh  
road o f  reform  o r ie n te d  toward the g radual p o l i t i c a l  and econo­
mic in te g ra tio n  o f A lg e ria  and the M étropole. S o u s te lle  con­
tended th a t  fo r  France to  subord inate  reform s in  A lg eria  to 
the  rees tab lish m en t o f  o rd e r would be to  m an ifest p o l i t i c a l  
weakness which could w e ll be used as a  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  t e r ­
ro rism .^  However, the immediate problem was the search  fo r  
ap p ro p ria te  methods fo r  dea lin g  w ith  r i s in g  a g i ta t io n ,  w ith  the 
v a s t  unemployment problem , w ith  the d is t r ib u t io n  o f fo o d s tu ffs  
to  the needy; and i t  was to  these p ress in g  concerns th a t  the  
Government turned  i t s  immediate concern. The s ta te  o f  emergency
^ Ib id . . p . 244.
2"M. S o u s te lle  d é c la re , devant le  Comité de C oordination 
pour l 'A f^ q u e  du Nord, que le  te rro rism  e s t  en ré g re s s io n . La 
peur s* e s t a tté n u é e , le  c o n ta c t a é té  r é t a b l i  e n tre  le s  re p ré r  
se n ta n ts  de l 'o r d r e  e t  l e s  autochtones qui fo u rn is se n t )  nouveau 
des reseignem ants. Des groupes de v o lo n ta ire s  peuvent Ê tre  
r e c ru té s  parmi l a  po p u la tio n  indigene de l 'A u zd s . Les incend ies 
de r é c o l te s  son t peu ü q x )r ta n ts , l ' i n t e r d i c t i o n  de fumer e t  de 
f ré q u e n te r  le s  boutiques européenes n 'a v a i t  duré que quelques 
jo u r s .  Mais des a t t e n t a t s  co n tin u en t A se p ro d u ire  e t  le s  
fo rces  de l 'o r d r e  p rocèden t à de nombreuses v é r i f ic a t io n s  d ' 
i d e n t i t é ."  I b id . .  p . 252.
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was the o rd e r o f the day*
In  the l a s t  days o f  J n ly , 1955, a marked reduction  in  
v io lence was achieved; n e v e rth e le ss , i t  was necessary  to  con­
tin u e  the a p p lic a tio n  o f the emergency regime* The Government, 
on Ju ly  30, 1955, went to  the N ational Assembly demanding a 
six-m onth renewal o f ex cep tio n a l au thority*  This was g ran ted  
by la rg e  m a jo r itie s  w ith  the passage o f the law o f August 7 ,
1955*1
The p erio d  o f r e la t iv e  calm did  no t l a s t  one month.
R ather than d e te rr in g  the in s u r r e c t io n is t s ,  the re im position  
of the s ta te  o f  emergency appeared to in v ig o ra te  the negative  
re a c tio n  to  French contro l*  On August 20 the re b e ls  boxmbed 
pub lic  b u ild in g s  in  the C ollo -F h ilippev ille-C onstan tine-G uelm a 
reg io n , and across the province spasmodic a tta c k s  were made upon 
European residences r e s u lt in g  in  numerous deaths* The Govern­
m ent's re a c tio n  was the a p p lic a tio n  o f the s ta te  o f  emergency 
to the e n t i r e ty  o f A lgeria* In  the f a l l  o f  1955, Edgar Faure 
t r ie d  v a l ia n t ly  to  embark upon a coherent p o licy  fo r  the p rov ince , 
b u t he was a l te rn a te ly  h indered  by in d e c is io n , in te rn a l  c o n f l ic t  
w ith in  h is  c a b in e t, and parliam en tary  o p p o sitio n . At v arious 
tim es the Government d ec lared  i t s  support fo r  the  gradual
^"The s ta te  o f  emergency * * * i s  prolonged fo r  a d u ra tio n  
o f s ix  months * * * “ (A r tic le  1 ) .  “The appeals en caasa tio n  
a g a in s t d ec is io n s  ju r is d ic t io n s  d iin s tru c t io n  * * * a re  c a r r ie d  
before  a s i i l i t a r y  triixunal en ca ssa tio n  e s ta b lish e d  by decree 
and conforming to A r t ic le s  T?6 and i j ^  o f  the Code o f M ilita ry  
Ju s tic e *  * * (A rtic le  2 ) .  "The é le c tio n s  p a r t i e l l e s  a re  sus­
pended in  th e  zones where the  s ta te  o^ em enency i s  m p lie d ."  
(A r tic le  4 ) .  F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l**** lo i s  e t  B é c o ts  
(August 14, 1955), p* 8 l? l*
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a p p lic a tio n  o f the A lgerian  S ta tu te  o f  1947,^ the S o tte  l i e  
program o f  In te g ra tio n ^  (which loqplled the repudatlon  o f  d ie 
1947 s t a t u t e ) ,  and the co n s id e ra tio n  o f a  new c h a r te r  fo r
^The s ta tu te  prom ulgated on September 20, 1947, known as 
^  "A lgerian S ta tu te ,"  con ta ined  the traAltloaal form ula th a t :  
A lg e ria  c o n s t i tu te s  a group o f  departm ents endowed w ith  c i v i l  
p e rso n a lity  and f in a n c ia l  autonomy," b u t added the  ph rase , 
and a  p a r t ic u la r  o rg a n iz a tio n ."  I t  e s ta b lish e d  a  governor- 
g e n e ra l, a  c e n tr a l  ad m in is tra tio n  under h is  d ir e c t io n , a  counc il 
o f government, and a re p re se n ta tiv e  Assembly-making A lg eria  
q u ite  d i f f e r e n t  from any o th e r  "group o f  departm ents" In  the 
French R epublic . "E ffec tiv e  e ^ l l t y "  was proclaim ed among a l l  
French c i t i z e n s .  However, the  S ta tu te  (A ra c le s  30 and 31) 
e s ta b lish e d  an A lgerian  Assembly c o n s is tin g  o f two sep a ra te  
c o lle g e s , each w ith  s ix ty  d e p u tie s , and each rep re sen tin g  v a s t­
ly  uneanal p o rtio n s  o f  the  popu la tion  (one m illio n  Europeans 
compared to  n ine m illio n  Moslems).
However, Inasmuch as a  c e r ta in  nundber o f  Moslems were 
p erm itted  to  remain In th e  f i r s t  co lleg e  (63,000 Moslems o u t 
o f a  t o t a l  o f  532,000 r e g is te r e d ) ,  th e re  was a p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t
Moslem re p re se n ta tio n  In  th e  f i r s t  co lleg e  would jo in  the  s o l id
b loc o f  Moslem depu ties In  th e  second co lleg e  and be In  a p o s i­
tio n  to  ou tvo te the Europeans. Thus, a s a fe ty  device was neces­
sa ry . A r t ic le  39 o f the  S ta tu te  p ro d d e d  th a t ,  a t  the  req u es t 
o f  e i th e r  th e  governo r-genera l, the fisumwe com m ittee, o r  one 
fo u rA  o f  th e  members o f  th e  Assembly, v o tes  s h a l l  be made by
a ts fo -th ird s  m ajo rity  o f  a l l  members—u n less  th e re  I s  a  simple
m ajo rity  In  each o f the c o lle g e s . The Europeans were thus given 
a b u i l t - i n  v e to  over the d ec is io n s  o f  the Assembly.
The S ta tu te  a lso  proclaim ed a  number o f reform s long 
demanded by Moslem le a d e rs . Inc lu d in g : a b o lit io n  o f  the com­
munes m ixtes (communes w ith  a  m a jo rity  o f n a tiv e s  b u t adm inis­
te re d  by an agent o f  the  g o v ern o r-g en era l) , the  reco g n itio n  o f 
Arabic as th e  o f f i c i a l  language and the teach ing  o f  A rabic a t  
a l l  le v e ls  o f  the ed u ca tio n a l system , the sep a ra tio n  o f Church 
and S ta te  f o r  the Moslem re l ig io n  as fo r  a l l  o th e rs , the ex ten ­
sion  o f  su ffrag e  to  Moslem women, and a b o li t io n  o f  m il i ta ry  
go^m m en t In  a l l  the t e r r i t o r i e s .  However, these  sm asures were 
to  become e f fe c t iv e  only  by a  vo te o f  the  A lgerian  Assead>ly—In  
which the Europeans had a  v e to . In  f a c t ,  none o f these  reform s 
were ev er adopted . Roy C. M acrldls and Bernard E . Brown, The 
De G aulle Reoubllc (Homewood. 111 .: The Dorsev P re s s . I n c . .
l^WTpp. ■57-30.’
%Edgar Faure was g re a t ly  In fluenced  by the S o u s te lle  v e r­
sion  o f  " in te g ra tio n ."  This In te rp re ta t io n  recognized  the 
" o r ig in a l i ty "  o f  A lg e ria  as a  province o f  France and foresaw 
the  need fo r  c e r ta in  ad m in is tra tiv e  autonomy a t  lo c a l  l e v e ls .
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A lg e ria  p rov id ing  fo r  g re a te r  autonomy.^
Faure approved o f  many o f the reform s im p lic i t  in  the 
A lgerian  S ta tu te  and embraced i t  as a co rnerstone  o f h is  Alge­
r ia n  p o lic y , as had P ie r re  Hendds-France: y e t , he v igo rously
upheld the S o u s te lle  memorandum on in te g ra tio n  and a lso  co n s i­
dered in c reased  a u th o r i ty , perhaps under a fe d e ra l s t ru c tu re ,  
as a p o ss ib le  a l te r n a t iv e .  His c a b in e t was b u i l t  o u t o f C enter 
and R ig h tis t  p a r t ie s  although i t  was dependent upon S o c ia l i s t  
support, d e sp ite  the f a c t  th a t  the S o c ia l i s t s  would n o t allow  
th e i r  members to p a r t ic ip a te  in  the government. I t  con tained
N ev erth e less, i t  supported  the fu sio n  o f  A lgerian  in d u s try , 
cu rrency , and economy w ith  th a t  o f  F rance. A ll c i t iz e n s  o f 
A lg e ria  were to  have "equal r ig h ts  and d u tie s"  b u t the  supreme 
d ec is io n s  fo r  A lg e r ia  were to  be made in  the Parliam ent and by 
the  E xecutive o f  F rance . A lg e ria  was to  be rep resen ted  in  the  
Assemblies o f  France according to  h e r  popu la tion  as any o th e r  
p rov ince . "In o th e r  words, in s te a d  o f  one m illio n  Europeans 
con fron ting  a permanent m a jo rity  o f  n ine  m illio n  Moslems in  
A lg e r ia , n ine  m illio n  Moslems in  A lg e ria  would face a m a jo rity  
o f  fo r ty - fo u r  m illio n  Frenchmen." I b id . . p . 47.
^Marc L a u rio l, a  p ro fe sso r  o f  law a t  the U n iv ersity  o f  
A lg ie rs , and s in ce  1958 a deputy from A lg e ria , proposed a  sys­
tem o f  p erso n a l fed e ra lism . This approach re je c te d  the 
c l a s s i c a l  form o f  fed era lism .b ased  on d iv is io n  o f  power between 
t e r r i t o r i a l  e n t i t i e s .  L au rio l in flu en ced  the  Government w ith  
h is  a n a ly s is  th a t  th e  e s s e n t ia l  problem in  A lg eria  was one o f 
mutual re sp e c t and a s so c ia tio n  o f  two communities th a t  l iv e  in  
the same geographic a re a . He proposed the  c re a tio n  o f  a na­
t io n a l  P arliam ent c o n s is tin g  o f  600 d e p u tie s , e le c te d  by a l l  
French c i t iz e n s  w herever they r e s id e ,  and a  Moslem se c tio n  o f 
100 d ep u ties  e le c te d  by "amslem Frenchmen" who m ain tain  th e i r  
p erso n a l s ta tu s .  The Moslem se c tio n  would be e x c lu s iv e ly  sov­
e re ig n  fo r  a l l  m a tte rs  concerning Moslem law; bo th  se c tio n s  
would d e l ib e ra te  jo in t ly  on m a tte rs  concerning France and A lg eria ; 
a l l  o th e r  m a tte rs  would be l e f t  to  th e  m etropo litan  s e c tio n .
The p roposal would c le a r ly  have p ro te c te d  the r ig h ts  o f  the  
Europeans b u t i t  had no appeal to  the Moslem le a d e rs . I b id . , 
p . 46, as in te rp re te d  from Marc L a u rio l, Le fédéralism e e t  1* 
A lg érie  (P a r is ,  1957), passim .
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f iv e  G a u llis te  (Republican S o c ia l and A .R .S .)—an unusually  
d isp ro p o rtio n a te  number considering  th e i r  minimal rep re se n ta ­
tio n  (69 apd 32) in  the N ational Assembly. I t  vas these  min­
i s t e r s  th a t  were v io le n tly  opposed to  any concession o f s e l f -  
government to T unis, Morocco, o r  A lg e ria , and who lim ite d  the 
a b i l i t y  o f  the Faure government to  fo llow  a ns)derate p o lic y  o f  
le s s  d i r e c t  ru le  by the French y e t w ith  permanent in c lu s io n  o f 
Morocco and A lg e ria  in  the  French Union.^
P arliam en tary  in tran s ig en ce  was j u s t  as in h ib i t in g  o f 
p o s it iv e  a c tio n  as m in is te r ia l  in d ec is io n  o r  in te rn a l  c o n f l ic t  
w ith in  the c a b in e t. A f u l l - s c a le  debate on A lg eria  was s tag ed  
between October 11 and 18. During these  d iscu ssio n s the P res­
id e n t o f  the Council p resen ted  a  s e r ie s  o f p o s it iv e  p roposals 
to  the le g is la t iv e  body. These inc luded : (1) in te g ra tio n  as
an a l te rn a t iv e  to  a s s im ila tio n  o r  sep a ra tio n  o f A lg e ria ; (2) 
improved lo c a l  government and reform  o f land  use; (3) separa­
tio n  o f  Is lam ic  r e l ig io n  from the  S ta te ;  (4) increased  teaching  
o f the Arab language; (5) more t r u ly  dem ocratic e le c t io n s  fo r  
the A lgerian  Assembly as a s tep  to  improvements, p o l i t i c a l ,  
economic, s o c ia l ,  and a d m in is tra tiv e ; and (6) measures to  r a is e  
the s tan d ard  o f  l iv in g .^  Thus, in  essence , Faure eiabraced the
^During the  Moroccan n e g o tia tio n s , the G a u ll is t  M in is te r  
o f  Pensions and M in is te r  o f  Defense were found to  be working a t  
c ro ss-purposes w ith  the Government and were asked to  re s ig n . 
This n ea rly  caused the  dow nfall o f  the ca b in e t as the Indepen­
dent Republicans wanted to  withdraw th e i r  M in is te r  M. P inay , 
the  M in is te r  o f  F inance, b u t P inay re fu sed  and the Independent 
Republicans continued th e i r  support o f  the Government. Herman 
F in e r , p . 429.
2 l b i d . ,  p . 430 . See a l s o ,  L^Ann^e P o l i t iq u e . 1955, pp .
7 6 -7 8 .
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reform s promised in  the A lgerian  S ta tu te ^  and wrapped them in  
the philosophy o f  " in te g ra tio n ," ^  Various depu ties o f  the 
Assembly suggested a lte rn a tiv e .p ro p o s a ls  fo r  ac tio n  in  the 
p rov ince . Debate raged fo r  th ree  days and the Assembly was 
nowhere n ea r beginning a d iscu ssio n  o f the government propo­
s a l s .  At th is  p o in t, a f r u s t r a te d  P re s id e n t o f  the Council 
demanded a vo te  o f  confidence on h is  program. The Assembly 
approved the  program by a v o te  o f 308 to  254, and records l i s t  
the  vo te  o f  confidence as a  "new v ic to ry  fo r  the  government;"^ 
b u t c lo s e r  sc ru tin y  makes th is  q u ite  q u estio n ab le . Herman 
F iner*s an a ly s is  o f  co n s id e ra tio n s  which a f fe c te d  the Assembly 
as i t  rendered  th is  d ec isio n  i s  most illu m in a tin g  :
The G a u ll is ts  and the R ight were s t i l l  determ ined to 
b rin g  down the Govermaent, b u t th e  R ight and the 
Moderates were n o t so u n ite d  as b e fo re , because tdie 
Prime M in is te r , th e  P re s id en t o f the R epublic, and 
o th e r  French n o tab les  p u b lic ly  expressed  h o rro r a t  
the sp e c ta c le  oi one more government c r i s i s  j u s t  
befo re  the Saar p le b is c i te  and as France was about 
to  e n te r  the Big Four Geneva conference in  Hovember. 
Moreover, agonized appeals were made to  n a tio n a l 
p rid e  a t  such a  p o l i t i c a l  mess; and those who sup­
p o rted  the Prime M in is te r . . . urged th a t  to  support 
the Government was to  support i t s  walkout from the 
U nited N ations Assembly, which had vo ted  to  pu t 
A lgerian  p o lic y  on i t s  agenda. The Communists had to  
support R ussia , which had helped  to  lead  the United 
N ations Assembly to  th is  t a c t i c , and th e re fo re  voted 
a g a in s t the Government, id iich , a  week b e fo re , they
had supported , in  o rd er to  make th e i r  p a r ty  appear
l i b e r a l  fo r  the e le c t io n s  o f  1956. The S o c ia l i s t s ,
IS unra . . p . 190, Note 1.
2 supra . . p . 190, Note 2.
^I'Ann^e P o l i t iq u e . 1955, p . 7 7 .
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who had supported the Government th e  week b e fo re , 
[ [In te rp e lla tio n s  on h is  p o lic y  and proposed so lu ­
tio n s  fo r  Moroccql la rg e ly  by co n v ic tio n , now voted  
a g a in s t i t ,  having c a lc u la te d  th a t  the  R ight and 
Moderates would s u f f ic ie n t ly  support the  Government 
and n o t w ish ing , then , to  leave the Communist P a rty  
w ith  a  monopoly o f  c o lo n ia l . l ib e ra lis m  when the two 
L eft p a r t ie s  should appeal to  the workers a t  the 
e le c t io n  o f  1956.1
The government o f  Edgar Faure was su sta in ed  in  the  vo te 
of confidence o f October 18, 1955, b u t only a most tenuous 
reasoning could  conclude from th is  form al approval th a t  (1) a 
m ajo rity  o f  the N ational Assembly supported the  Faure program 
o r  (2) th a t  the Assembly would cooperate w ith  the Government 
in  the iiq>lem entation o f these p ro p o sa ls . One should n o t be 
shocked th a t  ex traneous fa c to rs  a f f e c t  p a rty  p o s it io n s  when a 
vote o f confidence i s  in  q u es tio n . This i s  the n a tu re  o f  p a r­
liam entary  government. Government, whose re s p o n s ib i l i ty  i s  to  
e f fe c tu a te  a  coheren t p o lic y , banks i t s  l i f e  on the approval 
o f  an in te g ra l  p a r t  o f  th is  p o lic y —th is  i s  a t r a d i t io n a l  
weapon o f  the  E xecu tive . The L e g is la tu re  i s  p resen ted  w ith  
the s ta rk  a l te rn a t iv e  o f supporting  the  program o f  the  ca b in e t 
th a t  i t  has in v ested  w ith  i t s  confidence and charged w ith  
executive re s p o n s ib i l i ty  o r  fac in g  the re s ig n a tio n  o f  the 
policy-m aking a u th o r ity . However, ca b in e t c r is e s  a re  n o t e v i l  
in  th e u e lv e s .  They have been d escrib ed  as a normal and even 
ind ispensab le  fe a tu re  o f  the French p o l i t i c a l  system .
I t  has o f te n  been po in ted  o u t th a t  the Republic in ­
h e r i te d  from both  the Old Regime and Bonaparte an 
e f f i c i e n t ,  h ig h ly  c e n tra liz e d  c i v i l  se rv ic e ; in  o rd e r
^F iner, p . 430.
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to  p reven t the u t i l i z a t i o n  o f the v a s t  power o f  the 
bureaucracy fo r  p a r t is a n  purposes, th e  N ational 
Assembly must in^ose con tinu ing  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  upon 
th e  p o l i t i c a l  heads o f  the ex ecu tiv e . A t th e  same 
tim e, f a c t io n a l  groups th a t  would o rd in a r i ly  cosq»ro- 
mise th e i r  d if fe re n c e s  w ith in  one m ajor p a r ty  in  the 
U nited S ta te s  and B r i ta in  work to g e th e r  as sep a ra te  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  in  a  c a b in e t c o a l i t io n .  M a jo ritie s  
in  the  Assembly s h i f t  according to  th e  is s u e s ;  the 
c a b in e t c r i s i s  becouKS then a technique o f  adjustm ent 
enab ling  the Assembly to  dea l w ith  ad hoc problem s.
In  normal tim es the French parliam en tary  system works 
b e t t e r  than i s  r e a l iz e d  by most o f  i t s  c r i t i c s . 1
A fte r  the ou tb reak  o f th e  A lgerian  r e b e l l io n ,  "normal 
tim es" became a co n tin u a l p erio d  o f c r i s i s ,  and r e la t io n s  be­
tween p a r t i e s .  Assembly, and Government became q u ite  em b itte red . 
Between November, 1954 and May, 1958, f iv e  c a b in e ts  l o s t  the  
confidence o f  the Assembly—Hendès-France in  February, 1955; 
Edgar Faure in  December, 1955; Guy M ollet in  May, 1957;lo u rg es -  
Maunoury in  September, 1957; and F é lix  G a il la rd  in  A p ri l ,  1958. 
The system  began to  b reak  down w ith  the  d ism issa l o f  Mend&s- 
France and was in  f u l l  d is a r ra y  by the  l a t e  sp rin g  o f 1958. 
C abinet c r i s i s  no lo n g er p layed  i t s  fu n c tio n  in  the French 
parliam en tary  system . " In s te a d  o f  enab ling  a new m a jo rity  to  
work o u t a new p o lic y , each  c r i s i s  made i t  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  
c o a li t io n s  to  be formed on the b a s is  o f  a s p e c if ic  program ."^
As the  s p e c if ic  in s ta n c e  o f the Faure vo te  o f  confidence 
on October 18, 1955 so d ram a tica lly  in d ic a te d , change and v a c i l ­
la t io n  became normal o ccu rren ces . The system  provided no s ta b le  
policy-m aking fo rc e . In  th i s  k ind  o f s i tu a t io n ,  i t  was inqpos- 
s ib le  to  know what was th e  p o lic y  o f  "France" o r  i t s  Government
^M acridis and Brown, p . 48.
2 lb id .
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( fo r  the time being) o r  I t s  Assembly ( fo r  wbat time being?) 
on A lg e ria  o r  anything e l s e .  The expansion o f the pouvoir 
rég lem en ta ire  ( sh o r t o f  ab d ica tio n  o f  the  Assembly), the ap­
p l ic a t io n  o f the s ta te  o f  s ie g e , o r  the s ta te  o f  emergency 
o ffe re d  l i t t l e  a s s is ta n c e  to  the so lu tio n  to  th is  massive in ­
competence. U ltim a te ly , a p a r t i a l  o rd erin g  o f the p o lic y ­
making apparatus was to  be found in  the a p p lic a tio n  o f  the 
fo u rth  in s t i tu t io n  in  the French a rse n a l o f  emergency i n s t i ­
tu t io n s —the p r in c ip le  o f  the lo i-c a d re  o r  framework law.
The Assembly p e r s is te d  in  i t s  d is t r a c te d  
during the p erio d  between October 18 and November 29, 1955. 
Five tim es the Faure government was to  demand a vo te  o f  con­
fidence and fo u r tim es i t  was to  be su c ce ss fu l—twice on North 
A frican  p o lic y  and tw ice on p roposals to  c le a r  th e  a i r  by an 
e a r ly  appeal to th e  e le c to r a te .  The l a t t e r  two vo tes found 
Faure su sta in ed  by the vo tes o f  th e  Communist P a rty , which he 
d id  n o t welcome; on th e  l a s t  o f  these  v o te s , only 191 non- 
Communist depu ties  were fo r  him and 247 were a g a in s t. Then he 
was harassed  by blame f o r  the S aar v o tin g  which went a g a in s t 
F ra n ce 's  p o licy  o f  in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n  and harassed  because 
he was c a l l in g  up r e s e rv is ts  f o r  se rv ic e  in  A lg e ria . F in a lly , 
Faure challenged  a f i f t h  vo te  o f  confidence on h is  e le c t io n  
p roposa ls  and was d efea ted  on November 29, 1955. TWo days 
l a t e r ,  he d isso lv ed  the N ational Assembly, the f i r s t  time the  
E xecutive o f  France had taken such a c tio n  in  sev en ty -e ig h t 
y e a rs . Faure reoudned as Head o f  the C are taker Government^
l l n  th e  o r ig in a l  C o n s titu tio n  o f th e  Fourth R rau b lic , 
A r t i c l e  52 s p e c if ie d  th a t  in  case o f  d is s o lu tio n : (1) th e
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through the e le c tio n s  o f January 2, 1956, and u n t i l  the inves- 
t l t u r e  o f  Guy M ollet on February 1 . D espite the heigh ten ing  
o f ten sio n  between Moslem and colon in  A lg e ria , the C are taker 
Government was shorn o f i t s  c h ie f  emergency weapon during th is  
perio d  as the d is so lu tio n  o f  the Assembly p u t an autom atic end 
to the s ta te  o f emergency.^ At a time when maximum s e c u r ity  
and l e g a l i ty  was most d e s ira b le , the C are taker regime had no
3
recourse bu t to tu rn  to u n i la te r a l  d e leg a tio n  o f broad and
C ab inet, w ith  the exception  o f  the P re s id en t o f  the Council and 
the M in is te r o f  the I n te r io r ,  s h a l l  remain in  o f f ic e  to  ca rry  
ou t c u r re n t b u sin ess ; (2) the P re s id e n t o f  the Republic s h a l l  
appoin t the P re s id en t o f the N ational Assembly #s P re s id en t o f 
the C ouncil. The l a t t e r  s h a l l  appo in t the new M in is te r o f  the 
I n te r io r  w ith  the approval o f  the S e c r e ta r ia t  o f the N ational 
Assembly; (3) G eneral e le c tio n s  s h a l l  take p lace n o t le s s  than 
txrenty and n o t more than th i r t y  days a f t e r  the d is s o lu tio n . 
However, under the p ro v is io n s  o f  the amendments as passed  on 
November 30, 1954, in  case o f d is s o lu tio n : (1) the Council o f
M in is te rs  remains in  o f f ic e ;  (2) u n less  the d is so lu tio n  i s  p re­
ceded by a  vo te  o f  cen su re , i f  so ; (3) the  P re s id en t o f  the 
Republic names the P re s id e n t o f  the  Asseadbly, P re s id en t o f the 
Council o f  M in is te rs , and M in is te r o f  the  I n te r io r .  Consequent­
ly ,  as Edgar Faure resig n ed  upon the f a i lu r e  to  rece iv e  support 
on a v o te  o f confidence, under the amended ru le s  he was allowed 
to head the C are taker regim e.
^ i t h  the in  tra n s ig e n t Commnmists, P o u ja d is ts , and th e i r  
a l l i e s  holding 202 o f  the 635 s e a ts  in  the  N ational Assembly, 
i t  was c le a r  th a t  no government w ith  chance o f  success could be 
formed w ithout S o c ia l i s t  su p p o rt. Consequently, the  P re s id en t 
o f  th e  Republic asked Guy M bllet to  form a government which was 
based on the Republican F ron t e le c to ra l  a l l ia n c e .  I t  rece iv ed  
the vo te  o f the N ational Assembly by a m a jo rity  o f 420 ( in c lu d ­
ing Communists) to  71 (P o u jad is ts  and Indiependents) w ith  83 
ab s ten tio n s  (p rim arily  Independents).
^L'Ann^e P o l i t iq u e . 1955, p . 309.
^D elegation w ithou t the p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f the N ational 
Assembly.
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undefined a u th o rity  to  the Governor-General and the p re fe c ts  
in  A lg e ria—" a l l  powers • • • to take the  necessary  ex cep tio n a l 
measures in  the twenty days" ( th e  p e rio d  between d is s o lu tio n  
and the in v e s t i tu re  o f  a new c a b in e t) .  During th is  p e rio d  the 
ten sio n  between Moslem and colon made i t  necessary  to  postpone 
e le c t io n s  fo r  the A lgerian  Assembly.^ This extreme measure 
was taken by subo rd inates o f  a C are taker executive w hile the 
sovereign  L eg is la tu re  was in  d is s o lu t io n . I t  was n o t based 
upon a leg itim a te  d e leg a tio n  o f  a u th o r ity  from a cong)et%nt 
le g is la t iv e  body e x e rtin g  co n tin u a l o v e rs ig h t, as m ight be ex­
pected  in  a re p re se n ta tiv e  democracy concerned w ith  the  p o l i ­
t i c a l  r ig h ts  o f  i t s  c i t i z e n s .  This i s  n o t to  argue tdiat the 
A lgerian  e le c tio n s  should have been h e ld  in  December, 1955: 
i t  i s  to  dem onstrate the lim ita tio n s  o f  an excep tiona l p roce­
dure app lied  in  a  parliam en tary  system which does n o t 
adequate p rep a ra tio n  f o r  the p eriod  o f  t r a n s f e r  o f  power from 
one regime to an o th e r. Though the advantages o f e x p l ic i t  lim i­
ta t io n  o f the period  o f  ap p lic a tio n  o f an ex cep tio n a l regiom 
i s  undoubted, such l im ita t io n s  a re  ill-c o n c e iv e d  i f  they  r e s u l t  
in  the s u b s t i tu tio n  o f broad , poorly  d efin ed , d ir e c t  execu tive  
d e leg a tio n s fo r  e s ta b lis h e d  ex cep tio n a l in s t i tu t io n s  such as 
the  s ta te  o f  emergency during an interregnum .
As France sought a  government in  P a r is  in  January , 1956, 
ten sio n s  continued to  b u ild  in  A lg e ria . On the one hand, Moslem 
le ad e rs  demanded French reco g n itio n  o f  an A lgerian n a t io n a l i ty ;^
^L'Année P o l i t iq u e . 1955, p . 309.
^I'Ann^e P o l i t iq u e ,  1956, pp . 183 -84 , 187,
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on th e  o th e r  hand, European p a t r io t i c  o rg an iza tio n s  v io le n t ly
a ttac k ed  the moderate S o u s te lle  p ro p o sa ls  fo r  " in te g ra t io n ."
The lead ers^  o f  th e  Republican F ron t suggested "genuine popular
c o n su lta tio n  through f re e  e le c t io n s  in  a  s in g le  c o l le g e ."%
This so lu tio n  had no appeal to  e i th e r  A lgerian  n a t io n a l i s t  o r
co lo n . Indeed, F e rh a t Abbas was moved to  r e t o r t  th a t  only  the
F.L.N . (and n o t some fu tu re  A lgerian  Assembly) was q u a l if ie d
3to  n e g o tia te  w ith  F rance.
The new P re s id e n t o f  the Council went to A lg ie rs  s h o r tly  
a f t e r  h is  in v e s tltu tm  w ith  General C atroux, h is  nominee as 
su ccesso r to Jacques S o u s te lle  as Governor-General o f  A lg e r ia . 
M olle t was no t c o rd ia l ly  rece iv ed  by n a t io n a l i s t  e lem ents.
While attem pting  to  la y  a w reath on th e  Memorial to  the  Dead, 
he was b o d ily  a ttack ed  by the  R ig h tis t  mob who were dem onstrat­
ing  a g a in s t h is  p erson , p o l ic ie s ,  and the  appointm ent o f  Catroux. 
He was "profoundly shaken" and im pressed by th is  "p a in fu l mani­
f e s ta t io n  . . .  [pf^ devotion to  F rance, and anguish a t  being 
abandoned."4 Y ield ing  to  th is  ou tpouring  o f  resentm ent from 
the co lo n s . Catroux res ig n ed  and im m ediately M ollet appointed 
R obert Lacoste as Governor-General o f  A lg e r ia . On h is  re tu rn  
to  th e  Métropole from th i s  d ev as ta tin g  experience , the  P re s id en t 
o f  th e  Council b ro ad cast an appeal to the  re b e l le a d e rs  asking 
f o r  a c e a s e - f ir e  and prom ising f re e  e le c t io n s  w ith in  t h i r t y  days
^ u y  M ollet and P ie r re  M endes-France.
^L'Ann^e P o l i t iq u e , 1956, p . 187.
^M acridis and Brown, p . 55.
^ 'A n n ë e  P o l i t iq u e ,  1956, p . 187.
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a f t e r  the end o f  the in s u r re c t io n . This p o licy  which was 
la b e le d  the tr ip tv o n e . as i t  involved th ree  d i s t in c t  phases, 
advocated: c e a s e - f i r e ,  e le c t io n s ,  and n e g o tia tio n . As en v i­
sioned  by M ollet, the c e a s e - f i r e  would lead  to the su rrender 
o f arms by the re b e ls ; e le c t io n s  would allow  the A lgerian popu­
la t io n  to  designate  re p re se n ta tiv e s  in  whom they would p lace  
th e i r  t r u s t  in  n e g o tia tio n s  w ith  the French; and, the n eg o tia ­
tio n s  would serve as th e  framework upon which an A lgerian so lu ­
tio n  could  be reached—on th e  b a s is  o f  reco g n itio n  and re sp e c t 
fo r  the  A lgerian  p e rs o n a li ty , Moslem p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  the d e te r ­
m ination o f the fu tu re  o f  the  p rov ince , the in d is so lu b le  union 
o f France and A lg e ria , p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  democracy, re sp e c t 
fo r  in d iv id u a l r ig h ts ,  and ju s t ic e  under the  law .^ However, 
i t  was never c le a r ly  s p e c if ie d  in  what s p i r i t  and upon what 
p re c ise  terms the re p re se n ta tiv e s  from P a r is  would "n eg o tia te"  
w ith  th e  Moslem e l e c t .  From a cy n ica l p o in t o f  view, the 
g en e ro s ity  o f th is  o f f e r  i s  comparable to  th a t  ex h ib ited  by 
the S o v ie t Union in  arms c o n tro l n e g o tia tio n s  w ith  the U nited 
S ta te s  in  which the form er o ffe re d  to  d iscu ss  c o n tro l methods 
a f t e r  the l a t t e r  had destroyed  h e r weapons.
The re b e l o rg an iz a tio n , the F ron t de L ib era tio n  N a tio n a le .^ 
r e p lie d  th a t  any c e a s e - f i r e  must be preceded by reco g n itio n  o f
h b i d . .  pp. 191-92.
^The F ront de l ib é r a t io n  N ationale (F .L .N .) was the  p o l i ­
t i c a l  instrum ent o ?  th e  ComitS* la v o lu tio n n a ire  d lU nite a t  
d*Action (C .k.U .A .) whiek launched the  in s u r re c t io n . The second 
elem ent o f  the C.R.U.A. was the  Armee de L ib é ra tio n  N ationale  
(A .L.H .) which organized  the  stLli t a r i s  t i c  underground movement, 
te rsw in e  T i l l io n ,  France and A lg eria  (Hew York: A lfred  A.
Knopf, 1961), p . 140.
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an A lgerian  government and th a t  i t  would he the r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  
o f  th i s  e n t i ty ,  n o t the French s t a t e ,  to  organize e l e c t io n s .1 
C le a r ly , the S o c ia l i s t  government was caught in  the  c r o s s - f i r e  
between a c o lo n ia l la in o rity  which demanded the defense o f  p r iv ­
ile g e  a t  any c o s t and a  growing Moslem in su rre c tio n  which was 
beginning to  sm ell the warm blood o f n a tio n a lism .
I t  was a t  th is  tim e, in  February, 1956, th a t  the re b e l­
lio n  began to  spread w ith  alarm ing sw iftn ess  to a l l  le v e ls  o f  
the indigenous p o p u la tio n . W riting in  September o f 1957, 
Germaine T i l l io n ,  the d is tin g u ish ed  French e th n o lo g is t ,  recounts 
h e r  an a ly s is  o f  the p rocess:
In  the f i r s t  phase, young men ( th e i r  average age be­
tween tw enty-five and th i r ty - f i v e ) ,  determ inedly 
modem, w ith  a  wide experience o f  secrecy  (o ften  
e ig h t to  ten  years in  the h ig h er ech e lo n s), p o l i t i c a l  
tr a in in g , s t r i c t  d is c ip l in e ,  and a p e r fe c t  laiowledge 
o f  th e i r  m ilie u , s e t  o f f  the  in su rre c tio n  and con­
s t i tu te d  i t s  h ie ra rc h ic  arm ature. During th is  i n i t i a l  
p e rio d , th e  Moslem masses follow ed even ts—w ith  fa v o r , 
c u r io s i ty ,  an x ie ty , b u t somewhat from the o u ts id e .
In  the second phase—a f te r  December, 1955—the masses 
allowed themselves to  be led  by the n a t io n a l is t  orga­
n iz a tio n s , and a f t e r  February, 1956 the movement ex­
panded w ith  in c re d ib le  speed. At the end o f th is  same 
year (December, 1956) the work was done.
During th is  second phase, the men in  c o n tro l, the men 
who a c t ,  no lo n g er came only from the rev o lu tio n ary  
ran k s, is o la te d  from the masses by the  secrecy  neces­
sa ry  to  th e i r  a c tio n ; on the c o n tra ry , they rep resen ted  
the  e n t i r e  range o f the e l i t e  o f  the A lgerian  popula­
t io n .  From th a t  tim e, i t  was f u t i l e  to  suppose th a t  
we could sh ie ld  th a t  population  from th e i r  in f lu e n c e .
And rep ress io n  would in e v ita b ly  f in d  i t s e l f  confron ted  
by a homogeneous so c ie ty  which i t  i s  im possible to
^I'Annee P o l i t iq u e . 1956, p . 192.
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d es tro y  and which i t  i s  inqpossible to  sp a re . ^
Three years a f t e r  h is  co n fro n ta tio n  w ith  the n a t io n a l i -  
i s t s  in  A lg ie rs , Guy M ollet was to  admit th a t  a t  the  time he 
had n o t understood the v iru len ce  and danger o f  the righ t-w ing  
"A lgérie F rançaise" g roups.^  By the same token, i t  can be 
w ell argued th a t  French p o l i t i c a l  lead e rsh ip  a t  ; th is  p o in t in  
h is to ry  committed th e  ir re p a ra b le  m istake o f  f a i l in g  to  r e a l ­
iz e  th e  " ir r e v e r s ib le  c h a ra c te r  o f  the movement occurring  in  
the  s i l e n t  depths o f  a  n a tio n  th a t  no longer had e i th e r  news­
papers o r  r e p re s e n ta tiv e s . No doubt, to o , they f a i le d  to  eva­
lu a te  the e x te n t and scope o f  the o p era tio n  they had assumed 
the  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  la u n ch in g ."3
The M ollet government was b u ffe ted  by storms o f re a c tio n  
both  w ith in  the province and throughout the M étropole. I t  was 
harassed  by the c o n f l ic t in g  requirem ents o f  th e  v ario u s e le ­
ments o f  i t s  own governing c o a l i t io n .  I t  was su b jec ted  to  the  
g ive and take o f parliam en tary  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .  Consequently, 
i t  i s  n o t su rp ris in g  th a t  the p o licy  o f  th e  M ollet c a b in e t m is­
judged the s i tu a t io n  in  A lg e ria . The Government appeared n o t 
to  r e a l iz e  the im p lica tio n s  o f  the "v iru lence" o f  the  rig h t-w in g  
a g i ta t io n  and the " i r r e v e r s ib le  ch a rac te r"  o f  the movement oc­
cu rr in g  in  the s i l e n t  depths o f the A lgerian  community. How­
ev e r , i t  i s  q u estio n ab le , even i f  M ollet and h is  c o lla b o ra to rs
^ T ill io n , pp. 10-11.
^M acridis and Brown, p .  55.
^ T il l io n , p . 11.
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had understood these r e a l i t i e s ,  th a t  they would have been ab le  
to  do more than they d id . The b r ig h t  l i g h t  o f  " p a tr io t ic "  
p u b lic  o p in ion , the  chaos o f  p a r ty  d iv is io n , and the  in s i s t e n t  
demands o f v es ted  in t e r e s t  are  very  lim itin g  c o n s id e ra tio n s . 
Pëthaps the  b e s t  th a t  M ollet could  do, under c ircum stances, 
was to  push w ith  every  resource a t  h i s  command the vague p o l­
icy  o f  " in te g ra tio n "  to  which h is  regime was committed.
The M ollet c a b in e t was keenly  aware th a t  the  m aintenance 
o f  s e c u r ity  and o rd e r  in  the province had d e te r io ra te d  since 
the autom atic te rm ina tion  o f the s t a t e  o f  emergency in  Decem­
b e r , I 955I  and they were desirous o f  stren g th en in g  th e  au th o r­
i t y  o f departm ental and lo c a l o f f i c i a l s .  I t  was th e i r  co n s i­
dered judgment th a t  th e  re im position  o f  the s ta te  o f  emergency 
o r  the use o f  th e  s t a t e  o f  s ieg e  d id  n o t o f fe r  re sp o n sib le  
o f f i c i a l s  s u f f ic ie n t  la t i tu d e  to  d ea l w ith  the m u ltifa c e te d  
problems w ith  which they  were faced . In  the Government's view 
the vario u s asp ec ts  o f  the A lgerian  problem—economic, s o c ia l ,  
f in a n c ia l ,  a d m in is tra tiv e , j u d i c i a l ,  c i v i l  p o lic e , m i l i ta ry —
^Robert L acoste , the new Governor-General o f  A lg e r ia , 
speaking to  the  R a tio n a l Assembly on March 8 , 1956, in  defense 
o f the government p roposa ls  d ec la red : "Since the d is s o lu tio n
o f the P arliam en t and the autom atic te rm ination  o f  the  s t a t e  o f 
energency in  A lg e r ia , the a c ts  o f  te rro rism  have co n s id erab ly  
in c reased . One can count 1,803 in  January  as compared w ith  
1,224 in  December. W ithout the  r ig h t  o f  search  by day and 
n ig h t , the p u b lic  a u th o r ity  i s  incapab le  o f  c o n tro l l in g  the 
movenMnt o f  arms and, in  the meanwhile, the an x ie ty  which causes 
the  d iffu s io n  o f arms in  the European ^ p u la t io n  as w e ll as in  
the Moslem popu la tion  i s  the most grave th a t  we have co n fro n ted . 
The su rv e illa n c e  o f  th e  movement o f  persons and v e h ic le s  i s  in ­
s u f f i c ie n t  f o r  e f f e c t iv e ly  slowing down the c r im in a ls . I f  we 
w ish to  keep the work o f p a c if ic a t io n  from being sabotaged on 
a l l  s id es  by the u l t r a s ,  i t  i s  necessary  a t  l e a s t  to  have a 
c e r ta in  c o n tro l o f  th e  p ress  and o f  th e  ra d io ."  F rance, Jo u rn a l 
O f f i c i e l . . . ,  Assemblée N a tio n a le , D ébats (March 8 , 1956), p . 761.
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" re c ip ro c a lly  conditioned" one ano ther and were in d is so lu b ly  
in te r tw in e d .^  As a consequence, the c a b in e t f e l t  th a t  govern­
m ental p o lic y  must be planned on the b a s is  o f planned coo rd i­
n a tio n  and, when p o ss ib le  and ad v isab le , sim ultaneous implemen­
ta t io n  o f p o lic y .
To f a c i l i t a t e  governmental d ire c tio n  and synchron ization  
o f p o lic y  fo r  A lg e ria , M ollet sought a procedure which would 
involve th e  P arliam ent in  the determ ination  o f the p r in c ip le s  
upon which the program would be based , b u t which would a lso  
leave th e  Executive r e la t iv e ly  f re e  to apply  the p r in c ip le s  to 
s p e c if ic  s i tu a t io n s .  He wished to avoid th e  domination o f  the 
P arliam en t and, a t  the same tim e, to  s top  sh o r t o f the  use o f  
pure enab ling  l e g is la t io n .  I t  was very  doub tfu l i f  the Na­
t io n a l  Assembly would have acquiesced in  the  g ran tin g  o f enab­
lin g  le g is la t io n  in  1956. The P re s id e n t o f  the Council was 
dubious o f  any abandonment o f  the le g is la t iv e  competence, as 
was o f te n  the case in  th e  use o f enab ling  le g is la t io n .  As a 
r e s u l t ,  the  Government tu rned  to a r e l i c  o f  the Third R epublic;^ 
the v e h ic le  chosen was th e  procedure o f framework law s, the 
lo i - c a d re .
^ Ib id .
^L ois-cadres were new to  the  Fourth  Republic b u t they  were 
n o t novel to the  p ra c t ic e  o f  French le g is la t io n .  The S o c ia l i s t  
government considered  Léon Blum as the founder o f th i s  p rocedure. 
However, in  a c tu a l i ty  i t  i s  necessary  to  go back to  the Doumergue 
government o f 1934 to  f in d  the  o r ig in s  o f  th i s  type o f  law , % e 
f i r s t  lo i-c a d re  was th e  law o f  Ju ly  6 , 1934 concerning f i s c a l  
reform . Reacting to  p re ssu re  fo r  immediate ac tio n  on f i s c a l
205
In the passage of th is  type o f s t a tu te ,  the L eg is la tu re  
dec lares the o b jec tiv es  of p o licy  and delegates r e s p o n s ib il i ty  
to  the Executive fo r  the achievement o f the goals e s tab lish ed  
in  the framework laws. Determ ination of the necessary  and ap­
p ro p ria te  measures req u ired  by the o b jec tiv es  of s ta te  r e s ts  
w ith  the ad m in is tra tio n  and i t s  su b s id ia ry  departm ental and 
lo c a l organs. Consequently, i f  the Parliam ent is  w illin g  to 
pass a government b i l l  in  the form of a framework law w ithout 
major amendment o f the d ra f t  law, as was the case in March,
1956, the Executive i s  provided w ith  parliam entary  support and 
commitment to governmental p o licy  and a t  the same time is  
g ran ted  broad d is c re tio n  to implement th is  p o licy . This was 
p re c ise ly  what the  P resid en t o f the Council d es ired , fo r  he had 
warned the N ational Assembly th a t  in  vo ting  fo r  the government 
p ro je c t of March 16, 1956, they were n o t only accepting  a law,
m a tte rs , the Doumergue cab in e t asked fo r  and received  the p as­
sage of a b i l l  in  which, upon the suggestion  of the Government, 
the Parliam ent poses the p r in c ip le s  o f reform and f ix es  the 
lim its  in  which the Government may app ly , th e re a f te r ,  the p r in ­
c ip le s  posed by decree—decrees which u ltim a te ly  must be ap­
proved by the Parliam ent to  have permanent e f f e c t .  Some 300 
decrees were issu ed  as the r e s u l t  of th is  d e leg a tio n , w ith  the 
f i r s t  having e f f e c t  w ith in  twelve days a f te r  the promulgation of 
the le g is la t io n .
On June 6, 1936 Leon Blum demanded s im ila r  powers fo r  h is  
regim e. In h is  in te rv e n tio n  before the Chamber o f Deputies on 
th a t  day he defined  the method of l o i s -ca d re s ; " I t  i s  n o t, he 
s a id , the p le in s  pouvoirs ; the so lu tio n  to  which we l im it  ou r­
se lv es . . . c o n s is ts  o f p resen ting  sh o r t p ro je c ts  to  the Chamber, 
posing the p r in c ip le s  and fo rsee in g  a s o r t  of ex tension  of the 
pouvoir rég lem enta ire  h a b i tu e l . We do n o t demand undefined and 
in  determined powers. We w il l  n o t apply a s in g le  measure th a t  the 
Chambers have n o t e x p l ic i t ly  and form ally  vo ted , bu t we ask you, 
by a n ec e ss ity  which you cannot escape, to  bequeath to  u s , by a 
s u f f ic ie n t  d e leg a tio n , the choice o f method and means of execu­
tio n  ."  France. Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . ,  Chambre des Députés. Debats 
(June 28, 1934), p . 1807 and (June 7, 1936), p . 1334.
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they were embracing a p o l i t i c a l  program.^
L o is-cad res thus p re se n t themselves as devices ap p ro p ria te  
to  the c o lla b o ra tio n  o f th e  Government and the Parliam ent in  
s i tu a t io n s  in  which a se r io u s  problem p re se n ts  i t s e l f  to  the 
n a tio n  demanding immediate and comprehensive rea c tio n  on the 
p a r t  o f  government, in  which the  Government i s  ab le  to s u s ta in  
a r e la t iv e ly  s ta b le  parliam en tary  m a jo rity  in  support o f  the 
p o l ic ie s ,  and in  which the popu la tion  recognizes the s ig n i f i c ­
ance o f  the danger and i s  b a s ic a l ly  disposed  to  the use o f  ex­
c e p tio n a l powers. For the  most p a r t ,  these  con d itio n s were 
s a t i s f i e d  in  1956. The in su r re c tio n  in  A lg e ria  was a problem 
th a t  dug a t  the very  v i t a l s  o f  the French n a tio n . Whether i t s  
te rm ination  was u ltim a te ly  to  r e s u l t  in  a French so lu t io n , a 
Moslem so lu tio n , o r  a cotq>romise, an answer was a necessary  
p re re q u is i te  fo r  the emergence o f  France as a  major power in  
the postw ar w orld .^  Though th is  re tro s p e c tiv e  judgment was
l"Le p ro je t  qui vous e s t  soumis e s t  une de ces lo is -c a d re s  
que p ré c o n is a it  d é jà  Léon Blum: en l e  v o ta n t vous n 'ad o p te re z
pas sinq>lement une l o i ,  vous vous engagerez dans une p o l i t iq u e :  
c 'e s t  pourquoi i l  ne f a u t  pas q u ' i l  y a i t  d 'a m b ig u it^ e n tre  
nous." (Guy M ollet to  the N ational Assembly) L'Année P o l i­
tiq u e . 1956, p . 34.
^The Fourth  Republic emerged in  1946 in to  a world in  which 
power had s lip p ed  away from W estern Europe and was concen tra ted  
in  the  U nited S ta te s  and the  S o v ie t Union. In  a speech in  Bar- 
le-Duc in  1946, G eneral De G aulle conceded th a t  these  two g igan­
t i c  powers could  n o t be r iv a le d  by the in d iv id u a l n a tio n s  o f  
Europe. Y et, he went on to  contend th a t  th e  "o ld  w orld” could  
b ring  about a  new e q u ilib r iu m . "Ancient Europe which, f o r  so 
many c e n tu r ie s ,  was th e  guide o f . th e  U niverse, can c o n s t i tu te  
in  the h e a r t  o f  a w orld tending  to  s p l i t  in  Aw, the necessary  
elem ent o f  compensation and u n d erstan d in g ."  And o f  course 
"an c ien t Europe" was to  be le d  by the m ost.pow erful n a tio n  on 
the c o n tin e n t—France. These were p ro p h e tic  words fo r  the
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probably  n o t h e ld  by the m a jo rity  o f French c i t iz e n s  in  1956, 
th e re  can be l i t t l e  doubt th a t  th e  se rio u sn ess  o f the problem 
weighed upon the p o p u la tio n . Only the  extrem e-L eft r a is e d  
th e i r  vo ices in  o b je c tio n  to  the  appeal to  ex cep tio n a l pow ers.^ 
However, the Republican F ron t c o a l i t io n ,  in v ested  by a m a jo rity  
o f  420 to  71 w ith  83 a b s te n tio n s ,^  was ab le  to  m aintain  m ajor­
i t y  support in  the N ational Assembly d e sp ite  the d e fec tio n  o f 
the  M endesist R a d ica ls ,^  u n re s t w ith in  the S o c ia l i s t  p a r ty  over 
A lgerian  p o lic y , renewed S o c ia l i s t  h o s t i l i t y  to  the Commxunists, 
o p p o sitio n  o f the  Independents to  T unisian  and Morocaan p o lic y , 
and w idespread unhappiness over the  ta x  measures req u ired  to 
finance the  w ar. Support fo r  the Government d id  begin to  ebb 
in  the  stmmer o f 1956, b u t the Suez c r i s i s  and E g y p t's  open 
d e c la ra tio n  in  support o f  the A lgerian  re b e ls  served to  weld 
p o l i t i c a l  France in to  a k ind  o f n a t io n a l i s t  "sacred  union" in  
defense o f the r ig h ts  o f  th e  M otherland. M o lle t 's p o s it io n  was 
b o ls te re d  by th i s  k ind  o f su p p o rt. When one adds such o th e r
d e s tin y  o f  France was u ltim a te ly  to  depend upon i t s  p o s it io n  
w ith in  the European community r a A s r  than i t s  continuance as a 
c o lo n ia l power. I t  i s  on ly  s in e s  th e  so lu tio n  o f the A lgerian  
question  th a t  France has emerged f ro n t  and c e n te r  on th e  w orld 
s tag e  as a "major-power" though c e r ta in ly  n o t a "super-power" 
in  the  postwar w orld .
^L'Année P o l i t iq u e . 1955, p . 33.
^This la rg e  m a jo rity  inc luded  141 Communist v o te s . L' 
Ann6e P o li t iq u e . 1956, p . 22.
^In  May o f  1956, M endès-France, in  a l e t t e r  to  M o lle t, 
v ig o ro u sly  c r i t i c i z e d  Government p o lic y  in  A lg e ria . He subm it­
te d  h is  re s ig n a tio n  as M in is te r  witdiout P o r tfo l io ,  b u t re q u e s t­
ed trhat otAer R ad ica l m in is te rs  remain in  the  ca b in e t in  o rd e r  
to  a v e r t  a c r i s i s .  Though h is  s ta te d  reasons fo r  d ep a rtu re  were
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f a c to rs  as the profound resentm ent among the  mass o f  the popu­
la t io n  a g a in s t the S o v ie t rep re ss io n  o f the Hungarian Revolu­
tio n  and the re s u lt in g  p o l i t i c a l  is o la t io n  o f  the Communist 
p a r ty , the s p l i t  w ith in  the  ranks o f  the  P o u jad is ts  r e s u lt in g  
from antagonism caused by Poujade*s telephone in s tru c tio n s  to  
"h is"  depu ties to vo te a g a in s t m il i ta ry  ac tio n  in  Egypt, and 
th e  n e u tra liz a tio n  o f Mendès-France by the  s p lin te r in g  o f  the 
R adical P a rty , i t  i s  apparen t th a t  the M ollet regime had a 
r e la t iv e ly  s o lid  b a s is  o f  support and th a t  i t s  opposition  was, 
f o r  the moment, in  d is a r r a y . Consequently, the s i tu a t io n  was 
ap p ro p ria te  fo r  the use o f  lo is -c a d re s  as the framework upon 
which th e  Government was to  b u ild  i t s  A lgerian  program.
Under the lo i-c a d re  o f  March 16, 1956, the  M ollet c a b in e t 
was au th o rized  "to take in  A lg e ria  a l l  measures r e la t iv e  to  
investm en ts, publib  works, housing , a g r ic u l tu r a l  equipment and 
land te n u re , in d u s t r ia l  and farm su b s id ie s , la b o r  l e g is la t io n ,  
s o c ia l  w elfare  le g is la t io n ,  c i v i l  se rv ice  rec ru itm en t, and the 
r e o ^ a n iz a t io n  o f ad m in is tra tiv e  in s t i tu t i o n s —notab ly  the 
reform  o f  lo c a l c o l le c t iv e s ,  the  regime in  the  Saharan re g io n s , 
and the  c e n tr a l  governmental organisms in  g e n e ra l."^  These 
powers fo r  "modifying and ab ridg ing  the e x is t in g  le g is la t iv e  
d isp o s itio n s"  were su b je c t to  fo u r p rocedura l r e s t r i c t io n s :
s o le ly  p o lic y  m a tte rs , i t  i s  probable th a t  the M in is te r W ithout 
P o r tfo l io  resigned  in  a  p ique over the f a i lu r e  o f  M bllet to  
accord the Quai d 'O rsay to  him. I b id . . pp. 56-57.
^France, Jou rnal O f f i c i e l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (March 17, 
1956), p . 2591.
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(1) they were req u ired  to  be enacted in  m eetings o f  the  Council 
o f  M in is te rs ; (2) they were to  be ex e rc ise d  by the cab in e t a c t­
ing "on the  re p o rt o f the M in is te r R esident in  A lg eria  and the  
in te re s te d  m in is te rs ;"  (3 ) they were to  be enacted  a f te r  advice 
from the Council o f  S ta te ;^  and (4) the decrees were to  take 
e f f e c t  imm ediately a f t e r  th e i r  announcement in  the Jou rnal Of­
f i c i e l . b u t would n o t become permanent u n less subm itted to  Par­
liam ent w ith in  a year and r a t i f i e d  by i t . ^
A t the same tim e, excep tional p o lic e  powers were g ran ted
fo r  a p p lic a tio n  in  A lg e ria  which d id  n o t con ta in  the d e f in i t io n ,
q u a l i f ic a t io n , and r e s t r i c t io n  in h e ren t in  the Faure law on the
s ta te  o f  emergency. The ex ten siv e ly  d e ta ile d  and c a re fu l ly
q u a lif ie d  sp e c ia l powers fo r  the p ro te c tio n  o f the s ta te  were
reduced to  one in c lu s iv e  d e leg a tio n :
The government s h a l l  have a t  i t s  d isp o sa l in  A lg e ria , 
the most ex ten siv e  powers to take any excep tional 
measure req u ired  by the circum stances w ith  a view 
toward the rees tab lish m en t o f  o rd e r , the  p ro tec tio n  
o f persons and goods and the s e c u r ity  o f  the t e r r i ­
to ry .
When the measures taken by v ir tu e  o f the preceding 
c lau se  have the e f f e c t  o f  modifying le g is la t io n ,  
they w i l l  be prom ulgated.by decree decided in  a meet­
ing o f  the f u l l  cab inet.'^
And th is  g ran t was enhanced s t i l l  fu r th e r  by the s t ip u la t io n
th a t :
The government can , in  any m a tte r , by decree o f
the  f u l l  c a b in e t, a c tin g  on the  re p o r t o f  the M in is te r
^ A rtic le  1 o f  the  law o f  March 16, 1956. I b id .
^ A rtic le  2 o f  the  law o f  March 16, 1956. I b id .
^ A rtic le  5 o f  the law o f  March 16 , 1956. I b id .
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R esident in  A lg e ria  and the  in te re s te d  m in is te rs  
and having heard  the opinion o f  the Council o f
S ta te ,  extend to  A lg e ria , w ith  such m od ifications
as are  n ecessa ry , the laws and decrees in  e f f e c t  
in  the m otherland. 1
The vagueness and am biguity apparen t in  the phrases "any ex­
ce p tio n a l measure req u ired  by the circum stances" (A r tic le  5) 
and "with such m od ifica tions as a re  necessary" (A r tic le  4) 
serve to  emphasize the meagemess o f  r e s t r a i n t  as compared to 
the sum of a u th o rity  g ran ted  to  the Government by the  law o f
March 16, 1956. For example, under the p ro v is io n s o f  A r t ic le
5 , the  Governor-General was im m ediately provided w ith  a mas­
sive  delegation  o f  a u th o r ity  which included  competence to :
la  P ro h ib it  the  movement o f  persons and v e h ic le s  in  
the p laces and a t  the hours f ix e d  in  the a r r ê t e :
2. P resc rib e  a l l  measures c o n tro ll in g  the shipm ent o f 
goods and assu ring  th e i r  p re se rv a tio n ;
3 . Regulate o r  p ro h ib it  the im p o rta tio n , the exporta­
t io n ,  the purchase, the  s a le ,  the  d is t r ib u t io n ,  the  
tra n sp o r t o r  the  d e ten tio n  o f p ro d u cts , raw mate­
r i a l s ,  o r  anim als;
4 . I n s t i t u t e  zones in  which the continuance o f persons 
i s  reg u la te d  o r  p ro h ib ite d ;
5 . D etensine w hether o r  n o t to  assig n  to a  residence  
under s u rv e il la n c e , a l l  persons whose a c t i v i t i e s  
are  considered  to be dangerous to  the p u b lic  secu­
r i t y  o r  o rd e r;
6. P ro h ib it  p u b lic  o r  p r iv a te  m eetings o f  a n a tu re  
th a t  may provoke o r  feed  d iso rd e r ;
7 . Order o r  au th o rize  search  o r  p r iv a te  dom icile by 
day o r  by n ig h t;
8 . Take a l l  the  measures to  c o n tro l the  t o t a l i t y  o f  the 
means o f  ex p ressio n , n o tab ly  the  p ress  end the
l lb id .
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pub lications- o f  a l l  types as w ell as telecommuni­
c a tio n s , rad io  b ro ad ca s ts , movie p ro je c tio n s , and 
th e a t r ic a l  p re se n ta tio n s ;
9 . By an im m ediately executory  d ec is io n , to  t r a n s f e r ,  
to  suspend, o r  to  re tu rn  to  the d is p o s itio n  o f the 
resp o n sib le  ad m in is tra tiv e  agency, a l l  fu n c tio n a­
r i e s  o r  agents o f  the pub lic  s e r ^ c e  whose a c t iv i ­
t i e s  a re  d i s t in c t ly  dangerous fo r  s e c u r ity  o r  fo r  
the pub lic  o rd e r;
10. Take a l l  measures o f  p ro h ib itio n  o r  o f  d is so lu tio n  
coun ter to  any s o c ie ty , a s so c ia tio n , o r  group whose 
a c t iv i t i e s  a re  p re ju d ic ia l  to  the  s e c u r ity  o f  the 
province o r  to  the  p u b lic  o rd e r;
11. Enable the  c i v i l  and m il i ta ry  a u th o r i t ie s ,  each in  
th a t  which concerns i t ,  to  ex e rc ise  th e  powers o f  
re q u is i t io n  fo reseen  by the law o f  Ju ly  3 , 1877, 
r e la t iv e  to  m il i ta ry  r e q u is i t io n s ,  and the law o f 
Ju ly  11, 1938, on the  o rg an iza tio n  o f the  n a tio n  in  
time o f war;
12. Adjourn e le c t io n s  by a r r ê t e :
13. Suspend w ith o u t l im ita tio n  the continuance o f  e l e c t ­
ed lo c a l  assem blies which impede in  some manner the 
ac tio n  o f  the p u b lic  powers;
14. Provide the governor-general w ith  a u th o rity  to  in s ­
t i t u t e  zones in  which the r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  main­
ta in in g  o rd e r  passes  to  the m il i ta ry  a u th o rity  who 
ex e rc ise s  the  powers o f  p o lic e  norm ally ioqvarted to 
the c i v i l  a u th o r i t ie s .^
In  in s tan ce s  in  which th e  m il i ta ry  a u th o rity  re ce iv e s  a delega­
tio n  to  ex e rc ise  the powers o f  p a l l e t  in  ca rry in g  o u t the r e s ­
p o n s ib i l i ty  o f m ain ta in ing  the  p u b lic  o rd e r , i t  i s  a lso  p o ss ib le  
fo r  the Governor-General to  g ran t to  the m il i ta ry  competence to  
employ a l l  the a u th o r ity  sp e c if ie d  above excep t the  e x e rc ise  o f  
the c i v i l  a sp ec ts  o f  the  power o f  r e q u is i t io n  as sp e c if ie d  in  
the law o f  Ju ly  11, 1938.%
^France, Journal O f f i c i e l . . . .  L ois e t  D écrets (March 1 9 ,
1 9 5 6 ), pp . 2665 -6è .
^See item  11 above.
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A rt ic le  5 o f  the lo i-c a d re  o f  March 16, 1956, provided 
competence fo r  the w illin g  M ollet cab in e t to  re c o n s tru c t an 
ensemble o f  s p e c ia l s e c u r ity  measures av a ila b le  f o r  a p p lic a ­
tio n  in  A lg e r ia . Upon conqmarison w ith  the s ta te  o f  emergency, 
i t  i s  ev id en t th a t  (1) the I fo l le t  government r e in s t i tu te d  a 
s e c u r ity  regime in  most ways q u ite  s im ila r  to  the s t a t e  o f  
emergency, b u t th a t  i t  (2) fo rm ally  recognized the necessary  
cooperation  o f  the m il i ta ry  estab lish m en t w ith  c i v i l  s e c u r ity  
o p era tio n s in  a manner th a t  i s  d i s t in c t ly  co n tra ry  to  th e  
philosophy o f  the c i v i l  s ta te  o f  emergency. At the  same tim e, 
the  law o f March 16, 1956, was more o f  a g ran t o f  l e g i s la t iv e  
a u th o rity  to take  ac tio n  in  b road ly  defined  areas o f  competence 
than an a s s e r t io n  o f defined  p o lic y  to  be follow ed by the  Exec­
u t iv e .  Consequently, i t  f e l l  sh o r t o f  the th e o re t ic a l  id e a l  
o f  lo is -c a d re s  though i t  served  the v a lu ab le  se rv ice  o f  com­
m ittin g  le g i s la t iv e  power and support to governmental p o lic y  
in  a time o f  n a t io n a l c r i s i s  w ith o u t running the r is k s  e n ta i le d  
by decree le g is la t io n .
Though 1956 saw the p ro g ress iv e  in te rv e n tio n  o f th e  m il i ­
ta ry  a u th o r ity  in  support o f  and in  c o llab o ra tio n  w ith  the  
re g u la r  c iv i l i a n  s e c u r ity  ap p a ra tu s , the complex c o n fro n ta tio n  
th a t  developed between m i l i t a r y - c iv i l i a n ,  re v o lu tio n a ry , and 
co u n te rrev o lu tio n a ry  fo rces  d id  n o t evolve in to  a "war" in  which 
the combatants on both s id e s  were regarded as " s o ld ie rs "  b u t 
in to  a  h o lo cau st o f te r r o r  in  which the  in term ing led  mass pop­
u la tio n s  became both  the b a ttleg ro u n d  o f the c o n f l ic t  and the
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s tak es  o f  v ic to ry . The dry tim bers o f  emerging na tio n a lism , 
f r a n t ic  co lon ia lism , wounded p r id e , awakening s e lf - r e s p e c t ,  
and v e s te d - in te re s t  were irrev o cab ly  s e t  ablaze by Government 
execution  o f two A lgerian  p a t r io ts  in  June, 1956. For twenty 
months s ince  the ou tbreak  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  the regime in  Faxris 
had averted  recourse to  c a p i ta l  punishment in  th is  emotion- 
charged s i tu a t io n ,  b u t the  M bllet government allowed i t s e l f  to 
be convinced th a t  such methods were necessary  to stem the tid e  
o f  v io len ce . The r e s u l t s  were d is a s tro u s , in  view o f the r i s ­
ing Moslem unanim ity in  the face o f  French p re ssu re . By th is  
one stro k e  the Government conq)romised i t s e l f  and the i n s t i t u ­
tio n s  o f French ju s t i c e  before  the e n t i r e  p ro v in c ia l popula­
tio n  and welded the Arab masses to the  rev o lu tio n ary  c u rre n t 
in  a  manner th a t  had n o t been p o ss ib le  p rev io u sly . The imme­
d ia te  consequence o f  the i l l - a d v is e d  executions were b ru ta l  
r e p r i s a l s .  The re v o lu tio n a r ie s  re c ru ite d  "death commandos"^ 
who ded icated  th e i r  l iv e s  to  one v io le n t  s t r ik e  fo r  the n a tio n ­
a l i s t  cause. A cyc le  o f  events was in i t i a t e d  th a t  was to  be 
rep ea ted  again and again—a tta c k , d ea th , r e p r i s a l ,  d ea th . The 
uneven rhythm—a tta c k , d ea th , r e p r i s a l ,  death—was to become 
the h e a rtb e a t o f  the in su rre c tio n  and the death k n e ll o f 
A l& ^rie-F ran^aise.
Before June, 1956, cases o f to r tu re  in  A lg eria  could be
^The "death commandos" were r e fe r re d  to by the Arab popu­
la t io n  as f id d av in . o r  as y u s s e b b i l in . The former i s  the 
p lu r a l  o f the Arab word fe<^day o r  "he who p u r i f ie s ."  The l a t t e r  
l i t e r a l l y  means "those whom toe caravan abandons on the ro ad ."
I t  was f i r s t  used to  r e f e r  to  p a t r io t s  who scaled  the w alls  o f  
the  F o rt-N atio n a l in  1872. T i l l io n ,  p . 145.
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c i te d  b u t were ire la tiv e ly  I s o la te d . A fte r  the executions and 
r e p r i s a l s ,  " to r tu re  became the s i n i s t e r  complement o f  azrrest: 
te rro rism  j u s t i f i e d  to r tu re  in  some p e o p le 's  eyes, w hile to r ­
tu re  and c a p i ta l  punishm ent, in  o th e r  p e o p le 's  ey es, made the 
most murderous a tta c k s  p e rm iss ib le ."^
W ithin th ree  months o f these ev e n ts , the f i r s t  p la s t ic  
bomb was exploded in  A lg e ria  and i t  was n o t an Arab bomb b u t 
à  c o u n te r te r ro r is t  bomb—a French bomb.^ F if ty - th re e  persons 
were k i l l e d ,  280 made hom eless, and the residence  o f  one o f 
the o r ig in a l  "death commandos" was d estro y ed . O ff ic ia ls  in v es­
t ig a te d  and rep o rted , " I t  i s  thought th a t  the in c id e n t f ig u re s  
in  the s tru g g le  between menders o f  the F.L.N . and the Messa- 
l i s t s " ^  (conq>eting Arab f a c t io n s ) .  No a r r e s ts  were made. The 
European p ress  tre a te d  i t  w ith  backpage s to r ie s .  This p la c id  
re a c tio n  was no t tru e  f o r  the Moslem p o p u la tio n . They were 
stunned; " th e re a f te r  they f e l t  th a t  they had been d e liv e red — 
w ithou t defense, w ithou t arms, w ithou t le g a l recourse o f  any 
kind—to murder pure and sim ple. On September 30, 1956 the 
f i r s t  A lgerian  bombs were exploded. This time the re a c tio n  
was s e n sa tio n a l. French p u b lic  opinion demanded the cap tu re  
o f  the g u i l ty  a t  any p r ic e .^  The European popu la tion  o f A lg e ria  
rea c te d  by dem onstrations o f mass h y s te r ia —h y s te r ia  s im ila r  
to th a t  exanq>lified by the  Moslem re a c tio n  a f t e r  the  detonation
% i d . .  p . 146. ^ b i d . . p . 148.
^ Ib id . ^ Ib id . . p . 150,
^ Ib id . . p . 147.
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o f the f i r s t  p la s t i c  weapon—h y s te r ia  th a t  was a t  once mur­
derous and p a th e tic  and th a t  was to be hom e on an on by mer- 
c ilo u s  and o ften  in d isc rim in a te  a s s a s s in a t io n s , mass bombings, 
and to r tu r e s .^
As France s tro v e  to combat the p ro g re ss iv e  anarchy o f  
the s i tu a t io n  in  A lg e r ia , she had a t  h e r  d isp o sa l the s ta te  
o f  s ie g e , the s ta te  o f  emergency, sp e c ia l powers g ran ted  under 
the law o f  March 16, 1956, procedures o f  the  lo i - c a d re . ex ten­
sio n s o f  the pouvoir rég lem en ta ire . and the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  ad 
hoc ex cep tio n a l powers o u ts id e  the realm  o f e s ta b lis h e d  le g a l­
i t y ,  The s t a t e  o f  s ie g e  had been re je c te d  in  A p r i l ,  1955 in  
favo r o f  the s ta te  o f  emergency; the s ta te  o f  emergency ex­
p ire d  on December 1, 1955, w ith  the demise o f  the  Faure ca b in e t; 
a t  th i s  p o in t ad hoc emergency procedures were re je c te d  in  favor 
o f  organized  approaches to  c r i s i s  problem s; consequen tly , in  
the  p erio d  from March, 1956 to June, 1958, the  Government of 
France r e l i e d  upon " sp e c ia l powers" and procedures o f  the lo i -  
cadre to  c re a te  and to inqplement p o lic y  toward A lg e r ia .
With the  spread o f te rro rism  to  c o n tin e n ta l France^ in  
the f i r s t  s ix  months o f  1957, the  government o f  Maurice Bourgàs- 
Maunoury demanded the  r e in s t i tu t i o n  o f s p e c ia l  powers which had
h b i d . .  p . 151.
2
In  defense o f  h is  governm ent's re q u e s t fo r  the  ex tension  
o f  sp e c ia l powers to  c o n tin e n ta l F rance, the P re s id e n t o f  the 
C ouncil, Bourgës-Maunoury, warned th a t  N ational Assembly th a t :  
" . . .  i t  i s  n o t by chance th a t  the  e f f o r t s  o f  te rro rism  are  
d ire c tin g  them selves toward the M étropole. The re b e ll io n  h as , 
from the f i r s t ,  a ttem pted  to  conquer the  w aste lan d s . I t  has 
spread  f e a r  and d iso rd e r , b u t i t  has n o t o b s tru c te d  the French
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been a v a ila b le  to  the M bllet government, and th e i r  a p p lic a tio n
to  the M étropole as w e ll as to the overseas p rov ince . This
re q u e s t, a f t e r  a hea ted  and lengthy  debate in  the N ational As
2
sembly, was passed as a vote o f confidence. This law o f  Ju ly  
26, 1957 provided fo r  the im plem entation o f  these  r e s t r i c t iv e  
procedures w ith in  m etropo litan  France in  s i tu a t io n s  in  which a 
d i r e c t  r e la tio n s h ip  e x is te d  between the A lgerian  im broglio and 
the emerging te rro rism  on the c o n tin e n t.^  A s im ila r  a u th o r ity  
was g ran ted  to the G a illa rd  government upon i t s  ascension  to 
power in  N oventer, 1957.^
Moslems, in  many p la c e s , from a sso c ia tin g  themselves w ith  us and 
from c u l t iv a t in g  th e i r  f i e ld s .  The re b e ll io n  has a ttem pted , by 
p e rp e tu a l a t ta c k s  in  the c i t i e s ,  in  A lger in  p a r t ic u la r ,  to  
c re a te  exp losions o f  ir re p a ra b le  i l l - w i l l  between the two com­
m u n ities . The ac tio n  o f the Army has made t t i s  design m iscarry . 
The re b e ll io n  has attem pted to  rep lace  m unicipal and departm ental 
o rg a n iz a tio n . D espite  itm e f f o r t s ,  a  m a jo rity  o f  the communes 
r e ta in  fu n c tio n in g  m unicipal au tdko rities . Day a f t è r  day, new 
communes a re  bom  in to  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  and c o n s t i tu te  the  founda­
tio n s  o f  th e  A lg e ria  o f  t»day. Put in  check on A lgerian  s o i l ,  
the re b e l l io n  has moved some o f  i t s  y t i v i t i e s  to  the M étropole." 
F rance. Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . .  Assemblée N atio n a le . Débats (Ju lv  
17, 1957T T p . 36W .---------------- :
^ u p r a . . p . 210-11.
^Confidence was accorded to  the Bourgës-Maunoury govern­
ment on th e  m a tte r  o f  the renewal o f  the  law o f  March lb ,  1956, 
and the ex cep tio n a l measures r e la t iv e  to  A lg e ria  by a vo te  o f  
280 to 183. F rance, Jou rnal O f f ic ie l . . . .  Assemblée N ationale 
(Ju ly  19, 1957), p . 3790.
^ A rtic le  6 o f  the law o f Ju ly  26, 1957: "Peut ê t r e  d éc i­
dée, p ar d é c re ts  p r i s  dans le s  co n d itio n s  prévues aux a r t i c l e s  
1 e t  2 de l a  l o i  de mars 16, 1956, l a  fu sio n  e n tre  le s  cad res 
ou corps a lg é r ie n s  e t  le s  cadres ou corps m é tro p o lita in s  homo­
logues. La p résen te  d isp o s itio n  a v a le u r  in te rp r e ta t iv e ."
F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (Ju ly  28, 1957), 
p . 7458.
^ A rtic le  u n io œ  o f the law o f  November 16, 1957: "Sont
reco n d u ite s , ju s q u '8  l 'e x p i r a t io n  de p ré se n t Gouvernement, le s
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In te rtw in ed  w ith  the problem o f rep ressio n  o f  v io lence
1
and economic and s o c ia l  reform  was the continuing  n e c e ss ity  
fo r  the development o f  an acceptable^ p o l i t i c a l  s tru c tu re  in  
A lgeria* The p o licy  o f  the Mendes-France and Faure governments 
had been the  gradual b u t acce le ra ted  a p p lic a tio n  o f  the 1947 
s ta tu te .  A fte r  M ollet ob ta ined  h is  g ran t o f broad powers fo r  
A lgerian  reform s, he made a number o f s t r u c tu ra l  changes,^ 
though on th e  face o f i t  the sp e c ia l powers b i l l  seemed to 
au th o rize  only adm in ia tvctive  a l te r a t io n s .^  These changes, 
however, were regarded as p ro v is io n a l and M o lle t*s famous
d isp o s itio n s  de l a  l o i  du 16 mars 1956, conq>létde e t  m odifiée 
p a r c e l le s  de l a  l o i  du 26 ju i l le t  1957." F rance, Jo u rn a l O ff i­
c i e l . . . . Lois e t  D écrets (Novend>er 17, 1957), p . 10682.
^Bourgès-Mannoury was e n th u s ia s tic  about the  s o c ia l  and 
eeohoode achievements made p o ss ib le  by the sp e c ia l powers 
g ran ted  to  M ollet in  1956: "The nunber o f  lodgings constru c ted
in  1954 was 11,500; in  1956, i t  was 16,500, an in c rease  o f  
5 ,000 . A new plan  o f  m odernization ha» been e la b o ra te d . The 
e x p lo ita tio n  o f n a tu ra l  gas discovered in  la rg e  q u a n t i t ie s  p e r­
m its the inq>lementation o f a s e r ie s  o f  in d u s t r ia l  p ro je c ts  
which would have n o t been p o ss ib le  w ithout the d iscovery  o f 
gas: the co n s tru c tio n  o f a p la n t to re f in e  petroleum  in  A lgers;
the co n s tru c tio n  o f an iro n  works in  Bone, a  number o f  develop­
ments w ith in  the chem ical in d u s try , and f in a l ly  the i n s t a l l a ­
tio n  o f automobile production  in  A lgers . . . Thanks to  the 
ac tio n  o f the kray, thanks to  the confidence o f  the popu la tion , 
a lso  thanks to  the s ig n i f ic a n t  cooperation  o f Moslem agaricul- 
tu r a l  w orkers, the m agnificen t a g r ic u ltu ra l  p roduction  has con­
tinued  unencumbered. Thanks to  the sp e c ia l powers, which I  ask 
you to  re g ra n t in  the  economic sphere , we can in te g ra te  a l l  
development w ith in  the  framework o f  the law ." F rance, Jo u rn a l 
O f f ic ie l . . . .  Assemblée N ationale (Ju ly  17, 1957), p . 36971
^ I t  i s  questionab le  a t  th is  p o in t whether o r  n o t i t  was 
p o ss ib le  to  form ulate an "acceptable" p o l i t i c a l  s tru c tu re  fo r  
A lg e ria—«considering the in tran s ig en ce  o f the F.L.N. as w ell 
as the  p o l i t i c a l  u ltra -R ig h t wing in  F rance.
^Sunra. .p p .  208 -09 .
4%bid.
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tr ip ty q u e  o f (1) c e a s e f ire , (2) e le c t io n s ,  and (3) n eg o tia ­
tio n s  w ith  those e le c te d , was in tended to  lead  to  the even tual 
determ ination  o f A lg e r ia 's  governmental s t ru c tu re .  Several 
tim es during the M ollet regime, o f f i c i a l  p o licy  sta tem ents ex- 
p l i c i t l y  excluded the d ra f tin g  o f another s t a tu t  o c tro v ee ,  ^
although th is  p o s s ib i l i ty  was in c re a s in g ly  being d iscussed  in
h igh  p o l i t i c a l  c i r c le s  as a necessary  s te p  toward the so lu tio n
2o f  the A lgerian problem.
With the in v e s t i tu re  o f the Bourges-Maunoury cab in e t on 
June 12, 1957, the promulgation o f a new fundamental s t a tu te ,  
a l o i - ca d re , became o f f i c i a l  governmental p o licy . By in v estin g  
the  new Government, the N ational Assembly leg itim ized  the p r in ­
c ip le  o f the l o i - cadre although i t  would be a gross oversim pli­
f ic a t io n  to  a s s e r t  w ithout m od ification  th a t  the N ational 
Assembly e x p l ic i t ly  approved o f such procedures.
In h is  in v e s t i tu re  speech the incoming P resid en t o f the 
Council declared :
The ta c t i c s  o f the reb e ls  i s  c le a r .  They refuse  a 
c e a s e - f i r e .  Thus they avoid fre e  e le c t io n s  and, 
thereby , d iscussion  o f a s t a tu te .  At the same time 
they tu rn  toward in te rn a tio n a l opinion to  say th a t  
th e re  has been no progress and th a t  French commit­
ments are no t being kept , , , We w il l  not be o u t­
flanked by th is  maneuver. We w i l l  not allow our­
se lves to be hindered in  the co n s tru c tio n  o f a new 
A lg eria ,
That i s  why , , , I  have decided to  submit as soon 
as p o ss ib le  a b i l l  fo r  a l o i - cadre which w i l l  serve
1 %yA S ta tu t  octrovee i s  a c h a r te r  g ran ted  u n i la te r a l ly ,  
L'Annee P o litiq u e . 1956. pp. 113, 120 and L'Annee P o lit iq u e , 
1957, p , 211,
William G, Andrews, p , 74,
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as the b a s is  fo r  th e  p ro g ress iv e  in s t a l l a t io n  o f 
new p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c tu r e s .  This in s t a l l a t io n  w i l l  
begin a t  the lo c a l l e v e l ,  i t  w i l l  pass n ex t to the 
departm ental le v e l ,  then to  th a t  o f  the  reg io n .
Each region w i l l  becoom a  p ro v is io n a l p o l i t i c a l  
e n t i ty .
Beginning w ith  the  p rov inces and tiae ir  own p o l i t i c a l  
organs the s tru c tu re  o f  th e  "A lgerian ensemble" w i l l  
be e la b o ra te d .
When become p o ss ib le  the e le c te d  rep re ­
s e n ta tiv e s  o f  the people w i l l  be c a l le d  to  examine 
th i s  lo i- c a d re . to  adopt i t ,  o r  to propose the .
m o d ifica tio n s in  i t  which they b e liev e  d e s ira b le  . .
The lo i-c a d re  c o n s t i tu te d  the methodology fo r  en u n c ia t­
ing  the  c e n tra l  elem ent o f  long-range French p o lic y  fo r  
A lg e ria—a new p o l i t i c a l  s t ru c tu re  fo r  the p ro v in ce . In  th is  
in s ta n c e , however. P arliam en t d id  no t "upon th e  suggestion  o f  
th e  Government, . . .  pose th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  reform  and f i x  . . 
th e  l im its  in  which, th e  Govenmmnt may apply . . .  the p r in ­
c ip le s  posed by decree , decrees which u ltim a te ly  must be ap­
proved by the P arliam en t to  have permanent e f f e c t . F o r  the  
Bourgâs-Maunoury c a b in e t found i t  iiqpossible to  agree upon a 
d r a f t  b i l l  w ithou t a p u b lic  d isp la y  o f d issen s io n  and, when 
i t  f in a l ly  was ab le  to p re se n t a  proposal to  th e  I n te r io r  com­
m itte e  o f  the N ational Assembly, the governm ental program was 
a t  b e s t  a  s u p e r f ic ia l  coaqpfomise between the r i v a l  S o c ia l i s t  
and Independent eleam nts w ith in  the  c a b in e t. I t  in sp ire d  no 
confidence on the  p a r t  o f  th e  I n te r io r  committ:ee and, a f t e r  
an i n i t i a l  re b u ff  by th a t  group, the Government p u b lic ly  ad­
m itte d  i t s  in a b i l i ty  to  form coheren t p o lic y  and tu rned  to  a
^L*Ann^e P o l i t iq u e . 1957, p . 522.
^ S u p ra ., p . 204 , N ote 2 .
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"round-tab le  conference” o f p o l i t i c a l  p a rty  lead ers  in  an 
i l l - a d v is e d  and p a te n tly  e x tra -c o n s t i tu t io n a l  endeavor to 
secure agreement upon a  program fo r  A lg e ria . This d iv e rs io n  
o f pub lic  competence from c o n s ti tu t io n a l  channels co n trib u ted  
to  a s tr ik in g  p o r t r a i t  o f  a p o l i t i c a l  system in  d is in te g ra ­
t io n .  A vigorous government, backed by s u b s ta n tia l  m a jo rity  
support, employing an ap p ro p ria te  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n  to  o rd er 
p o lic y , could n o t be achieved in  the l a s t  two years o f  the 
Fourth Republic.
I n i t i a l l y  the  Government was d e te rred  in  i t s  ta sk  o f 
determ ining the p r in c ip le s  upon which an A lgerian s ta tu te  
could  be based because o f  a fundamental disagreem ent between 
the P re s id en t o f the Council and h is  A lgerian M in is te r , Robert 
L acoste .^  Other c o n tr ib u tin g  fa c to rs  were p ressu res  ex e rted  
through in te rn a tio n a l  p o l i t i c s  as the A lgerian  question  was 
d iscussed  in  the forum o f  the U nited N ations and the in te rn a l  
p ressu res  r e s u lt in g  from an acrimonious f r e e - f o r - a l l  th a t  
broke ou t in  the Assembly on Ju ly  28, 1957, and which subse­
quently  occupied the Government f o r  a nine-day p e rio d . U l t i ­
m ately , a s e r ie s  o f  conferences between members o f  the s t a f f s  
o f  the  Lacoste and Bourg&s-Maunoury re s u lte d  in  a tenuous 
agreement concerning th e  broad p r in c ip le s  upon which govern­
m ental p roposals fo r  A lg e ria  could be evolved:
^Robert L acoste became a  symbol o f  the p o lic y  o f  u n re le n t­
ing firm ness in  suppressing  the r e b e l l io n . He accepted  the 
n e c e ss ity  fo r  some s o r t  o f "p ro v is io n a l"  s ta tu te  fo r  the  pro­
v ince  , b u t he f e l t  v ery  s tro n g ly  th a t  such a s ta tu te  should 
n o t lead  to  independence and th a t  the new governmental o rg an i­
z a tio n  fo r  A lg e ria  should n o t be f e d e ra l .  Le Monde. Ju ly  9 , 
1937, p . 4 .
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The "Federative Parliam ent" would in v e s t fo r  the 
du ra tion  o f i t s  mandate a "Federative Council" 
p resid ed  over by the  R epresen tative  o f the P re s i­
dent o f the French R epublic, he being the head o f 
the execu tive .
The proposed b i l l  . . . a lso  s e t ,  in  a p rec ise  
manner, the d iv is io n  of functions between the  t e r r i ­
t o r i a l  a u th o r i t ie s  and the French R epublic. The 
l a t t e r  would keep, in  p a r t ic u la r ,  the army, the 
diplom atic s e rv ic e s , genera l f in a n c ia l  q u estio n s, 
c i v i l  and c rim in a l ju s t ic e ,-a d m in is tra t iv e  l i t i g a ­
t io n , secondary and h igher education . . .
The A lgerian people would continue to  be rep resen ted  
in  the French P arliam en t.^
Using th is  agreement as a p o in t of d ep artu re , Bourges- 
Maunoury opened c a b in e t d iscussion  of the l o i - cadre on August 
23, 1957, more than two months a f t e r  h is  in v e s t i tu re .  He d is ­
covered immediately th a t ,  w hile i t  was r e la t iv e ly  easy to  ob­
ta in  a genera l "agreement" on somewhat vague p r in c ip le s  (broad 
d e c e n tra l iz a tio n , d iv is io n  in to  reg io n s , common fe d e ra tiv e  
in s t i tu t i o n s ) ,  i t  was most d i f f i c u l t  to  d e ta i l  the s p e c if ic  
powers to  be he ld  by the re sp e c tiv e  A lgerian in s t i tu t io n s  or 
to  define  the task s which would be e n tru s te d  to  these  i n s t i t u ­
t io n s .^  Faced w ith  the  dilemma o f in te rn a l  d iv is io n  w ith in  
h is  c a b in e t, Bourges-Haunoury tu rned  to  form al co n su lta tio n s  
w ith  the  heads o f  p o l i t i c a l  groups no t rep resen ted  in  the Gov­
ernment, bu t whose support was necessary  to  the passage o f th is  
le g is la t io n .  He found opinion more s p lin te re d  and disagreem ent
^Le Monde, August 23, 1957, p . 1.
^Le Monde, August 22 , 1957, p . 1.
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more profound o u ts id e  the Government than w ith in  i t .  He then 
turned  to  the people themselves through a d ire c t  rad io  broad­
c a s t ,  b u t—perhaps because o f the  t r a d i t io n a l  fe a r  among 
Fourth Republic p o l i t ic ia n s  th a t  d i r e c t  communication between 
the Executive and the  people smacked o f Caesarism—he merely 
explained h is  program and the  need fo r  i t s  passage ra th e r  than 
using th is  conversation  as a p la tfo rm  fo r  a s s a il in g  the deb i­
l i t i e s  o f p a rty  in tran s ig en ce .
A d ra f t  b i l l  was then adopted and a second round o f con­
s u lta tio n s  follow ed. D espite the  P rem ier 's  agonizing e f fo r ts  
to  e lab o ra te  a proposal th a t  would a t t r a c t  wide su p p o rt, basic  
disagreem ents remained even w ith in  th e  ca b in e t, when the  d ra f t  
was subm itted to  i t .  The d ra f t  b i l l  was sen t to  the  N ational 
Assembly and r e fe r re d  to  the I n te r io r  Committee of th a t  assem­
b lage . The Defense M in is te r, André M orice, whose opposition  
to  the b i l l  had not been w ell-concea led  p rev io u sly , f a i le d  to  
appear w ith  the  P resid en t o f the Council and the M in iste r R esi­
dent fo r  A lgeria  to  defend the b i l l  before the Committee. By 
th is  s in g le  a c t ,  he d ram atica lly  emphasized the lack  of cohe­
sion  w ith in  the Bourgès-Maunoury c a b in e t—a cab in e t ded icated  
in  terms of p o licy  to  the development o f a coherent program 
fo r  A lgeria  and a cab in e t req u es tin g  th e  g ran t o f excep tional 
a u th o rity  under a l o i - cadre to  implement th is  p o lic y . The 
committee immediately launched in to  a b i t t e r  debate over the 
se le c tio n  o f a rap p o rteu r fo r  th e  b i l l .  H o s ti l i ty  was so
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pronounced th a t  the P re s id en t o f  th e  Council withdrew the
b i l l  and convoked a meeting "of a  c e r ta in  number o f  p o l i t i c a l
p e r s o n a l i t ie s  to  seek a rapprochem ent lead ing  to  th e  form ation
of a  broad n a tio n a l m a jo rity  on th e  lo i- c a d re .^
Thus a new procedure o f  French parliam en tary  govern­
ment was b o m , marking an o th er long s te p  In  the  
degradation  and p a ra ly s is  o f  th e  regim e. The c a b in e t 
whose com position had always depended on the p roper 
dosage among the m a jo rity  p a r t i e s ,  was now com pelled.
In  o rd e r to  p rev en t I t s  own d is in te g ra t io n ,  to  summon 
f re s h  and more o f f i c i a l  p a r ty  re p re se n ta tiv e s  to  
so lve the p o lic y  question  too d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the  c a b i­
n e t  I t s e l f . 2
This "round-tab le  conference" met on September 20 and 
21, 1957. I t s  o b je c tiv e s  w ere: (1 ) the avoidance o f  the
breakup o f  the  Council o f  M in is te rs ,^  (2) the p ro v is io n  o f  
time to  aw ait the  d ec is io n  o f  the  N ational Council o f  th e  So­
c i a l i s t  P a rty  which had n o t determ ined I t s  p o s it io n  on the 
lo i-c a d re  a t  th is  tim e, (3) the  r a l ly in g  to  th e  Government 
te x t  o f  those who were h e s i ta n t ,  (4 ) the attem pted m od ifica­
t io n  o f  th e  d r a f t  b i l l  to  make I t  accep tab le  to  moderate op­
ponen ts, and (5 ) the emptying o f the te x t  o f " d e ta i ls "  and the 
d e fe rr in g  o f them to  Implementing decrees o r  to  subsequent
^Le Monde. September 19, 1957, p . 1.
o
^Andrews, p . 85.
^"Vhat, then , can be th e  u t i l i t y ,  the o b je c t ,  and the  
e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  the  ' l a s t  co n fe ren c e '?
(1) I t s  convocation . . .  w i l l  a t  l e a s t  have p e rm itted :
■=—avoidance o f  the b reak  u p  o f  the Council o f  M in is te rs  
on Wednesday morning. The re s ig n a tio n  o f M. André M orice would 
have been fo llow ed, n o t only  by th a t  o f  the th re e  o th e r  members 
o f  h is  p a r ty  In the Government, b u t a lso  by th a t  o f  M. Robert 
L acoste .
The M in is te r  f o r  A lg e ria  does n o t agree w ith  th e  c r i t iq u e  
and does n o t share th e  fe a rs  o f  th e  M in is te r  o f  N atio n al D efense.
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law s.^  The Conference served only  to provide a forum fo r  in ­
e f fe c t iv e  compromise between le ad e rsh ip  echelons—a compromise 
th a t  cou ld  n o t be tra n s fe r re d  to  the f lo o r  o f  the Assembly.
The "round-tab le  conference" tu rned  in to  a tense  d ialogue be­
tween Roger Duchet o f  the Independents, supported in  substance 
bu t n o t always in  ta c t i c s  by Jacques S o u s te lle  and, o u ts id e  
o f  the  conference, by André M srice, the e rs tw h ile  M in is te r  o f 
Defense, and Guy M ollet o f the  S o c ia l i s t s ,  supported by Joseph 
P e r r in , Faul-H enri T eitgen , and Edgar Faure. The fundamental 
p o in t o f  co n ten tio n  was tdie n a tu re  o f  the " fe d e ra tiv e "  execu­
t iv e .  The Independents and S o u s te lle  sought to d es ig n ate  tdie 
M in is te r  fo r  A lg e ria  as th is  o f f i c e r ,  b u t Guy M ollet argued 
th a t  to  have the M in is te r  fo r  A lg e ria  d i r e c t  the fe d e ra tiv e  
counc il would "preven t him from p lay ing  h is  ro le  as a r b i t e r  
and would involve d i r e c t ly  in  a l l  the c o n f l ic ts  among t e r r i ­
t o r i e s .%
In  an a ttem pt to  re so lv e  the c o n f l ic t ,  Bourgés-Maunoury 
proposed th a t  the  s tru c tu re  o f  the fe d e ra tiv e  co u n c il be p o s t­
poned u n t i l  such time as a sp e c ia l law could be passed provid ing
He j u s t i f i e s  and defends the d r a f t  b i l l  as i t  was subm itted  to 
P arliam en t. But i t  i s  v ery  c e r ta in  th a t  the re s ig n a tio n  o f  h is  
co lleagues would p lace  him in  a d e l ic a te  p o s it io n  in  A lg e r ia ; . . . 
Le Monde. September 20, 1957, p . 1.
^"The o p era tio n  would be j u s t i f i e d  to  the e x te n t th a t  the 
p re se n t p roposal d e fin e s  n o t on ly  a framework b u t descends to  
the means; b u t i f  i t  does th i s  i t  i s  p re c is e ly  to  s a t i s f y  those 
who wanted to inc lude  in  i t  numerous safeguards fo r  French sov­
e re ig n ty . The id e a  o f a  ' th in n e d -o u t 'b i l l  i s  a t t r a c t i v e .  I t  
would n o t re so lv e  the  d i f f i c u l ty ;  i t  would d e fe r  i t .  I t  would 
n o t s e t t l e  the c o n f l ic t ;  i t  would prolong i t . ” Le Monde. Sep­
tember 20, 1957, p . 1.
^Le Monde, Septem ber 2 2 , 1957, p . 1 .
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fo r  iC . l  The Independents took up th is  Idea and proposed the 
accomplishment o f th is  o rg a n iz a tio n a l problem by means o f 
decree . Guy M ollet accepted  th is  so lu tio n , b u t a f t e r  a n ig h t 
o f m ed ita tion  the Independent le a d e r , Duchet, r e je c te d  th is  
p lan  advocated by h is  coho rt T e itg en . Duchet f e l t  th a t  the 
decree procedure was more p e r ilo u s  than th a t  o f  the law, fo r  
no one could  fo resee what use might be made o f i t  by the gov­
ernment then in  power.^
There was no so lu tio n  to  the problem o f the  fe d e ra l 
ex ecu tiv e . A fte r  c e r ta in  o th e r  m od ifications were made in  the 
d r a f t  b i l l , 3 i t  was resubm itted  to the  Assembly accompanied by 
a " c o rre c tiv e  l e t t e r "  th a t  assuaged the o b jec tio n s  o f  some o f 
the conserva tive  members o f  th e  I n te r io r  com mittee. The l e t t e r  
withdrew the designation  " le g is la t iv e "  from the  t e r r i t o r i a l  
assem blies, lim ite d  the fe d e ra l assembly to  co o rd in a tin g  func­
t io n s ,  and deprived the  fe d e ra tiv e  council o f  the r ig h t  to 
choose one o f i t s  members to "d ire c t"  i t s  o p e ra tio n s . The
l l b i d . . pp. 1 -2 .
Z ib id . .  p . 1.
^"The a t t r ib u t io n s  co n ferred  by the t e r r i t o r i a l  assem blies 
on the F edera tive  Assembly must be 'w ith  an aim toward coordina­
tio n  and may n o t im pair the  autonomy o f the t e r r i t o r y .  ' . . .
The second paragraph o f the same a r t i c l e  was d e le te d . I t  
s t ip u la te d  th a t  P arliam en t, by means o f a law, could t r a n s fe r  
to the fe d e ra tiv e  and t e r r i t o r i a l  organs c e r ta in  a t t r ib u te s  
rese rved  to  the R epublic. . .
The in s t i tu t io n s  provided can be m odified "by concordant 
re so lu tio n s"  and n o t slaqply "by agreement" o f  the t e r r i t o r i a l  
assem blies, the F ed era tiv e  Assembly, and P arliam en t. Le Monde. 
September 24, 1957, p . 1 .
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c lause perm itting  P arliam ent to delegate  a d d itio n a l powers 
was s tr ic k en  and the L e g is la tu re  was given the prim ary author­
i t y  over a l te r a t io n s  in  the  A lgerian  governmental s tru c tu re  
w ith  a ssen t req u ired  by the  t e r r i t o r i a l  and fe d e ra tiv e  assem­
b l ie s .  D espite these a l te r a t io n s  the committee was unable to 
agree upon amendments to  the d r a f t  b i l l  and rep o rted  i t  w ith­
o u t recommendations, thus allow ing the o r ig in a l  governmental 
b i l l  to serve as the b a s is  fo r  d iscussion  in  the Assembly.
The techniques enqployed by Bourgës-Maunoury were to no 
a v a i l .  There was no "n a tio n a l m ajority" to  be found. In 
such circum stances the ex cep tio n a l procedure o f  the lo i-c a d re  
o ffe re d  no so lu tio n . The perv ersio n  o f th is  technique, in to  
which the Bourgâs-Maunoury government had subsided , served 
only to r e s ta te  the inadequacy o f the im m obility o f  the p a rty  
s tru c tu re  o f  the Fourth R epublic, r a th e r  than to  provide a 
workable excep tional method o f dec ision  making. Consequently, 
when Bourgès-Maunoury staked  the l i f e  o f  h is  government upon 
a  vo te  o f  confidence on the lo i-c a d re  fo r  A lg e r ia , he was de­
fe a te d .^
The lo i-c a d re  proved to  be a procedure o f  l i t t l e  a p p li­
c a b i l i ty  in  a  s i tu a t io n  in  which th ere  was no n a tio n a l consensus 
concerning the p ro p rie ty  o f  a proposed program and no " re la ­
t iv e ly  s ta b le  parliam en tary  m ajo rity "  in  support o f  governmental
the Bourgés-Maunoury question  o f confidence, the con­
s t i tu t io n a l  m ajo rity  xaifulrad to  re fu se  confidence was 298. The 
b i l l  was defeated  by a v o te  o f 279 ag a in s t adoption to  253 fo r  
adoption . As a consequence, th e  Government was n o t c o n s titu ­
t io n a l ly  req u ired  to  re s ig n . However, i t  chose to  conform to  
w e ll-e s ta b lish e d  p ra c t ic e  in  the Fourth Republic by re fu s in g  to 
remain in  o f f ic e  a f t e r  d e fe a t  on a  m ajor p o lic y  v o te .
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d r a f t  laws designed to I n s t i t u t e  such a program.
The re s ig n a tio n  o f  the Bourg^s-Maunoury ca b in e t c re a te d  
a month-long governmental c r i s i s  which was term inated  w ith  
the in v e s t i tu re  o f the prev ious reg im e 's  R adical M in is te r  o f  
F rance, F é lix  G a illa rd . G a illa rd  immediately promised a new 
governmental te x t  o f the d r a f t  law. This te x t  emphasized th a t  
France would no t be co n ten t to  base h e r  p o lic y  toward A lg e ria  
s o le ly  upon the nega tive  rep re ss io n  o f te rro rism . G a illa rd  
made i t  q u ite  c le a r  th a t  the Government wished to  take p o s i­
t iv e  s tep s  toward an economic, s o c ia l ,  and p o l i t i c a l  so lu tio n  
o f the A lgerian  problem w ith in  the co n tex t o f  a  province in d is ­
so lu b ly  bound to the M étropole, and c o n s is te n t w ith  the p r in ­
c ip le  o f  the coex istence o f the two A lgerian  com nunities.^  In  
p u rs u it  o f  these o b je c tiv e s  the  Government defin ed  procedures 
fo r  an e le c to r a l  law which would take in to  account doubts ex­
p ressed  concerning adequate safeguards fo r  the  European popu­
la t io n  in  A lg e ria  during the  f i r s t  d iscu ss io n  o f  (die te x t  o f 
the Bourgès-Maunoury d r a f t  law b efo re  the  P arliam en t. The 
G a illa rd  version^  in c reased  the "guarantees" o f  the European
^L'Année P o l i t iq u e . 1957, p . 538.
^"M. Robert Lacoste and h is  c o lla b o ra to rs  have d ra f te d  a 
new lo i-c a d re  . . . The new te x t  r e ta in s  most o f  the ^ r e v i o i ^  
one . . . ; in  p a r t ic u la r  i t  r e ta in s  the fe d e ra tiv e  organs in  
A lg ie rs . But M. Lacoste has adopted an id e a  advanced by M. 
S o u s te lle  and accepted by ^  Guy M oU et: th a t  o f  the rep résen ­
ta t io n  o f  "communities." ^ S o u s te l l^  proposed the c re a tio n  o f  
an Assembly o f  Communities in  A lg ie rs  and D&illet) env isioned  
one in  each t e r r i t o r y .  The new b i l l  s a t i s f i e s  b o th . I t  has . .
(a )  A longisde the t e r r i t o r i a l  assem b lies , c o n s u lta tiv e  
assem blies o f  communities, comqxised, on a  b a s is  o f  p a r i ty ,  o f 
re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f the A lgerians w ith  Koranic s ta tu s ,  o f 
Europeans, and o f  economic, c u l tu r a l ,  and s o c ia l  groups ;
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community, lim ited  the  p o l i t i c a l  r ig h ts  o f the Moslem commun­
i t y ,  and provided th a t  d ra f t  le g is la t io n  would no t go in to  
e f f e c t  u n t i l  th e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  "calm " in  A lg e r ia .
The I n te r io r  com m ittee was more r e c e p t iv e  to  th e  G a illa rd  
d r a f t  law than i t  had been to  th a t  o f  the  preceding Government.
This was p a r t i a l ly  the  case because many o f the com m ittee's ob­
je c t io n s  had r e s u l te d  in  m od ifica tions o f the o r ig in a l  Bourgès- 
Maunoury d ra f t  and p a r t i a l ly  because the  committee was aw aiting
(b) Alongside the fe d e ra tiv e  co u n c il in  A lg ie rs , i t s e l f  
is su ed  from the t e r r i t o r i a l  assem blies, a fe d e ra tiv e  co u n c il of 
communities w ith  c o n s u lta tiv e  power;
(c ) An a r b i t r a t io n  procedure between the t e r r i t o r i a l  a s ­
sem blies, whose fu n c tio n  would be comparable to  th a t  o f  le g is ­
la t iv e  assem blies, and the co u n c ils  of communities, whose ro le  
would be comparable to  th a t  o f the  Council o f the Republic . . .
In case  o f disagreem ent, the M in is te r fo r  A lgeria  could e i th e r  
implement the d ec is io n  taken on second read ing  by th e  t e r r i ­
t o r i a l  assembly o r r e f e r  the d isp u te  to  the mainland P arliam en t.
The mechanism . . .  i s  thus h ea v ie r  and more com plicated 
. . . But . . .  i t  i s  one o f th e  co n d itio n s necessary  to  win 
th e  support o f  a s u f f ic ie n t  number o f opponents, and, in  p a r t i ­
c u la r ,  o f Independents, o f whom 41 vo ted  ag a in s t the  (firsW  
b i l l .
The government a lso  hopes to  accomplish th is  by p re sen tin g , 
sim ultaneously , a b i l l  fo r  an e le c to r a l  law. There again the 
same p r in c ip le s  a re  being re ta in e d  and e s p e c ia lly  the s in g le  
e le c to r a l  co lle g e . But . . . th e  p re se n t b i l l  s p e c if ie s  the 
. . . form o f b a l lo t in g . In o rd er to  ensure "eq u itab le  and 
au th en tic "  re p re se n ta tio n  o f com munities, i t  i n s t i tu t e s  a system 
o f p ro p o rtio n a l re p re se n ta tio n  . . . Each l i s t  would e le c t  as 
many cand idates as th e  number o f times i t s  vo te co n ta in s  a  q u o tien t 
r e s u l t in g  from the d iv is io n  o f the  t o t a l  number o f v o te rs  by the 
number o f  se a ts  to  be f i l l e d .  The "rem ainders" would be d is ­
t r ib u te d  a t  the le v e l o f the t e r r i t o r y  among the groups having 
p resen ted  l i s t s  in  more than e ig h t co n s titu e n c ie s  throughout 
A lg e ria . Le Monde. November 10-11, 1957, p. 4.
The in s t i tu t i o n  o f the "councils o f  communities" e n t a i l s ,  
in  e f f e c t ,  the  d e le tio n  o f the p roposal o f the a r b i t r a l  co u rt . . . 
The Council o f S ta te  becomes the only means o f reco u rse .
The counc ils  o f  th e  communities . . . w i l l  have . . . com­
petence only in  the  f in a n c ia l  domain and over problems concerning 
the  coex istence  of th e  communities. Le Monde, November 13, 1957, 
p . 4 .
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i t s  opportun ity  to  sabotage the b i l l .  In  a seemingly co n tra ­
d ic to ry  manner the committee s tru ck  o u t the phrase lim itin g  
the fed e ra tiv e  organs to "coord inating" functions and provided 
th a t  the fed e ra l co u n c il and the t e r r i t o r i a l  assem blies would 
have ex ecu tiv es. I t  appeared a t  f i r s t  th a t  these m od ifica tions 
would streng then  the b i l l  immeasurably. However, the committee 
then turned  and ap p lied  the coup de erflfce. I t  requ ired  th a t  
a l l  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  r a th e r  than a sim ple m a jo rity  of them, adhere 
by consent to  the new arrangements befo re  the fe d e ra tiv e  organs 
could  be e s ta b lish e d . As some o f the t e r r i t o r i e s  were to have 
European m a jo r i t ie s , the colons were provided w ith  an e f f e c t iv e  
ve to  over the es tab lish m en t o f fe d e ra tiv e  organs and, in  the  
s i tu a t io n  o f November, 1957, th is  rendered the lo i-c a d re  in to  
a lo i-c a d a v re . I t  was passed , to be su re ,^  b u t th e re  was no 
chance whatsoever o f  w inning over the Moslem population  to  i t s  
acceptance. The c o n tr ib u tio n  o f the  G a illa rd  government to  
the r e d e f in it io n  o f A lgerian  p o licy  was to add to th is  a lread y  
u n r e a l i s t ic  p roposal a few q u a lif ic a t io n s  which would a ffo rd  
supplementary guaran tees to the European popu la tion .
The governing C enter c o a li t io n s  could n o t agree on a 
program o f genuine in te rn a l  autonomy, nor on a p o licy  o f  l i b e r ­
a l  reform s, nor on war w ithou t reform s. They staggered  along , 
f a l te r in g  fo r  a time b u t n o t f a l l in g ,  unable to suppress the
^By the Invoking o f the question  o f  confidence, the 
G a illa rd  government ob ta in ed  passage o f both the o rg an iz a tio n  
and e le c to ra l  b i l l s  w ith o u t fu r th e r  amendment. On November 29, 
1957 the lo i-c a d re  was passed , 269 to  200, and the e le c to r a l  
law was passed , 267 to  200.
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in su rre c tio n  th a t  had consumed A lg e ria , and equally  unable to  
provide p o licy  o f in te rn a l  reform  accep tab le  to the Moslem 
p o p u la tio n . U ltim ate ly , c o n tra d ic tio n s  w ith in  the  system 
c rea ted  a complete immobilism o f p o lic y  making. The r e s u l t  
was a r is in g  wave o f n a tio n a lism  demanding lead ersh ip  which 
swept pub lic  opin ion  in  e a r ly  1958. This n a t io n a l i s t ic  fe rv o r  
was the match th a t  ig n ite d  the rev o lu tio n ary  s i tu a t io n  in  e x is ­
tence in  A lg e ria : "a p ro l i f e r a t io n  o f c o n s p ira to r ia l  groups
which had worked the A lgerian  population  to a fev e r p i tc h  over 
the danger o f  being 'abandoned '; a p o lic e  fo rce and m i l i t i a  in  
A lg eria  la rg e ly  made up o f elem ents o f the very popu la tion  th a t  
wished to overthrow the regime; an army profoundly dem oralized 
by the  task s o f crush ing  a re b e llio n  in  the absence o f  c le a r ly  
defined  p o l i t i c a l  o b je c tiv e s ; a la rg e  number o f g en e ra ls  and 
o f f ic e r s  who en te red  in to  d iss id en ce ; and a M in is te r o f  N ational 
Defense nourished a p lo t  to destroy  the Republic o f which he 
was supposed to be the ' d e f e n d e r ' T h e  consequence was the 
d e s tru c tio n  o f th e  Fourth  Republic.
The system was moribund. Faced w ith  the in su r re c tio n  o f 
May 13, 1958, the outgoing government o f F é lix  G a illa rd  t r a n s -  
fe red  a l l  c i v i l  a u th o r ity  in  A lg e ria  to  the m il i ta ry  commander. 
General S a lan . The value o f th is  t r a n s f e r  i s  q u es tio n ab le , as 
i t  allowed the p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  the Committee o f  P ub lic  S a fe ty  
to  wrap themselves in  the m antle o f leg itim acy . As General 
Mas su in s is te d  on May 14: "I want to  avoid bloodshed. I  am
^Macridis and Brown, p . 62 .
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n o t an Insubord inate  G eneral . . . There can be no question  o f 
c re a tin g  a t  A lg ie rs  an in s u r re c t io n a l government • . . Power 
belongs jto General Salan and he i s  the emanation o f th e  govern­
ment. I f  the Committee fo rg e ts  i t ,  i t  w i l l  be d is s o lv e d .”^ On 
May 17 P ie r re  P fim lin  was gran ted  h is  re q u e s t fo r  the i n s t i t u ­
tio n  o f  the s ta te  o f  emergency in  a l l  o f  m etro p o litan  France fo r
2
a  p e rio d  o f th ree  months. However, the time had passed  when 
e i th e r  re g u la r  procedure o r  the im plem entation o f le g itim a te  
c r i s i s  devices could s u b s ta n tia l ly  a l t e r  the s i tu a t io n .  In  a 
t e s t  o f  s tre n g th  between Army and c iv i l i a n  government, in s t r u ­
ments fo r  the t r a n s f e r  o f  c iv i l i a n  a u th o r ity  to the m il i ta ry  
c o n s t i tu te  a danger r a th e r  than a  s e c u r ity  m easure. In  such a 
t e s t ,  procedures fo r  the  development o f  long-range p o lic y  based 
upon parliam en tary  m a jo rity  support and execu tive  im plem entation 
a re  incapable o f a p p lic a tio n . Grants o f  extended competence to 
the departm ental and lo c a l  c iv i l ia n  a u th o r i t ie s  a re  o f no value 
when the  m il i ta ry  ho lds a l l  c iv i l i a n  a u th o r ity . The c r i s i s  
in s t i tu t io n s  a v a ila b le  to the Fourth  Republic were o f  l i t t l e  
u t i l i t y  in  the l a s t  days o f  the May emergency. L eg itim ate  c r i ­
s i s  in s t i tu t i o n s ,  as v e h ic le s  fo r  the a s s e r t io n  o f  p o s it iv e  
p o lic y  form ulation  and a p p lic a tio n , p rov ide no answer to  the 
in te rn a l  s t r i f e  o f  a  le g a l  o rder d ire c te d  a g a in s t i t s e l f .
^Merry and Serge Bromberger, Leg 13 complots du 13 mai 
( P a r is :  L ib ra ir ie  Arthème Fayard, 1959), p . 222.
^France, Journal O f f i c i e l . . . .  L o is  e t  D écrets  (May 17 ,
1 9 5 8 ), p . 4734.
CHAPTER V III 
THE SBSTRUCTION OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW
The A lgerian  in s u r re c t io n  shook th e  Fourth  Republic to
I t s  knees. I t  was a  shock (secousse) th a t  was n o t only the
beginning o f  a  ca tas tro p h e  b u t a lso  the s ig n a l fo r  reo rg an l-
1
za tlo n  (redressem ent) . R eorganization began w ith  the Inves­
t i t u r e  o f  the De G aulle government on June 1, 1958. This 
regime was Immediately empowered to p repare  a  new c o n s ti tu t io n  
Inco rp o ra tin g  the  p r in c ip le s  o f  u n iv e rsa l su ffra g e , the sep ara­
tio n  o f l e g is la t iv e  and execu tive  powers, th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  
o f  the  Government to  the  P arliam en t, the  Independence o f  the  
ju d ic ia ry ,  and an o rgan ized  re la tio n s h ip  between the  French 
Republic and the peoples a s so c ia te d  w ith  lt.%  Formal reorgan­
iz a t io n  cu lm inated , a t  l e a s t  m om entarily, w ith  the  r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  
by g re a t m a jo r i t ie s ,  o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f the F if th  Republic 
on September 28, 1958.
This C o n s titu tio n  was designed to  achieve a " ra tio n a liz e d "
^As p re d ic te d  by G eneral de G aulle In  h is  l a s t  p re ss  con­
ference  o f  June 30, 1955, b efo re  h is  ten^o rary  re tire m e n t. Le 
Monde. Ju ly  2 , 1955, p . 1 .
^P e te r C aofbell and B rian Chapman, The C o n s titu tio n  o f  
th e  F i f th  Republic (Oxford: B a s il Blackwood, 1958), pp. 27-28.
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system in  idileh a  p re c ise  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  powers between the 
Government and the Parliam ent would allow  avoidance o f  the  
d iseq u ilib riu m s o f re ac tio n a ry  appeal to  a rb i t r a ry  government 
and o f  r a d ic a l  appeal to  Assanhly government which had plagued 
France in  the p a s t .  The P re s id en t o f  th e  Republic was in s ta l le d  
as the " a rb i te r ” and "guaran to r” o f  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  system . 
The ju d ic ia ry  was s e t  a p a r t  and u su a lly  p r iv ile g e d  in  o rd e r to 
assu re  the  p ro te c tio n  o f  in d iv id u a ls ' a g a in s t the powerful 
E xecutive and a g a in s t th e  consequences o f  an accord between 
him and the le g is la t iv e  Assem blies.
The key elem ent o f  th is  reo rg an iza tio n  was the  r e la t io n ­
sh ip  between the Executive and the L e g is la tu re . In  the  t r a d i ­
t io n a l  and c la s s ic  p a t te rn  in  ex is ten ce  before  the F i f th  
R epublic , the re la tio n s h ip  between th ese  two organs had been 
rep resen ted  by a  le g a l  h ie ra rch y  o f  laws and re g u la tio n s  based 
upon the supremacy o f  th e  L e g is la tu re  as the possesso r o f  the 
n a t io n a l sovere ign ty  and the so le  source o f law ( l o i l . This 
h ie ra rc h ic  p a t te rn  was achieved by the arrangement o f  te x ts  
in  a  manner p a r a l le l  to  the o rd er o f  precedence o f th e  issu in g  
le g is la t iv e  o r  governm ental organ. Consequently, under the  
au t& ority  o f  the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  documents o f  the  T hird  and 
F ourth  Republics i t  was p o ss ib le  to a u th o r i ta t iv e ly  e s ta b l i s h  
an o rd e r o f  precedence fo r  (1) organic s ta tu te  law, (2 ) re g u la r  
s ta tu te  law, (3 ) reg u la to ry  decrees issu ed  by the  P re s id e n t o f 
th e  Council o f  M in is te rs , (4) m in is te r ia l  re g u la tio n s  issu ed  
by th e  re sp e c tiv e  heads o f  departm ents as p a r t  o f the  p rocess 
o f  th e  e lab o ra tio n  o f  governmental programs, (5 ) p r e f e c to r ia l
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mad (6 ) m unicipal ng e ltd » .^  The h ie ra rch y  was fo r ­
mal ( l o i  fo rm elle ) r a & e r  than su b s tan tiv e  ( l o i  m a té r ie l le ) :^  
n e v e rth e le ss , the  sovereign  L eg is la tu re  possessed  a  g en era l 
and uncond itiona l norm ative power (pouvoir norm atif g én é ra l 
e t  in co n d itio n n e l^ which allowed i t  to  in te rv en e  in  any domain 
in  defense o f  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  the  C o n s titu tio n . Any new 
le g is la t io n  passed by th e  L e g is la tu re  imposed i t s e l f  im m ediately 
upon a l l  au th o rity  in v ested  w ith  the  reg u la to ry  power and te n ts  
emanating from the  Executive were su sc e p tib le  to  ab ro g a tio n , 
ip so  f a c to , to  the  degree th a t  th e i r  p ro v is io n s  co n tra d ic te d  
th e  p re sc r ip tio n s  o f  the  le g is la t iv e  power as embodied in  law ,^ 
Though the  L e g is la tu re  remained th e  u ltim a te  source o f  
norm ative power in  France u n t i l  the  passage o f  the De G aulle 
C o n s titu tio n , the  com plexity o f  m id-O ren tie th  cen tury  govern­
ment rendered the  t r a d i t io n a l  system to  be le s s  and le s s  ade­
quate . I t  became c le a r  th a t  a su b s tan tiv e  h ie ra rch y  in  which 
th e  L eg is la tu re  makes th e  law and i s  incapab le o f  d e leg a tin g  
th is  rig jht was in a p p ro p ria te . E a^erience had dem onstrated 
th a t  in  France a re p re se n ta tiv e  parliam en tary  le g is la tu r e  i s  
incapable o f  determ ining p o lic y  in  an ab so lu te  manner such as 
would be req u ired  fo r  th e  o p era tio n  o f an e f fe c t iv e  su b s tan tiv e  
h ie ra rc h y . Consequently, th e  recourse  in  the  T hird and Fourth
^^eo rg es Morange, "La h ié ra rc h ie  des te x te s  dans l a  Con­
s t i t u t i o n  du 4 octobre 1958," le c u e i l  D allo z . Chronique. 1959,
p . 21.
^ t tp r a . . p . 131. 
f r a n g e ,  p . 21.
4 b i d .
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Republics vas to  the fo m a l l s  t i c  supremacy o f  th e  la v  vh lch  
a llo v ed  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  d e leg a tio n  o f le g is la t iv e  cos^etence 
to  th e  Executive fo r  the  accoapllshmaot o f  sp e c if ie d  o b je c tiv e s  
v l th ln  sp e c if ic  time l im ita t io n s .  I t  I s  upon th is  fo rm a lis t ic  
h ie ra rc h y  th a t  the  ex cep tio n a l I n s t i tu t io n s  o f  the pre-1958 
p e rio d  vere  based .
P a r t ic u la r ly  during 1934-1940 and In  the 1955-1958 p erio d , 
the  d is t in c t io n  be m ean lav  and re g u la tio n  became In c reas in g ly  
b lu r re d . The French ju r id ic a l  system  f e l l  In to  a  massive s ta te  
o f  confusion and co n g estio n . The p arllaam ntary  agenda vas 
overvhelmed by an excessive  number o f  p ro je c ts  o f  la v .  P a r l ia ­
ment debated and argued, bu t on occasions o f  g re a t  Im portance,
I t  tended to  ren d er s t e r i l e  comproadses^ r a th e r  than e f fe c t iv e  
p o lic y  d e c is io n s . At the  same tim e. In  the realm  o f  ex cep tio n a l 
procedures the Government, q u ite  Incongruously , In  th e  case o f 
A lg e r ia  found I t s e l f  r e la t iv e ly  f re e  from le g is la t iv e  incum­
b ran ce s . Hovever, coheren t long-range programs depended upon 
the  coopera tion  o f  Government and le g is la tu r e  as v e i l  as  the 
m aintenance o f  a  s ta b le  c o a l i t io n  In  support o f  n a tio n a l p o l­
ic y , and n e i th e r  o f  th ese  p re re q u is i te s  vas a t ta in a b le  In  the 
F ourth  R epublic. M ichel Debré ea^ la ln ed  th i s  dilemma q u ite
Edmond Burke claim ed th a t  "A ll govem sm nt. Indeed every 
human b e n e f i t  and enjoym ent, every  v i r tu e ,  and every prudent 
a c t .  I s  founded on compromise.” (  Speech on Com elllatlem  v l t i i  
A m erica," (1775), l a  Wbrks. 12 v o ls * , Boston: L i t t l e ,  Brova and 
C o ., 1877, I I ,  p . 1 6 9 ^  O ther v r l t e r s  "condemn.compromise as 
rank  covard lce and sh eer opportunism . A b e t te r  v le v , perhaps, 
vou ld  d is t in g u is h  a  lo v e r  form th a t  appeases a l l  v l th o u t  s a t i s ­
fy in g  any > f  v h lch  lo g ro ll in g  I s  th e  p ro to ty p e) from a  h ig h er 
one th a t  f u l ly  re c o n c ile s  th e  I n i t i a l  d if fe re n c e s .
P a r t ic u la r ly  In  th e  Fourth  R epublic , th e  C enter p a r t i e s .
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cogen tly  in  him prementmtion o f  the d r a f t  t e x t  o f  the  Conmti-
tn tio n  o f  1958 to  the C onncil o f  S ta te :
An obmarver o f  o a r  parliam nntary  l i f e  cou ld  have no ted  
between th e  warm, b a t  even more mince th e  l ib e r a t io n ,  
thim dottbla d ev ia tio n  o f  o a r  p o l i t i c a l  o rg an iz a tio n : 
a  parlianm nt overwhelmed by b illm  and ramhlng in  d ie -  
o rd e r  toward th e  m a lt ip l ic a t io n  o f  d e ta i le d  mpeechem, 
b u t a  government t r e a t in g  w ithou t p a rliam en ta i^  in ­
te rfe re n c e  the  g rav en t n a tio n a l problema* The rem ult 
o f  theme two obmervationm le d  to  a  doable crimim: 
th e  inqpotence o f  th e  S ta te  becaume o f  th e  f a c t  thuit 
th e  adm inim tration warn bound by inezeumable Imwm, the  
anger o f  the n a tio n  becaume o f th e  f a c t  th a t  a partim an 
c o a l i t io n  p laced  in  th e  government p a t  b e fo re  i t  merioum 
meamarem decided w iduM it having been mabndtted previoum- 
ly  to  merioum mtadÿ#*
The anmwer o f  the  F i f th  Republic to  thim dilemma wam the  
reo rg an iza tio n  o f  the re ia tionm hip  between the  P arliam en t and 
the Govemmmnt. Four m ajor proviaionm o f  a  g en era l c h a ra c te r  
determ ine th e  n a tu re  o f  thim re ia tio n m h ip : (1 ) the incom pati­
b i l i t y  between the p arliam en ta ry  mandate and a c a b in e t p o e t,
(2 ) the  manner in  which th e  rem ponm ibility o f  th e  ca b in e t be­
fo re  th e  P arliam en t comem in to  p la y , (3 ) th e  dim tin e  t io n  be­
tween " le g im la tio n ” and " ru le  m aking,” and (4 ) the  in tro d u c tio n  
o f  th e  "execu tive  Iradget.”^
hmmmtramg by v io le n t  oppom ition on the  extrem a l i g h t  and extrema 
L e f t ,  cou ld  do l i t t l e  mare than  achieve th e  "lower" form o f  
conpromime by which none cou ld  be m a tim fied .. lankw art A. lam tow, 
^  P B l |^ m  o f  C eg ^eg m e (P rin ce to n : P rin ce to n  ün iverm ity
^Michael Debrd,
^Kmcridia and Brown, p .  168.
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For c r i s i s  govermssnt the  e s s e n t ia l  re la tio n s h ip  i s  th a t  
between " le g is la tio n "  and " ru le  making." The C o n s titu tio n  o f 
1958 p ro v id es , in  accordance w ith  th e  canons o f P arliam entary  
government, th a t  th e  " l« r  i s  v o ted  by P arliam en t."  Members 
o f  P arliam ent and the  Government can intzoduce b i l l s  and amend­
m ents. The scope o f  lamnaking, however, i s  su b s ta n tiv e ly  
defined  in  the c o n s t i tu t io n  (A r tic le  34) to in c lu d e :
• • • the r a n u la t^ n s  concerning: 
c i v i l  r ig h ts  ana fundamental guaran tees given to  the  
e i t i s e n s  f o r  th e  e n s rc isa  o f  th e i r  p ^ l i c  l i b e r t i e s ;  
th e  demands made on e i t i s e n s  and th e i r  p ro p erty  in  
the  in te r e s t  o f  n a tio n a l defense; n a t io n a l i ty ,  s ta tu s ,  
and le g a l ca p ac ity  o f  p e rso n s , .  • .
determ ination  o f  crim es and o ffen ses  and the  p e n a ltie s  
th a t  they may in c u r; c rim in a l procedure; amnesty; the 
c re a tio n  o f  new types o f  ju r i s d ic t io n  and th e  s ta tu te  
o f  the  ju d ic ia ry ;
th e  b a s is ,  th e  r a t e ,  and th e  methods o f  c o l le c tin g  
tames o f  a l l  ty p es; the issuance  o f  currency; .  . .
th e  e le c to r a l  system  o f  P arliam en tary  a s se sh lie s  and 
th e  lo c a l  assem blies; . . .
th e  n a t io n a liz a tio n  o f  e n te rp r i r e s  and the  t r a n s f e r  
o f  p r o p e r ^  o f  e n te rp r is e s  from th e  pub lic  to  the 
p r iv a te  s e c to r ;  . . .
th e  b as ic  p r in c io le s  o f :
th e  g en era l o rn a n lsa tio n  o f n a t io n a l defense; 
th e  f re e  a à s in ls t r a t io n  o f  lo c a l  communities, the  
e x te n t o f  th e i r  ju r i s d ic t io n  and th e i r  reso u rces; 
education ;
?zep erty  r i g h t s , c i v i l  and commercial o b lig a tio n s ; e g ls la t io n  p e r ta in in g  to  employment, un ions, and 
s o c ia l  s e c u r ity .*
P arliam en t was a lso  au th o rized  to  d ec la re  war (A r tic le  35) and
to  extend the e f f e c t  o f  the  s t a t e  o f  s ie g e , as decreed by the
^Jean C h a te la in , l a  nouvelle  c o n s ti tu t io n  e t  im rAgimm 
p o l i t i e ue ^  l a  France ( W  e d . ;  ^ a n s :  E d itio n s  B erger- 
L e v ra u lt , 1#W) p p ; 3(9^70.
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C o rae ll of  M in is te rs  s beyond a  p erio d  o f  f i f t e e n  days (A r tic le
3 6 ).
This ennm sratlon o f  le g is la t iv e  power was lim ite d  and 
conld  n o t be en larged  excep t by an o rg an ic  law. A ll o th e r  
m a tte rs  "than those th a t  f a l l  w ith in  th e  domain o f th e  law s h a l l  
be o f  a  reg u la to ry  c h a ra c te r"  (A r tic le  3 7 ) . C o n s e ^ n t ly ,  the 
norm ative siq>remacy o f  the  law was overthrow n. The t r a d i t io n a l  
p a t te rn  o f  la v  as th e  expression  o f  th e  g en era l w i l l  em anating 
from the sovereign P arliam en t and c o n s t i tu t in g  the I n i t i a l  and 
uncond itiona l le g a l a c t  was no more. In  the h ie ra rch y  o f  
s ta tu te s  e s ta b lish e d  In  the  F i f th  R epublic , lam was n e i th e r  
su b s ta n tiv e ly  nor fo rm a lls t lc a l ly  supreme. R egulation was no 
longer the subord inate  and c o n d itio n a l a c t .^
A r t ic le  37 a lso  s t ip u la te d  th a t  l e g is la t iv e  te x ts  concern­
ing m a tte rs  w ith in  th e  doawln o f the  law "may be m odified  by 
decrees Issued  a f t e r  co n su lta tio n  w ith  th e  Council o f  S ta te ."  
However, "those le g is la t iv e  te x ts  id ilch  may be passed a f t e r  the  
p re sen t C o n s titu tio n  has become o p e ra tiv e  s h a l l  be m odified  by 
decree , only  I f  the C o n s titu tio n a l Council^ has s ta te d  th a t  they
^Sunra. .  p . 132.
^In  t r a d i t io n a l  theo ry  and p r a c t ic e ,  the  law o f  P arliam en t 
has been aiqpseme and th e  machinery f o r  ju d ic ia l  review was ru d i­
m entary, w ith  I t s  development considered  co n tra ry  to  th e  sov­
e re ig n ty  o f  the  people as expressed  by th e  P arliam en t. The 
Fourth  Republic made a  fe eb le  attem pt to  c re a te  an organ o f  
ju d ic ia l  review In  I t s  C o n s titu tio n a l C onadttee. But n o t only 
was a  m a jo rity  o f  I t s  members chosen by a  p a r t is a n  v o te  in  the  
Assembly, thus a f fe c t in g  th e i r  Independence and o b je c t iv i ty ,  b u t 
a lso  i t s  powers were extrem ely lim ite d  and, in  f a c t ,  were h a rd ly  
ever u sed .
T i t l e  FIX o f  the  C o n s titu tio n  o f  th e  F i f th  Republic b reaks
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have # reg u la to ry  c h a ra c te r  .  , . Thus, p a s t lav s  d ea lla g  
w ith  m a tte rs  th a t  were now beyond th e  scope o f  the l e g is la t iv e  
power could  be m odified by sim ple d ec ree . They were "d e leg a l­
iz e d . A r t ic le s  37, 41, and 61 in su red  the  d is t in c t io n  be­
tween le g is la t io n  and ru le  making by a s e r ie s  o f  s a fe ty  d ev ices . 
I f  i t  appears in  the  course  o f  th e  l e g is la t iv e  procedure th a t  
P arliam ent i s  co nsidering  a  b i l l  o r  an amendment th a t  i s  o u ts id e  
the  domain o f  law (A r tic le  34) o r  th a t  i s  co n tra ry  to  a  delega­
tio n  th a t  has been g ran ted  to  the Government by the  P arliam en t
w ith  th is  t r a d i t io n  by making the C o n s titu tio n a l Council alm ost 
an independent organ o f  govermnent* I t  i s  composed o f  a l l  fo r ­
mer P re s id en ts  o f  th e  Republic and n ine o th e r  members, th re e  
chosen by each o f  th e  P re s id e n ts  o f  th e  two chambers p lu s  th e  
incumbent P re s id e n t o f  th e  R epublic, who a lso  names one o f  the 
members as the  p re s id in g  o f f i c i a l  o f  th e  C ouncil.
The Council has a  number o f  s p e c ia l powers o f  s u rv e il la n c e : 
th e  assurance o f th e  r e g u la r i ty  o f  th e  e le c t io n  o f th e  P re s id e n t 
o f  th e  Repidblic and the  meoÉbers o f  P arliam en t; and th e  procedures 
used in  a  re fe ren d a : th e  approval o f  the  ru le s  o f  procedure 
adopted by the  A#o houses o f  P arliam en t; the  determ ination  o f 
th e  scope o f  the domain o f  th e  law when asked by the  Government 
to  s t r ik e  down a proposed p r iv a te  member b i l l  o r  deputlms* amend­
ments to  Government b i l l s ;  th e  determ ination  o f  the  scope o f  the  
domain o f th e  law when asked by the  Government to  decide idaetdier 
a  m a tte r  th a t  was a  s u b je c t o f  le g is la t io n  befo re  th e  F i f t h  
Republic now comes w ith in  th e  purview o f  execu tive  ru le  making; 
the  n u l l i f i c a t io n  o f  law o r  t r e a ty  th a t  i s  considered  to  be in ­
com patible w ith  th e  C o n s titu tio n .
I t  i s  a lso  the  C ouncil th a t  alone decides when th e  sudden 
in c ap a c ity  o f  the P re s id e n t o f  the  Republic re q u ire s  h i s  rep la ce ­
ment by the  P re s id en t o f  the  S en a te , o r  w hether new e le c t io n s  
should be c a l le d  f o r  h is  permanent replacem ent. F in a l ly ,  th e  
Council must be co n su lted  by the P re s id e n t o f  the  -Republic on 
the  use o f  th e  emergency powers under A r t ic le  16, a# w e ll as on 
every measure taken under th e se  powers. Beer and Ulam ( e d a .) ,  
pp . 336-37.
^C hate la in , p .  370.
^Suora. .  p . 96.
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(A r tic le  38 ), the  Government may d ec la re  the  " I n a d a ls s lb l l i ty ” 
o f  such a  p ro je c t  o f  la v .  "In the case o f  disagreem ent between 
th e  Government and th e  P re s id e n t o f  the  Assembly concerned, the 
C o n s titu tio n a l C ouncil, upon the re q u es t o f  e i th e r  p a r ty ,  s h a l l  
ru le  w ith in  a time l i s i i t  o f  e ig h t d ay s ."^  I f  a  b i l l  i s  en ac ted  
by P arliam en t b u t th e re  a re  doubts about the  ju r i s d ic t io n  o f  
th e  L e g is la tiv e  Assembly, th e  P re s id en t o f  the  R epublic , th e  
P rem ier, o r the  p re s id e n ts  o f  th e  two assem b lies , can b rin g  
the  question  befo re  th e  C o n s titu tio n a l Council befo re  the b i l l  
i s  prom ulgated.^ I f  th e  b i l l  i s  passed  and prom ulgated, even 
then i t  can be brought befo re  the  C o n s titu tio n a l Council on 
th e  ground th a t  i t  d e a ls  w ith  a  m a tte r th a t  was beyond P a r l ia ­
m en t's  co#q)etence.^ F in a l ly ,  the Government can modify in  th e  
fu tu re  by sim ple decree a  lew passed  by th e  L e g is la tu re , p ro ­
v ided  th a t  the P arliam en t exceeded i t s  competence in  p assin g
i t . 4
The C o n s titu tio n , in  th e  aforem entioned A r t ic le  38,5 
p rov ides ex p ress ly  th a t  a l l  lawmaking power enjoyed by the  
P arliam en t may be d e leg a ted  to  the E x ecu tiv e . The system  o f
^ A rtic le  41 o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  October 4 , 1958. 
C h a te la in , p . 371.
^ A rtic le  61 o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  October 4 , 1958. I b id . . 
p . 376.
^ A rtic le  37 o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  October 4 , 1958. I b id . .  
p .  370.
4 lb id .
^Sunra. .n n . 239-40.
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d é e re ta - Io ls  o f  th e  T hird  Repoblic end enelogoos prectL ees o f 
the Fourth  e re  thus enshrined  in  th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  the  F if th  
R epublic . "The Covem asnt mey, in  o rd e r to  ce rry  o u t i t s  
progren» esk P e r lie n e n t to  eu th o rize  i t ,  fo r  e l im ite d  p e rio d , 
to  teke through ord inences meesures th e t  ere  norm elly w ith in  
the domain o f  th e  la w .”^ Such ord inences come in to  fo rc e  es 
soon es they e re  p ronuigeted  b u t they  e re  n u ll  end vo id  i f  a 
b i l l  fo r  th e i r  r a t i f i c a t i o n  i s  n o t subm itted  by the  Government 
befo re  F arliam ent w ith in  a  p re sc rib e d  p erio d  o f tiam , o r  i f  
the r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  b i l l  i s  r e je c te d .^
Thus, the p r in c ip le  o f  the  se p a ra tio n  o f execu tive  and 
le g is la t iv e  power i s  inco rpo ra ted  in  the French c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
system in  a  most unique manner. The domain o f the le g is la t iv e  
power i s  m a te r ia l ly  defined  and r e s t r i c t e d .  The reg u la to ry  
power a p p lie s  to  a l l  o th e r  m a tte rs  and, in  the event o f  p a r l ia ­
mentary d e le g a tio n , ord inances may be issu ed  on su b je c t m a tte r 
th a t  i s  norm ally w ith in  the domain o f  th e  law. I f  the  L eg is­
la tu re  moves o u ts id e  i t s  f i e ld  o f  competence, the  C o n s titu tio n a l 
Council stands ready to  define  th e  boundaries o f  the  le g itim a te  
sphere o f  le g is la t iv e  competence. However, i f  the E xecutive i s  
pu rpo rted  to  have invaded the  comq»etence o f  the L e g is la tu re , 
recourse  must be to  the  Council o f  S ta te  by the p la in t  o f  u l t r a  
v i r e s . 3 Thus, i t  i s  s trange  b u t tru e  t i ia t  the ad m in is tra tiv e  
c o u rts  become th e  defenders o f  parliam en tary  p r iv i le g e .  There
^C hate la in , p .  370.
. p .  48.
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Is  no vsy  to  take an a l le g a tio n  o f  E aeentlve v io la t io n  o f 
le g is la t iv e  cosqpetence to  the  C o n s tita tio n a l Council except 
by passage o f Ian d ec la rin g  the ac tio n  to  be in v a l id .
This sep ara tio n  o f powers i s  com plicated by the d iv is io n  
o f  the executive a u th o r ity  between the re sp o n sib le  p a r lia a e n ta ry  
ex ecu tiv e , the Prem ier, and the  un responsib le  " a rb ite r "  o f  the 
co n s titm tio n a l system, th e  P re s id en t o f  the  R epublic . C onsti­
tu t io n a l ly ,  the Prem ier and h is  M in iste rs  a re  coim etent to  
"determ ine and d ir e c t  th e  p o lic y  o f the n a tio n "  (A rtic le  20); 
" d ir e c t  the o pera tion  o f  th e  Government" (A r tic le  21); "be re s ­
ponsib le  fo r  n a tio n a l defense" (A rtic le  21 ); and "ensure the 
exécution  o f  the lews" (A r tic le  2 1 ). The Prem ier a lso  has the 
a u th o rity  to  i n i t i a t e  le g is la t io n  (A rtic le  3 9 ), take  appeals to  
the C o n s titu tio n a l Council (A r tic le  4 1 ), demand p r io r i ty  on the 
agendas o f  the assem blies (A r tic le  4 8 ), propose th e  o th e r  mem­
b ers  o f  th e  Govemsmnt (A r tic le  8 ) ,  and propose c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
amendment» to the P r e s i ^ n t  o f  the  Republic (A r tic le  8 9 ). He 
nay a lso  dism iss minhers o f  h is  c a b in e t and re p la ce  them w ith  
in d iv id u a ls  o f  h is  own ch o ice . F in a lly ^  he co o rd in a tes  the  
ac tio n  o f  the Government and sup erv ises the execu tion  o f  d ec i­
s io n s . However, both  Prem iers o f  the Republic—M ichel DebrA o r  
Georges Pompidou—have remained staunch defenders o f  p re s id e n t ia l  
p o lic y . Vhen disagreem ent has occurred  between th e  P re s id en t 
and th e  Prem ier, i t  has been the re sp o n sib le  p arliam en tary  exec­
u tiv e  th a t  has y ie ld ed . The c la s s ic  exasqple i s  th e  re s ig n a tio n  
o f  M ichel Debré in  1962. Debrd resig n ed  a f t e r  th e  su c cessfu l
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referendum o f A p ril 8 , 1962, when the  P arliem eat wes n o t in  
s e e tio n ; nhen he had n o t faced  and d id  n o t expect to  face  an 
adverse v o te ; vhen, indeed, he even had an o p p o rtu n ity  to  
in c re a se  h is  parliam en tary  m a jo rity .
A pparen tly , Dehr^ wanted an e le c t io n  to  fo llow  the s ign ing  
-  1
o f  the  Cvian Accords in  o rd e r  to  s u b s ta n tia te  the  p o stu re  o f  
governm ental support as France moved in to  th e  po st-A lg erian  
e r a .  De G aulle was opposed, and the disagreem ent was s u f f ic ie n t  
to  r e s u l t  in  D ehre 's re s ig n a tio n  on A p ril 12, 1962.
The presidency  o f  th e  F i f th  le p u b lie  i s  the  "keyst»ne o f  
th e  a r c h " 2 o f  the  new Republic—both  the  symbol and the  in s t r u ­
ment o f  re in fo rc e d  execu tive  a u th o r i ty . Beside i t  the  o f f ic e  
o f  th e  Prem ier p a les  somewhat by com parison. The C o n s titu tio n  
o f the  F i f th  Republic m ain ta ins the i r r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  the  
P re s id e n t, h u t a t  th e  same time i t  p rov ides him w ith  p erso n a l 
powers th a t  cam be ex e rc ise d  s o le ly  a t  h is  d is c re t io n .  I t  
p rov ides him w ith  the  a u th o r ity  to  make d ec is io n s  concerning 
a l l  m a tte rs  r e la te d  to  th e  Conmmnity and allow s fo r  a  v i r t u a l  
veto  power over a  la rg e ,  even i f  i l l - d e f in e d ,  a re a  o f  p o lic y  
making.
^On March 18, 1962 the d e leg a tes  o f  France and o f  the 
re b e l moveamnt, sms t in g  in  B rian , reached f in a l  agreement
f o r  an end to  th e  A lgerian  w ar. A sta tem en t is su e d  by bo th  
d e leg a tio n s  con ta ined  th ree  b a s ic  p o in ts :  (1 )  a  c e a s e - f i r e  was
agreed smon and beesme e f f e c t iv e  on March 19, 1962; (2 ) the  
people o f  A lg e ria  ware to  be g ran ted  the  r ig h t  o f  s e lf -d e te rm i­
n a tio n ; and (3 ) the  b e s t  so lu tio n  would be am independent 
A lg e ria  coopera ting  w ith  France under s t ip u la te d  co n d itio n s . 
French Bnhassy, P ress and .Inform ation  S erv ice  (Hew Y ork),
Fogftiffa Af f a i r s . Ho. 130 (March 18, 1962), p .  1 .
^Andrews, p . 50.
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I t  is  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of the P re s id en t 
o f the Republic to "see th a t  the C o n s titu tio n  is  respected" 
(A r tic le  5 ); "to ensure , by h is  a r b i t r a t io n ,  the reg u la r  func­
tio n in g  of the governmental a u th o r i t ie s , as w ell as the c o n t i ­
nuance o f the S tate" (A r tic le  5 ) ; and to  be the "guantor of 
n a tio n a l independence . . (A rtic le  5 ) . He appoints the 
Prem ier (A rtic le  8 ); p res id es  over the Council of M in isters 
(A r tic le  9 ); promulgates the laws (A rtic le  10); submits b i l l s  
to referendum (A rtic le  11); a f t e r  c o n su lta tio n  w ith the Prem ier 
and the p res id en ts  o f the assem blies, d ec la res  the d isso lu tio n  
of the N ational Assembly (A rtic le  12); i s  commander of the 
armed fo rces and p res id es  over the high council and committees 
of n a tio n a l defense (A rtic le  15). "When the in s t i tu t io n s  o f 
the R epublic, the independence o f the n a tio n , the in te g r i ty  of 
i t s  t e r r i to r y  or the fu lf i l lm e n t of i t s  in te rn a tio n a l  commit­
ments a re  th rea tened  in  a grave and immediate manner and when 
the reg u la r  function ing  o f the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  governmental 
a u th o r i t ie s  i s  in te r ru p te d ,"  i t  i s  the r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of the 
P re s id en t o f the Republic to  "take the measures commanded by 
the circum stances . . . "  (A rtic le  16). I t  i s  a lso  h is  respon­
s i b i l i t y  to inform the n a tio n  of the measures taken by a pub lic  
message. The C o n s titu tio n a l Council must be consu lted  w ith  
regard  to  such measures (A rtic le  16). During the period  o f the 
im position  of A rtic le  16, the Parliam ent may meet by r ig h t .
C o n s titu tio n a l s tru c tu re s  a r e ,  a t  th e i r  b e s t ,  frameworks 
w ith in  which p o l i t i c a l  so c ie ty  can be given b i r th ,  can be n u r­
tu red , can grow, and can , subsequently , evolve. Within the
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C o n s tlto tlo n  o f th e  F i f th  R epublic, th e  evo lu tion  o f the exec­
u tiv e  element shows the  p ro g ressiv e  dominance o f  the P re s id e n t 
o f  the  Republic over the  o f f ic e  o f  the P rem ier. I t  appears 
th a t  the P re s id e n t, f o r  the moment a t  l e a s t  because o f  the  ac­
quiescence o f the P rem ier, may, i f  he so w ishes, d ism iss bo th  
th e  Prem ier and the in d iv id u a l m in is te rs .^  C o n s ti tu t io n a lly , 
the form ation o f the  c a b in e t i s  the  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  the 
Prem ier se le c te d  by the  P re s id e n t, fo r  i t  i s  the Prem ier and 
h is  ca b in e t th a t  a re  c o l le c t iv e ly  re sp o n sib le  to  the P arliam en t. 
However, i t  i s  obvious th a t  during the  1958-1963 p erio d  th e  
P re s id e n t p a r t ic ip a te d  a c tiv e ly  and in te rv en ed  p e rso n a lly  in  
the  form ation o f  bo th  th e  9ehvi and Pompidou cab in e ts  and in  
the s e le c tio n  o f  c a b in e t m in is te rs .^  The P res id en t o f  the 
Republic has c a l le d  c a b in e t m eetings, p res id ed  over them, and
^Ihe re fe ren ce  h ere  i s  to  th e  unw illingness o f  Debr^ to  
f ig h t  f o r  p o lic y  which was coun ter to  th a t  d es ire d  by the  P re s­
id e n t o f  th e  Republic and r e fe r s  to  h is  re s ig n a tio n , w hether 
demanded by Be G aulle o r  n o t ,  iHmu a  profound p o licy  d isa g re e ­
ment occurred . . The a u th o r ity  o f th e  P re s id e n t over the  c a b in e t 
can be documented by Be G a u lle 's  d ism issa l o f  Antoine P inay as 
M in is te r  o f  Finance because o f  h is  disagreem ent w ith  p re s id e n t ia l  
fo re ig n  p o licy  (January , 1960), and the  expulsion  o f  Jacques 
Sous t e l l e  from h is  p o s i t io n  as M in is te r  o f  S ta te  on the  o rd e r  
o f  th e  P re s id en t o f  th e  R epublic. A lso , in  August, 1961 Louis 
Joxe became M in is te r  o f  A lgerian  A ffa irs  as th e  p erso n a l cho ice 
o f  G eneral de G au lle .
2»The make-up o f  the  Oebr6 and Foaqpidou cab in e ts  r e f l e c t s  
. . .  accord w ith  th e  p r in c ip le s ,  g o a ls , and methods o f  Be 
G a u lle 's  P residency . .  . Although under the  F i f th  Republic the 
cho ice  o f  M in is te rs  s t i l l  halongs to  th e  Prime M in is te r c o n s t i ­
tu t io n a l ly ,  the  members o f  the Bebrd and Pompidou cà b in e ts  were 
chosen in  coopera tion  w ith  Be G au lle ."  Beer and Ulam ( e d s .) ,  
p .  411. _
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through h is  s e c r e ta r ia te ,  p repared  the agenda and kept records 
of the d ec is io n s . The Prem ier "may d ire c t  the o p era tio n  of 
the Government" but the determ ination  of p o licy  i s  v i r tu a l ly  
com pletely w ith in  the ju r is d ic t io n  o f the P resid en t o f the 
Republic and h is  s t a f f .
The sep ara tio n  o f powers, then , has re s u lte d  in  the le g a l 
and p o l i t i c a l  separa tion  o f the  Executive and the L eg is la tu re . 
However, th is  re la tio n sh ip  i s  profoundly m odified by the 
" ra tio n a liz a tio n "  o f the Parliam ent i t s e l f , ^  and by the evo­
lu tio n  o f the "d iv ision" o f th e  executive power toward the sub­
ju g a tio n  o f the o ff ic e  o f the Prem ier to the P re s id en t o f the 
Republic. The r e s u l t  i s  th a t  the  p o l i t i c a l  system o f the F if th  
Republic i s  no t "parliam en tary ."  The fundamental c r i t e r i a  of
s u b s ta n tia l  s e r ie s  o f innovations were employed in  an 
attem pt to  in su re  th a t the  Parliam ent in  the F if th  Republic 
would be ab le  to  ca rry  ou t i t s  "proper" functions under the 
G a u ll is t  c o n s ti tu t io n  bu t th a t  i t  would be able to  do l i t t l e  
e ls e .  The r e s t r ic t io n  o f the  lawmaking functions to  su b stan tiv e  
m atte rs defined  in  the c o n s ti tu t io n  is  of c e n tr a l  im portance.
The a u th o r ity  o f the lower house in  the Fourth Republic has 
been tempered by the s tren g th en in g  of the Senate in  the  F if th ;  
however, the r e s u l t  has been more of a confusion o f powers than 
a c le an -cu t d iv is io n . The agenda of the houses i s  no longer 
the outcome o f in term inable debates between the p re s id in g  o f f i ­
c i a l ,  the re p re se n ta tiv e s  of parliam entary  groups, and a gov­
ernment d e leg a te . The Government now determ ines th e  o rder o f 
business. The Parliam ent can no longer e s ta b l is h  i t s  own s tan d ­
ing o rd e rs . They must be approved by the C o n s titu tio n a l Council 
before they become e f f e c t iv e .  The number o f parliam en tary  com­
m ittees  i s  reduced and th e i r  functions are  c a re fu l ly  circum­
sc rib ed . F in a lly , i t  i s  the  government te x t  o f a  b i l l  r a th e r  
than th e  com m ittees' amendments and coun terp roposa ls , as in  the 
Fourth R epublic, which comes before the p lenary  se ss io n  o f the  
Assembly, and the Government has the  r ig h t  to  r e j e c t  a l l  amend­
ments and to  demand a vo te  on i t s  own te x t .
The new procedures do seem to  r e f l e c t  a  genuine d es ire  to  
c o r re c t  some of the more f la g ra n t  abuses o f the p a s t ,  bu t a t  the 
same tim e, they make deep in roads in to  the cap ac ity  o f the
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a  parliam en tary  regime i s  the " re s p o n s ib i l i ty ” o f  the Govern­
ment to  the l e g is la t iv e  body. In  the  F i f th  le p u h lic  the  law­
making fn n e tio n s  o f  the  P arliam en t, i t s  a b i l i t y  to  question  and 
to  s c ru tin iz e  and to  ho ld  the  K aecutive re sp o n s ib le , a re  n a r­
rowly c ircum scribed . More im p o rtan tly , i t  i s  n o t the  respon­
s ib le  prem ier th a t  makes p o lic y , b u t th e  P re s id e n t. The regime 
i s  n o t " p re s id e n tia l"  e i th e r .  The French P re s id e n t has the  
power to  d isso lv e  the  L e g is la tu re , to  ho ld  a referendum over 
p o lic y  q u e s tio n s , and to  le g is la te  in  a rea s  o u ts id e  the defined  
m a te r ia l  competence o f  the  l e g is la t iv e  body. He i s  a lso  the 
f in a l  judge o f  the  meaning o f  the  C o n s titu tio n . Such powers 
a re  n o t h e ld  by any o th e r  p ra c t ic in g  p r e s id e n t ia l  regim e. In  
f a c t ,  the essence o f  P re s id e n t ia l  government i s  th e  sep a ra tio n  
o f  the  execu tive  and th e  le g is la t iv e  power. Consequently, the  
p o l i t i c a l  system  o f  F rance, a t  th i s  w r i t in g , may he b e s t under­
stood as p erso n a l ru ie ^ —persona l ru le  based upon the in te rv e n ­
t io n ,  the  " a rb i t r a t io n ,"  and the  guaran tee o f  th e  P re s id en t o f  
the R epublic .
The re o rg a n isa tio n  o f th e  e s s e n t ia l  p o l i t i c a l  and le g a l 
r e la t io n s h ip s  in  th e  F i f th  Republic n e c e s s i ta te d  a  reo rd erin g  
o f th e  p o stu re  o f  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  in  French c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
and p u b lic  law . The r e s t r i c t io n  o f  th e  le g i s la t iv e  domain o f
P arliam en t to  o p e ra te  as a  "parliam sn tary" l e g is la t iv e  e n t i ty .  
I t  i s  a  imcoam let. . Jean  R ivero , La
h ié ra rc h ie  mes te x te s  dams l a  c o n s t i tu t io n  du 4 octobre  1958, 
R ecueil D a lle z . C hreniaue. 1959, p .  263.
iRoy C. K aërid is  and Bernard K. Brown, fumplemant to  th e  
% ^ ^ ^ u lle  tonufalic (Homewood, 1 1 1 .: The Dorsey P re s s , incT ,
248
the  P arliam ent (A rtic le  34) and the  aim altaneoas reco g n itio n  
o f  P a rliam en t's  a b i l i t y  to  d e leg a te  i t s  m a te r ia l competences 
to  the E xecutive have c re a te d  a  s i tu a t io n  in  which the proce­
dures o f  d ec ree -lav s  and lo is -c a d re s  have been included in  th e  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  s t r u c tu re .  This n o rm alisa tio n  o f  former emer­
gency p ra c t ic e s  i s  the  r e s u l t  o f  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  reco g n itio n  
o f  the  coxqxetence o f  the  re sp o n sib le  E xecutive to  make p o licy  
in  the a reas  o u ts id e  th e  r e s t r i c t i v e  domain o f the  law (A r tic le
37) and to  rece iv e  from P arliam en t d e leg a tio n s  eiqpowering i t  to  
d ea l by ordinance w ith  m a tte rs  th a t  a re  norm ally w ith in  the  
domain o f  the  law (A r tic le  3 8 ).
The s ta te  o f  s ie g e  was re ta in e d  as an ap p licab le  emergency 
weapon capable o f  use under th e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  the Council o f  
M in is te rs , b u t l im ite d  in  th a t  " i t s  p ro roga tion  beyond tu e lv e  
days may be au tho rized  on ly  by P a rliam en t. The s ta te  o f 
emergency was a lso  re ta in e d . I t  waS a lso  i n i t i a t e d  by the  
Council o f  M in is te rs  and req u ire d  P arliam entary  approval to  be 
implemented fo r  longer than a  tw elve-day p e r io d . However, the  
s ta te  o f  emergency was n o t based upon an a r t i c l e  o f  the  C o n sti­
tu t io n  as was the s ta te  o f  s ie g e . E s th e r, i t  was rev ived  by 
Executive ordinance^ to  form a  p a r t  o f  th e  " sp e c ia l powers” 
ga th ered  to g e th e r by th e  Debre government in  February and March 
o f  1960 to  be used as means fo r  a  f in a l  a ttem pt to  p ac ify  A lg e r ia .
^C h a te la in , p .  370.
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D dcrets (A p ril 15,
1960), p .  3584.
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To th is  in h e rita n ce  o f  the T hird  and FonrA  R epublics, 
the  F i f th  has added the d is t in c t iv e  and vaguely defined  g ran t 
o f  ex cep tio n a l powers to  the  P re s id en t o f  the Republic con tained  
in  A r t ic le  16.1 Procedures under A r t ic le  38 appear to  be le s s  
severe than those under A r t ic le  16; however, in  th e  torw ented 
years  preceding  the Evian Accords they were each to  p lay  a 
s ig n i f ic a n t  ro le  in  the ev o lu tio n  o f  c r i s i s  government in  the 
F i f th  R epublic•
During February , 1960, in  th e  a fte rw ath  o f the  ab o rtiv e  
and unsuccessfu l m il i ta ry  coup in  A lg ie rs ,2 the Debr^ government^ 
moved to  r e a s s e r t  i t s  a u th o r ity  through the im position  o f  
A r t ic le  38 . Debrd warned the  N ational Assembly th a t  France was 
faced w ith  " c iv i l  war"^ and th a t  th e  Republic must s u s ta in  the
IS u p ra .. p . 241.
^ the  d ism issa l o f  G eneral Massu f l* a f fa ir#  in  Jan­
u a ry , 1960 tr ig g e re d  a long aiqpeeted re v o lt  in  A lg e r ia . The 
in s u r re c t io n  la s te d  one week as th e  army h e s i ta te d  and allowed 
th e  popu la tion  to  propagandise i t s  and the arm y's d i s s a t i s f a c ­
t io n  w ith  the  Government's A lgerian  p o lic y . In  th e  l i g h t  o f  the 
Evian A ccords, i t  i s  in te r e s t in g  th a t  in  h is  appeasement speech 
o f  January 29, 1960, G eneral da G aulle announceds " th e  re b e l 
o rg an isa tio n  . . .  m ain ta ins th a t  i t  w i l l  eeaa#**l%e only  i f  I  
n e g o tia te  w ith  i t  beforehand , by s p e c ia l p rerogatlw e, on th e  .
Sl i t i c a l  d e s tin y  o f  A lg e r ia , which w i l l  be tantam ount to  b u lld -  g I t  up as the on ly  v a l id  re p re se n ta tiv e  and to  e le v a tin g  I t  
In  advance to  being the goveromant o f  the  co u n try . That I  w i l l  
n o t do ."  James H. M elsel, The P ^ l  o f  the Republic (Ann Arbor: 
Q a lv e rs lty  o f Michigan P re s s , 19o2), pp . 63-.6o.
^The d ec is io n  to  invoke A r t ic le  38 was made a f t e r  a  s e r ie s  
o f  conferences by De G aulle and Debr^ w ith  meehera o f  th e  ca b i­
n e t ,  the p re s id e n ts  o f  th e  two parliam en tary  chambers, th e  head 
o f  the  C o n s titu tio n a l C ouncil, and o th e r  c i v i l  and m il i ta ry  
le a d e rs . P arliam en t was c a l le d  In to  ex trao rd in a ry  se ss io n  to  
pass the Government b i l l .  Andrews, p . 117.
^Debrd defin ed  " c iv i l  war" as a  taragedy In  which Frenchmen
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n a tio n a l leg itim acy  as rep resen ted  in  the  person and by the 
p o licy  o f  G eneral de G au lle .^  He a s se r te d  th a t  the Govemmmnt 
d id  n o t have a t  i t s  d isp o sa l the  necessary  machinery to  main­
ta in  o rd e r , to  con fron t fu tu re  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  o r to  in su re  the 
success o f  th e  p o licy  o f  the Government*^ Consequently, i t  
was necessary  fo r  the Government to  ask  th e  Parliam ent f o r  the 
passage o f  a  " sp e c ia l powers" b i l l  to  enable the E xecutive to  
" le g is la te ” by ordinance w ith in  the  domain o f  the  le g is la t iv e  
power* A e s e  ord inances were to  be defined  in  scope, l im ite d  
in  tim e, and su b je c t to  the approval o f  the P re s id en t o f  the  
Republic*^ I t  was a lso  eiqm cted th a t  the  Government would 
p e r io d ic a lly  p lace  befo re  the Parliam ent f o r  i t s  approval reg ­
u la r  b i l l s  embodying ordinances th a t  i t  had issued* The P ar­
liam ent would r e ta in  i t s  l e g is la t iv e  power, budgetary a u th o r ity , 
r ig h t  o f  c o n tro l ,  and r ig h t  to  censure the  Government*^ How­
ev e r, in  view o f  the " ra tio n a liz e d "  n a tu re  o f  th e  P arliam ent 
and the consequent le g is la t iv e  c o n tro l o f  the Government, the  
re te n tio n  o f  normal powers in  a reas  o th e r  than those covered by 
the " sp e c ia l powers" requested  by the  Governmen t  appeared to  
have l i t t l e  so lace  fo r  the smnbers o f  the  n a tio n a l Assembly*
tu rn  a g a in s t t h e i r  government* F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l***. 
Assemblée n a t io n a le . BAbats (February 2 , WoA), p* 115*
llb id * .  p* 116*
^ Ib id *
^ tb id *
4 lb id .
^Ibid*
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Many o f  Ü&eae p arliam en tarian a  harbored grave doubts about 
th e  wiêém o f  any d ladnu tlon  o f  th e  a lread y  r e s t r i c t e d  domain 
o f  the  lam. M everthaless, under the  p ressu re  o f  even ts  in  
A lg eria  and th e  in s i s te n t  demands o f  the  Government, which 
couched i t s  appeal f o r  extended powers in  the  name o f  the 
P re s id en t o f  the  le p u h l ic ,  th e  Parliam ent was u n w illin g  to  
r e s i s t  and Inam diately  vo ted  th e  re^piests o f  the  Government.^ 
A u th o rity  was g ran ted  to  the  Governmen t  to  "ca rry  o u t i t s  
program" (A r tic le  38) by means o f  the  issuance o f  ord inances 
designed to  inplesm nt the  "measures necessary  f o r  the m ainten­
ance o f o rd e r , th e  safeguard ing  o f  the  S ta te  and the  C o n s titu ­
t io n ,  and th e  p a c if ic a t io n  and ad m in is tra tio n  o f  A lg e r ia . 
Although th i s  b i l l  was o r ig in a l ly  lim ite d  in  time o f  a p p lic a ­
tio n  to  one y e a r , i t  req u ired  th e  ord inances issu ed  under i t s  
comqpetence to  be p resen ted  to  the  N ational Assembly b efo re  
A p ril 1 , 1961, and was caduaue in  th a t  i t  te rm inated  in  the  
even t o f  the  d is s o lu tio n  o f  th e  N ational A ssea tly ; i t  exceeded 
th e  powers accorded in  enab ling  le g is la t io n  in  th e  Fourth  le p -  
u b lic .^  Broad and undefined  powers were g ran ted  to  the
^The law o f  February 4 , 1960, au th o riz in g  the  Government 
to  ta k e , by a p p lic a tio n  o f  A r t ic le  38 o f  th e  C o n s titu t io n , c e r ­
ta in  measures r e la t iv e  to  tho maintenance o f  o rd e r  and th e  sa fe - 
guardinc o f  th e  S ta te  was passed  in  the  N ational Assembly a f t e r  
one d a y 's  debate by a  v o te  o f  441 to  75 and in  th e  Senate on 
th e  same day by 225 to  39. F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ia l . . . ,  As s y -  
b lëo  N a tio n a le . Id b a ts  (February 2 anW ^, 19W ), p p . 129, iB é.
^France. Jo u rn a l O f f i c i a l . . . .  Lois e t  S d cre ts  (February 
5 , 1960), p .  iiT ff.   :  :-------- * - -
^Though th is  law con ta ined  b roader d e leg a tio n s  than  any 
enab ling  le g is la t io n  in  the  F ourth  le p u h lic , i t  went no f u r th e r  
than the laws o f  March 19, 1939 and Seceaber 8 , 1939. Swora. .
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Government to  ”s«fegu«rd the S t a t e , b u t  no mention vas made 
o f the governm ental program mho se "exeea tion” th ese  competences 
were to  make p o s s ib le . There vas so d e f in i t io n  o f  the  p o licy  
l im its  v i th in  vh ich  the Government could  o r  could  no t a c t .  Nor 
vas th e re  any d is t in c t io n  dravn betmeen A lg e ria  and m e tropo litan  
France v i t h  regard  to  th e  «application o f rep re ss iv e  tech n iq u es. 
F in a lly ,  th e  p e rio d  o f tim e in  vh ich  the ord inances issu ed  under 
th is  cosqpetience v ere  p e rm itted  to  have v a l id  and le g itim a te  
e f f e c t  v i th o u t  the  approval o f  P arliam ent vas n o t one o r tvo 
months as one might ex p ec t, b u t the e n t i r e  p e rio d  o f  th e  lav — 
u n t i l  A p ril 1, 1961.
The la v  o f  February 4 , 1960 d e f in i te ly  augamnted and r e ­
in fo rced  th e  p erso n a l c o n tro l o f  the  P re s id e n t o f  the R epublic .
The p ro v is io n  th a t  execu tive  ord inances must be signed  by the
2
P re s id en t vas a c tu a l ly  a  requirem ent o f  A r t ic le  13 o f  the Con­
s t i t u t i o n  although  such a  p ro v is io n  vas a lso  in co rp o ra ted  in  
the enab ling  a c t .  C e rta in ly  th i s  s t ip u la t io n  provided the b a s is  
f o r  the c lo se  and d i r e c t  a s so c ia tio n  o f  De G aulle with govern­
m ental p o lic y  and served  to  re in fo rc e  the  "p erso n a l” c o n tro l o f
^H. P a tr ic e  Brocas remarked in  the debate on th e  lav  o f  
February 4 . 1960, th a t  th e  g en e ra l a u th o r ity  "pour l e  sauve­
garde de l 'E t a t "  m i ^ t  v ery  v e i l  comprehend th e  e n t i r e ty  o f 
French c i v i l ,  c r im in a l, and ad m in is tra tiv e  le g i s la t io n .  Conse­
q u en tly , th e  a u th o r ity  g ran ted  to  th e  Government mould be q u ite  
u n lim ited . F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f i c i a l . . . .  A ssenhlee R a tio n a le . 
Débats (February 5 , 1960)%^p . 125.
^ A rtic le  13 o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f the  F i f th  Republic:
"The P re s id e n t o f  th e  Republic s h a l l  sign  the  ord inances and 
decrees decided upon in  th e  Council o f  M in is te r s .”
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the P re s id en t o f & e lep n b lle*  In  the p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere 
o f  the  F i f th  R epublic, the  acquiescence o f  th e  Head o f  S ta te  
in  governmen ta l  p o licy  s ig n i f ie d  h is  appioval o f  such p o lic y .
I t  vas n o t the form al approval o f  a  t i t u l a r  Head o f  S ta te ,  b u t 
th e  p o l i t i c a l  approval o f  the  " a rb ite r "  o f  the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
system . I t  i s  n o t in s ig n if ic a n t  th a t  such approval f a c i l i t a t e d  
the  tran sfe ren ce  o f  th e  p erso n a l p re s tig e  o f  th e  P re s id e n t to  
the  Government to  a  degree s u f f ic ie n t  to  in su re  popu lar approval 
and th e  reassurance o f  the  m oderately h o s t i le  elem ents o f  the 
N ational Assembly and th e  S enate . I t  can v e i l  be argued th a t  
the v io len ce  o f  re a c tio n a ry  d isapp roval o f  the  De G aulle p o licy  
fo r  A lg e ria  and the  con tinued  h o s t i l i t i e s  on the p a r t  o f  A lgerian  
n a t io n a l i s t  e lem ents, to g e th e r  v i th  continued  popular confidence 
in  Da G au lle , u ltim a te ly  j u s t i f i e d  f o r  bo th  the p u b lic  and th e  
m a jo rity  o f the P arliam en t the r e s u l t in g  in c rease s  in  the  a rb i­
t r a r y  pover o f  the execu tive  agency.
The domain o f  the la v  as defined  by A r t ic le  34 i s  con­
cerned p rim arily  v i th  c i v i l  r ig h ts  and fundamental guaran tees; 
the  determ ination  o f  crim es and misdemeanors; n a t io n a l i ty ;  the 
fundamental guaran tees to  c i v i l  and m il i ta ry  personnel; p roperty  
r ig h ts  and c i v i l  and commercial o b lig a tio n s ; and le g is la t io n  
concerning employment, un ions, and s o c ia l  s e c u r i ty .^  T herefore , 
o f  n e c e s s ity , ord inances issu ed  by d ie  Government under the 
a u th o r ity  o f  A r t ic le  38 in  m o d ifica tio n  o f A r t ic le  34 must dea l 
v i th  c i v i l  and c rim in a l r ig h t s .  They c o n s t i tu te  an expression
^Duora. .  p . 237.
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o f p o lic y , b u t do n o t provide any f a r th e r  ex cep tio n a l mean# 
fo r  the determ ination  o f  p o lic y .
Aa p rev lo aa ly  n o ted , ^  the re-eatabllafam ent o f  the  I n s t i ­
tu tio n  o f the s ta te  o f  emergency as an a v a ila b le  procedure o f  
c r i s i s  government was an I n i t i a l  consequence o f  tdils d e leg a tio n . 
However, the p o te n t ia l  o f  the lsq»lementatlon o f  th i s  device was 
rendered questionab le  by the tran sfe ren ce  o f  s e le c te d  coaqpetences 
fo r  rep ressio n  o f In fra c tio n s  o f the law from the c i v i l  to  the  
f ld llta ry  a u th o r ity , tiius b lu n tin g  the p o te n tia l  o f  an e s s e n t ia l ­
ly  c i v i l  c r i s i s  I n s t i tu t io n .
The ordinance o f  A p ril 18, 1960 g ran ted  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  
to  the m il i ta ry  fo r  " a l l  crim es ag a in s t the s e c u r ity  o f the  
s t a t e ,  armed r e b e l l io n , the In s tig a tio n  o f o r  p a r t ic ip a t io n  In 
a  c rim in a l mob, and fo r  a l l  crimes and misdemeanors a g a in s t 
commerce and m a n u f a c t u r i n g . I t  a lso  tra n s fe re d  competence 
from the c i v i l  to  tibe m il i ta ry  agency fo r  murders and homicides 
committed v o lu n ta r i ly ,  fo r  the banishment and e x i le  o f  In d iv i­
d u a ls , fo r  the  v o lu n ta ry  s e t t in g  o f f i r e s ,  lo o tin g , and In  a 
gen era l manner, a l l  crim es and misdemeanors committing an o f ­
fense a g a in s t the n a t io n a l d e fen se .”^ I t  should be noted  th a t  
th is  ju r is d ic t io n  extended only to  v io la tio n s  th a t  were " r e l a t ­
ed to  In fra c tio n s  o f the law In  r e la t io n  to  th e  even ts In  
A lg eria  s in ce  October 30, 1954.”^ Thus, a sp e c ia l ca tego ry  o f
^ u p r a . . p . 248.
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  Discrets (April 24,
1960), p . 3816.
^ Ib ld . 4 ib ld .
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In s v rre e tlo n - ra la te d  crim es was c rea ted  and ju r i s d ic t io n  was 
removed from c iv i l i a n  hands.
The Debrd government used th is  ordinance power to  in c re ase  
the s e v e r ity  o f  p e n a ltie s  isgwsed a g a in s t v io la to r s  o f  th e  o rd e r 
and s e c u r ity  o f  the S ta te  when i t  announced the  m o d ifica tio n  o f 
the  Penal Code, the Code o f  Penal P rocedure, and the  Code o f  
M ilita ry  J u s t ic e  in  June, 1960.^ The r e s u l t  was a  necessary  
streng then ing  o f  the rep re ss iv e  s tru c tu re  o f  the French pena l 
regime; however, a  r e la te d  consequence was a  fu r th e r  developmspnt 
o f  the coercive a u & o rity  o f  the m il i ta ry  v is - a - y is  the  c iv i l i a n  
cosqieteoce.
Furtherm ore, a s ig n i f ic a n t  s e r ie s  o f  l e s s e r  p e n a lt ie s  
r e la t in g  to  o ffen ses  th a t  were d i r e c t ly  connected w id i th e  
A lgerian  s i tu a t io n  and d e trim en ta l to  n a tio n a l defense were 
c rea ted  by ordinance betareen J u ly ,  1960 and March, 1961. In  
o rd er to  combat evasions o f  the  m il i ta ry  d r a f t ,  e i th e r  army o r  
navy o r  t h e i r  re se rv e s , p e n a lt ie s  o f  imprisonment o f  from one 
to  th ree  years and f in e s  ranging from 200 to  100,000 MF. were 
e s ta b lish e d  fo r  anyone knowingly c o n trib u tin g  to  such ev asio n .^  
The burning o f v e h ic le s  which became so commonplace in  A lg e ria
^Ihe death  p en a lty  was p re sc rib e d  fo r  th e  m ajor crim es o f 
treaso n  and espionage as w e ll aa f o r  th e  " d ire c to rs  and o rg an i­
se rs "  o f  th e  in s u r re c t io n a l moweaent in  A lg e r ia . O ther p en a l­
t i e s  were in c reased  in  s e v e r i ty .  For example, crim es p rev io u s ly  
im eriting sen tences o f  from f iv e  to  .ten  years were norm ally 
p laced  in  a  ca tegory  e n ta i l in g  a  te n -  to  tm enty-year sen ten ce . 
F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  P dcre ts  (June 8 , 1960), 
pp. 5107"!^  19.
F ra n c e .  Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . .  Lois e t  B é r e t s  (September
23, 1960), p . 86617 I b i t . .  feT rusry  l .  1961. pp . 1205-06.
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durlag  th i#  p e rio d  ves ehellenged  w ith  the  c e r ta ia ty  o f  from 
two to  f iv e  years* imprisoament and f in e s  ranging from 2,000 
to  10,000 A lso , the  lo s s  o f  French n a t io n a l i ty  was p re s ­
c r ib e d  fo r  those who, being  e^>loyed in  th e  azny o r  in  the 
p u b lic  se rv ic e  o f  an o rg an isa tio n  o f which " la  France ne f a i t  
pas p a t r i e ” o r  more g e n e ra lly , w i l l  n o t re s ig n  o r  texm inate 
th i s  r e la t io n s h ip  when requested  to  by an in ju n c tio n  o f  the 
French Government#^ This l im ita t io n  upon n a t io n a l i ty  was ap­
p lic a b le  bo th  to  o rgan ised  in su r re c tio n  in  th e  cause o f n a tio n ­
a l i s t  A lg e ria  and to  th e  0#A;S;^ movement when i t  was o rgan ised  
in  March, 1962.
In  the  a re a  o f  c i v i l  government, A lgerian  departm ental
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  W c re ts  (February 1, 
1961), p . 1205.
1945) ^^^*1345 O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (February 4 ,
^The S e c re t Axmy O rgan isa tion  (0 ;A .^ ;)  was "formed by 
m il i ta ry  and c iv i l i a n  elem ents in  A lg e ria  when measures o f  open 
o p p o sitio n  f a i l e d .  The S ec re t Armqr sought to  p rev en t a t  a l l  
c o s ts  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  c o n tro l from France to  th e  n a t io n a l i s t  
P ro v is io n a l Gove rnment o f  A lg e r ia ."  I n te r e s t in g ly ,  the  O^A;S; 
sought leg itim acy  as th e  re p re se n ta tiv e  o f  the A lgerian  peop le . 
This concept o f  i t s  r e la t io n s h ip  to  the province i s  b e s t  ex­
p la in ed  by the  testism ny  o f  Jean-M arie Le Pen, a  deputy to  th e  
N ational A ssenbly in  th e  t r i a l  o f  General la o u l  S alan : The 
0 ;A“;S . b e liev e d  in  "a s e c r e t  p a c t . . .  between i t  and th e  aov- 
emment" and on ly  a tta c h ed  idben th e  p a c t was n o t honored. ^A ll 
would have been w e ll had the  governmen t  on ly  r e a l is e d  t h a t , . in  
s t i r r i n g  up tro u b le  by means o f  p o lic e  sp ie s  and a sen ts  n ry o c a -  
te u r s .  i t  was producing a  c i v i l  war between th e  people o f  France 
and th e  people o f  i t s  A lgerian  departm ents. For the O.A.S» was, 
to  the  OÿA^N^, th e  A lgerian  p eo p le ."  (ProcNs do la o u l S a lan , 
p .  2 7 0 .) Edgar 8 .  F u m is s , J r . ,  Be Gaullo and th e  Frmach Army 
(New York: The Tw entieth CenturyVFund, 1964), pp . 27 and 77.
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e le c t io n s  were p laced  d i r e c t ly  nnder the c o n tro l o f  a  c e n tra l  
commission op era tin g  nnder the su p erv is io n  o f  the Governor- 
General in  A lg e r ia . IWo A lgerian  re p re se n ta tio n a l u n its  were 
c re a te d : a  s e r ie s  o f  A lgerian  G eneral (D epartm ental) Councils
and fo u r Commissions o f  E lec ted  O f f ic ia ls  (commission d 'e lu s ) .
The General Council e le c t io n s  were the  f i r s t  to  be h e ld  in  
A lg eria  s in ce  1955. At th a t  time th e  double e le c to r a l  co lleg e  
system was s t i l l  in  use and as a consequence the  Aw main e th n ic  
groups e le c te d  an equal n u s te r  o f  co u n c il swrnbers. However, in  
February , 1956 the  in te n s i f ic a t io n  o f  the n a t io n a l i s t  r e b e llio n
caused the replacem ent o f  th ese  co u n c ils  by appoin ted  adm inis-
1t r a t iv e  commissions. The s in g le  co lleg e  system and multim eaber 
c o n s titu e n c ie s  were adopted f o r  th e  1960 e le c t io n s .^  The r e s u l t  
was an overwhelming v ic to ry  f o r  De G aulle p o lic y , w ith  those 
pledged to  the  support o f  the P re s id e n t o f  the  Republic number­
ing  298 and dw  A lad rie  f ra n ç a is e  l i s t s  e le c t in g  on ly  88 m asters 
o f  co u n c ils  in  the  e n t i r e  p ro v in ce .
lyA roifo  P o l i t iq u e . 1956, p . 121.
^A s in g le  e le c to r a l  c o lle g e  w ith  mmltimamber c o n s titu e n c ie s  
was adopted to r  th e  e le c t io n  on May 27, 1960. Each p a r ty  nomin­
a ted  cand idates equal in  number to  the  s e a ts  to  be f i l l e d .  In  
97 o f  the  113 e le c t io n  d i s t r i c t s ,  a l l  the can d id a tes o f  the p a r ty
which won the  la rg e s t  number o f  v o te s  were e le c te d . In  the r e ­
maining d i s t r i c t s ,  la rg e ly  u rban , the  s e a ts  were d is t r ib u te d  by 
p ro p o rtio n a l re p re s e n ta tio n . Each l i s t  in  each co n s titu en cy  where 
Europeans numbered from 3 to  10 p e rce n t o f  th e  popu la tion  was 
req u ired  to  co n ta in  one European cand ida te  and, where they num­
bered  10 to  20 p e rce n t o f  the  p o p u la tio n , a t  l e a s t  one and as 
amny as one h a l f  o f  the can d id a tes  were European. The e le c t io n  
re tu rn ed  301 Moslems and 149 European members in  c o u n c il. F rance, 
P ress and Inform ation  S erv ice  (Hew York), French A f f a i r s .  No.
105 (June 22, 1960), pp . 1 -3 . -
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To soppleaent these  depsrtanentsl co u n c ils  in  the A lgérien  
re p re se n ta tiv e  h ie ra rch y  the  Government a lso  used the ordinance 
power to  c o n s ti tu te  the Commissions o f  E lec ted  O ff ic ia ls  fcom- 
m issions d*dlu) • I t  i s  to  be remembered th a t  sh o r tly  a f te r
h is  ascension to  power as the l a s t  Prime M in is te r  o f  the Fourth 
R epublic, General de G au lle , speaking in  A lg ie rs  on June 4 ,
1958 had promised th a t  "from th is  day forward France considers 
th a t  th e re  i s  only  one c la s s  o f  c i t iz e n  in  A lg e ria : th e re  a re
only Frenchmen, Frenchmen w ith  th e  same r ig h ts  and the same 
d u t ie s .”^ He in s is te d  th a t  " fo r  the ten  m illio n  Frenchmen in  
A lg e ria , th e i r  v o tin g  r ig h ts  w i l l  be comparable to  the v o tin g  
r ig h ts  o f  a l l  o th e rs . They w i l l  e le c t  . . . in  a  s in g le  e le c ­
to r a l  c o lle g e , th e i r  re p re se n ta tiv e s  fo r  the  Pouvoirs p u b lic  in  
the same manner as a l l  o th e r  Frenchmen. V ith  th ese  e le c te d
^There were fo u r  c a te g o rie s  o f  members in  th e  Commissions 
o f  E lec ted  O f f ic ia ls :  (1 ) s ix te e n  depu ties and e ig h t sen a to rs
rep resen tin g  A lgerian  eo n s titn e n e ie s  were e le c te d  by the r e s ­
p ec tiv e  parliam en tary  chambers; (2) the  chairmen o f  the th ir te e n  
A lgerian  General C ouncils were members by r i ^ t ,  and the Coun­
c i l s  e le c te d  51 oü&ers from th e i r  groups; (3 ) twenty mayors o r  
members o f  the  m unicipal co u n c ils  were a m i n t e d  by the G la m o r-  
General in  A lg eria  upon the  nomination o r th e  re sp e c tiv e  p re ­
f e c t s ;  and (4 / twelve members o f  the Chambers o f  Commerce and 
o f  A g ricu ltu re  in  A lg e ria  were appointed by th e  Prem ier.
The e le c te d  and ^ p o in te d  members were grouped in to  fo u r 
commissions concerned w ith  (1 ) lo c a l  government, (2 ) administnrar 
t iv e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  and re g io n a liz a tio n , (3 ) r e la t io n s  betnreen 
the  two communities in  A lg e ria , and (4 ) ru ra l-m o d ern iza tio n . 
France^^Jo^m al O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t -P ic r e t s  (Ju ly  19, I960),
^L'Ann^e P o li t iq u e , 1958, p . 544.
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re p ré s e n ta tiv e s , we w i l l  see how to  do whet remains • . • I ,  
de G au lle , to  you th e re , open the door o f  r e c o n c il ia t io n .
And in  h i s  b ro ad cast o f  September 16, 1958, lAen he o v e rtly  
promised "se lf-d e te rm in a tio n "  to  the A lgerian  peop le , he an­
nounced th a t  "Mèzt y ea r th e re  w i l l  be e le c t io n  o f  the  General 
C ouncils, from which w i l l  be drawn l a t e r  g re a t a d m in is tra tiv e , 
economic, and s o c ia l  c o u n c ils , which w i l l  d e l ib e ra te ,  a longside 
the G overnor-G eneral, on the development o f  A lg e r ia .”^ Never­
th e le s s ,  n e i th e r  the departm ental co u n c ils  o r  the commissions 
d»6lu were p a r t ic u la r ly  re p re se n ta tiv e  o f  the " ten  m illio n  
Frenchment in  A lg e r ia ” re fe r re d  to  on June 4 . More than one 
q u a r te r  o f  th e  "commissioners" se rv in g  on the commissions JfiÛdl 
were gove rnme n ta l  iq»pointees and ano ther 20 p e rcen t were desig ­
nated  by the  G overnm ent-controlled P arliam en t. The rem aining 
55 p e rce n t emanated from the G eneral Councils in  which the sup­
p o r te rs  o f  th e  Government had a  65 p ercen t a w jo r ity . A t the 
same tim e, i t  was re a d i ly  apparen t th a t  the commissions were to 
be assigned  p u re ly  c o n su lta tiv e  fu n c tio n s  and th a t  no formal 
a u th o rity  was to  be g ran ted  to  them to d ea l w ith  the  fu te re  
p o l i t i c a l  s ta tu s  o f  A lg e ria . I t  was announced th a t  they  were 
so r e s t r i c t e d  in  o rd e r  n o t te  predeterm ine th e  vo te  o f  the 
A lgerian  people concerning th e i r  fu te re  governmental system nor 
to  p re ju d ic e  the  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  c e a s e - f i r e  n e g o tia tio n s  w ith  
the r e b e ls .  C onsidering th e i r  somewhat "rigged" n a tu re , the 
conclusion—th a t  in  these  in s  tsn ces  the  ordinance power a v a ila b le
k b i d .
F r a n c e ,  P re ss  and In fo rm ation  S erv ice  (New Y ork), Speeches 
i pd P re ss  Conference (September 16, 1958), pp-* 1 -2 .
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under A r t ic le  38 was employed to  e s ta b l is h  p se u d o -rep resen ta tiv e  
in s t i tu t i o n s  which cou ld  and, under Governmental guidance, would 
make some c o n trib u tio n  to  the le g itim a tio n  o f  Governmental p o l­
ic y  toward A lg eria—i s  n o t f a r  from the t r u th .^
The ordinance power a v a ila b le  under A r t ic le  38 as im ple- 
smnted in  the law o f  February 4 , 1960 was a lso  used to  d ea l w ith
a v a r ie ty  o f  o th e r  s u b je c ts :  th e  reo rg an iza tio n  o f  the p o lic e
2 • *  fo rc es  in  A lg e ria , the c o n tro l o f  p ro s t i tu t io n ,^  the a p p lic a tio n
the  a p p lic a tio n  o f  th e  In te rn a t io n a l  Code o f  P ublic  S a n ita tio n  
as a  measure in  the f ig h t  a g a in s t v en erea l d is e a s e ,^  the e s ta ­
b lishm ent o f  p rocedures to  d ea l w ith  the problem o f  alcoholism ,^
^The commissions d * ftu  rep o rted  in  January , 1961, and re ­
commended: (1 ) the  grantiing o f  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  more coaqpetence to
th e  local.governm en ta l u n i t s ;  (2 ) the  weakening o f  the  a l l -  
A lg erian  a u th o r ity ; (3 ) th a t  th ree  "reg ions" w ith  "c o n su lta tiv e  
co u n c ils"  be form ed;, and (4 ) th a t  re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f  communal 
( th a t  i s ,  e th n ic )  and economic groups be inc luded  in  th e  coun­
c i l s  a t  v a rio u s  le v e ls .  I t  i s  noteworthy th a t  the Government 
b i l l  f o r  A lg e ria  subm itted  to  th e  popu la tion  in  the January 
referendum , though worded very  vaguely , conformed c lo se ly  to  the 
substance o f these recommendations, A r t ic le  2 o f  the  referendum 
b i l l  i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  p e r t in e n t :  "O n til s e lf-d e te rm in a tio n  has 
been e f fe c te d  • • • decrees ta k e n .in  Council o f  M in is te rs  s h a l l  
a rrange fo r  the o rg an iz a tio n  o f  the p ^ l i c  powers o f  A lg e ria  • • • 
on the  fo llow ing  b a s is :  (a )  • • • in s t i tu t i n g  bo th  an execu tive
organ and d e l ib e ra tiv e  assem blies having ju r i s d ic t io n  over a l l  
the  A lgerian  D epartm ents, and ap p ro p ria te  reg io n a l and d ep a rt­
m ental execu tive  organs and d e l ib e ra tiv e  organs and (b) ensur­
ing  th e  coopera tion  o f th e  communities as w e ll as the guaran tees 
ap p ro p ria te  to  each o f them; • • • ” F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  
Lois e t  D dcrets (December 9 , I9 6 0 ), p . 11043.
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . . Lois e t  D dcrets (August 23,
1960), pp . 7834=3?T'‘
F r a n c e .  Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (November
27, 1960), p . inssn
^ Ib id . .  p . 10549.
^ Ib id . . p . 10708.
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the re g u la tio n  o f the horn# d i s t i l l a t i o n  o f a lc o h o l,^  and, even, 
the re lo c a tio n  o f former French s e t t l e r s  from Indochina.^ With 
the exception  o f the reo rg an iza tio n  o f p o lice  s tru c tu re s ,  a l l  
of these  su b jec ts  a re  only vaguely re la te d  to  the purposes o f  
the law o f  February 4 , 1960— "th e  maintenance o f  o rd e r , the 
safeguarding  o f  the S ta te  and the  C o n s titu tio n , and the  p a c if ic ­
a tio n  and ad m in is tra tio n  o f  A lg e r ia ."  They c o n s t i tu te  e x c e lle n t 
examples o f  th e  extrem ely broad and r e la t iv e ly  undefined powers 
th a t  can be made a v a ila b le  to  th e  Executive under A r t ic le  38. 
Whether such scope o f  d e leg a tio n  c o n s ti tu te s  abuse o f  the le g is ­
la tiv e -e x e c u tiv e  re la t io n s h ip  as e s ta b lish e d  under th e  F if th  
Republic i s  a  m a tte r o f  o p in io n . However, reg a rd le ss  o f  o n e 's  
in te rp r e ta t io n  o f "abuse," i t  should be recognized th a t  & e 
parliam en tary  p ra c t ic e  o f  abandoning procedures fo r  c o n tro ll in g  
the Government's use o f  d e leg a ted  a u th o rity  in  time o f  c r i s i s ,  
the a s so c ia tio n  o f the  P re s id e n t o f  the Republic w ith  governmen­
t a l  o rd inances, and the emphasis o f  the  c re a to rs  o f  th e  F if th  
Republic upon the r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  Government fo r  th e  i n i t i a t i o n  
and th e  im plem entation o f  p o lic y  have a l l  c o n trib u ted  to  inde­
pendence when the Executive i s  delegated  a u th o r ity  w ith in  the 
sphere o f  competence o f  P arliam en t.
^France. Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . .  Lois e t  S ec re ts  fAuaust 31.
1960), p . 8039. : ------------ ;----------,
^The ordinance was is su ed  in  o rd er to  f o r e s t a l l  parliam en­
ta ry  d iscu asio n  o f  a  p r iv a te  msmber b i l l  dea ling  w ith  th is  same 
problem and considered  to  he d e trim en ta l p sy ch o lo g ica lly  to  the 
morale o f  th e  colons in  A lg e r ia . F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  
Lois e t  B é c re ti  YKgieh 16, I9 6 0 ), p .  2551.
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6ad e r the F if th  le p u b lle  the men moat in f lu e n t ie l  la
p o lic y  aak iag—Be C n l l e ,  Bebr^, end Foapidou, mad m eabetmn-
tim l m a jo rity  o f th e i r  MLaimterm—here a l l  been p a r tis a n e  o f
the " a d a ia i i t r a t iv e  t r a d i t io n  in  p o l i t i c s ." ^
T heir b e l ie f  in  the  ex is ten ce  o f  an o b je c tiv e  n a tio n a l 
in t e r e s t  has aade th e a  see the n a tio n  and i t s  p rob leas 
as sn b a itte d  to  a  v a s t  a d a in is t ra t iv a  p rocess in  which 
choosing the r a t io n a l ly  c o r re c t s o la tio n  i s  more v i t a l  
than choosing the one fo r  which th e re  i s  p u b lic  o r  
p arliam sn tary  co n sen t. None o f  th ea  were r e a l ly  a n t i ­
dem ocratic b u t they  d id  b e lie v e , w ith  Be G au lle , th a t  
gen era tin g  consensus o r  even consent f o r  a sp e c if ie d  
p o lic y  was u su a lly  hopeless in  F rance, «hen, th e re ­
fo re ,  the  p ressu re  o f  p o lic y  d ec is io n s became g re a t ,  
as in  tim es o f  c r i s i s ,  t h e i r  f i r s t  r e f le x  was to  is su e  
an ordinance o r  d ec ree , and be done w ith  i t .  I f  A ie  
r e s u lte d  in  the in fringem ent o f  the parliam ent## law­
making power o r  in  abusing a  g ran t o f  d e leg a ted  le g is ­
la t iv e  a u th o r ity , th e re  was re fe ren ce  to  th e  " sa fe ty  
o f  the s ta te "  o r  to  ra iso n  d * a ta t, the u ltim a te  j u s t ­
i f i c a t io n  o f. those in  the  ad m in is tra tiv e  t r a d i t io n  o f 
p o l i t i c s . 2
The a p p lic a tio n  o f  A r t ic le  38 in  the  law o f  February 4 , 
1960 i s  aa eiqpression o f  th i s  "ad m in is tra tiv e  t r a d i t io n ."  I t  
re p re se n ts  the fu sion  o f  ex cep tio n a l and re g u la r  a u th o rity — 
the abso rp tion  o f  the ex cep tio n a l power to  d e leg a te  le g is la t iv e  
competence by the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  framework o f  the  F i f th  lepub- 
l i c .  This procedure i s  then the co n tre -n ied^  o f  A rti c le  13 o f  
the C onstipa tion  o f 1946: A r t ic le  13 fo rb idd ing  a l l  form al 
d e leg a tio n s  o f  a u th o rity  from the Parliam ent to  the Government 
and y e t recogn ising  the  s u b t le t ie s  o f  procedure by which i t  was 
p o ss ib le  in  f a c t  to  extend the  le g is la t iv e  competence to  the
^Beer and Glam ( e d s .) ,  p . 419.
^ Ib id . .  pp. 419-20.
^Leo Hamon and Jean C o tte re t ,  "Vie e t  d r o i t  p a r le m e n ta ire ,” 
Revue du D ro it P u b lic . UXV (May-June, 1960), p . 653.
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b e n e f i t  o f  th e  Execmtive; A r t ic le  38 , on the o th e r  hand, rep ­
resen  tin g  fo re s ig h t  as to  the  n e c e s s ity  o f "suppleaentary  ex­
ten sio n s o f  the  co^M tence"^ o f  the  Executive and le g itim a tin g  
these ex tensions by c o n s t i tu t io n a l  f i a t .
In  c o n tra s t  to  the a p p lic a tio n  o f  A r t ic le  38 in  1960,
A r tic le  16 was n o t d ec la red  u n t i l  th e  so -c a lle d  G en era ls '
le v o lt^  o f  A p ril 22, 1961 th rea ten ed  a  m il i ta ry  coup d 'd t a t .
In  th is  in s tan ce  the  s i tu a t io n  was s u f f ic ie n t ly  grave th a t  no
s ig n if ic a n t  o p p o sitio n  was evidenced ag a in s t the in te n tio n  o f
P re s id en t de G aulle to  implement h is  a u th o rity  under A r t ic le  16.^
The day a f t e r  the i n i t i a t i o n  o f  th e  re b e l l io n , A p ril 23, 1961,
Be G aulle announced:
Before the  m isfo rtune th a t  co n fro n ts  the country  and
the th r e a t  th a t  faces & e le p u b l ie ,  having taken the
o f f i c i a l  advice o f  the  C o n s titu tio n a l C ouncil, o f  the 
Prime M in is te r  and the P re s id e n ts  o f  the Senate and 
the E a tio n a l Asssmibly, I  decided  to  use A r t ic le  16
l l b i d .
^The n a tu re  o f  the  A p ril 22, 1961 u p ris in g  i s  in d ic a te d  by 
the f i r s t  rad io  b ro ad cast beamed from A lg e ria  to  the  M étropole. 
"At n ine o 'c lo c k , France V, which th e  m utineers had b a p tise d  
lE ad io -F ran ce ', b ro ad cast an 'o r d e r ' o f  the  in su rg en t 'm i l i ta r y  
commandt i n s t i t u t i n g  a  s ta te  o f  s ie g e . A r t ic le  5 o f  th i s  'o rd e r ' 
th a t  in d iv id u a ls  h s ^ n g  p a r t ic ip a te d  d i r e c t ly  in  th e  ' e n te rn r is e  
d 'abandon'  o f  A lg e r ia  and th e  Sahara were to  be a r r e s te d  and 
accused befo re  m il i ta ry  tr ib u n a ls  which wore to  be im m ediately 
c rea ted  to  co n s id e r th e  crim es committed a g a in s t th e  seemriQr o f 
the S ta te  . . • The m il i ta ry  a u th o r ity  w i l l  have th e  singm lar 
competence f o r  o rd erin g  these  a r r e s t s . "  In  conclusion  th e  com- 
uunioue d ec la red  (A r tic le  7 ) :  "The command has determ ined to  
a t ta in  a l l  o f  th e .o b jec tiv e s .id d .ch  i t  has e s ta b lish e d  fo r  the  
sa fe ty  o f  tibe S ta te .  A ll r e s is ta n c e  w i l l  be broken from wherever 
i t  comes#" T his o rd e r  was signed  by th e  Generals C h a lle , S alan , 
Jouhaud, and Z e l le r .  L'Annde P o l i t i e u e . 1961, p . 282.
% u n ra . . p .  244.
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o f  the C o n s titu tio n . Beginning today I  s h a l l  ta k e , 
i f  need be, d i r e c t ly  th e  measures re q u ired  by the 
circum stances .  .  .  1
And in  a  message to  th e  P arliam ent convened a t  the opening o f
i t s  o rd in ary  se ss io n  on A p ril 25, he s ta te d :
In  conform ity w ith  the  C o n s titu tio n  • • • I  decided 
to  invoke A r t ic le  16 and have begun to  take  the 
measures necessary  fo r  th e  m aintenance o f  the  con­
s t i tu t io n a l  organs • • • At the  same tim e the P ar­
liam ent has convened au to m atica lly  (de p le in  d r o i t ) .
In  the p re se n t c ircum stances, I  b e lie v e  th a t  the 
a p p lic a tio n  o f  A r t ic le  16 ought h o t to  modify the 
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  P a rliam en t: the  ex e rc ise  o f  the  l e g is ­
la t iv e  power and c o n tro l .  Because o f  t h i s ,  the 
r e la t io n s  between P arliam en t and the Government w i l l  
con tinue to  fu n c tio n  in  the normal co n d itio n s  except 
w ith  regard  to  th e  measures taken o r  to  be taken by 
v i r tu e  o f A r t ic le  16 . P arliam en t th e re fo re  Whose _ 
second se ss io n  opens today w i l l  con tinue i t s  ta s k .^
As A r t ic le  38 had in troduced  the ordonnance in to  the 
h ie ra rc h y  o f  law o f  th e  F i f th  R epublic, A r t ic le  16 in troduced  
the  d ec is io n  issu ed  s o le ly  under the s ig n a tu re  o f  the P re s id e n t 
o f  th e  R epublic. The im position  o f  th i s  "emergency a u th o rity "  
r e s u l te d  in  the issuance  o f  a  s e r ie s  o f  o rd e rs  designed to  g ird  
F rance fo r  a prolonged c r i s i s .  The s ta te  o f  emergency ( 6 ta t  
d^wrxemce) was d ec la red  and i t s  d u ra tio n  prolonged u n t i l  f u r th e r
^L’Annfe P o l i t iq u e . 1961, pp . 651-52. The C o n s titu tio n a l 
C ouncil advised  th a t  ' co n s id erin g  th a t  in  A lg e r ia , some g en e ra l 
p f f ic e r s  w ithou t command and, fo llow ing them, c e r ta in  elem ents 
o f  th e  m il i ta ry  a re  in  open re b e ll io n  a g a in s t  the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
government . . .  C onsidering  th a t  because o f  th ese  a c ts  o f  sub­
v e rs io n  . . .  the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  the Republic f in d  thesm elves 
menaced in  a manner grave and immediate . . .  the  co n d itio n s  
e x i s t  by the C o n s titu tio n  f o r  the  sp p lic a t io n  o f  i t s  A r t ic le  
16 ."  F rance. Jo u rn a l O f f i c i e l . . . .  Lois e t  D dcrets (A n ril 23. 
1961), pp . 387^-77. " :
^ I b id . .  p . 653.
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o rd e r .^  Ceasorshlp was e s ta b lish e d  fo r  a l l  p u b lic a tio n s  w hich, 
in  th e  opin ion  o f  the  M in istry  o f  Inform ation  o r  the M in istry  
o f the  I n te r io r ,  " in  one way o r ano ther g ive support to  subver­
sion  d ire c te d  a g a in s t th e  a u th o r i t ie s  o r  th e  laws o f the Rep­
u b l ic ." ^  The Government was au th o rized  to  p u t under house a r ­
r e s t  o r  in  d e ten tio n  camips (in ternem ent a d m in is tra tif )  any p e r­
son who has " p a r t ic ip a te d  in  subversive a c t i v i t i e s  d ire c te d  
ag a in s t the a u th o r i t ie s  o f  the Republic o r  who has encouraged 
such a c t iv i ty .  "3 The p e rio d  o f time in  which a  person could 
be le g a l ly  h e ld  befo re  being taken befo re  a  m ag is tra te  fo r  
form el accu sa tio n  was in c reased  fromi f iv e  days to  f i f t e e n  d ay s .4 
The tenure  o f  c i v i l  Judges in  A lg e ria  was revoked, thus allow ­
ing the Government to  reap p o in t Judges accep tab le  to  the P res­
id e n t o f  the  R epublic .^  The m d lita ry  fo rc es  were g ran ted  the  
r ig h t  o f  r e q u is i t io n  in  the e n t i r e ty  o f  French te r r i to r y .^  The 
le g a l guaran tees o f  m d lita ry  personnel and o f  c i v i l  se rv a n ts  
was suspended, thus ask ing  p o ss ib le  t h e i r  reaoval f ro a  o f f i c e ,
^By th e  ord inance o f A p ril 15, 1960 th e re  was a  tw elve- 
day t ia e  l i a i t  on the ia p o s lt io n  o f  th e  s ta te  o f  emergency un­
le s s  i t s  continuance was approved by P a r l ia a e n t .  Sunra. . p . 248.
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (A p ril 28, 
1961), p .  3947. :  : -
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écréta (A p ril 24 ,
1961), p .  3876.
4 lb id .
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ia l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (A p ril 27,
1961), p .  3930.
F r a n c e ,  Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (A p ril 24,
1961), p .  3877."
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demotion in  rank, expulsion  from the se rv ic e  on in d iv id u a l 
o rd e rs , o r  the w ithholding o f  th e i r  pensions.^  F in a lly ,  a 
sp e c ia l h igh  m il i ta ry  tr ib u n a l was in s t i tu te d  to  t r y  cases 
involv ing  the sa fe ty  o f  the  S ta te  and the d is c ip l in e  o f  the 
army in  s i tu a tio n s  r e la te d  to  the in su rre c tio n  in  A lg e r ia .^
The Executive a u th o r ity  moved d e c is iv e ly  and w ith  d isp a tch  
a g a in s t the in s u r r e c t io n is t s .  L o y a lis t genera ls  were confirm ed 
in  th e i r  posts^  w hile a l l  o th e rs  were removed and o rd ers  were 
issu ed  fo r  th e i r  a r r e s t .^  The m unicipal council o f  Grand-Alaer 
was removed and rep laced  by an appointed committee th a t  was 
amenable to  the d ic ta te s  o f  the Government in  P a r is .^  A ll 
d a i ly  newspapers in  A lg e ria  were suspended althougjh the Jo u rn a l 
d 'A lte r  was allowed to  resume p u b lic a tio n  on A p ril 28.^ Curfews 
were e s ta b lish e d  a t  n ine  o -c lock  in  the evening fo r  a l l  p e rso n s .7 
I t  m ight a lso  be noted  th a t  s ix  commissioners o f  p o lic e  were 
suspended in  th is  p erio d  and more than 200 c i v i l  se rv an ts  were 
a r re s te d .*  In  f a c t ,  when the pu tsch  co llap sed  on A p ril 27, a l l
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  E g r e t s  (A p ril 24,
1961), p . 3876, l S a ^ % r n  I F ,  1961)," pT 3907'. ""
^France. Jou rna l O f f i c i e l . . . .  Lois e t  D écrets (A p ril 28.
1961), p . 394f.     :----------
^L'Amnee P o l i t ie u e . 1961, p . 292.
^ Ib id .
* lb id .
7 lb id .
* Ib id .
267
the o f f ic e r s  o f  the  F i r s t  Regiment o f  F s rs c h o tis ts  were tsken
in to  custody .^  In  a l l ,  i t  was es tim a ted  th a t  16,000 a r r e s t s
were made fo r  a c t i v i t i e s  co n tra ry  to  th e  o rd er o f  the  S ta te
2
and the n a tio n a l defense .
I t  i s  fre<piently argued th a t  A r t ic le  38 i s  ap p ro p ria te  
f o r  a p p lic a tio n  in  m inor c r i s i s  s i tu a t io n s  when the cooperation  
o f  the N ational Assembly i s  assured  and th a t  A r t ic le  16 nay be 
p ro p erly  employed on ly  when the f a te  o f  the n a tio n  hangs in  the 
b a lan ce .^  However, when cosqparing the immediate e f f e c t s  o f  the 
im position  o f A r t ic le  38 in  1960 and o f  A r t ic le  16 in  1961, the 
s im i la r i t i e s  between the r e s u l t s  o f  th e  use o f these  two devices 
i s  q u ite  s t r ik in g .  In  each in s tan ce  a  s u b s ta n tia l  l im ita t io n  
was p laced  upon s e le c te d  in d iv id u a l l i b e r t i e s  (freedom o f  asso­
c ia t io n ,  freedom o f  the  p re s s , r ig h t  o f  re p re s e n ta tio n ) , funda­
m ental guarantees t%) m il i ta ry  and c iv i l i a n  personnel were modi­
f ie d  o r  abrogated , th e  s ta te  o f  emergency was ap p lied , and 
sp e c ia l ju d ic ia l  competences were arranged  fo r  crim es r e la te d  
to  the A lgerian in s u r re c t io n . In  the ease o f A r t ic le  38 excep­
t io n a l  p e n a ltie s  were in troduced  to  d iscourage in s u r re c t io n -  
r e la te d  crim es, w hile  in  the  case o f  A r t ic le  16 in ternem ent
v ss  e s ta b lis h e d . D espite  th e i r  d is s im ila r  form s, 
a  m ajor e f f e c t  o f  the  im position  o f  A r t ic le  38 as w e ll as 
A r t ic le  16 was an enhancement o f  the power o f  the P re s id en t o f
k b i d .
Z ib id ., p . 293.
^Hamoa and C o t te r e t ,  p . 655.
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th e  Repvblle—£ je £ t  l e  powvoir éa Chef de l« E te t end, se trouve 
étendu dens le s  deux c e s .^
N everthe less, th e  s im i la r i ty  between the  reco u rse  to  
A r t ic le  38 and the reco u rse  to  A r t ic le  16 can be overemphasized# 
I t  must be remembered th a t  the  e f fe c tiv e n e s s  o f  A r t ic le  38 i s  
l im ite d  to  the a re a  circum scribed  by A r t ic le  34, w hile A r t ic le  
16 c o n s t i tu te s  an exceedingly  broad emergency power o f  th e  un- 
re sp o n s ib le  Head o f  S ta te .  The l a t t e r  may be ap p lied  a t  h is  
d is c re t io n  and i s  esq»loyed u n t i l  such a  time as the P re s id e n t 
o f  th e  Hepublic deems i t  ap p ro p ria te  to  re tu rn  to  th e  re g u la r  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  order# A r t ic le  16 i s  a lso  used to  in te rv e n e  
w ith in  th e  cosqpetence o f  th e  resp o n sib le  Government, w hile 
A r t ic le  38 i s  a  method i f  in c reas in g  the a u th o rity  o f  th i s  Gov­
ernment# T herefore , in  a  s i tu a t io n  where the two elem ents o f  
th e  execu tive  power a re  n o t in  complete harmony. A r t ic le  38 
c o n s t i tu te s  a device a v a ila b le  to  th e  Prem ier and h is  c a b in e t , 
whereas A r t ic le  16 i s  s o le ly  a device a v a ila b le  to  the  P re s id e n t 
o f  the  Republic#
The long-range im p lica tio n s  o f  A r t ic le  16 a re  undefined , 
m u ltifa c e te d , and su b je c t to  the judgment o f  the  P re s id e n t o f  
th e  Republic# This d ev ice , as ap p lied  in  1961, remained in  
fo rce  f o r  f iv e  months#^ Though the  "grave and immediate danger" 
subsided  w ith  the  c o lla p se  o f  the A lgerian  u p r is in g , and the 
in s t i tu t i o n s  o f  the R epublic inc lud ing  bo th  the  P arliam en t and
l l b i d .
^The a p p lic a tio n  o f  A r t ic le  16 was term inated  by th e  P fe i-  
s io n  o f  September 29, 1961# F rance, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  L ois
e t  D éc re ts  (Septem ber 2 9 , 1961), p# 8963#
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the c o u rts  were allow ed to  function  norm ally o u ts id e  o f  A lg e ria , 
th e  "emergency a u th o rity "  av a ila b le  under A r t ic le  16 remained 
a p p lic a b le .
E le c tio n s  were h e ld  during th is  p e rio d . P arliam en t, 
which under A r tic le  16 met ^  p le in  d r o i t  during the p erio d  o f  
a p p lic a tio n  o f A r t ic le  16, was adjourned from May 19 u n t i l  June 
12 in  o rd e r  to  l e t  i t s  members a tten d  th e  departm ental e le c t io n s  
o f  June 5 and June 12. Indeed, even a b y -e le c tio n  was h e ld  fo r  
the  E a tio n a l Assembly in  the 7 th  d i s t r i c t  o f  Seine on these  same 
d a te s . I t  i s  in te re s t in g  th a t  the e le c t io n  d a tes  fo r  th i s  con­
t e s t  were s e t  by decree issu ed  on May 5 ,^  o r  some nine days 
a f t e r  th e  co llap se  o f  th e  in su rre c tio n  in  A lg e ria . Consequent­
ly ,  th e  P re s id en t o f  th e  S ep th lic  in d ic a te d  q u ite  e a r ly  th a t  h is  
use o f  A r t ic le  16 would h o t  be incumbered by a s t r i c t  in te rp r e t  
ta t io n  o f  the concept o f  "grave and immediate danger."
The P re s id en t o f  the  S e ^ b l ic  viewed the m eetings o f  P ar­
liam ent during  th e  im ^ s i t io n  o f A r t ic le  16 to  be o f  an advisory  
r a th e r  than a  l e g is la t iv e  c h a ra c te r . In  a  l e t t e r  to  th e  Prem ier 
during  the  a g r ic u l tu r a l  c r i s i s ^  o f  l a te  A ugust, 1961, De G aulle 
emphasized th a t  the  in te n t  o f  the C o n s titu tio n  was to  allow  the 
reassem bling o f the  le g is la t iv e  bodies ^  p le in  d r o i t  under 
A r t ic le  16 "so th a t  th e  P re s id en t o f  the Republic and the
^France, Jo u rn a l O f f ic ie l . . . .  Lois e t  P fe re ts  (May 6 , 1961), 
p . 4182»
^The steady  d ec lin e  o f  a g r ic u l tu r a l  p r ic e s  in  the  summer o f  
1961 caused s u b s ta n tia l  u n re s t among the  a g r ic u l tu r a l  popu la tion
and t h e i r  p ressu re  group re p re s e n ta tiv e s . Though P arlism eat had 
adjourned o f  i t s  own v o l i t io n  on Ju ly  22, 1961, i t  was tech n i 
a l ly  in  se ss io n  fo r  so long as A r t ic le  16 remained in  e f f e c t .
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government can c a l l  Parliam ent u rg en tly  to  a s s i s t  them .”^ How­
e v e r , the in te n tio n  was n o t to  allow  th e  Parliam ent to  le g is la te  
"un less th e re  are  reasons re la te d  to  the circum stances th a t  en­
danger d ir e c t ly  the n a tio n  and the R epublic, reasons which most 
c e r ta in ly  would c a l l  fo r  ac tio n  on the p a r t  o f  the  C hief o f  
S ta te  and the Govemamnt»”^ The emergency power and w ith  i t  
the subordination  o f Parllaam nt to the  Executive was to  continue 
co n cu rren tly  w ith  the  r e - in s t i t u t io n  o f  the normal fu n c tio n s  o f 
government o u ts id e  o f  the  a rea  d e a lt  w ith  by De G aulle under 
A r t ic le  16. Consequently, as understood by the P re s id en t o f 
the R epublic, the r ig h t  to  assemble under A r t ic le  16 c o n s ti tu te d  
noth ing more than the p r iv ile g e  o f cooperating  w ith  and g iv ing  
support to the C hief o f  S ta te  in  n a t io n a l em ergencies. I t  d id  
n o t c o n s t i tu te ,  in  any senae, the r ig h t  to  m aintain a  reg u la to ry  
o v e rs ig h t over the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the  C hief o f S ta te  in  th e  nor­
mal sphere o f  competence o f P arliam en t.
I t  i s  tru e  th a t  in  Sep te a s e r ,  1961 the P arliam en t, meet­
ing  a g a in s t the o b jec tio n  o f  De G au lle , in troduced  le g is la t io n  
endeavoring to f i x  the  p r ic e s  o f  a g r ic u l tu r a l  commodities.
However, the Prem ier blocked a l l  b i l l s  by invoking A r t ic le  37
There developed an in s i s t e n t  demand fo r  a  sp e c ia l m eeting o f  the 
le g is la t iv e  bodies to  co n sid er th is  problem and to  in troduce  
rem edial le g is la t io n .
^L'Amnee P o l i t ia u e . 1961, pp. 664-65.
i^bid.
^ A rtic le  37 o f  the  C o n s titu tio n  o f the F i f th  R epublic: 
"M atters o tite r than t ^ s e  which f a l l  w ith in  the domain o f  the  
law s h a l l  be o f a  re g u la to ry  c h a ra c te r  . . . "  French Embassy, 
P re ss  and Inforam tion S erv ice  (Hew Y ork), The.French C o n s titn t io n .
p .  18.
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A r t ic le  40,1 A r t ic le  41^ o f  the  C o n s titu tio n , claim ing th a t  
the  proposed b i l l s  mere e i th e r  beyond the  le g is la t iv e  competence 
o f  Parliam ent o r  th a t  they  e n ta ile d  a d d itio n a l ex p en d itu res .^
In fu r ia te d  by these  l im ita tio n s  upon th e i r  power the  
d ep u tie s  a ttack ed  th e  P re s id en t o f  the  Republic in  name fo r  the 
f i r s t  time in  the  l i f e  o f  the F i f th  R epublic .^  The S o c ia l i s t  
p a r ty  in troduced  a "motion o f censure" which, i f  passed and 
h e ld  to  be v a l id ,  would have brought down the re sp o n sib le  gov­
ernment in  a p erio d  o f  n a tio n a l emergency. However, th e  P re s id en t 
o f  the  Republic would n o t have had the  r ig h t  to  d isso lv e  the 
P arliam en t because o f  th e i r  r ig h t  to  s i t  perm anently during the 
ix q w sitio n  o f A r t ic le  16. To ru le  on the r e c e iv a b i l i ty  o f  the
^ A rtic le  40 o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  the  F if th  R epublic:
" B il ls  and amendments in troduced  by members o f  P arliam en t s h a l l  
n o t be considered  when th e i r  adoption would have as a  consequence 
e i th e r  a  dim inution o f  p u b lic  f in a n c ia l  resou rces o r  th e  c re a ­
t io n  o r  in c rease  o f  p u b lic  e:qpenditores." I b id . . p . 19.
^ A rtic le  41 o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  the  F i f th  R epublic:
" I f  i t  appears in  th e  course o f  th e  le g is la t iv e  procedure th a t  a 
P arliam entary  b i l l  o r  amendment i s  n o t w ith in  the  domain o f the 
law o r  i s  co n tra ry  to  a d e leg a tio n  o f  a u th o rity  g ran ted  by 
v i r tu e  o f  A r t ic le  38, the  Government may d ec la re  i t s  in ad m iss ib i­
l i t y .
In  case o f  disagreem ent between the  Government and the 
P re s id e n t o f  the  assembly concerned, th e  C o n s titu tio n a l C ouncil, 
upon t&e req u es t o f  e i th e r  p a r ty , s h a l l  ru le  w ith in  a  time l im i t  
o f  e ig h t  days. French Embassy, P ress and Inform ation  S erv ice  
(Hew York), The French C o n s titu tio n , p . 19.
^L'Année P o l i t i a u e . 1961, pp . 113-14.
^For e n a u fle : M. Maurice Bergasse (Independent) condemned 
"the  persona l in te rp r e ta t io n  given by th e .C h ie f  o f  S ta te  to  the  
p re s id e n t ia l  powers, which s t e r i l i z e  P arliam en t, as in  1815, 
when th e  King alone had the r ig h t  to  p re se n t to  the  Chambers 
th e  laws which t&ey had no o th e r  choice b u t to  v o te .” I b id . ,  
p . 115.
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S o c ia l i s t  m otion, the  C o n s titu tio n a l Council was reconvened in  
S ep tenher. I t ,  however, ru le d  i t s e l f  incom petent on a  "motion 
o f censure" subm itted  in  the  N ational Assembly during the p e rio d  
o f  a p p lic a tio n  o f A r t ic le  16.1 The d ec is io n  was l e f t  up to  the 
P re s id e n t o f  the N ational Assembly, Chaban-Oelmas. Recognizing 
th e  s ile n c e  o f  the C o n s titu tio n  on the re la tio n s h ip  o f  the  
E xecutive and the L e g is la tu re  when A r t ic le  16 i s  in  fo rce  and 
th e  p o s it io n  o f  the P re s id e n t o f  the  Republic as the " a rb ite r"  
o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n , Chaban-Delmas concluded th a t  th e  in te rp r e ­
ta t io n  o f  the P re s id e n t o f  the Republic ought to  be co n c lu s iv e .
The P re s id en t o f  the Republic had made i t  c le a r  in  h is  
l e t t e r  o f  August 31^ to  Prem ier Debre th a t  th e  re la tio n s h ip  be­
tween L eg is la tu re  and Executive in  p erio d s o f  the isq w sitio n  
o f  A r t ic le  16 were governed by sp e c ia l c r i t e r i a  e s ta b lish e d  
by the n e c e s s i t ie s  o f  emergency s i tu a t io n s .  Consequently, 
Chaban-Delmas ru le d  th a t  th e  motion o f  censure was n o t re c e iv ­
ab le  in  the circum stances o f  the m eeting o f  P arliam ent ^  p le in  
d r o i t  under th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f A r t ic le  16.3 Hence, in  p erio d s 
o f  emergency proclaim ed by the P re s id en t o f  the Republic and 
extended under h is  d is c re t io n ,  the a u th o r ity  o f  the re p re se n ta ­
t iv e  bodies was s t e r i l i z e d  by the "personal"  in te rp re ta t io n  
given by De G aulle to  the  p re s id e n t ia l  powers. A r t ic le  16 i s  
n o t a d e leg a tio n  to  d ea l by ordinance w ith  m a tte rs  w ith in  the
^Decision o f September 8 , 1961. I b id . .  p . 670.
^Supra. . p . 270.
^L'Année P o l i t i a u e . 1961, pp. 115-16.
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le g is la t iv e  cosqxetence. I t  c o n s t i tu te s  a  u n i la te r a l  assumption 
o f  le g is la t iv e  c o i^ te n c e s ,  when deemed necessary  by the P re s i­
d en t o f  the R epublic, w ith in  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd e r  o f  the 
F i f th  R epublic.
CONCLUSIONS
The "emerging c o n f l ic t  between ordinance and law" has 
raged through the l i f e  o f  fou r re p u b lic s , two esq>ires, th ree  
p ro v is io n a l governments, and continues under a f i f t h  re p u b lic . 
D espite the  s u b s ta n tia l  v a r ie ty  o f  in s t i tu t io n a l  forms u t i ­
l iz e d ,  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  have played a continuing and v i t a l  
ro le  in  the development and evo lu tion  o f p o l i t i c a l  p rocesses 
in  F rance. The im portance o f  such devices may be a t t r ib u te d  
p rim a rily  to th e i r  d i r e c t  re la tio n sh ip  to the ends o f govern­
ment. Government may be considered  the agency through which 
the n a tio n  tra n sa c ts  i t s  b u s in e ss . I t  c o n s ti tu te s  the p o l i ­
t i c a l  e d if ic e  o f the n a t io n . As such i t  i s  prey to p o l i t i c a l  
tu rm oil and i s  su b je c t to  m od ification  and change as circusi- 
s tance d ic ta te s ,  though the na tio n  may continue in d iv is ib le  
and p e rp e tu a l. N otw ithstanding, i t  i s  the function  o f govern­
ment to  s u s ta in  the e s ta b lish e d  o rd er o f  so c ie ty  and to  con­
t r ib u te  to  the  maintenance o f  the independence and sovere ign ty  
o f th e  n a tio n .
C o n s titu tio n s  provide the framework w ith in  which the 
ordered  p o l i t i c a l  so c ie ty  o p e ra te s . The broad o u tlin e s  e s ta ­
b lish e d  by the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  framework a re  normally f i l l e d  in
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by th e  passage o f  o rgan ic and s ta tu to ry  laws and by the deve­
lopment o f  p o l i t i c a l  customs and sw res. H everthe less, In 
o rd e r fo r  the n a tio n  to  su rv iv e , government, whatever I t s  
ten o r o r  makeup, must be prepared  f o r ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  be ab le  to  
a d ju s t  to ,  the demands o f  emergency s i tu a t io n s .  Such prepa­
r a t io n  and adjustm ent I s  e x tra o rd in a r i ly  d i f f i c u l t .  I f  n o t 
loqposslble, w ith in  the framework o f  the  o rd in ary  day-to-day 
procedures o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c tio n . E x trao rd in ary  measures are 
n ecessa ry . The government may provide w ith in  I t s  w r itte n  
c o n s t i tu t io n  fo r  an emergency c lau se  o f  some type , v e s tin g  
lim ite d  o r  unlls&lted powers In  the hands o f  a Head o f  S ta te .
I t  was to  th is  type o f  emergency power th a t  France turned  
under the  C harter o f  1814 and the C o n s titu tio n  o f 1958. How­
e v e r , emergencies w ith  which the re g u la r  o rd e r may n o t be ab le  
to  cope vary  trem endously as to  type o f  th r e a t  and degree o f  
se r io u sn e ss . Consequently, they demand response a t  a m u lti­
p l i c i t y  o f  le v e ls  and w ith  a  v a r ie ty  o f  techn iques.
Appeal to the  p r im it iv e , a b o r ig in a l power o f  even a 
doodnant execu tive does n o t, o f n e c e s s ity , provide the n a tio n  
w ith  adequate c r i s i s  p ro te c tio n . Government must prepare fo r  
a v a r ie ty  o f s i tu a t io n s  o f s t r e s s .  I t  must use a l l  the  regu­
l a r  dev ices a t  I t s  d isp o sa l to  th e  maximum o f  th e i r  e f f ic ie n c y . 
I t  must be aware o f  the  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  o f  p ro te c tin g  the n a tio n  
by extending the re g u la r  p o l i t i c a l  and le g a l o rd e r to  the 
l im i ts  o f  le g ltlo iacy . I t  must p repare  v ia b le  c r i s i s  I n s t i t u ­
t io n s  f o r  the  ap p ro p ria te  l im ita t io n  o f In d iv id u a l and o rg an i­
z a t io n a l  l i b e r t i e s  when In te rn a l  In su rre c tio n  th rea ten s  o r  when
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th e  n a tio n  i s  invaded. C iv ilia n  a u th o r ity  may be tra n s fe r re d  
to  the  m il i ta ry  b u t on ly  under the most s tr in g e n t  p e n a ltie s  
f o r  v io la tio n  and abuse. In the extreme c r i s i s  i t  may be 
necessary  to v e s t th e  Executive w ith  coiq)lete decision-m aking 
a u th o rity  fo r  the acconqplishment o f  s p e c if ie d  o b je c tiv e s  w ith ­
in  a lim ite d  p erio d  o f  time as determ ined by the re p re se n ta tiv e  
L e g is la tu re . However, as C lin ton  R o s s ite r  wrote concerning 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  d ic ta to r s h ip ,  i t  i s  a c a rd in a l p r in c ip le  th a t  
th e  iiq>lementor o f  th e  c r i s i s  powers must n o t determ ine the 
purposes o f  a p p lic a tio n  o r  the len g th  o f  time in  which the 
power i s  made a v a ila b le .  I t  must always be remembered th a t  
those resp o n sib le  f o r  the  iaqplementation o f  such powers a re  
the  agents o f  the government in  the  se rv ic e  o f the n a tio n .
T heir con tinu ing  and prim ary o b je c tiv e  must be the defense o f 
th e  e s ta b lish e d  o rd e r  o f  so c ie ty . In the  l a s t  a n a ly s is , i f  
v io la t io n s  o f  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd e r a re  n ecessary , then 
pragmatism must dom inate. The su rv iv a l o f  the n a tio n  i s  
su p e rio r  to  the maintenance o f the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd e r . In  
some in s tan ces  i t  i s  on ly  through sh o rt- te rm  i r r e g u la r i ty  th a t  
long-range r e g u la r i ty  can be achieved and p erp e tu a ted .
C r is is  in s t i tu t io n s  as employed in  France have ranged 
from m inutely  defined  procedures such as the  s ta te  o f s ieg e  
and the  s ta te  o f  emergency to  devices f o r  the devélopment and 
im plem entation o f p o lic y  cosqxrehended w ith in  the concept o f  
enab lin g  le g is la t io n —p le in s  p o u v o irs . d é c re ts - lo is  « and lo i s -  
c a d re s—to  i l l e g a l  ex ten sio n s o f the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd e r .
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N ev erth e less , they a re  a l l  e s s e n t ia l ly  v a r ia tio n s  upon the  
same theme: the co n cen tra tio n  in  the hands o f the E xecutive
o f powers which, in  normal tim es, would be d iv ided . They seek 
e i th e r  the  r e s t r i c t io n  o f  p u b lic  l i b e r t i e s  and re p re se n ta tiv e  
r ig h ts  in  periods in  which the  e s ta b lis h e d  o rd e r i s  menaced, 
o r  th e  ex tension  o f a u th o r ity  to  the  Executive which w i l l  f a c i ­
l i t a t e  the development o f  coheren t p o licy  and i t s  imqplementation.
These o b je c tiv e s  a re  su sc e p tib le  to  achievement by a 
v a r ie ty  o f  techn iques. Under the Third and Fourth Republics 
the most ex ten s iv e ly  eoq>loyed was the ex tension  o f the re g u la r  
o rd er w ith in  i t s  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o r  a t  l e a s t  i t s  q u a s i-c o n s titu -  
t io n a l  l im i t s .  An e x c e lle n t exaaqple from the  Fourth  Republic 
was the in s t i tu t io n  o f  the  ca tegory  m a tiè res  rég lem en ta ire  p a r 
n a tu re  by the  Marie government in  1948. The reco g n itio n  o f  the 
ex is ten ce  o f  such a m a te r ia l coaq>etence o f  the reg u la to ry  power 
was a c tu a lly  superimposed upon the re g u la r  o rd er and was ac­
cep ted  as c o n s is te n t w ith  the prem ise o f  the  form al supremacy 
o f the law . I t  perm itted  execu tive im plem entation o f a broad  
d is c re tio n a ry  a u th o rity  in  the economic and f i s c a l  realm s 
which had n o t been a v a ila b le  p rev io u s ly . To be su re , the  u l t i ­
mate r e s u l t  was s u b s ta n tia l  m o d ifica tio n  o f the re g u la r  o rd e r . 
However, d ec isio n s in  m a tte rs  such as th ese  a re  alm ost never 
made p r im a rily  upon co n s id e ra tio n s  o f  le g a l i ty  and c o n s t i tu ­
t io n a l i t y .  The tendency i s  f o r  them to  emerge as the conse­
quence o f  the  in te rp la y  o f  co n s id e ra tio n s  o f  immediate circum ­
s ta n ce , t r a d i t io n a l  p rocedure , and e x e c u tiv e - le g is la t iv e
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com petition as w ell as o f  le g a l form. As was the case w ith  
the  Marie f in a n c ia l  and economic law o f August 17, 1948, the 
r e s u l t  i s  normally coflq>romise. N everthe less, i t  may w ell be 
th a t  the  compromise i s  o f  a p o s it iv e  n a tu re  and th a t  i t  makes 
p o ss ib le  evo lu tion  toward a more acceptab le and competent 
re g u la r  o rd e r.
The concept o f  n a tu ra l  m a te ria l cozq>etences of the regu­
la to ry  power in troduces one to  the a rea  o f  enabling  le g is la ­
t io n . This category  o f  p ro v is io n a l en la rg eaen ts  o f  the regu­
la to ry  power r e fe r s  to the issuance o f  re g u la tio n s  o f  an excep­
t io n a l  n a tu re  which may modify, ab ridge , o r rep lace  s ta tu to ry  
law i t s e l f .  There i s  some question  concerning the j u s t i f i c a ­
t io n  fo r  considering  laws passed under the concept o f m a te r ia l 
competences o f the reg u la to ry  power as enab ling  laws. The 
source o f th e i r  power has been sought in  the in t r in s i c  au tho r­
i t y  o f  the executive power to issu e  ord inances r a th e r  than in  
ex tensions o f the le g is la t iv e  power.
There i s  no question  about the s ta tu s  o f  the  Poincaré , 
Doumergue-Tardieu, I.aval, Chau temps, and D alad ier decree laws 
which dominated the in te rw ar y e a rs . They c o n s titu te d  d ir e c t  
enab ling  g ran ts  from P arliam en t. The Poincaré cab in e t had 
argued th a t  these procedures m erely c o n s ti tu te d  a method o f 
p rov id ing  the Executive w ith  a  parliam entary  mandate to  execute 
the w ishes o f the  people and o f  the e le c te d  re p re se n ta tiv e s  in  
P arliam ent by iiqplementing c e r ta in  p ro v is io n a l m easures. I t  
was the  governmental con ten tio n  th a t  the P arliam ent was assured
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the r ig h t  to  undertake d e f in i t iv e  dec isions and consequently  
these procedures d id  n o t move o u ts id e  the re g u la r  o rd e r . The 
problem was no t j u s t  a question  o f provid ing  a u th o r ity  to  the  
Executive which the lews had n o t fo reseen . I t  was sim ply a 
question  o f  the L eg is la tu re  e n tru s tin g  the Government, an 
agency which i t  co n tro ls  and can always o v e rru le , w ith  the 
conq>etence to i n s t i t u t e  reform s which P arliam ent would remain 
f re e  afterw ards to  accep t o r  to  r e j e c t .  I t  was, o f  course , 
n o t th is  siaqple. The r ig h t  o f  the sovereign Parliam ent to  
enable th e  Executive to  make re g u la tio n s  ccq>able o f  modifying 
and amending s ta tu to ry  law was, a t  th a t tim e, most questionab le  
under any circum stances. I f  d e fe n s ib le , i t  was so only under 
r ig id ly  sp e c if ie d  co n d itio n s . The re s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  a L egis­
la tu re  in  a parliam en tary  system i s  to  le g i s la te  and to c o n tro l— 
i f  ever so in d i r e c t ly .  I t  f s  n o t to  abd ica te  i t s  cosq»etences 
in  tim es o f  c r i s i s .
There was l i t t l e  question  th a t  th e  re g u la r  o rd e r could 
be extended under the T hird  R epublic. As Europe rushed toward 
a c o n fla g ra tio n  in  the 1930*s ,  the law o f n e c e s s ity  d ic ta te d  
the augmentation o f the a u th o rity  o f the French execu tive  power. 
C e rta in ly  ex tensions in  the normal competences o f  the Govern­
ment, m o d ifica tio n s in  the lab o rio u s n a tu re  o f  the le g is la t iv e  
p rocedures, and g ran ts  o f  s p e c if ic a l ly  le g is la t iv e  power to 
the E xecu tive , were a l l  w e ll adv ised . But such ex tensions and 
g ran ts  should have been made w ith in  reasonab le  l im its  o f  su b je c t 
and tim e. The re g u la r  o rd e r was le g a lly  su sc e p tib le  to  ex ten s io n .
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I t  was n o t le g itim a te ly  open to  parliam en tary  ab d ica tio n  o f 
i t s  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o b lig a tio n s  to  the b e n e f i t  o f  the  E xecu tive .
In  the use o f  enab lin g  a u th o r ity  the p o in t a t  which one 
passes from the ex ten sio n  o f  the  re g u la r  o rd e r o f  so c ie ty  to  
i r r e g u la r  derogation  o f  t h i s  o rd e r  i s  n o t su b je c t to  abso lu te  
and p re c ise  d e f in i t io n .  N onetheless, i t  must be recognized 
th a t  in  i t s  haphazard and ill-c o n c e iv e d  s tru g g le  fo r  s u rv iv a l, 
the T hird  Republic v io la te d  th e  fundamental concepts o f  i t s  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd er and so moved o u ts id e  the realm  o f  the 
ex tension  o f  the re g u la r  o rd e r  in to  th a t  o f  i r r e g u la r i ty — 
from c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty  and p s e u d o -c o n s titu tio n a lity  to  b la ta n t  
u n c o n s ti tu t io n a li ty .  I t  i s  argued, one the one hand, th a t  a l l  
decree le g is la t io n  passed  in  the T hird Republic was i l l e g a l ,  
and on th e  o th e r  hand, th a t  such reg u la to ry  a u th o r ity  was a 
j u s t i f i a b l e  ex tension  o f  the  power o f  the E xecutive in  time 
o f extreme c r i s i s .  As a  g en e ra l r u le ,  however, the  boundaries 
w ith in  which the re g u la r  o rd e r  might be le g it im a te ly  extended 
during the  T hird and F o urth  Republics were circum scribed  by 
the  r e a l i t y  o f  e f f e c t iv e  parliam en tary  c o n tro l .  W ithout the 
reasonably  d i r e c t  and re sp o n s ib le  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f the P a r l ia ­
ment, ordinances o f  the  va lue  o f s ta tu to ry  law could  on ly  be 
considered  i r r e g u la r .
A second technique was th a t  o f  the augm entation o f the 
re g u la r  o rd e r  by e i th e r  s ta tu to ry  o r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  c re a tio n  
o f  permanent emergency in s t i tu t i o n s  designed to  provide the 
a d s d n is tra tio n  w ith  e x tra o rd in a ry  a u th o rity  w ith in  the boundaries
281
o f the  lew to r e s t r i c t  c i v i l  and re p re se n ta tiv e  r ig h t s .  The 
o b je c tiv e , o f co u rse , was the u lti ia a te  p ro te c tio n  of such 
r ig h ts .  W ithin th i s  ca tegory  France has developed the  p o l i t i c a l  
s ta te  o f s ieg e  and the  s ta te  o f emergency. The e s s e n t ia l  ques­
tio n  th a t  these  devices p resen t i s  one o f  c o n tro l .  I f  P a r l ia ­
ment i s  w illin g  to  v e s t  organized ex cep tio n a l competences in  
the E xecutive fo r  defense o f a p o rtio n  o r  a l l  o f  the c i v i l  a rea  
a g a in s t th re a ts  to  the  pub lic  o rd e r , w i l l  i t  have the f o r t i tu d e ,  
a b i l i t y ,  and c a p ac ity  to  m aintain a  broad and e f fe c t iv e , over­
s ig h t  over the  a p p lic a tio n  o f these instrum ents? I f  the Exec­
u tiv e  t r a n s fe r s  c i v i l  a u th o r ity  to the m il i ta ry ,  w i l l  i t  be 
ab le  to c o n tro l i t s  delegee and in su re  the le g itim a te  ap p lic a ­
tio n  o f the c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n ?
The experience o f  1914-1918 and 1955-1956 in d ic a te s  th a t  
once a device such as the s ta te  o f  s ieg e  o r  the  s t a te  o f  emer­
gency has been c a lle d  in to  o p e ra tio n , the P arliam ent i s  ab le  to 
ex e rc ise  only the b ro ad es t o f  o v e rs ig h ts . I t  must depend upon 
the Government th a t  i t  has in v ested  to  iiBq>lement the  in s t i tu t io n  
and to e x e rc ise  r e s t r a i n t .  However, in  the  T hird  and Fourth  
R epublics, even in  the  d ark est periods o f  n a t io n a l c r i s i s ,  the 
Parliam ent has been ab le  to  m aintain  the p o l i t i c a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  
o f the Government to  i t .  N everthe less, once a  Government i s  
in v ested  in  a c r i s i s  s i tu a t io n ,  i t  tends qu ick ly  to  become 
r a th e r  autonomous in  the  iiq>lementation o f  c r i s i s  p rocedures.
I t  should a lso  be noted  th a t  requirem ents fo r  the  subm ission o f 
decrees to  P arliam ent o f ten  demanded the type o f  a u th o rity  th a t
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does n o t c o n s ti tu te  an e f f e c t iv e  l im ita t io n . Such r e s t r ic t io n s  
a re  ex p o s t fac to  in  the extreme and i t  i s  n o t to  be expected 
th a t  such c o n tro l a f t e r  the f a c t  would o ften  m a te r ia l ly  a f f e c t  
the p o s s ib i l i t i e s  o f  success o r  f a i lu r e  o f the c r i s i s  i n s t i t u ­
t io n .
The problems encountered in  the iaQ>lementation o f  the 
s ta te  o f  s iege  and the s ta te  o f  emergency fo rc e fu lly  demons­
t r a t e  the n ec e ss ity  o f c lo se  cooperation  between c i v i l  and 
m il i ta ry  a u th o r i t ie s  in  the a p p lic a tio n  o f c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  
designed to  defend the e s ta b lish e d  o rder by the a p p lic a tio n  o f 
l im ita tio n s  upon c i v i l  and re p re se n ta tiv e  r ig h t s .  The s ta te  
o f s iege  was founded on the  p r in c ip le  o f the t r a n s f e r  o f  c iv i ­
l ia n  competences to the m il i ta ry  fo r  sp e c if ic  purposes under 
sp e c if ie d  circum stances. Yet in  the a p p lic a tio n  o f th is  dev­
ic e ,  the a i i l i t a r y  assumption o f c iv i l ia n  a u th o r ity  i s  m odified 
by the maintenance o f r e s id u a l conqpetences to d ea l w ith  m atte rs  
n o t d i r e c t ly  r e la te d  to the purposes o f the in s t i tu t io n  by the 
normal c i v i l  p o lic e  a u th o r i ty . In  a c tu a l i ty  th e  s ta te  o f 
s iege emerges as a device which combines the advantages o f  
c i v i l  and m il i ta ry  rep re ss iv e  techn iques. In  a  s ia i i la r  manner, 
the  s ta te  o f  emergency, a  c i v i l  i n s t i tu t i o n ,  has combined c i v i l  
and m il i ta ry  ju r i s d ic t io n s .  The A lgerian rev o lu tio n  has demons­
t r a te d  r a th e r  c le a r ly  th a t  in  s i tu a tio n s  o f  prolonged c i v i l  
d isobedience in  which the masses o f society must l iv e  under the 
co n s tan t th r e a t  o f  v io le n c e , i t  i s  w ise to  employ both elem ents 
o f  coerc ive  a u th o rity  a v a ila b le  to  the  Govemsmnt—c i v i l  p o lic e
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and m il i ta ry  a u th o r ity . An in te l l ig e n t  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n  o f 
th i s  type m il l  combine th e  advantages o f each elem ent under 
the d ire c tio n  o f the execu tive  power and w i l l  attem pt to  coun­
te rb a lan ce  the p o te n tia l  excesses o f  m il i ta ry  commanders and 
m in is te rs  o f  the I n te r io r .
T h is , o f  cou rse , does n o t answer the problem o f  m il i ta ry  
subord ination  to the c iv i l i a n  a u th o r ity . In  A lg e ria  insubor­
d in a tio n  was e s s e n t ia l ly  the  consequence o f d is illu s io n m en t 
w ith  inadequate parliam en tary  government, despondency over 
rep ea ted  c o lo n ia l re v e rse s , and a deep fe e lin g  o f  o b lig a tio n  
to  the  A lgerian population  which c e r ta in  elem ents o f  the  French 
m il i ta ry  f e l t  were betrayed  by the ir re sp o n s ib le  p o l i t ic ia n s  
o f  the  Fourth  Republic and by the  p o lic ie s  o f  th e  P re s id en t o f  
the F i f th  R epublic. In  s i tu a t io n s  in  which the m il i ta ry  does 
n o t co«q»letely re sp e c t the  resp o n sib le  Government and i s  i t s e l f  
id e o lo g ic a lly  and em otionally  committed to a  p o s it io n  th a t  has 
been i n i t i a l l y  supported and then subsequently  r e je c te d  by th e  
c iv i l i a n  regime, i t  i s  to  be expected th a t  profound d is re s p e c t 
fo r  the governmental p o s it io n  may develop. I f  confron ted  by 
governmental in d e c is io n , such tendencies may explode in to  
v io len ce  and in su b o rd in a tio n —as exem plified  by the A lgerian  
coun terrevo lu tio n  o f 1960 and 1961.
A th ird  technique i s  th e  isqplementation o f an "emergency 
powers" c la u se . This i s  the u ltim a te  c r i s i s  i n s t i t u t i o n .  The 
ordinance power i s  in v ested  w ith  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  the secu­
r i t y  o f  the s ta te  under the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd er and i s  lim ite d
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only by p o l i t i c a l  and m oral c o n s id e ra tio n s . The dangers im­
p l i c i t  in  th e  use o f  such a  device a re  obvious: as A r t ic le  48
o f  the Weimar C o n s titu tio n  dem onstrated, the re g u la r  o rd e r  can 
be destroyed  as e f f e c t iv e ly  by the misuse o f  d is c re tio n a ry  con­
s t i t u t i o n a l  powers as by the employment o f i l l e g i t im a te  p rac­
t i c e s .  I t  i s  a lso  tru e  th a t  emphasis upon the a p p l ic a b i l i ty  
o f  an in c lu s iv e  emergency power may l u l l  the n a tio n  in to  a 
sense o f  f a ls e  s e c u r ity  and reduce in t e r e s t  in  the development 
o f  le s s e r  y e t  v i t a l l y  inqw rtoot c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  needed to  
respond to  th r e a ts  a t  le s s  than th e  u ltim a te  le v e l  o f danger. 
The T hird  and Fourth  Republics bo th  lacked th is  weapon in  
th e i r  c r i s i s  a r s e n a l.  I t  cannot be denied th a t  the  T hird  was 
ab le to  ach ieve tremendous co n cen tra tio n  o f a u th o r ity  by eaq^an- 
s ions o f the re g u la r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  powers and by recou rse  to 
u n c o n s ti tu t io n a l  d e leg a tio n s  to  the  re sp o n sib le  Government. 
However, i t  could  n o t achieve the  degree o f leg itiau icy  in h e re n t 
in  a compact "emergency power" made a v a ila b le  to  the E xecutive 
under th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  system to  suspend o r  a l t e r  s ta tu to ry  
p ro v is io n s  f o r  the  s e c u r ity  o f  the  s t a t e .  The c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
process p rov ides a re s id u e  o f l e g a l i ty  th a t  cannot be o therw ise 
a t ta in e d .
A fo u rth  technique i s  th a t  o f  i r r e g u la r i ty .  I r r e g u la r  
p rocesses a re  n o t s in g ly  to o ls  f o r  th e  d e s tru c tio n  o f l e g a l i ty .  
They hove been used fre q u en tly  and w ith  some success to  defend, 
to  s u s ta in ,  and to  c re a te  le g it im a te  p o l i t i c a l  form s. C e rta in ­
ly  the use o f  proclam ations o f th e  King to  sp ec ify  d e ta i le d
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re g u la tio n s  fo r  the implem entation o f s ta tu to ry  laws in  the 
F i r s t  Republic were b la ta n t ly  i r r e g u la r ,  y e t the o b je c t was 
the v i ta l iz a t io n  o f the re g u la r  o rd e r . The ordinances issu ed  
to  g ird  the n a tio n  fo r  war in  August, 1914 w ithout sp e c if ic  
parliam en tary  au th o riz a tio n  were in t r in s i c a l ly  i l l e g a l  as were 
th e  v i r tu a l ly  u n lim ited  d e leg a tio n s to  the  D alad ier government 
in  1939, b u t in  each case the c r i s i s  procedure was used in  
defense o f the le g itim a te  o rd e r .
P ro v is io n a l regimes by th e i r  very  n a tu re  must depend 
upon i r r e g u la r  ordinance le g is la t io n  because o f th e i r  lack  o f  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  foundation . However, they  may r e s u l t  in  the 
es tab lish m en t o f  a re g u la r  o rd e r . The Second, T h ird , and 
Fourth Republics as le g a c ie s  o f  the p ro v is io n a l governments o f  
1848, 1870-1875, and 1945-1946, re s p e c tiv e ly , a t t e s t  to th is  
p o s s ib i l i ty .
The use o f  i r r e g u la r  procedures to  the  abrogation  o f  the 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rd e r h a s , o f co u rse , evidenced i t s e l f  as a 
re cu rr in g  dilemma fo r  French p o l i t i c s .  There a re  numerous 
exanq>les o f  which, perhaps, the v io la t io n  o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
forms by the f i r s t  Napoleon and the ab d ica tio n  o f the N ational 
Assembly to  the person o f Marshal F é ta in  a re  the most f la g r a n t .
The C o n s titu tio n  o f the F i f th  Republic has e s ta b lish e d  a  
new re la tio n s h ip  between the ordinance and the law. The form al 
supremacy o f the law has been overthrow n. There no longer 
e x is ts  a u n if ie d  h ie ra rc h y  o f  law based upon the  sovere ign ty  
o f  P arliam en t. Law, the is su e  o f  the re p re se n ta tiv e  L e g is la tu re ,
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can now be m odified by ordinances decreed by the responsib le  
Government under d i r e c t  delegated  a u th o r ity  c o n s ti tu t io n a lly  
gran ted  by the P arliam en t, o r by d ec is io n s issued  by the P res­
id e n t o f the Republic under emergency competences made a v a i l ­
ab le  through the d isc re tio n a ry  "emergency powers" a v a ila b le  to 
the person o f the C hief o f  S tate*
A major p o rtio n  o f  the  c o te r ie  o f  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  
achieved by re g u la r  o r  i r r e g u la r  means in  the Third and Fourth  
Republics have been ra is e d  to the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  le v e l by the 
d e f in it io n  and l im ita t io n  o f  the sphere o f  conqpetence o f the 
le g is la t iv e  power and the sim ultaneous expansion o f the j u r i s ­
d ic tio n  o f the reg u la to ry  power. Enabling procedures have been 
incorpora ted  in  the re g u la r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  s tru c tu re  as the 
r e s u l t  o f  the p r in c ip le  o f  the d e leg a tio n  o f  le g is la t iv e  com­
petences. The ex tension  o f the reg u la to ry  power to a l l  areas 
n o t comprehended w ith in  the lim ite d  domain o f the law now 
includes ju r i s d ic t io n  considered  w ith in  the m a te ria l competence 
o f  th is  power in  the  Fourth  R epublic. The s ta te  o f siege has 
a lso  been cons t i tu t io n a l iz e d  and remains as an ap p licab le  
c r i s i s  in s t i t u t i o n ,  a lthough , in te r e s t in g ly ,  only the insub­
o rd in a te  m il i ta ry  le ad e rs  o f  the G enera ls ' Revolt in  1961 have 
e le c te d  to  apply i t .  F in a lly , the s ta te  o f  emergency as i n i ­
t ia te d  in  1955, has su rv ived  as a  s ta tu to ry  device and has been 
implemented under the  ausp ices o f  parliam entary  d elegation  in  
1960 and as a  p a r t  o f  the "emergency powers" o f  the P re s id en t 
o f  the Republic in  1961. I t  i s  reasonab le to  contend th a t  in
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many In stan ces the I r r e g u la r  has become the re g u la r . I t  i s  
a b so lu te ly  c e r ta in  th a t  c r i s i s  in s t i tu t io n s  have been enthroned 
in  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  s tru c tu re  o f  the F if th  Republic.
The p o l i t i c a l  p rocess con tinues to evolve. The new o rd e r  
moulds and reshapes i t s  po stu re  as i t  faces  the cha llenges o f  
the day and moves, h o p e fu lly , toward m atu rity  and s t a b i l i t y .  
C r is is  procedures th a t  were yesterday  q u as i- leg itim a te  ex ten ­
sio n s o f the  re g u la r  o rd e r  a re  today enshrined in  the s a n c ti ty  
o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty .  And y e t they remain devices fo r  the 
so lu tio n  o f  excep tiona l problem s. They a re , however, only 
in s t i tu t i o n s —a framework in to  which p o l i t i c a l  man must pour 
v i t a l i t y  and co n ten t. They can accoaq>lish no more than circum­
stance  and p o l i t i c a l  sa g a c ity  w i l l  allow  them to ach ieve.
C r is i s  in s t i tu t io n s  a re  never a s u b s t i tu te  fo r  a resp o n sib le  
m a jo rity , re sp e c t fo r  m in o rity  r ig h ts ,  a  s p i r i t  o f  compromise, 
o r  the  ex is ten ce  o f  a consensus. They may, i f  in te l l ig e n t ly  
enqployed, provide method fo r  the sh o rt-te rm  defense o f l e g i t i ­
mate p o l i t i c a l  so c ie ty . They cannot su s ta in  an ill-c o n c e iv e d  
o r  an e s s e n t ia l ly  u n stab le  p o l i t i c a l  s tru c tu re .
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